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**THE STATE
AND ITS
AILMENTS**

THE STATE AND ITS AILMENTS

BY

R. V. WYNNE

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Preface

THE story of the State has not yet been fully told. "The State," in a treatise under this name has been viewed from a particular standpoint, by Dr. Woodrow Wilson, the promoter of the League of Nations. It has a certain influence among the English-speaking peoples. It is an academic disquisition. Its main basis rests on Greek theories and it inclines to a democratic view of the State. In this respect it is unfortunate. Review and research are necessary to detect the variances between statements and facts. The relics of the State, from earlier to later times, remain as valuable material for use in the work of research. The methods of the late Sir Richard Owen, in the study of comparative anatomy, can be applied to the State to allow its evolution to be traced. In particular cases the State's existence, with its nature, its form and its principle, from its origin to its destiny, can be followed with definite results. The State is a specific institution which can be differentiated from all other institutions.

The scraps of circumstantial evidence which allow the course of evolution to be traced in animate structures have a kindred value, for a like purpose, in the artificial organic structures which have been evolved by man in his progress to perfection. The soldier, the priest and the artisan have characteristic mentalities. These types of men have, also, their characteristic institutions. The tests of consistency allow the truth to be approached. At first, some of the various parts can be seen and, at last, the nature of the whole can be concluded. The State's ideal appears. The State's organic structure, with its physiology and pathology can then be studied and, finally, patient investigation yields its reward. The few hard facts stand and many visionary conjectures vanish. In guidance to the truth an ounce of fact is worth more than a ton of fiction. The popular theory that the State originated in patriarchal rule is not tenable. The numerous popular fallacies connected with democracy rest on fictions. The story of the

State, in its origin and development, has a basis of fact. It is a scientific study and it has a fascinating influence. It links Britain, in its Celtic relics of the State, with the Homeric age and its Achæan relics of the State which, in turn, are connected with like relics of an earlier age, in Assyria. Certain specific customs of the Aryan race have survived in its branches, which are now regionally far apart, and these customs confirm the main fact that the State was evolved, as a military institution, from an earlier institution of another type. The soldier, in the State, was the original principal and the priest became accessory. In the following treatise, "The State and its Ailments," the main purpose has been kept in view of presenting an outline of the State and its ideal. The careers of certain States, in Europe, have been illustrated in relation to this outline and ideal and, especially, in regard to the rise and to the development of the State in Britain. The standard of the State, in its perfection, allows the condition of the State to be realised in its dilapidation and imperfection. The ultimate purpose has been to serve the empire State in the efforts of its compatriots to consolidate its strength and to prevent its disintegration. Within the empire's international environment one State has attempted to set up a worldwide rule. The great States of the world need to be on guard to secure their defence and welfare. Britain's empire State has a duty to itself. The three factors of the State, in its domain, its supremacy and its community, mark the bounds of the subject. The constitution of government, then, follows so that the State's management and its economy can be systematically studied. The State and its ailments, within the scope of political science, can be treated methodically and like a subject of natural science. The popular fallacies that the "Crown" is the kingship and that the House of Commons has the supreme control have to be dispelled. These fallacies are supported in Dr. Woodrow Wilson's treatise on "The State." The reader with a fair knowledge of history, will realise that, in contrast, this treatise, "The State and its Ailments," is only an outline which indicates the excellence of the State in its earlier stage of existence. The subject has been lightened, here and there, by a repetition to save a reference. The study of political science, as a useful work, would afford a diversion to many minds accus-

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tomed to systematic investigation. It would, also, yield knowledge which would help to keep in check some of the gravest evils which affect humanity. There is no knowledge of more value to the world than the knowledge of the State which, in its system, order and discipline, is the best and greatest of all human institutions.

R. V. W.

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CHAPTER I

POLITICAL CREEDS

(1) TRUE AND FALSE CREEDS

AIMS and tendencies in the ways of life pervade animated nature. Among men instinct and reason can be generalised into codes or creeds of conduct suitable to the maintenance and the environment of life, either in a natural condition, or life in a State, or life in an institution which, falling short of a State, has some near, or remote, relation to a State, as a true State. Life in a State may, also, vary widely as between "statesmen," in the sense of members of the State's community, in its orders, classes and grades and its mere subjects, or the denizens within the State domain, the simple subjects, who have the duty to be obedient to the State without having any part in its management. There are codes of duty based on principles of propriety which bind all who dwell in the State. There are, also, creeds of conduct based on the same principles of propriety, and having their origin in truth, as a light to guide those who dwell in the State. These creeds are political creeds. They were made by man in the specific relation to an institution evolved by man within the principle of the natural provision for his welfare. All political creeds have to be considered relatively to the State, as a specific institution, and relatively to worthiness and to utility, as principles of conduct.

The good and true political creeds contrast with those which are bad and false. Men, even from the earliest times, either by heredity, or as a consequence of the softness of human nature, have been influenced and misled by bad and false political creeds. It has been a matter of cause and effect. There has been, usually, either defective intelligence, or a dulness of the moral sense, or there have been both defects, and these have been followed either by a want of thought, or by some inability to break away from the thralldom of these false creeds.

It is clear that all political creeds before they are accepted ought to be tested by the standards of propriety to find whether or not they are within the principles of worthiness and utility, or whether,

being wholly, or in part, outside of these principles, they are, in part, or wholly, within the circles of viciousness and detriment. In the latter event, a political creed may be, in part, or wholly, in the nature of a political heresy, or error. The full and ultimate effect of a heretical political creed, in the conduct of men, may be either detrimental, or destructive, to the State. It may, primarily, be either directly, or indirectly, demoralising to the State's magistrates and servitors, as agents in the management of the State, or to its political community, and debasing to its general population.

At this point, it has to be well realised, as it has already been implied, that although a State is an artificial structure, yet it is, in this respect, consistently within the scope of Nature's scheme of utility. It keeps within the ambit of creation, and it may be regarded, in mundane development, as a part or a particle, in the great totality which tends to the final goal of perfection. It will be seen, later, that the State, as a specific institution, marked, at its evolution, a notable stage in the progress of civilisation. The human groups, within their several States, as institutions for defence and welfare, have varied according to their inherent, or acquired, qualities and consistently with their several environments. The main point, which has always to be kept in view, is the State itself as a specific institution. The State, in this respect, has to be differentiated from all other institutions whether these be for religious, or social, or industrial, or any other purpose. The State is a domain institution for the defence and the welfare of the community, and it has the supremacy relational to its domain. It has the duty, by means of this supremacy, to secure its domain community against the rest of the world. The great State, as an empire State, contains within its domain the provincial States which, within their provinces, have a certain superiority in their managements over their smaller regions. Each provincial State, however, is always subject to the supremacy of the great State which owns the domain.

(2) SUBORDINATE INSTITUTIONS

The institutions from which the State is differentiated have among them those which exist for religious, or social, or industrial, or other purposes. These institutions are, or can be, useful accessories of the State, and they have the duty to be subordinate to the State, as the principal institution within its domain. There

have been, however, among these accessory institutions some which, in their viciousness, due either to their vanity or selfishness, have been antagonistic either to the State itself, or to its provinces. They have disregarded their political duty to the State in failing to be subordinate to it. Some of these vicious institutions have usurped powers and have assumed positions either as the rivals, or as the masters of the State, or, at least, as its foes. They have pretended, either by phases, or by stages, not to be subordinate to the State, and not to be the accessories of it, but to be independent and principals. They have professed a degree of freedom which has amounted to licentiousness in not being consistent with political propriety in the allegiance of subjects in a free State. They have gone further in their licentiousness and, ignoring the State's supremacy, have preached sedition and have incited the State's subjects to be disloyal to the State.

The true State, it will be seen, later, was of military origin and it was the institution and the home of the brave and the free. In spite of this hard fact the licentious preachers of sedition, in their vicious accessory institutions, have associated with their sedition a specious pretence of "freedom," garbed in the dress of religion, or morality, that the compact body of this viciousness may be concealed under the colour and cloak of worthiness. The truly free, in the true State, as a specific institution, had no need to enlarge their freedom. In the well-ordered State they were the freest of the free and they had none to oppress them. They had followers and they had slaves. They knew well the difference between freedom and licentiousness.

The earliest record of the free State in Europe, belongs to the Homeric age, three thousand years ago. Generosity and freedom in the State community, then, went hand in hand. The ancient States of this period were not dominated either by the men of the sanctuary, or by the men of the guild. In the ideal State of the Phæacians, the graded rulers, in the senate, and the various members of the community, vied in generosity and in good-fellowship. There was no call for equality and there was no antagonism of classes. In the ideal State of Ithaca, there were local and temporary disorders, but the qualities of worthiness and of viciousness were not associated with class hatreds. In worthiness, the faithful senator and the faithful servitor, the faithful wife and the faithful son, the faithful nurse and the faithful swine-herd, with even the faithful dog, all had their places of honour with the faithful king and the faithful ex-king, Laertes, his father. This was a feudal State.

It is true that, in the State of the Phæacians, the guildsmen

were becoming an organic body in the State. It is, also, true and very clear that the specious pretence of an enlarged freedom in the nature of licentious extravagance did not arise, or have its birth, in the true State and that it did not proceed from ingenuous races. This "eleutherian" freedom sprang from mixed races which had once been in bondage, or in slavery.

It had a specious and pretentious grievance against the ruling classes of the truly free. It became the cult of emancipated populations in Greece, and thence it extended to Rome. It became the cult of those who had been released from discipline. It was a characteristic of degeneracy. It expressed a desire for laxity and to be left free from control. In its exuberance it was the source of licentiousness which involved a disregard for the State. The State was the institution of free, generous and military races. Ex-servile, non-military races had to reach a higher standard to be equal to the older races which had never been in bondage. In this way the political generosity of the older races was different and distinct from the "liberalism" or "eleutherian" freedom of the emancipated races.

In Latin civilisation the political cult of liberalism has always tended to compromises. In Rome, truculent licentiousness often grew bold in its attacks on the State when it was known that the State was badly served by those who would yield, as a result of intimidation, rather than stand fast and do their duty to the State. Liberalism, in its bending and yielding, became a cult, as the basis for compromises. It truckled to licentiousness. Truth and duty were sacrificed to a specious expediency. The State as a specific institution suffered and became distorted as a stage in its decline or decay. Truckling liberalism and truculent licentiousness are thus counterpart political evils which are favoured by false political creeds. The sources of these false creeds, and their careers, can be traced through long periods of time.

Their effects can be illustrated in various States. An example of the evil effects of the pretences of a false creed may be seen in the modern political fallacies of "self-determination" and "home rule." These fallacies, as sophisms, originally emanated from the minds of astute knaves, to enter the minds of the less intelligent subjects of the State, to distort the proper views, or the wholesome ideas, which should rightly dwell there. Such sophisms are never prepared for any good purpose. They are generally prepared to supply a part in the systematic process of an evil scheme.

False political creeds which produce evils within the State may have their sources outside of the State, in accessory institutions such as the Sanctuary, or the Guild, in a foreign domain. The

Sanctuary, on the basis of divinity and religion, has assumed in certain instances an international, or a supernational, character. The Guild, on the basis of humanity and morality, has assumed likewise a moral predominance of an international or supernational character. False doctrines, in respect of religion and morality, issuing from these specific institutions, have become parts of heretical creeds which are antagonistic to States. If these false creeds are followed by thoughtless and misguided persons, these false creeds may tend to subvert the true State, either by disintegrating its domain, or by severing and lessening its supremacy, or by demoralising its population. It is in the interest of the State that all false political creeds should be grouped together and then be isolated, to be carefully examined and tested. The evil doctrines contained in these false creeds are traceable backwards from effect to cause, and they may be made to indicate their various elements and the sources of their viciousness. When these doctrines are placed in relation to certain standards they may be found to accord with particular private interests and to be directly adverse to public utility in the State, to public policy and to the public interest of the general population of the domain.

These false political doctrines may have a depraving influence on classes or on parts of the State's population. It is for this reason that in the testing of political creeds the true State, as a specific institution, has to be strictly differentiated from both religious and industrial institutions which are more primitive in their organisations than is the State and are, also, inferior to it in utility and in excellence. The State has always been able to do for itself all the work which these accessory institutions have professed to do for it. The true State, with its free and excellent community, has always to be on guard against those influences which may degrade it and, indirectly, by this means, deform the State itself, as the container apart from its contents, and the community and the population within it. The excellent community may be demoralised, gradually, but effectively, by being mixed with and by being contaminated by a backward, or a degenerate, population infected with the peculiar usages and habits of those, or of the descendants of those, by whom they were originally acquired in accessory institutions such as the Sanctuary and the Guild.

The Fort, the Sanctuary and the Guild, for long periods of time, developed practices and usages which were so deeply ingrained in their populations that these several populations became differentiated, as by a second nature. Atavism, as an influence in the population of a domain, tends to reproduce aptitudes in some

branches of industry and inaptitudes in other branches. Men, like horses and dogs, by specific development, tend to specific variation within the limit of their kind.

(3) SPECIFIC INSTITUTIONS

The State, as a specific institution, was the offspring of the Fort. It had a military community of excellent quality, in respect of manliness. This community had been well trained to have a due regard for the order, the system and the discipline which are requisite in the defence of the domain and in the management of the State for the welfare of its proprietary community.

The Sanctuary, as a specific institution, like the State, was ruled "from above," in the sense that the hierarchical system was the forerunner of the feudal system of the State but with a difference. The headship of the hierarchical system was in a Chief Priest as the vicegerent of the Deity, whilst the headship of the feudal system was in a Board of four kings. This Board was, on occasion, enlarged by the addition of four Princes and four Headmen (or servitors). This Senate of twelve military officers was relational to the three grades in the community contained in the provinces, sub-provinces and minor regions of the domain. This Senate was relational to, rather than representative of, the whole domain, in the sense that "representation" implies appointment "from below."

In both the Sanctuary and the State power and authority were deemed to be derived "from above." Priestly rule was exercised apart from military rule. The "one-man" rule of the Sanctuary contrasted in this way with the "Board-rule" of the State. The Sanctuary population had always been very mixed and general, in not being select, as in the State, and it had no voice in the management of the Sanctuary. In contrast, the military community, as a proprietary body, had an interest and a voice, to a limited extent, in the management of the State. Whilst the military order was in the service of the Sanctuary before the State was evolved, the lands of the military order were held as the reward of its service duties and this reward was relational to the three grades. Hence came, at a later period, the electoral franchise rights in the State.

The Guild, as a specific institution, is more ancient than the State but is less ancient than the Sanctuary. The Sanctuary produced many species of the Guild to suit every branch of industry

of both the rural and the urban populations. Utility and welfare, in the modes of industry and in the means of livelihood, were the aims and the inducements to co-operation. The Sanctuary officers were skilful in economy and in management, and the Guildsmen had not the control. The Guildsmen had a limited influence. The forces of selfishness, in the several individuals, were kept in balance by the common interest of the body of individuals. All were cared for in the Guild, which was in the nature of a club. A percentage of the products was contributed to the Sanctuary for the use of capital, or stock, which was supplied, and for the cost of management. The Guild rested on a personal basis.

In the State the Guild system was varied, in some respects, and, especially, in its management. The State did not exercise the control which had belonged to the Sanctuary, and the Guild began to incline to the usages of the State and to form political aims. The Guild principle remained as it had been under the Sanctuary. In urban districts a Guild had a ward (or sub-district), as the dwelling place and the working place of its members. The contributions in work and the distributions in products, or in their equivalents, in the necessities of life, were relational to households and not to individuals. The principle of likeness, or "equality," in the portions, both in the contributions, in work, and in the distributions, in the products, has been a characteristic of the Guild system from the earliest times. The "equality" standard became an obsession with Guildsmen. This originated the attempts to apply the equality principle in the political system of the State.

The Guilds were not all alike. They had, however, a common practice in the members having a voice in their managements. They had the duty to support their own poor. The Guildsmen formed a group in the population, and this group was, relatively, large when compared with a more notable group, the military community, which was the political community of the State. It will now be realised that this political community, as the proprietary body of the State, was the more excellent part of the population of the domain, and that it was an organic and a self-controlled body which compared favourably with the Sanctuary populations and with the Guild populations.

The Statesmen, the Sanctuarymen and the Guildsmen had the creeds of conduct and the several codes of duty which were peculiar to their separate specific institutions. These distinct parts of the population rested on separate bases and looked towards separate goals. The political creeds were relational to the true State, as the principal institution, with the supremacy in its domain. The intrusion of Sanctuary doctrines and practices and of Guild doctrines

and practices which ignored this supremacy and set up a pretence to a share in this supremacy at first implied and then asserted a partnership in the management of the State. Hence came a conflict in the State and dissensions in its population. The results have been very various. Where, however, the State has survived the conflict and has kept on its course, as a specific institution, the true State has resulted, with its appropriate system of management, either by its select community, or by that part of it which was more fit to manage it as a State, than by that part of it which was less fit to manage it. The State has thus been preserved by the strict maintenance of State policy.

This policy has necessitated the equally strict subordination of the Sanctuary to the State, as a national Sanctuary. This policy was followed by the Attic State in its earlier career. The exclusion of the influence of the international Sanctuary was consistent with the same policy. This policy has likewise necessitated the strict subordination of the industrial Guilds to the State. This policy, in this respect, was also followed by the Attic State in its earlier career. The tribal systems of Attica, Sparta and Rome, all throw much light on the policy of the tribal bodies in their subordination to the State and also on the systems of economy which were appropriate to the several tribal bodies, both apart and in relation to the State. Where the State has not long survived the intestine conflicts between the different parts of its domain population the results have tended in directions which have been characteristic of the particular dominant influences. In Attica the Guild class of the population, in time, outnumbered the original military community and became dominant. Then quality yielded to number.

At a later period the State which had originally been controlled "from above," as by a Senate, became controlled "from below," as in a Guild, and the State fell and never rose again as a true State. In Sparta the State Senate and the international Sanctuary of Delphi, after the Dorian invasion, co-operated, but in the end after a few centuries, the true State was modified. It became a quasi-State. The Sanctuary obtained an undue influence with the denizen population. The quasi-State became subject to its Ephors who were like the Tribunes at Rome. The quasi-State declined and never rose again as a true State. At Rome, under the kings, the Sanctuary, under the Apollonian cult, became dominant when in 560 B.C. the feudal structure of the State was modified. The State was of tribal origin and it rested on a military foundation. It became a quasi-State. At a later date, in 510 B.C., when the kings were driven out, the reaction resulted in another type of the

quasi-State, when the Republic came into existence. The Republic was soon shaken by tribunism connected with plebeian pretensions and backed by the patronage of the Apollonian Sanctuary. The patricians, as the domain community of the State, with the supremacy in both the State and in the Sanctuary, were outnumbered by the plebeian population. The Sanctuary was of tribal origin, the patricians were the proprietors of the domain. The patricians allowed the plebeians to have a certain equality with them on the Sanctuary basis, but did not allow the plebeians any equality on the State basis, except in the payment of taxes and in military service, which were duties in return for protection and justice.

The plebeians at Rome were like the Perioecans in Lacedæmon. At Rome the plebeians were placed on the economic basis for taxation and military service in 560 B.C. There was from that date, therefore, for some purposes, a mixed community. The patricians, as a part of it, were in a minority. In the struggle which followed for equality in the management of the State, the higher quality of the smaller body was illustrated in the tenacity with which it upheld the State, its own institution, against the attacks of the multitude which was the larger body. At the time when the mixed community of patricians and plebeians was first dominated by the effects of the false political creed of the extraneous population, despotism was favoured by the multitude.

The ideal of the true State survived with the patricians. It was the standard of reform. The Republic declined and failed by its inherent defects and it was followed by the Empire. The Emperor Augustus reverted to the Standard of the State, in the Homeric age. He assumed the character of King Alcinous, as chief Senator, in the ideal State of the Phæacians. This policy of reform gave an extended period of life to the Roman State. Control was restored as "from above," in the State and ceased to be as "from below" by the multitude. Political creeds, both true and false, have not ceased to influence the careers of States for, respectively, their preservation, or their destruction. A true creed has corrected what a false creed had debased.

(4) FALSE CREEDS

False political creeds are traceable to their earliest sources in the Sanctuaries and in the Guilds. The effects of the moulding influences of false creeds upon the more ignorant and foolish, as

well as upon the less competent and the more perverse parts of the general population, are deeply impressed. In modern times the victims of these false creeds have, again, become the malignant and the inveterate foes of the State, as they were in ancient times. The false doctrines have effects, akin to those of disease, upon their credulous victims. The fault is neither in the State, nor in the wise and prudent part of its community, but in the false creeds and in their propagators who sedulously mislead and deprave the more ignorant and the less intelligent with the more foolish and vicious parts of the population. The victims have neither the sense nor the capacity to apply the proper tests to these false creeds. They have not the primary standard in the ideal of the true State.

If even the simple tests were strictly applied, then the sophisms and the shams, the hypocrisy and the knavishness contained in the creeds would easily be apparent to persons of even the most ordinary intelligence. The victims of these false creeds, in each successive generation, would then be lessened in number. The more ignorant and perverse parts of the population would gradually cease to be their own enemies and the worst adversaries of the State would be held in their due subjection to it. The more sober-minded parts of the community would then have a much greater influence in the State to secure the welfare of the whole population. The debased part of a population is to the rest of the community what evil weeds are to the good crop. When these evil weeds have been allowed to grow on the land the useful crops have always ceased to thrive and loss has resulted. If the evil elements in the community were allowed to follow their false creeds and to set up their debased institutions on the fantastic lines of their own ideals, then the success of their depravity would result in the deformity of the State. The new hybrid institution would be a political monstrosity.

In the past, in the deformed State the despotism derived from and favoured by the Sanctuary has usually been joined by multitudinism favoured by the Guilds. These Guilds, in a manner, are to-day replaced by Trades Unions. When the State has ceased to be the principal in its own domain it has usually become distorted and then has become accessory to some other dominant institution. In this process of change from cause to effect, the bane of the State has been the prevalence of heretical political creeds. In the tenets of these creeds there are to-day races and populations which still follow the inherited or the acquired inclinations of the Sanctuary and of the Guild, and these inclinations make many persons unreliable, as subjects, and very defective as supporters of the State. The State, therefore, has need to be consistent in its public policy.

The State needs to be carefully exclusive in securing the proper qualifications in all persons who have the duty to serve the State. It is not enough to secure competent supporters as "enfranchised" subjects with an expert knowledge of the duties of Statesmen, as differentiated from Sanctuarymen and Guildsmen. It is necessary to go much further. The more incompetent and malignant subjects should be excluded from any interference or participation in the management of the State. Such excluded persons need not be excluded from taking part in the management of a parish or a town, as small regions within the State, but under the State, and, in strictness, not parts of the State with any control in its government.

Such excluded persons need not be liable to any unequal treatment, in the way of justice, as subjects of the State. If the State is to advance to its goal of perfection it must not be impeded, diverted, or retarded by its subjects who are incompetent to take any useful part in its management. The scope of politics, as the business of management of the State, is to be differentiated from the scope of demics, as the business of management of the regional populations, in rural and urban districts. Every State, in modern times, is more or less influenced, as ancient States were influenced, by the extreme classes of excellence and baseness in the population and by the presence of a middle class, which is merely good and bad, but with the good predominant. There is no need, on this account, for any departure from the policy of humane treatment of the more vicious parts of the population. The safety of the State and the welfare of its community require a standard of propriety which includes all the duties to the State, and this standard has to be strictly observed. In the government of the State the mechanism of the agency bodies, relational to the domain, its supremacy and its community, has to be differentiated from the mechanism of "representative" bodies of its populations. The State came into existence as an organic institution, derived from an earlier organic institution. Paternalism, in the majesty of the Sanctuary government, preceded magistracy, as the supremacy in State government.

In the Sanctuary, as in a hierarchical structure, and in the State, as in a feudal structure, the rule was "from above" (*ex supero*) and not "from below" (*ex imo*), as in the Guilds. In the Sanctuary the High Priest was the vicegerent of the Deity and he was not controlled "from below." The population of the ancient independent Sanctuary, therefore, had no part whatever in its management. That which, in a later age, was termed "representation," did not exist. Paternalism and "representation" were mutually

exclusive. The priests, in the regional parts, derived their authority from their superiors and not from those to whom they ministered and whom they supervised. In the State, also, the magistrates and the servitors were appointed "from above" by co-option. The servitors, at a later period, were nominated for a selection and, after the choice, there was, on approval, a confirmation by the magistrates concerned.

Eligibility was a condition precedent to election and confirmation. It follows that, in earlier times, trustees, or agents, were the means of "representation" and that only eligible persons with the necessary qualifications, could be indicated to superiors for appointment by the electors.

As the State was the offspring of the Fort, military competency and efficiency remained for long periods of time among the usages and the practices of the State. When the Guildsmen were allowed to share in the management of the State, then the nature of the State became modified, just as the nature of an efficient army would have been modified by a change in its control "from above" (*ex supero*), as by its commanders, to its control "from below" (*ex imo*), as by its privates. In the long history of States, the career of the Roman State, from its origin to its final fall, supplies the full history of a comparatively modern State and it illustrates the evil influence of false political creeds. Two points are sufficient to mark the distortion of the State by (1) the Sanctuary and by (2) the Guild. Rome affords a convenient example. The earlier Senate, a small body of thirty magistrates, was undermined by the despotism of kings, supported by the Sanctuary. The later Senate, a large body of 300 magistrates was undermined by Tribunism, supported by the Guilds and backed by the Sanctuary. Rome never had a democracy but was saved from that evil by the Empire, with a Senate, which failed because its substructure had not been made effective. These two points are sufficient to indicate the characteristic doctrines connected with true and false political creeds. Men who were equally honest were at cross purposes because the true State ideal was not realised. The State was not regarded as a specific institution. Pride and prejudice, greed and selfishness, with other vices, influenced those who attacked the State. The ideals and the sentiments of the more virile and excellent parts of the community ceased to prevail. Those of the effeminate and debased parts of the population became dominant.

(5) TRUE CREEDS

The facts of history warrant certain general conclusions. The State, as a specific institution, has a duty, by the means of education, to provide agents of a sufficiently high standard of excellence to enable it to perform its functions, as a State, and to supply its variety of services with competent persons. It has also, a duty to raise its political community in this respect, to enable it competently to maintain its part in such duties as the State may require from it. The State has a co-relative duty not to tolerate the teaching of false doctrines, or heretical political creeds, which contravene the duties of subjects to the State, or tend to defeat the purposes of the State, in defence and welfare. The State also, ought not to tolerate criminality. This simple truism may be expanded within the varying range of several principles.

It is not consistent with the principle of propriety in the management of the true State, to tolerate in its subjects curable evils which, if not cured, would result in political depravity in its community, or in the commission of political crimes, as offences against the State. Attacks on the State itself, which is the best of all human institutions, ought never to be tolerated, nor even countenanced. The Sanctuary and the Guild, within the domain, have duties to the State and they ought not to be allowed to take any mischievous part in politics. There are no greater crimes in the State than crimes against the State and its community. To impair the safety of the State, to lessen its supremacy, or to demoralise either its magistrates, or its servitors, or its communities and its populations, is conduct which is not free from criminality. - The same principle prevails in respect of those who weaken the economic power of the State. The industrial power and the productive power are within the range of the economic power. The multitudes and the leaders of multitudes, even in a province, may be and often have been, not only their own foes, but also the worst adversaries of the State and of its community. Worthiness, wisdom and utility, associated with the best qualities of manliness, are requisite in the government of the State. In the State, as in an army, nothing is to be left to chance. Where viciousness, folly and waste are tolerated, there the main sources of political mischiefs are not excluded. Great evils often spring from small defects. The domination of heretical political creeds on these points has often had its effects in moulding the minds of both despots and multitudes.

These two classes of human beings from the earlier times have

been the two extreme causes of mischiefs in the State. The "one-man" rule of the Sanctuary system, as a source of despotism, was incongruous with the "Board-rule" (or "Senate rule") of the State system. The unigra^d sway of the multitude of the Guild system, in its several branches of industry for production and livelihood, as the source of control "from below" was also incongruous with the trigra^d magisterial control "from above" in the State system. The trigra^d system of magistrates and servitors, in the State, preceded despotism and allowed the Chief Senator, as the first king in a quartet of four kings, to be subject to the Senatorial control of his fellow Senators of the Board of State.

The truths of political science, illustrated by the facts of history, in the careers of several States, have been either overlooked, or have been ignored, in this respect. Hence have arisen false political creeds. Political malefactors to a great extent have been either the victims of their own fallacies, or the dupes of the sophisms of others and, as a consequence, have been the causes of mischiefs in the State. The truth stands and it is never inconsistent with itself. The whole and its parts agree. Where the truth is or is not appreciated, the effect in each case may be due to a difference in the human mentality. The classes of men, in relation to intelligence and moral excellence, or in relation to stupidity and baseness, are far apart. There are, also, other classes of men who are defectives. The fool and the knave have mixed qualities. They differ to the extent that the fool may have more honesty than wit and the knave may have more wit than a regard for principle. Worthiness, wisdom and utility, with particular ability and material wealth, have always been necessary in those who have had the duty to influence the management of the State. Under the tribal systems, in the more ancient States, each tribe had a duty to itself in its own management. The tribal kings, princes and chieftains who took part in the management of the State, were thus more or less selected persons. There was variety and there was competition which evolved excellent classes.

The opposite classes of defective persons were less useful to the State and where they possessed power, or authority, or influence, they were liable to be a source of detriment and danger to the State. The ancient and the modern States are alike in these respects. The classes of excellent, defective and base persons still exist. There have always been, and there are still, between the excellent and the base classes, as extremes, a large middle class body of persons who are fairly worthy, wise and able, and inclined more to excellence than to baseness. The excellent, and those inclined to be excellent, have mentalities which can appreciate

true political creeds. They have the good common sense and the moral rectitude to realise the nature of the true State and to stand by it. They may be in a minority and they may be beset by the greater number, or the multitude, but they will not falter in their duty to uphold the State, at any cost to themselves, and at any peril which may threaten them. The quality of the true creeds meets a like quality of goodness in the mentalities of the more excellent persons who are responsive to these creeds. It follows that political creeds, political persons and political mentalities all need to be closely scrutinised to secure the harmony in worthiness, wisdom and utility which is necessary in the proper management of the true State. There is need to go to the centre and to the bounds of the subject, in the search of the truth, in the political creed, that all points and lines, in their several relations, with conditions and circumstances, may be rightly appreciated. Fearless tenacity is necessary, with the strictest impartiality, in the discovery and in the testing of both truth and error. The laying bare of errors and of popular fallacies, with a study of the vagaries of political depravity, in the evils due to human baseness, can be made a source of light. Truth and error are but counterparts. The inquiry may be systematic.

The State, the Sanctuary and the Guild, as institutions, differ as widely as do a man, a bird and a beast. The former, as artificial institutions, are separated from the latter, as natural organisms. The latter have their limits of variation in their structures and in their purposes, in Nature's economy. The former, as human institutions, are in a similar plight. In the State, Statesmen, as the supporters of the State, have to consider well the nature, the structure and the purpose of their own institution. They have always to be on guard against deceptive appearances and false analogies. They have most of all to be on guard against the errors and false doctrines in the creeds which have emanated from the Sanctuaries and from the Guilds. The guile, the fraud and the effeminacy of the Sanctuary with the selfishness, the greed and the brutishness of the Guild, are among the evils which have been carried, by degenerate or defective populations, into the States which were peopled by more virile races with military usages. The State, as a specific institution, had its own peculiar variety of systems, in respect of control, management, defence, economy, industry and welfare. A comparison of the three specific institutions will disclose their differences and, in these respects, will indicate the truth. In the perception of the truth, the relation of one thing to another, either as cause and effect, or as antecedent and consequent, or as supremacy and subjection, or as a whole

and its parts, or as the angles of a triangle to two right angles, is a relation which exists and has always existed and will exist to the end of time, whether it is perceived or is not perceived by all or by none, or only by certain human beings. Mentalities vary but the truth is immutable. The arrogance of certain Sanctuaries, and the bigotry of certain Guilds, by their dominance, have not affected the truth, nor lessened, in any way, the position and the supremacy of the State.

In spite of this fact, in modern as in ancient times, in the more or less mixed and demoralised community, and population of the State, heretical political creeds and doctrines have led many fair-minded and honest persons to erroneous conclusions and to improper conduct towards the State. These persons have been misled, and have lost their way in the maze of relations caused by confusing the three specific institutions which, however associated, have to be kept distinct and apart. Those who would avoid such errors have to view the State, as it was, as the true State, and to remember the changed circumstances and the mixed community, with parts which tend to follow divergent ways. These parts are under the influence of dominant ideas, derived from sources antagonistic to the State, in times more or less remote, and in some cases from distant lands. In Britain, which is rich in the relics of the true State, and, in this respect, excels all other regions of the earth, caused by the long survival of ancient feudalism and of military races, the differentiation of the State from the Sanctuary and from the Guild, is not difficult.

The totality of the system of the State has to be maintained in its exclusiveness so that those who would rightly contemplate its management may not become involved in extraneous theories which, however appropriate they may be to other specific institutions, are adverse or detrimental to the State. In this way, the State structure may be contemplated, with its well-being and its ailments, just as the human organism is contemplated, with its well-being and its ailments. The physician of the State must be as well trained as the physician who has to maintain human health and to remove or ameliorate human ailments. The physician of the State needs to be alert to keep his mind free from the thralldom of heretical political creeds and doctrines. In the light of true political creeds the skilled Statesman, as the physician of the State, in the consideration and discussion of the State's variety of systems, in respect of control, management, defence, economy, industry and welfare, will be guided by the nature of the State, as a specific organism, in the purposes of its existence, as an institution for defence and welfare. The business of the management of the

State, as politics, may also be kept clear from the business of the management of regional populations, as demics. This course will avoid the liability of the untutored mind to be brought under the thralldom of a vicious circle of thought. Excellence begets excellence. Excellence in statesmanship is a source of excellence in political principles which can be developed and extended to shape appropriate precepts, in true political creeds, which, by their moulding influence, become reproductive in political excellence. It is important that the community and the population in the State domain should shape conduct by the standard of goodness. False theories and the errors of badness have to be shunned. The populace, when wedded to a series of wrong ideas, instilled by malicious agitators, may become a peril to the State. This mischief is not to be tolerated but is to be attacked and suppressed as being in the nature of crime.

It may be necessary to strengthen the framework of the State and the power of its magistracy in order to maintain the stability of the State and to secure the primary purposes of its existence, in the defence of its domain and in the welfare of its population. In addition to the old evils which were adverse to the State, in groups, derived from the Sanctuary and the Guild, new evils, also in groups, have come into existence in the State as the results, respectively, of growth, change, development and neglect. Some of these are variants of old evils with new names. It remains true that the management of the State is the business of Statesmen. It is not the business of the multitude. It requires professional training.

The foes of the State will still follow their own false creeds. They must be faced and fought. These foes include proletarians, trades unionists, communists, socialists and others of a like kind.

CHAPTER II

THE STATE

(1) THE STATE AS AN INSTITUTION

AMONG the evils which afflict the State those internal evils, which arise in the populations of its domain and are detrimental to the organic system of the State, have first to be considered to see whether they are altogether curable, or are only reducible to a minimum. The State may be viewed, both from the outside and from the inside, as a domain institution, for the defence and welfare of its political community and its general populations. The State, as a true State, consists of three elements, viz. its domain with its supremacy relational to that domain and with its political community which is in the nature of a proprietary body. The constitution of the State, that is, its mechanism of government, is relational to its domain, its supremacy and its community. The management of the State, on behalf of its community, is maintained by dual orders of political agents, as magistrates and servitors. These dual agencies are relational to supremacy and subjection, within the principle of co-operation, akin to that of master and servant. The relative position is more within the scope of *status* than the scope of *contract*. The magistrates are in the nature of domain lords and the servitors are in the nature of domain tenants. Both orders of agents are later refinements of kindred orders of an earlier system, with trustee duties on behalf of regional communities in a generalisation of their common duties to the State and to its community. In the true State the supremacy in the domain was located in a committee of the magisterial agents who formed the Board of Management which was the Supreme Senate.

The president of this board was termed the King, or the great King, or the King of Kings, or the Chief Senator. The title great king, or king of kings was due to the fact that, as with the Celtic races, and with ancient kindred races, the Senate, or board, was composed of three quartets of kings, princes and headmen. This was a trigrade body in receding grades of subordination. The first grade, as the kings, and the second grade, as the princes, were magisterial agents, and the third grade, as headmen, were the

servitorial agents who were attendant, as assistants, or ministers. This Supreme Senate was relational to the whole domain. Its members had duties in the several departments of State. They formed dualities for the exercise of the several offices of State, either by joint action, as commissioners, or as principal and deputy. In the more ancient Senate the three grades were quatuorviral (or in quartets) and, in the less ancient Senate, these grades were decemviral. In the Homeric age the grades were quatuorviral among the Achæan races in Greece, but, after 1100 B.C., the time of the Dorian invasion, these grades became decemviral, as at Sparta. This fact has a considerable significance, in respect of the origin, the antiquity and the modification of the State. The quatuorviral principle is traceable eastward to Japan and westward to Britain. It connects the military origin of the State with ancient feudalism. The State, as a specific institution of military origin, is thus linked with the Achæan feudalism of the Homeric age, with that feudalism of a remote age which survived in Japan until 1867 and, also, with Celtic feudalism of a not less remote age, in Britain, where it existed in 55 B.C., when the Romans observed it, and which continued to survive among the Celts as an organic system until far into the Middle Age. It thus happens that two insular regions, Britain and Japan, separated by a great continent, had military races, with feudal systems of great antiquity, similar in principle and connected with the military origin of the State. There was a relationship between the several magisterial grades and the domain, in its partition into great provinces, provinces and minor regions. The officers of the State were officers of the great provinces (as the kings), with those of the provinces (as the princes) and those of the minor regions (as the headmen). They were like officers of relative grades in an army. The Senate contained groups from the several grades. The magisterial system of the State had its Control and its executive "from above" (*ex supéro*). The State, as an organism, was controlled by its headship. The Senate was the headship of the State and from it emanated the thought and action which were exercised in the management of the State. The Senate was akin to headquarters in the control of an army. This management in the State differed from and contrasted with the management of an industrial Guild which was "from below" (*ex imo*). The defence and the welfare of the State were based on duty and policy in the public interest. The whole State, with its provincial and regional parts was managed by subordinate Senates, substantially similar to the supreme Senate, which controlled the whole domain, and which was, by its possession of the supremacy, the Government.

Magistracy was dominant, and the servitors were servient. A comparison of the Common Council held by Telemachus as delineated by Homer (*Odyss.* 2) with the Celtic "Mod" and with the Common Council of England, in the time of Edward II, has a certain significance. The likeness is not due to accident, nor to a coincidence. It is due to ancient custom which had survived, with military races, in their management of the State. The Celtic system of delegates to the Mod, from the regional parts of a province, and the use of these delegates, on their return home, to promulge the new ordinances, were not peculiar to Britain. In the Senate of the Celts the elaborate system which existed for the disqualification and removal of kings, princes and headmen, for misconduct, with provisions for the election of others in their places, was the survival of an ancient custom. The grounds of disqualification, as by a loss of *caste*, caused by the commission of crime in the cases of lying, cowardice, stealing and receiving stolen goods, indicated defects in the character of Senators, and these defects were inconsistent with their necessary quality of worthiness. Integrity, good faith, and fair dealing were notable qualities in feudal relations. The duty of the Second King or Second Prince, in the quatuorviral sets, in the election of a new First King, or First Prince, in place of the culprit king or the culprit prince, was systematic. In Britain, as in England, in the feudal Council of State, which existed before the Norman Conquest and continued after it, the great officers of State included one such as the Earl Steward of England, who was in the position of the Celtic Second King. The Lord Chief Justiciary of all England, the Lord Justiciary of England, the Earl Marshal of England, and the Earl Constable of England, with other great officers of State, were members of the Senate of England, and which, by its feudal term was known as the "Coron of England." The King of England was no more than one of those great officers. He was the President of this Senate by election. He had the duty to obey this Senate, as its agent. He was liable to be deposed for disobedience or other misconduct which disqualified him from continuing to hold the eminent office of the kingship. The great magistrates and the magistrates, termed the great peers and the peers (*patres*), had the right to approach the king at all times on State business, and the king had the duty to accept their counsel, for consideration. He was absolutely bound by the counsel tendered by the great peers in the Council of State. There was no novelty in this practice in England, in view of the fact that the practice had existed among the Britannie Celts. It was consistent with the supremacy of the Senate, and it was inconsistent with the

"one-man" rule of despotism (monarchical absolutism) which had always been antagonistic to the "board-rule" of the State.

It is convenient, here, for comparative purposes, to look at an ancient State. In Persia, soon after 520 B.C., when Darius and the Seven Persians, as rulers, had set up the Senate of Persia, and had divided the domain into twenty provinces, with provincial Senates, on the model of the Supreme Senate, the position of Darius as the King, or the Great King, or the King of Kings, was that of Chief Senator. He was not a despot but an agent of the Supreme Senate which possessed the supremacy in the domain. He was controlled by his fellow Senators, who had the right to approach him, at all times, and he had the duty, in the Senate, to accept their counsel. The Seven Persians were, in a sense, partners. There was a phase partly of *status* and partly of *contract*. The Seven Persians, as tribal kings and princes, had grades and precedence. The principle of Senatorial rule, set up in the time of Darius, was but the reversion to a military principle which had existed in the great States which, in that region, had preceded the Persian Empire, in much earlier times. The Senate was characteristic of the State, as a specific institution of military origin. Whilst this Senate endured the Persian domain was well managed, strong and prosperous. When the Senate ceased to exist then despotism and misrule were revived to be followed by weakness in government and by the loss of prosperity. The traditions of Persia and Media were connected with the ancient military empire of Assyria. We have seen that, in Europe, in the Homeric age, Senates existed in the two ideal States of Phæacia and Ithaca where the chief kings were not despots and where there was no trace of Sanctuary domination, nor of any rivalry with the State, in this respect. In Attica, the State emerges through the mist of time as a feudal State, with its Senate, the Areopagus, of military origin, with virile qualities and with a reputation for ability, in worthiness, wisdom, and justice, notable for its impartiality. There had been a generalisation of the supremacy in relation to a united domain. There was a secular Sanctuary, at Eleusis, as an accessory of the State. In the Areopagus, as the domain Senate, the chief kingship in the course of time was modified and by processes and stages the Senatorial supremacy was undermined. It is convenient, for comparative purposes, to glance at other ancient Senates.

At Sparta, after the Dorian invasion, there was a Senate which was eminently characteristic of a military State. This Senate was a trigrade decemviral body of thirty Senators. It included two kings. This Senate, in respect of numbers, contrasted with

that of Attica which, on the quatuorviral basis, could not have contained more than twelve, or thirteen, Senators. The Senate, in each case, had the supremacy in the domain. The Senate of Sparta illustrated the great value of a Senate to the State as a source of stability. In the 8th century B.C. it stood fast, with success, against the attacks of Phidon King of Argos and his confederates, the Sanctuary priests of Apollo of Argos and the Guilds of Ægina, when they tried to obtain the supremacy in Greece. If we turn to Rome we see that, soon after its foundation, there was a Senate which was characteristic of a military State.

A relic of it long survived in the *Comitia curiata*. This Senate was like that of Attica and that of Sparta, to the extent that it rested on a tribal basis. It was, however, most like that of Sparta to the extent that it was a trigrade decemviral body which originally contained two kings. At Sparta, as at Rome, there was a strict tribal precedence. The smaller Senate of earlier Rome was a source of stability to the State. It appears, like that of Attica, the Areopagus, to have rested upon a larger body, like the Senate of the Republic, which was a Senate of 300 members. The latter was in the nature of a great council. In addition to Senators, as a magisterial order, there were servitors of an equestrian, or knightly order. These relative orders existed in the Homeric age and are traceable to remote antiquity. The stability in the State, as between the Senate with its magistrates and with the accessory servitors, on behalf of the domain community, as the proprietary body, with its accessory general population, was subject to a slow but continual change.

There were changes within the tribal bodies. The organic system of these bodies was a source of stability. The tribal precedence tended to disappear. There were changes in the mixed community. It was lessened by losses, due to the calamities of war, and it was increased by additions from the general population. The mixing of vigorous military races with degenerate non-military races begins to affect the State when it involves the political community. In a view of the State, the changes in its community are the result of a common evil which still affects all States. The process is slow, as that of a gently flowing river, but the effect is cumulative, unless there is constant diligence in reform, to prevent it. A part of the process is seen by one generation, but the part which preceded and the part which followed were not seen. The State itself, as a specific institution of military origin for defence and welfare, it may now be concluded, has its most characteristic part in its supreme Senate, as the headship of the State. Here was the government. Here the magisterial and servitorial agencies

co-operated in an accord in respect of the domain. The Government controlled the system of management which, as a whole, included the domain with its great provinces, provinces and minor regions. The principle of the constitution, in its relation to the State, has now to be considered. The constitution of government includes three councils which are traceable from earlier times, in ancient States, as the outcome of the feudal system.

These Councils were (1) the Supreme Senate, (2) the Great Council of the domain magistrates, which was the substructure of the Supreme Senate, and (3) the Common Council, which contained the Supreme Senate and the Great Council, with the addition of the servitors of the provincial communities, in one assembly, for the purpose of consultation. It is noticeable that the two primary magisterial bodies were not dependent on the servitorial body, in any way. The control was "from above" (*ex superno*) and not "from below" (*ex imo*).

This is the short outline of management in the feudal State. It outlines the English State, as it was, before it was deformed. It indicates the utility, the simplicity and the strength of that famous structure, the constitution of government which, on a large scale, reached its perfection in Britain. It was at this stage, or soon after it, that the turning point was reached when the process of decline and decay began. In ancient States the process was similar in the stages. In Britain the reactions, in the way of reform, saved the State. The loss of the Supreme Senate (or First Chamber) was the beginning of the mischief. This Council of great magistrates, termed the "Coron of England," was the feudal Areopagus. It had maintained an honourable record by the continual succession of the great Statesmen who had belonged to it. It was like that body in Japan, "Genro," which contains the "Elder Statesmen." It is enough, for the purpose in hand, to mention the work and to point to some of the deeds of the "Crown Officers," or Coroners. They helped to obtain the record termed Magna Carta. In the reign of King John, the Earl Marshal of England and the Earl Constable of England restrained that prince from despotism. These two great peers, as coroners, or agents of the Senate, brought home to the mind of the prince that a King of England was not the master of the State but only the executive officer of the Supreme Senate. The wayward prince was warned by his fellow great magistrates that despotism would not be tolerated. Magna Carta indicated the duty of the Throne, as the seat of the executive officer of the State magistracy, and the relative position of the political community. This illustrates a reaction, in England, by means of reform, to maintain the ideal of

the State. The great peers, as coroners, saved the State from going the way of despotism. In the year 1265, another great officer of State, the Earl Steward of England, had a prominent part in extending and in enlarging the body of servitors to serve in Parliament, as the Common Council, by adding to the Knights of the Shire, as domain tenants, the citizens and the burgesses, as agents for the cities and boroughs in each shire. The political community, with domain interests and relative duties, in support of the State, was enlarged and strengthened. In the year 1295 this principle was maintained and the Clergy were then, also, included in the Common Council. The general effect of these reforms was to increase the allegiance to the State and to prevent the bond of patriotism from being lessened by clericalism which had long been influenced by the foreign Sanctuary in its antagonism to the State.

In the year 1297, when the King, Edward I, was acting as a despot, two of the great peers, as members of the Senate, the Earl Marshal of England and the Earl Constable of England, by lawful means, in the pursuance of their official duties, defeated despotism and again saved the Constitution. The wrong which was afterwards done by the Throne, in its revenge at defeat, and the efforts made by the Throne to destroy the Supreme Senate by a process of dismemberment, are matters of history. In the year 1305, the peers, by their own accord, restored the Senatorial powers of the ancient Senate, which was but the standing committee of the Great Council of England. The peers, then, instituted two separate committees of their order with the addition of knights attendant. The lords and the knights of the Council of State had always co-operated in State service. These committees of "Receivers and Triers of Petitions" restored and retained, for the Great Council, the Senatorial powers of the ancient Supreme Senate, commonly called the "Crown of England." The great peers, in their duty to the State, were steadfast and tenacious of purpose. In the year 1311, the Lords Ordainers, as a committee, exercised the supreme magistracy of the domain against the Throne, to restrain despotism on the Throne, and also against Ministerial misconduct, under the Throne. The purpose was to secure the safety of the State and the welfare of its community.

The wayward and erratic King, Edward II, was ultimately deposed and put to death. The policy of reform in the State was steadily maintained. In the year 1376 the Prince of Wales, as a great peer and a member of the Council of State, took part both in the Common Council, and in the Great Council, with the rest of the peers, as the domain magistracy, in the expulsion from

office and in the punishment of licentious ministers. This was the first impeachment. The House of Commons had not yet come into existence. The impeachment was in the nature of an information. The articles were presented by the Common Council to the Great Council which accepted them and acted on them. This process indicated that the Ministers of the Throne were, indirectly, the Ministers of the Crown and that the Great Council exercised the supreme control in the place of its lost committee, the Supreme Senate, or the Coron, which was the earlier Council of State.

The process of the first impeachment came within the principle of Petitions to the Receivers and Triers of Petitions. The Triers were a committee of the Great Council and the Great Council could accept and act upon its report. A little later, in the year 1382, the peers in parliament, that is, from their place in the Common Council of England, before it was partitioned into two Houses, and, therefore, before the House of Commons had come into existence, made their famous declaration as to reforms in the State. The peers, as justiciaries, were no respectors of persons and the King was treated as a peer. They gave King Richard II full warning, as to his erratic conduct, that despotism would not be tolerated. In spite of this warning the King continued his course of perverse conduct and finally he was deposed and put to death. In the year 1399 the peers clearly delineated the powers and the duties of domain magistrates, as against the groundless and idle pretensions of some of the servitors in parliament.

Time has justified the course then taken, by the peers, who knew well the principles of the Constitution. It indicates, also, the depth of political ignorance to which the burgesses had fallen. The peers, as magistrates, and the shire knights, as servitors, by practice and custom, had maintained, up to this date, the best traditions of the true State and of its Constitution, as its system of management. It is certain that a large part of the population was profoundly ignorant of the nature of the State. The multitude was liable to be misled by persons who were less ignorant but more vicious, and these persons had their own purposes to serve. Plebeian theories of the State had infected the multitude. The feudal system was being broken to be replaced by a modified political system.

In 1406, the elective kingship, under the feudal system, ceased, and the Throne became hereditary by statute. In the same year, by a statute, the shire electorates were degraded and remained so until 1429, when the "forty shillings" freehold franchise

remedied that evil, also, by a statute. This reform was maintained until 1885, when the old evil was revived. In the year 1407, the Common Council of England was divided into two Houses. The House of Commons then came into existence. It was in the nature of an excrescence on the Constitution. The servitors in parliament were allowed to meet in a Chamber apart from the magistrates in parliament. The House of Commons began a downgrade course in the management of the State. This course was in the nature of control "from below" (*ex imo*). It introduced the most malignant evil which has afflicted States from the earliest times.

It will now be seen that the State, in England, in the two centuries which lapsed between Magna Carta and the origin of the House of Commons, underwent a great change in its constitution of government. It began with the struggle against despotism and it ended in the new struggle against multitudinism. The new struggle was a conflict between servitors and magistrates. The lower grade servitors, as the agents of the multitude, aimed at becoming the masters in the State. So long as the high class electorates existed the high class representatives, as the shire knights, maintained a moderating influence in parliament and the lower class electorates, by their lower class representatives, the burgesses, could do but little mischief.

The evil arose in the Common Council, in the reign of Edward III, when the more ignorant servitors were contaminated by clerical influence. The evil was developed and was organic when the House of Commons came into existence. The period has now been outlined during which the State, in England, was changed from the feudal type, as the nearest approach to the true State, to a non-feudal type, in which the evils of despotism and multitudinism tended to deform the State. What followed this period of change can be shortly outlined. In respect of the electorates of the servitors, many decayed boroughs belonged to landed proprietors, as "pocket" boroughs, and the proprietors as patriots, appointed the servitors, indirectly, so that high class servitors, as able and patriotic statesmen, became members of the House of Commons and raised it to a condition of excellence. The agitation which preceded the Reform Act of 1832 was opposed to the system of "pocket" boroughs. This system was in the nature of a select electorate. The new electorates have failed to return the more excellent type of representative. Low class multitudinous electorates have always failed to produce high class representatives. The degradation of the House of Commons has been due to the abolition of the triggrade electoral system. The high grade electorates returned

the high class representatives ; and all grades of the community were, relatively, represented.

It is convenient to follow, in bare outline, the career of the State, in England. In the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries two great political events occurred, as the results of reaction in the State, due to the sway of popular influence. In the year 1534, the Reformation of the Church of England brought to a head a conflict which, by intermittent efforts, had existed for a thousand years. It is one of the romances of Britain, connected with the career of the State. The victory, won by the State, marked a natural reaction to the true State. In Britain the native Church was the most ancient Christian Church in Western Europe. In the sixth century the Roman Sanctuary, in furthering the ambitions of clericalism, was the cause of seditious attacks being made on five native kings, by means of an emissary, Gildas, a Celtic priest. The Britons had their native abbeys and churches which were accessory to the domains of the provincial princes. Feudalism was in power and it was progressive. In Britain it had never been submissive to clericalism. In the course of a thousand years, in spite of invasions, revolutions and changes of dynasty, the mischievous influence of the foreign Sanctuary came to an end. In England, in the sixteenth century, after a series of conflicts between soldier and priest since the Norman Conquest, the Tudor King, of the Celtic race, prevented any further interference, by this foreign Sanctuary, in the affairs of the State. The pretended part-supremacy of the Roman Church was effectively suppressed. The Church of England was reduced to obedience and its ministers were made to attend to their proper functions and to leave politics alone. This exclusion of the pretension of the foreign Sanctuary to have any part-supremacy in the State, or in its domain, completed the organism of the State, in restoring to it the undivided supremacy in its own domain. The realm of England, then, became again a true State and, as such, it ranked as the first free State in Europe. In this respect, Britain won the greatest political victory in the modern world. Apart from the political side of the Reformation, the doctrinal differences although they were, and still are, important, yet they need not be referred to lest they should obscure the political aspect. The political supremacy has to be kept clear and unclouded. The unity of one domain, and of one supremacy, allowed the State to make political progress, so that, from the date of the Reformation, the domain of the "Crown of England" has never ceased to expand. Since that event the magistracy of the domain has vindicated the State's supremacy against all other external pretensions. In the State's

internal affairs the pretensions of divine right, on the Throne, and of popular rights, in the population, have been the grounds of usurpation. The false doctrines, as to the divine right of kings, and, as to the rights of the populace, to be dominant over the rest of the community, were importations from Latin civilisation. The earlier plebeianism and the later liberalism both tended to looseness and licentiousness, in the populace, where restriction and propriety were necessary. The reactions to the State, in England, were adverse to despotism on the Throne and to tyranny in the multitude. The reactions to the State may be considered apart from two notable omissions to act, in which the magistracy has been at fault in not acting.

The reactions in the seventeenth century may be mentioned first. There was despotism on the Throne and there was tyranny in the House of Commons. Despotism in rulers, and the tyranny of multitudinism are relative evils which have been the sources of the greatest disasters which have overtaken States. Despotism as "one-man rule," which was characteristic of the Sanctuary, has always contrasted with "Board rule," which was characteristic of the State. Despotism on the Throne came to a head in the reign of Charles I. The House of Commons, at the same time, was swayed by fanatical and outrageous demagogues who, in the maze of issues, political, religious, social and industrial, did not clearly realise whether the domain institution was a State, a Sanctuary, or a Guild. The reaction to the State, against the vagaries of despotism and multitudinism, was a reaction to the more wholesome feudal principles which had guided statesmen, in Britain, in earlier times. Magisterial duty and military sobriety required the strict observance of the system, the order, and the discipline which are necessary in the State, to secure the defence of its domain and the welfare of its population. The feudal principles, which were observed in the feudal courts, had a strict regard for truth and justice. These principles had no regard for persons. The King was deposed and put on his trial. He was convicted and sent to the block. The House of Commons, after its attempt to abolish the kingship and the peerage, was closed. The House of Commons, a body of servitors, had tried to suppress the two branches of magistracy, the executive and the control, which had, respectively, the direction and the supremacy in the State. The Protector, Cromwell, acted as a moderator. The romance of Britain was, again, illustrated, in respect of political, and racial, continuity. Cromwell was a descendant of the native race and, by his vigour and tenacity, he saved the State. He reverted to its ancient lines in his work of reconstruction. At a later period, the mischievous

theory of divine right, in despotism on the Throne, had to be defeated by the State. The Act of Settlement, in limiting the title to the Throne, linked with it acts of defeasance, by a change of status, as by a loss of *caste*. It made a definite provision against the evil pretensions of the Roman Church. The tenant of the Throne was not to be an adherent of that Church. This principle of a title and a defeasance was a reversion to an ancient practice in the State. It is another illustration of the romance of Britain in the reversion to ancient practices, as the means of political reform. The two notable omissions of the magistracy to act with vigour in the internal affairs of the State have to be mentioned. The domain magistracy has failed to curb the pretensions of the House of Commons, which is a body of servitors, and it has, also, failed to provide magisterial agents to represent the new provinces of the expanded domain. The first omission has allowed the "populace evil" of ancient States to be revived. Hence arose the tendency of the servitorial agency to domineer over the magisterial agency. This is a phase of licentiousness. The control and the executive of the control are both magisterial functions in the State. The mastership in the State does not belong to the Throne, which is only the seat of the executive. It does not belong to the Privy Council which is an accessory of the Control, just as the Throne is its accessory. It does not belong to the Cabinet, which is a Ministerial body, accessory to the Privy Council, and it does not belong to the Prime Minister, who is only a Ministerial accessory of the Executive. It does not belong to the House of Commons, which is a purely servitorial body, which is accessory to the peerage, as the magistracy of the domain. The House of Commons, when it was at its best, was a high class body of servitors, in three grades, viz. (1) the knights of the shires, (2) the citizens, and (3) the burgesses of the several shires. These three grades, roughly represented the relative three classes in the community of the domain. This bond of union effectively prevented the domination of class antagonism both in the domain community and in the general population.

In 1832, on a review of the past, the trigrade system of servitors in parliament, was deliberately approved by a well considered national decision. This system was then repaired where it had become defective. The knightly grade was strengthened. In the agitation of demagogues and in the prating of plausible liberalism, which preceded the so-called Reform Act of 1867, the principles of the Reform Act of 1832 were neglected. The principles of Political science and the precedents in the Political history of England, were disregarded. In 1867, the trigrade system was

unbalanced. There was "a leap in the dark." The State ceased to be guided by prudent Statesmen and it became the subject of a gamble by unscrupulous politicians. The relative number in the lowest of the three grades was unduly increased. Quality in the representatives finally yielded to numbers. In 1884-5 the evil was extended. The old trigrade system of servitors was virtually swept away and it was replaced by the unigrade system of servitors. This change degraded the competent to the level of the incompetent. In effect it was a disqualification of the higher grades by indirect means. Quality, in aptitude and in statesmanship, was sacrificed in pandering to the multitude. The trigrade system had been a characteristic of the servitor part of Parliament, in England for 620 years, when it was abolished in 1885. It had been a main source of strength to the State and of prosperity to its community. It was destroyed before its destroyers realised what had been done. Although it has, at all times, been unreasonable to expect high class representative servitors from low class electorates yet, since the trigrade system of the State was displaced by the unigrade system of democracy, as a form of multitudinism, the tendency of the House of Commons has been to lower the franchise and to enlarge the electorates. The State is eminently a virile institution, and it needs the support of the most virile part of its community. There has recently been a departure from this principle. The power of the magistracy has been weakened and the power of multitudinism has been strengthened. The failure of magistracy to control the House of Commons, as the House of Servitors, has been due to a loss of balance in parts of the Constitution. The House of Commons has prevailed in its unconstitutional pretensions because it has not been curbed by a strong magistracy. The community is at fault in not having invigorated the magisterial agencies of the domain. This accounts for the first omission of the magistracy to exercise the supremacy in the internal affairs of the State. The second omission to exercise this supremacy was the failure, in due time, to provide magisterial agents for the new provinces of the extended domain. The Throne and the community are not free from blame. The peerage, as the domain magistracy, had saved the State from despotism and from multitudinism, as well as from clericalism, as the agency of the foreign Sanctuary, which was antagonistic to the State. The peerage magistracy did not allow the kingship, as its own executive agency, to become the puppetship of the Roman Church. It did not allow the kingship to become the puppetship of the administration. The peerage magistracy remained, for centuries, the firm rock which was the main source of stability in the State.

The knightage loyally co-operated with the peerage. When the feudal system became defective the peerage and the knightage continued to be the champions of the State against clericalism, despotism and multitudinism, supported by Ministerial coteries and Court intrigues. In earlier times, in Ireland and in Wales, the State magistracy of England had supplied magisterial agents to the new provinces of the domain. After the time of the Reformation attempts were made to continue this practice. The theory of the old tenures was gradually displaced. After the Great Rebellion and the Restoration, the Throne and the House of Commons were inclined to co-operate. The peerage, relatively, was weakened. The House of Commons tended to become dominant. The House of Lords ought to have had in it magisterial agents from every province to which the Throne sent governors. This policy was not followed. The community was mainly to blame for the omission. The moral is that the magisterial agency needs to be made stronger than the servitorial agency, just as the Control needs to be made stronger than the Executive, and, as the Executive needs to be made stronger than the Administration. The restoration of the Supreme Senate, as the Council of State, would supply the State with the best means of self-control. The empire domain, containing all provinces of it, ought to be the basis of the Supreme Senate. The State has been illustrated, as to its structure and principles, as a specific institution. There is no region of the earth which excels Britain in its wealth of relics of the true State and there was a peculiar fitness in following, in outline, the main changes in the State structure in England, to the present time. There remains something which is necessary, for comparative purposes, to notice in the peril of multitudinism, which overshadows the State, and in the need to view, comparatively, the variant structures of the State and of the Sanctuary, to appreciate fully the origin of the State.

In modern times, the tendency, in Britain, has been to lessen the power of the more intelligent, the more substantial and the more competent servitors, in parliament, and to increase the power of the less intelligent, the less substantial and the less competent parts of the population. Multitudinism always tended to lessen the stability of the State. Multitudinism has always allowed the community to be attacked by its worst elements, such as its parts which have predatory tendencies. Multitudinism introduced those social conflicts and mob violence which ruined the Greek States and nearly destroyed Rome when the Republic fell.

The Roman community then, by its better classes, allowed the Empire to be set up and the ideal of the State to be restored,

with a Senate, to exercise the supremacy, as "from above" (*ex supéro*), as by its magistracy, and not "from below" (*ex imo*), as by the populace. This event marked a turning point in European civilisation. The statesmanlike Romans would not have democracy at any price. The statesmanlike English up to the middle of the last century were equally averse to what was termed the "pure" democracy or the unigra^de system, which was the most dangerous, as it was, also, the most loathsome form of democracy. On this point the State, as a specific institution, is to be differentiated from the Sanctuary and the Guild, just as a man is to be differentiated from a bird and from a beast. The structure of the true State is like a feudal structure with Senate rule over the domain containing its provinces, its sub-provinces and its minor regions. In the Sanctuary the hierarchical structure was, and still is, similar, to a limited extent, to that of the State, in the principle of rule "from above" (*ex supéro*), but, in its supremacy and in its subordinate grades, the principle of "one-man rule" prevails. The community and the populace had no voice in the management.

The State in England, both in its feudal structure and in its principle of management, by dual branches of agency, as by magistrates and servitors, was characteristic of the true State. The State's economic system, its judicature system, its exchequer system, its military system and its Sanctuary system were, thus, all subordinate and accessory to the State, itself, as the principal institution in its domain. The main points may be recapitulated. The magisterial agency had three grades, viz. (1) great peers holding State offices in the Supreme Senate, with the description "of England" added to the office; (2) peers, as the earls of the several shires, which were like petty states; and (3) minor peers, as barons of Hundreds, or shire districts.

The servitorial agency had, also, three grades, viz. (1) the knights of the shires, (2) the citizens of cities in the several shires, and (3) the burgesses of the boroughs of these shires. The Sanctuary system, on the hierarchical lines, also, had a certain similarity. The Sanctuary of Rome, which came into existence after the fall of the Western Empire and on the rise of the Pontificate office, was as well-organised as the State in Britain was well-organised. The Roman Sanctuary, never had the domain basis, outside of the later but small domain which it acquired in Italy. The Roman Sanctuary was set up on the personal basis of a regional Christian Society. It became a servitor body in the seat of a fallen empire. Its origin, its rise, its increase and the main incidents of its career can be closely traced. When the structure was completed and the various powers and the relative offices had been assumed, then,

an implied magisterial influence, in matters divine and human, was allowed to it by its own supporters. The Pontificate was the Chief Office. The College of Cardinals included the Cardinals who are in the nature of Senators. There are three grades, viz. (1) Cardinal Bishops, (2) Cardinal Priests, and (3) Cardinal Deacons. The Cardinals of the two first grades are, in a sense, magistrates of greater and lesser degrees. The Cardinals of the third, or lowest, grade are in the nature of servitors. When, at a later period (about 800 A.D.), the Holy Roman Empire had been erected, its two chief dignitaries were the "Lord the Pope" and the "Lord the Emperor." Kings, princes, dukes, counts and barons, had places therein, relational to the greater and the lesser parts of the domain. Britain was never within this domain but was affected by it, as a part of its environment. The Holy Roman Empire was in the nature of a monstrosity with its two Superiors. It, however, helped in the reconstruction of Continental States. Britain remained insular and independent. The Holy Roman Empire was not unlike a more ancient institution which, on a small scale, had existed, in early and remote times, long before the State, as a specific institution, had been evolved. This abbey-like institution will be mentioned.

There may have been several institutions of this kind. It may be well to glance backward at the origin of human institutions, although the region of the earth, where the State was first evolved, may not be known. The State was derived, as an organic body, from a different and more ancient organic body. The Romans, in a later age, knew of such an institution, in Egypt, where the Roman emperors, from the rise of the Empire, were virtually constables, as military servitors, in the service of the regional Sanctuaries.

The three Egypts, as a military domain, had been united and were subject to the supremacy of the several Sanctuaries. What happened to the military order in Middle Egypt is known. It ceased to have an occupation when the military frontiers ceased to exist. Similar incidents, in earlier times, must have occurred in the China regions, when domains were united, and bodies of the military orders departed, to find new homes in the West. Europe, in early times, became the seat of military races which set up States and produced high class civilisations. After the evolution of the State, with its undivided supremacy in the domain, the soldier and the priest changed places, in their relative superiority. In the long interval, from the time of the evolution of the State, there have been many reactions for the supremacy, by the Sanctuary against the State. Hence originated the conflict in which the soldier has maintained the mastership in the State against the

rivalry and the pretension of the priest. It is enough that, in one of these reactions, in a great and historic struggle mentioned, Britain was the champion of the State. The Roman Church had derived its theory of supremacy from a system which had existed in Egypt. The Roman Church was the best organised Sanctuary in Europe. The State in England was the best organised State in the West. It had continued to observe the military and the political usages of an earlier age. In a conflict of more than a thousand years the State maintained the supremacy in its own domain and the usurpation of the Sanctuary was defeated. There are States which, in this respect, are still backward and the old struggle has not ceased. It will be necessary at a later stage and, in its proper place, to indicate, more fully, the past influence of the Roman Church, in the region of the fallen Western Empire, and also the consequences of its present pretensions.

(2) THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE

It may be concluded, by a process of reasoning on circumstantial evidence, that an abbey-like institution, in a very remote age, was the parent of the State. There was a time, in the existence of such an institution, when two orders had existed, together, and had co-operated, in the same domain, without rivalry. The priestly order of the Sanctuary was, then, primary and superior. The military order of the Fort, under the Sanctuary, was secondary and was in feudal service to the Sanctuary. The military order possessed certain lands of the domain for the maintenance of the three grades of its own order. Thus the priestly order and the military order, in a common service, under the Sanctuary, had separate Households. Each great Household was complete in itself and managed itself. The business of each order was peculiar to itself, as a separate jurisdiction. Each order had its characteristic usages and customs. These usages were accentuated in industry. The priestly order was skilful in the management of its industrial population. It avoided slavery, but it had taskmasters and overseers who had disciplinary powers. The military Household maintained order in the domain and had the care of roads and communications. It was, also, in charge of the defence of the domain and of foreign relations. The military order, throughout the domain, in provinces, sub-provinces and minor regions, had lands which were worked by their own freemen aided by slaves. These slaves may have been captives taken in war, or the descendants

of such captives, or native malefactors who had been reduced to slavery, or to bondage. In the great domain of the ancient abbey-like institution, both on the Sanctuary side and on the military side, all authority was derived "from above" (*ex supero*). In the hierarchical system control "from below" (*ex imo*), was never tolerated. In the feudal system the same principle prevailed, but, as a consequence of "Board-rule" (as opposed to the "one-man-rule" of the Sanctuary) there was co-operation (as on a military basis) between the magistrates and the servitors. In the feudal system of the military order the virile qualities of the soldiers and the Board-rule (or group-rule) of the Senate, allowed the cultivation of justice and goodfellowship between the members of each grade and between the several grades. There were common interests in the tenure and in the cultivation of the land. Hence came the peculiar relations which arose, as between domain lords and domain tenants, as servitors, and also the domain occupiers. The landed interest was the true basis of co-operation, as in tribal communities, and at a later stage, it was the true source of the political franchise. In respect of property in land there was feudal *status* and tribal *status* with extensions as to clan and person. In this way, to a limited extent, both in respect of lands and offices, there was something in common between *status* and *contract*. The same is true, to a limited extent, between *status*, grade and caste. The priest and the soldier, as agents of the common principal, had something in common in their separate jurisdictions. In the Household of the military order the officers had the status of priests. This order had accessory to it a body of ministerial, or secular priests, as servitors, with appropriate duties which included an expert knowledge of land cultivation. It follows that the soldier, having the status of a priest, and having the services of accessory ministerial priests, as servitors of the military order, could manage a domain without the aid of the priestly order but the priestly order could not manage the domain without the aid of the military order. The evolution of the State turned upon this point. It is not easy, to-day, to conjecture from what great abbey-like institution, as such, the State, as a specific institution, first emanated as an independent body. The cause of the evolution appears to have been due to special circumstances. It may be that, in the extension of a Sanctuary domain, by means of its military order, as in a conquest, the new provinces were managed by that order without the superior domination of the priestly order. The soldier, as we have seen, could manage the domain without the priestly order, which was more or less effeminate, but the priestly order could not manage it without the military order which was virile. There

was a certain amount of rivalry between the higher grades of the two orders and a good deal of it between the lower grades and especially on the civilian side, against the military men who had the administration of criminal justice. In the Homeric age the "woolly headed" Thersites, as related in the "Iliad," had the spiteful tongue of the Sanctuary Guildsman and the impudence countenanced by the priests, as against the soldiers. In the same age, Nausicaa, as related in the "Odyssey," indicated the existence of similar impudence in certain of the working classes, as against the ruling classes. The King's daughter must have been aware of the political evils of that time. In respect of region and period, the Assyrian Empire appears to have emerged as the first, or earliest, State evolved, as a specific institution, free from any priestly supremacy. This State appears to have been in existence 5,500 years ago. The military officers, as kings, princes, and headmen, were their own priests and they had their own ministerial priests.

The change in the domain institution made the military order primary and superior in the domain with its own domestic secular priests secondary and subordinate to it. As between Babylonia and Egypt, in earlier times, there was something in common, as between both domains, but there was much that was peculiar to each. These two typical Sanctuary domains were a thousand miles apart, but traces of similar relative systems of two orders, with the priestly order superior, can be followed to very early times. The co-operation of these orders must have originated on a service basis. The position of the "Pharaoh," in Lower Egypt, was in the nature of a chief constable to the Sanctuary bodies. "Pharaoh" was an official name, as "Great house," that is "Senate house." He was a president. He was a soldier with a superior priestly entourage, apart from his position as Chief Senator of the military Board. The earlier Roman Emperors, as we have seen, continued in this kind of capacity and status, in Egypt, until long after the Christian era. The main connecting links between Assyria and the Thracian, the Achæan and the Celtic races were the common military customs in respect of the State. These customs made the military races strongly averse to any domination over them by priests. The military orders, in different States, and domains, appear to have had a fellowship feeling with other military orders, just as the priestly orders had with other priestly orders. The remoteness in time of the feudal system in the West, as in Britain, is very great. The Romans, long before the Christian era, looked upon Britain as a land of mystery. They saw in it, in Cæsar's day, a civilisation similar to that related to them of the Homeric age,

a thousand years earlier. This was in an age long before Rome itself was founded. The existence of the Druid order in Britain, with privileges held from the military order, and with customs akin to those of Persia and Media, may indicate an origin connected more directly with China, or Assyria, than with Babylonia, or Egypt. There may have been another cause of the evolution of the State. On the consolidation of early domains the services of the military orders for frontier defence, would cease to be necessary between the regions of the united domain of an enlarged State. In Middle Egypt such a position arose and had definite results. It may be that, in an early age, the members of such orders, in China, either voluntarily or under pressure, moved towards Western Europe. It was a tradition of the Britons that their forefathers had come from "the great Summerland." There are links between the Aryan races in India and in Britain.

In any event, the principle of the State, as a specific institution, for defence and welfare, with a virile community, with military customs and a high class civilisation, stands out clearly in contrast to the principle of the older and non-progressive institution of the Sanctuary with its abbey-like domain, its priestly supremacy and its docile and industrious population. The State, even as a military Household within the Sanctuary domain, and before it had emerged with independence, had possessed a select community with its officers, in worthiness, in ability and in duties, in no way inferior to the higher grade priests, and with its general population, in virile qualities, in training, and in discipline, far superior to the mixed and "much managed" populations which were subject to the pastoral rule of priests and to the supervision of overseers. The early State must have had much excellence when it is compared with the Sanctuary institution. In the military order the home and the position of women and the training of children, in accordance with the needs of military economy, influenced natural development in mind and body. The result was the production of men and women who were self-controlled and independent as well as brave, free and generous. The servility and the subservience of the priest-ridden populace of the Sanctuary were absent from the State.

(3) THE SERVILE THEORY OF THE STATE

The State, to maintain its economic power, continued its system of slavery and even increased the extent of it. It was well known to the ancients that freemen in industry, were more reliable and

more valuable than slaves. Slavery which had existed with the military order, under the Sanctuary, had come in by necessity, but the economic gain was accompanied by a loss due to demoralisation. The reduction and the abolition of slavery and bondage had been contemplated even in the earliest times. Among the Celts, with the most ancient laws in Europe, provisions had existed for slaves and bondmen, naturally gifted, to have a qualified freedom in the hereditary callings of a smith, a bard, or a priest. In China, in earlier times, provisions for ultimate freedom, in the course of seven generations, indicate a similar policy. Slavery has had a sinister influence in the career of the State. Necessity caused its introduction, as a lesser evil than extermination, and necessity, under changed circumstances, has caused it to cease, as a lesser evil than its continuance.

In the State, the extermination of felons, as rebels against the State and its community, was due to a regard for economy and necessity rather than to a disregard for humanity and justice. In respect of the State's antagonists, who have existed since the evolution of the State, in the distant past, two classes have been conspicuous. The sacerdotal Priest, with his pretended celestial title to supervise the State and its community, and the democratic Guildsman, with his pretended right to be the spokesman of the people, have attempted to sway the lower classes of the population against the State. These two, the priest and the guildsman, have been, respectively, the more subtle and the more outrageous foes of the State.

The multitude, containing a high percentage of the slave-tainted descendants of the emancipated population, still remains the most dangerous foe of the State. In those regions of the earth where the State has survived, and has prevailed, as in Britain, and in lands where the customs of Britain have been carried, a strict regard for the structure and the management of the State may enable the revived political disease, "the populace evil," to be controlled and, in time, to be reduced to a minimum. The main peril which overshadows the State is not the difficulty of suppression of an evil. In a struggle, the good and true, although they should be the lesser number, would easily prevail over the evil elements in the multitude, although the latter should be the greater number. The real difficulty is the existence of maudlin sentiment in a section of the general population; and this section is averse to nipping evils in the bud, because it does not realise the need for severity and thoroughness in suppressing political evils before they have become malignant. Maudlin sentiment also affects the votaries of eleutherian freedom, or "liberalism." These votaries are, sometimes, apathetic, or

they must "wait and see." They do not measure the range of possibilities and probabilities. They seem to expect thistles to produce apricots. The weak friends of the State, in this respect, are more dangerous than its foes. The mentality of a large part of the general population does not see and appreciate the State, as a specific institution. The fact that the State had, originally, a high class, or select, community and a low class, or mixed population, is but rarely considered. Excellence and baseness have always been contrasted. In human groups worthiness has been a source of perfection and viciousness has been a source of imperfection. The "generous freedom" of untainted excellent races is preferable to the "eleutherian freedom" of slave-tainted races. It is not for the excellent to boast of their good qualities but, with modesty and manliness in conduct, to observe the principles of propriety. The boast of eleutherian freedom, to be better than the best, and to imply that generous freedom is vicious, is but to make an imputation which recoils upon itself, inasmuch as "liberalism," when traced to its source, is found to have been derived from slave-tainted populations. The bulk of the population is confused by the sentiments which were derived from other and lower institutions of an earlier age. These sentiments may not accord strictly with the truth, but, in their descent, may have been modified by prejudice, or affection to exceed, or fall short of, the truth. A part of the general population remains, on some points, either half-hearted in its allegiance to the State, or it is entirely adverse to the State. In the past, even from earlier times, there have been racial leanings towards the habits of thought and practice which prevailed, long ago, in institutions of a more primary and lower type of organism than the exalted and complex type to which the State belongs.

Instances are numerous. The Hebrew race, which is quick-witted, still retains characteristics of the Sanctuary, just as the Hebrew Sanctuary was, when it emerged from a sub-province of Egypt. The Hebrews never had the true State. They had something which, in its nearest approach to it, was a nondescript institution under a "divine kingship" and, therefore, subordinate to the Sanctuary. The Hebrews had broken away from the irksome bondage of Egypt and, as marauders, they had determined to possess themselves of a domain to which they had no title whatever. They have long been a domainless people scattered in domains not their own and living their lives apart from the several national communities, whilst following, too much, the lines of private utility and imbued with certain international proclivities. The typical subjects of the true State, in contrast, have clung to their domain, on the lines of dominant public utility, in relation to the

whole community, and with the duty and generosity of military races, in a constant regard for all, both in defence and in welfare. The true Statesmen, apart from Sanctuarymen and Guildsmen, have excelled, by an undivided allegiance, in their support of the State and its community. The Greeks, and especially the Dorian Greeks, were, in some respects, like the Hebrews. The Greeks had the true State but they had a divided allegiance. They leaned, in one direction, to the State and, in other directions, to the Sanctuary, as at Sparta, and to the very numerous Guilds, as at Argos and Corinth, and later, as at Athens. The earlier Greeks, both in their homelands and in their colonies, were more military and they leaned more to the State and were better Statesmen than were the later Greeks who were less military and were more mercantile. The later Greeks became thoroughly demoralised when the industrial and the mercantile classes had taken to politics and had begun to domineer in the State. The pursuit of private utility was then allowed to invade the province of public utility. The main characteristic of Statesmen, or "men of the State," was, then, lost. In this respect the Greeks contrasted with the Persians, in the dominant community, in the new Persian Empire. The Persians were a virile and clean living people with the sobriety and independence of hillmen and with the military instincts and the generous qualities of the purer Aryan races. Indeed, the great Cyrus, in 546 B.C., had noticed the urban types among the Greeks and had expressed his contempt for peoples who had in their cities places "where men meet to lie and cheat." The Greek inclinations to follow the dictates of private utility, too much and too far, with an aptitude for international proclivities, have continued to survive during the long intervening periods which have since elapsed. The State, which ought to be supported by patriotism and nationalism, has always tended to be weakened by the prevalence of cosmopolitanism and internationalism.

In Rome there was a characteristic contrast, in respect of the failings of the Hebrews and the Greeks. The ruling race, at Rome, for a long period, remained more military and left the minor industries and the mercantile pursuits to the general population, as the custom had been at Sparta, until, there, as at Rome, a reaction came, when politics were influenced by the multitude. Political degradation followed the demoralisation to which the mixed community has always been liable. At Rome, the domination of the multitude was inconsistent with the maintenance of excellence in the management of the State. Although, in the modern State, the evil of slavery has been abolished and, in form, all parts of the population are free yet, in fact, the emancipatory, or eleutherian,

type of freedom, with its inherited prejudices and inclinations, is widely prevalent, and it contrasts with that ingenuous freedom which has descended, with its worthiness and wisdom, its political sobriety and its patriotism, fortitude and generosity, as a treasured heritage, in support of the State, in every branch of service. The domain class of the community appears to have been, always, a minority of the domain population. In many cases it must be due to thoughtlessness that persons of intelligence and integrity have become captivated by the snare of emancipatory, or eleutherian, freedom, as a sentiment, in its attenuated form of "liberalism," or "national liberalism." This liberalism always echoes the voice of bondage where there is no bondage but only the servitude of licentiousness that feels the restraints of true freedom. The student of jurisprudence can see, in "contract," something that has its counterpart in "freedom." Contract, in its perfection, has been approached from two sources. The contract of the soldier for feudal service, was a high class contract worthy of a freeman. The contract of the servant, or, as an artificer, with his master, sprang out of post-servile relations, as that between a freedman and his patron. This class of contract has been gradually improved to approach the high quality of the soldier's feudal contract.

In the same way the freedman's eleutherian freedom has been gradually improved to approach the high quality of freedom, in the true State, of races which had always been free. It is a delusion to suppose that eleutherian freedom, as in the creed of liberalism, has an excellence which ingenuous freedom does not possess. The victims of this delusion have often been drawn into the snare of false political doctrines before they have perceived that their minds were being moulded by the warping influences of a false political creed. Generosity and liberalism are as far apart as genuineness and hypocrisy. If a wide and deep survey is made of the population of Europe, and of its contiguous, or near regions, it will be realised that the effects and their causes, in political movements, in modern times, are not widely different from those of earlier times. The effects are the fruits of evil systems which have their roots in the distant past. The thinking and the reasoning part of the population, the wise and the worthy, the politically competent, as the true and steadfast supporters of the State, form but a small minority of the total population of any of the States. This is the part of the population which is morally responsible for the safety and the welfare of the State. It stands, more or less, in the place of the earlier political community which was a select and an exclusive body. It has the duty to study the State, to stand by it, and to support it, against the most malignant malefactors in its domain.

These malefactors are the foes of the State, and they are more dangerous to it than its external foes. "Mob-sway," in plain English, for "democracy," and "mob-leader" for "demagogue," if used as the better terms, as the vehicles of truth, from mind to mind, would help to remove the delusions which are facilitated by the use of foreign terms. The mob-leaders, as politicians, often have followers who are more thoughtless and foolish than willfully perverse. In a review of the community and of the population of the domain, and of the relative portions of these bodies, much could be traced of the free and the unfree. The unfree, as those in servitude, or in bondage, have been the sources of the servile theory of the State. They imagined that it was an institution derived from the multitude, as the original founder of the State. The "people" is a term which is, and has been, a stumbling-block. The term has many dimensions from a group, as in a ward, or parish, to a population, as of a domain, to include its community.

The populace, to the mob and to the mob-leader, is magnified and exalted when termed "the people." The servile antecedents of the populace are enough to account for the existence of servile theories of the State. These servile theories are traceable to the mixture of races, to the rise of new nationalities and to the results of conquests, or invasions. The Hebrews and the Greeks were mixed races and small nations with antecedents which indicated associations with the Sanctuary and the Guild. These races, from their rise to their decadence, were independent for less than a thousand years. Both races failed in respect of the State. They were never united under a State-like supremacy until they and their land were absorbed in a foreign domain, as in that of a great and well managed State.

(4) THE VIRILE THEORY OF THE STATE

The Persians and the Romans, as military races, were supporters of the State. They expanded their domains until great empires were constituted. Civilisation was advanced and peace and progress prevailed, throughout vast regions, for long periods of time. Britain, to a limited extent, was once a province of the Roman Empire. In Britain the native States were maintained and the feudal systems were not destroyed under Roman rule. A blended and brilliant civilisation prevailed for several centuries. After the fall of the Western Empire there was disorder and a mixed population arose. When Britain was invaded, in 450 A.D., by

the barbarians, its native servile population was no longer bound. New conditions allowed the rise of a mixed people which included the invaders. If periods of 250 years be taken from 450 A.D. to 1450 A.D. then the growth and change of this population, in England, under the control of military classes in charge of the State, can be followed, from point to point, to note the slowness of the change. At the first stage, 700 A.D., less than one-tenth of the population was free and at the last stage, 1450 A.D., less than one-tenth remained in bondage.

If the same points in time be taken, in respect of the progress of language, literature and civilisation, the slowness of the change can be corroborated. The fact is notable that, since the millennium of the Middle Age was ended, a period of less than 500 years has passed away. The Wars of the Roses marked a new change. It may be concluded that the process of development is still continuing, under new conditions and circumstances. In Britain an ancient civilisation, which was characteristic of the State and its domain, has continued to shape the development of the population as in the like instances of Persia and Rome.

In Britain and in its expanded domain, this ancient civilisation tends to the goal of perfection, in an institution which, although it is impaired yet it still belongs to the type of the true State. This State is a specific institution. It can excel, as such, only within its proper scope of development. It must retain the mastership in its domain as "from above" (*ex supero*) and not as "from below" (*ex imo*). It must be kept free from the supremacy and from the rivalry of the Sanctuary, as well as from the domination and the demoralisation of the Guilds, or the equivalents, as in trades unionism. The State community has to be differentiated from the population of the domain which is to be treated fairly and justly, but it is not to have the mastership in the State. The magisterial and the servitorial agencies in the State, in their separate branches, with their several grades, have to be strictly maintained, as being necessary parts of the State structure. It is necessary to be on guard against what are negations of the State. Greek terms and Hebrew descriptions are not suitable to any parts of the State structure. Monarchy, Aristocracy and Democracy are misnomers and misleading terms for any parts of the State's constitution of government. If "politics" be the term for the business of managing the State then "demics" would be an appropriate term for the business of managing the regional communities and populations. Democracy, in strictness, is within the scope of demics and it is outside of politics. It has nothing to do with the State. The English have acquired two errors which,

as foibles, are the sources of much political evil. It is a common English error, in regard to the State, to suppose that "monarchy," or kingship, in the sense of despotism, preceded the Senate. The result of research leaves the point clear, beyond a doubt, that the Senate preceded the kingship, or monarchy, in the supremacy. It is another common English error that the "political kingship" was the "divine kingship," as that which was characteristic of the Hebrews. The result of research leaves the point clear, beyond a doubt, that the political kingship was relational to the Senate, and that it was derived from it.

(5) A REVIEW OF THE STATE

In a review of the State and of the ideas of the ancients, derived by analogy from the studies of Nature, several points are noticeable. Hesiod was not alone in his industrial views. Like views are traceable in Celtic thought prevalent in Britain. The analogies of natural systems were suggestive. They were fallible guides when they passed beyond the due limits of likeness. The analogy of a State and of a hive of bees is limited to a system. It had been thus noted long before the time of Rousseau, and the dreamers and visionaries, who were going to re-shape society, after the French Revolution. The reaction, when it came, was towards the State. The analogy between the State and the Sanctuary and that between the State and the Guild are very limited and the limits must be kept clear. There must be no confusion. It is necessary, on these points, to combat false doctrines and false political creeds. The true origin of the State, as indicated by circumstantial evidence, cannot be ignored. The English foibles, as to the origin of the State, remain, as they were indicated by Pope, in his "Essay on Man":—

- IV. Nor think, in Nature's state they blindly trod ;
 The state of Nature was the reign of God :
 Self love and social at her birth began,
 Union the bond of all things and of man.

Thus then to man the voice of Nature spake :
 "Go, from the creatures, thy instructions take :
 Learn from the birds what food the thickets yield ;
 Thy arts of building from the bee receive ;
 Learn of the mole to plough, the worm to weave ;"

- V. Great Nature spoke ; observant men obeyed ;
 Cities were built, societies were made ;
 Here rose one little State ; another near
 Grew by like means, and joined through love or fear.

* * *

Thus States were formed ; the name of king unknown,
 Till common interest placed the sway in one.
 'Twas virtue only (or in arts or arms,
 Diffusing blessings or averting harms).
 The same which in a sire the sons obeyed,
 A prince the father of a people made.

- VI. Till then, by Nature crowned, each patriarch sate,
 King, priest and parent of his growing state.

* * *

Force first made conquest, and that conquest law ;
 Till superstition taught the tyrant awe,
 Then shared the tyranny, then lent its aid,
 And gods of conquerors, slaves of subjects made.

This fantastic theory of the origin of the State is the popular theory and it is akin to the servile theory. The virile theory follows the facts. The evolution of the State from the Sanctuary, which rested on the enlarged and artificial lines of patriarchal rule, conducted with wisdom and worthiness, were effected, by stages, far apart in time, and at a regional centre not now known beyond a conjecture. What is known is that no region of the earth is more rich in the relics of the true State than Britain which, in its Druid system, had the earliest and the most complete academic institution in Europe. The constitution of the State, in its utility, simplicity and strength, also reached its perfection, on a large scale in Britain and became the most renowned political structure in the world.

The English people, as a mixed race, are not yet 1,500 years old, whilst the native Celtic race, in Britain, cannot be less than 3,000 years old. The English wrongly ascribe much of the excellence in the State to the race which is termed Anglo-Saxon. Britain is, in fact, the seat of great and kindred races which have their headships in Western Europe. The earlier Celts and the later Teutons have had much in common as they followed the primary races, in successive waves, to the West. The Celts were not only the earlier race, after a Siberian race, and before the Teutons, but they were spread most widely over Europe. They are traceable along the Atlantic shore from Norway to the Spanish peninsula.

They had a kinship with the earlier races of Southern Europe and of Northern Africa. The ancient customs of the earlier Celts linked them with Asia and, in Europe, with the Thracians, the Achæan Greeks, the Latins and the Iberians. The megalithic monuments and the stone and metallic relics from ancient graves, in Britain, confirm the conclusion that the races of Britain were connected with the earliest civilisation in Europe.

The Aryan races were pre-eminent in Europe before they had invaded India. The State, within the range of military institutions and customs, is the most notable relic, and especially in the structure of its feudal system and its quartet bodies, in three grades, of kings, princes and headmen, in the constitution of the supreme Senate of the domain. The mnemonic system of the Druids was akin to a similar mnemonic system in the Far East. The Druids, also, like the Magi of Media, were, as an order, accessory to the military order and to its institution the State. In the West the State, therefore, appears to have survived from a remote age, as the result of a constantly prevalent ideal. This accords with the virile theory of the State. The popular fallacy that "the people," as "the populace," had been the source of the State was traceable both in Attica and in Rome. In England, soon after the Norman Conquest, a similar fallacy originated and, later, as mentioned by Hallam (Middle Age), false records were fabricated to support popular political pretensions which had no foundation in fact. The theory of the State, with the supremacy in the kingship, as in monarchy, was promoted by Clericalism, and it reached England from France in the time of King John. The source of the evil is obvious. The reactions in England have always been against this theory. The Clerical theory of the "coronet" as the badge of the servitor of the Sanctuary, and the feudal theory of the "coron" (or Senate, as the "crown") have been antagonistic since the time of King John. The reaction, under Edward II, was effective and deposition and death were the penalties of the regal pretensions. The "divine right," as a mischievous theory, continued to survive. It has had evil effects. One is very prominent. The ideal of the State can never have been truly realised by those English writers on the constitution when they have referred to the king as "wearing the crown." These servile theories of the kingship have thus come down to modern times. The more virile theories of the feudalists, supported by reason, custom and the facts of history, will bear the strictest tests of criticism. One factor in the argument is notable.

At the time when the Cæsar represented the State the Founder of Christianity implied a priority in the State in the terms "Render

unto Cæsar." This implication made the Sanctuary hold a secondary position in a land which had suffered the blight of the Sanctuary in its sacerdotalism and in its degraded Sanctuary population. It implied an excellence in the State, as the specific institution, which had the supremacy in the domain. The State has been the main source of progress.

CHAPTER III

THE ANTAGONISTS OF THE STATE

(1) THE STATE OUTLINED

THE State, as it stands, has been outlined relatively to its parts, which are : (1) the domain, (2) the supremacy, and (3) the community. The constitution of the State's government has also been outlined with its various seats of power, which are (a) its Supreme Senate, (b) its Great Council, and (c) its Common Council. The two main branches of agency, which act on behalf of its domain community, are : (1) the magisterial agency and (2) the servitorial agency. These agencies indicate the mechanism of government in which there is co-operation. The magisterial agency has the control and the executive. The magisterial agency acts alone and it co-operates also with the servitorial agency, in Council, as an intermediary between the Supreme Senate, as the government, and the community. The community is composed of parts and classes. The difference between the community and the general population of the domain has been noticed. This outline completes the structure of the true State, as a specific institution, for defence and welfare. The constitution of government, apart from the State domain is a fabric or structure. The terms patriotism, statesmanship and goodfellowship all import virility, with freedom and generosity in the management of the State and in the exercise of its supremacy. This supremacy, as the control, with its executive, is exercised with wisdom, with worthiness and with fairness and justice, so far as defence and welfare can be secured to all within the State's domain. The friends of the State, as its supporters, in allegiance to it, have to be differentiated from its foes. Its foes may, also, be differentiated from the ordinary malcontents and malefactors who may be found in any domain. It is necessary to be more specific. The friends of the State, in their duty of undivided allegiance to it, stand by it, with generosity, and defend it under all circumstances. The antagonists of the State must be ranged among its foes. These foes may be both internal and external. The external foes are, more or less, common to all States to the extent

that they are derived from the environment, which now includes the rest of the world, outside of the domain of each particular State. The internal foes have already been indicated as the rivals who seek to exercise the supremacy in the domain, either by direct, or by indirect means, by ousting the magisterial control which has usually resided, and ought always to reside, in a Supreme Senate. The Senate is the most characteristic part, or power, in the constitution of the true State, as a specific institution. It contains the supreme magistracy. The senatorial body is the control and the chief magistrate, a member of it, is its supreme executive officer.

(2) THE TWO MAIN ANTAGONISTS OF THE STATE.

The State (like the earlier Guild) was evolved from the Sanctuary, in a remote age, when the State became supreme and the Sanctuaries and the Guilds, within its domain, then became its accessories, for service purposes. The State was the institution of the military order which, originally, had been in feudal service to the Sanctuary. In the reaction that has existed, from very remote times, against the State, the two main antagonists of the State have been the Sanctuaries and the Guilds. The Sanctuary has either seized, or it has attempted to seize, the supremacy, or it has striven to share in the exercise of that supremacy.

The supremacy in the State is a unity which has no superior and it has no equal in the domain. It follows that, in the State, all accessory bodies must be in subjection to the State. The Sanctuary (or the State's domestic Sanctuary), as the source and means of a service, ought, therefore, to be in subjection to the State and, consistently with this principle, it follows that any pretension to superiority over, or to equality with, the supreme Senate, as the headship of magistracy, which has the supreme control in the State, has been reprobated and it is to be resisted. The indirect pretension of the Sanctuary, in posing and in operating as the patron of a military despot, to possess either superiority, or an equality in this respect is, also, to be reprobated. It matters not that the Sanctuary, in this respect, may have the support of the industrial population, or of a majority of it. The position of a foreign Sanctuary is less tenable than that of a domestic, or national, Sanctuary, in any such direct or indirect pretension.

This position of a foreign Sanctuary always allows such a Sanctuary, as a principal, to be treated as an external foe, by means of its agents within the domain. The position of a Sanctuary,

in relation to the State and to the State's supremacy, is not varied by the nature of the creed. The position of the Sanctuary priest, in his profession of being a sacerdotal person and not a secular person, does not give him any superiority over a lay person. All priests, within the State, are ministerial persons, for the service of lay persons.

Religion knows no frontiers, and its principles and precepts are not within the exclusive knowledge of either particular persons, or certain classes, whether these persons be laymen or priests. The State is not less competent than the Sanctuary to make provision for the religious needs and services which may be requisite for the welfare of the population of the State domain. The State in the administration of justice, by its magistracy, exercises the powers of life and death and it is equally competent to make provisions for the religious and moral welfare of its population. The excellent and fair parts of the population, in proportion as they may be the more virile, the more intelligent and the more worthy parts, so will they be less in need of the tutorial care of priests than the less virile, the less intelligent and the less worthy, as the baser parts of the State population. These baser parts, together, may be the more numerous, or the majority of the population. The Guild populations, as the multitudes, were the majority of the Sanctuary population, but its parts were all subordinate to the Sanctuary which, in turn, was subordinate to the State.

The true State is not bound fast in fate to be ruled by the majority of its population, as a Guild of workers is ruled by a majority of its members. The State differs from both the Sanctuary and the Guild. Any fantastic fallacy, as to the powers of the majority of the population of the State to control the State is too trivial for discussion. This sinister doctrine of the "rule of the majority" was a political heresy at the dawn of European history. It remains to-day as a heresy of the populace. The final victory of Ulysses, as the hero of the "Odyssey," illustrated the foolish fallacy in this heresy. The fallacy was exposed by the moral which resulted from the tenacity of purpose of the most typical hero of ancient Europeans, as portrayed in the "Odyssey." The doctrine of the rule of the majority appears to have first arisen at the time when there was a "political community" and, outside of it, a large population of "denizens," who were subjects of the State but had no share in its management. The Guildsmen were, originally, only denizens in the State. This was the relative position in the Homeric age and long after it. The domain community, as proprietors of the domain, had the duty of defence and welfare and it managed the State. The denizen populations of the rural

and urban regions of the domain, although they were excluded from interfering in the State, yet they were treated on a humanitarian basis. There was equality in treatment, in respect of justice, industry and the Sanctuary which, in turn, had a regard for the Guilds. The Senate, in that age, was a characteristic trigrade body of kings, princes and headmen, who, in their several grades, co-operated in their political duties and maintained the usual terms of goodfellowship. The Senators feasted together. They had a trigrade trinity of divinities. They were their own priests. The domain, the provinces and the minor regions of it, were indicated in the gradation of the Senators. The trinity was relative to the gradation and, in its powers, it indicated unity with variety. The State's Government structure was organic, like the headquarters structure for military management. This policy, in regard to State management, was characteristic of the military order and it was associated with religious observances.

The military lords and tenants were related, as sets of kings, sets of princes, and sets of chieftains (or headmen), with their respective followers. Their shares, greater and lesser, in the domain lands were bonds of union, as the tribal lands. The Sanctuaries, also, were organic. Some of them were like abbeys. They had their feast days. Their hospitality was an attraction to guests of all kinds. The several Guilds were organic. They had their own feast days which were connected with their own purposes. Hence came the united power and, with it, the ambitions of Guildsmen. The supply of the means of livelihood was a main object of Guild life within the scope of industry. The relics of ancient economic systems, in regions widely apart, indicate a similarity of purpose to supply the needs of existence in respect of three notable parts of the population, viz.: (1) the military part, (2) the priestly part, and (3) the industrial part. The struggle for existence made these parts competitive, under their respective managements, by power, by influence and by necessity. The power and the number of each of these parts varied. The variation in their numbers, and in their means of existence, produced far-reaching economic effects. The forces of economy are among the greatest forces which have shaped the world. Within States, by a variety of reactions, the economic forces have tended to divergency and intricacy in the process of new developments.

(3) THE ECONOMIC FORCES IN THE STATE

In the struggle for existence, hope and fear, as the inducing and compelling forces, in human nature, have always been constant influences. Utility, as a beacon of conduct, has been, and still is, a standard of gain and loss. The public utility, which regards the welfare of the community, varies widely from private utility, which is attractive to the selfishness of individuals, groups and classes. It follows, that, on the political basis of the State, on the religious basis of the Sanctuary, on the industrial basis of the Guild and on the demic basis of each regional population, separate groupings of parts of the population were naturally and necessarily evolved, with variant aims and with competing interests. The early trigrade trinities, already mentioned, are significant, from an economic standpoint, of unity and variety. There are traces of an original supreme unit with subordinate grades. These grades, in some regions, were not limited either to three, or to five, or to seven, as in Assyria, but were subject to a variety of service extensions, connected with the Sanctuary Guilds, as in *castes*.

The sublime aims of the Sanctuary and the pastoral theory of regional priests, that they were divine shepherds in charge of human flocks, produced, in the priests, a lofty attitude towards the industrial populations. There was a reciprocal attitude of humility, in these populations, in gratitude for the care and protection which the priestly patronage afforded to them. The position of another class in the State was very different. The military community never tolerated this priestly patronage. It had its kings, its princes, and its chieftains, with the *status* of priests, and it had its own accessory priestly service by ministerial persons. The position of the priestly order, in the State, was different from that of the military order and from that of the industrial population.

The priestly part of the population, either by instinct, or by tradition, appears never to have forgotten its original primitive superiority in the earlier Sanctuary domain. The evolution of the State and its consequences do not appear to have been fully realised, either by the Sanctuary priests, or by the general population. This evolution remains, to-day, as a matter of obscurity to the general population. The popular fallacy on the subject has been mentioned. The nature of the State, as a specific institution which differs from the Sanctuary and from the Guild, as widely as a man differs from a bird and from a beast, has always been a fundamental fact which was not truly appreciated by the non-military population. The three several groupings

of men may have caused some of these groups to be at cross purposes.

This was the result of influences which may have been beyond the comprehension of these groups as it certainly was beyond their control. The industrial population became closely grouped. Each group, probably, had a tendency to keep on its course, along the lines of the past, which sprang out of unity and tended to variety. Each group tended to excel in its own branch of utility, and again, in this private utility, there was great variety. There is no need to follow the groupings beyond the effects in the State. Rural and urban industries have been, and still usually are, relational to raw and finished products. In urban districts the economic forces are more intricate than in rural districts. The details, in this respect, come more within the scope of "demics," as the business of regional managements, than within the scope of politics, as the business of State management. None the less the influence of regional populations, as a cause, within the range of multitudinism, has produced effects which have, in structure and in principle, changed the organism and the nature of the State.

(4) THE STATE'S UNITY BECAME DIVIDED

The groupings in the State produced two main effects in two separate divisions. (1) The State tended to be divided, in respect of its supremacy, by the rivalry of the Sanctuary, in its antagonism to the soldier and to his institution, the State. This first division, in a sense, was vertical and it directly affected the headship of the State. (2) The State, also, tended to be divided, in respect of its community and its population, by the rivalry of the Guilds, in their antagonism to the soldier and to his institution, the State. This second division, in a sense, was horizontal. It directly affected the political community in its relations with the denizen populations.

Then, an unstable equilibrium arose between the parts of the entire population. The forces of economy were involved and new adjustments, from time to time, had to be made. These were made on the lines of a compromise which allowed new evils to be introduced. The mixed community which arose, or resulted, was ill-assorted. The ancient free and military race, which had never known servitude, became yoked with the new addition and the industrial population which, in the State, had always been outside of the political community. This small but high class political community had been long accustomed to hold its own against the

large but low class denizen population. The new economic system, caused by the fusion of the two contrasted populations, made the industrial classes liable to bear the State burdens of taxation for the support of the State and, also, of military service for the defence of the domain. In short, economic causes produced political effects with far reaching consequences. The student of the State will be familiar with the phases of change in Athens and at Rome. The State in these regions, as elsewhere, was shaken to its foundations.

(5) THE MIXED COMMUNITY

The two parts of the new mixed community did not quickly coalesce. Sentiment was involved as well as economy. On the side of the old community pride and prejudice had to be overcome and, in spite of the generosity of military races, there was need for the older part of the community to secure itself effectively against the depredations of the newer part and of the multitude connected with it. On the side of the new part of the community there was need to moderate ambition, to avoid jealousy and to restrain a predatory instinct. The circumstances were not always similar. In the older part, and more excellent part, of the community there had been a minimum of criminal law developed. This was a creditable feature of the ancient State. After the mixed community came into existence the provisions of criminal codes became highly developed. There was good cause for this in the low class populations, with the servile taint and the effects of demoralisation.

In the States of Greece, in respect of the mixed community, no two of them were alike. In the Roman State, the facts and the circumstances of the process of fusion changed with great rapidity. In a thousand years from 750 B.C. to 250 A.D. each stage of 250 years was reached with different elements, with new conditions and under changed circumstances. Had the political community of Rome, in the earlier stages of the process of absorption, been allowed more time to select and to assimilate the better elements, and to exclude the worse elements of its denizen population of plebeians, the results, in the development of the State, might have been very different. In a free State the political community, as the enfranchised part of the population, ought to be more select than less select. It ought not to fall below the standard of political competency in its members. Had this principle been observed, in the Roman State, a steady growth and an enduring success

might have prevailed against decline and disaster. In Britain, in respect of mediæval feudalism, the position was better. The strict regional managements of the parish, the town, the hundred, the city, and the shire, with the province and the domain, for a longer period, under the feudal lords in England had allowed the shires and the realm, sheltered by the insular position, to become fairly organic before the reaction against the State, by the emancipated population, had set in and changed the nature and the form of the State. These main lines of the State, in Britain, were of great antiquity. The ideal of the State was traceable, even in the smaller and most ancient regional managements, such as the manors and the hundreds and the shires. This ideal had survived, in the city of London and in other cities, even from the Roman period. The general population had been well disciplined under the Baronial rule. In Japan the relics of the feudal system indicate the excellent effects of the supremacy of the State management and of the subordination of the regional communities. In a general review of the distant past, in ancient States, both empire States and city States, with the general trend of changes in the interval, a fair conclusion may be formed of the causes of success and failure in the political difficulties, connected with antagonism in the State, to divide its supremacy, and antagonism, in the mixed community, by the majority of the population, to obtain the mastery over the rest of the community. The multitude has often failed to appreciate the nature of the State and, in its waywardness, has been the cause of great political calamities. It has not realised, in time, or at all, that, in the true State, the magisterial agency has the duty to maintain the State's supremacy and that the servitorial agency, as its accessory agency, has the duty to support it. When long periods of time are taken and the careers of ancient States are compared, traces appear of several common causes of antagonism, in the community, against the State. These causes indicate well-marked tendencies connected either with a divided allegiance to the State, or with an antagonism to the State, either by an assumption of non-allegiance, or by an avowed hostility to the State.

(6) THE DIVIDED ALLEGIANCE TO THE STATE

The two main sources of the divided allegiance have been the allegiance to the Sanctuaries and the allegiance to the Guilds. The members of these specific institutions have always been more inclined to them as being their own than they have been inclined

to the State which was, originally, a military institution. The Sanctuary and the Guild institutions in turn were ambitious, and they were disinclined to be subordinate to military persons. In their ambitions their aims were clear and definite. They intended to attain supreme power, either by direct or by indirect means. The Sanctuary, apart and alone, in the distant past, had originally possessed direct power until the State had been evolved. In Egypt, as we have seen, the Pharaoh, as Head Senator of the Military Senate, was subordinate to the Great Priests. In a later age, in Greece, a Despot, favoured by the Sanctuary, was in a somewhat similar position, except that there was not a military Senate. It often happened that the Despot was a renegade of the military order and that he had the support of the Sanctuary on mutual terms. The Sanctuary also by this means, increased its influence over the Guildsmen. The magisterial and the servitorial agents of the military community lost their proper functions. Both branches of the agency of the military community were levelled down to the position of the Sanctuary population which had no voice in the management of the Sanctuary, or the domain.

The Guildsmen rested on a personal basis and not on a domain basis. The resultant effect was that the State was weakened and the Sanctuary was strengthened. The position of the Guilds differed widely from that of the Sanctuary. The Guild had never been supreme in the domain and it had never been entrusted with the management of the domain, either by the Sanctuary, or by the military class. In Europe it came into political power, in a later age, at first, indirectly and, then, by revolutionary means directly. In Egypt, the Guild of Ptah, in an earlier age, had obtained, for a time, *de facto*, power by revolutionary means.

The third source of antagonism to the State was a combination of the two primary sources, the Sanctuary and the Guild. This combination has been a more dangerous antagonist of the State than either of the two was, apart from the other. The two, together, have been revolutionary, violent and predatory in their attacks on the military community. As a rule, however, the manliness, the wisdom and the worthiness with the other good qualities of patriotic soldiers, both as Senators and as Servitors, have been sufficient to control adverse influences in their community, and, also, in the management of their institution, the State. When the community became "mixed," up to the limits of safety, this control continued, as a rule. As an exception, guile and cunning, with combinations and numbers induced, at first, by a pretence of self defence but, later, prompted by the hope of successful depredations, gave rise to political ambitions, in the multitude, to have the supremacy

in the State. These depredations on the original or military communities of the State were effected by revolutions and were then followed by reactions to moderation and to positions of more or less stability in the State. We have seen that the unscrupulous soldier, as a renegade, has occasionally seized the supreme power in the State with the direct, or indirect, support of the Sanctuary.

An example is the usurpation of Pisistratus at Athens. At a later stage, when the Senatorial Council and the earlier structure of Government had been broken down, despotism on a throne was followed by the usurpation of the Guildsmen and the more worthy but less numerous body yielded in turn to the less worthy but more numerous multitude. This was the collective multitude of all the wards (or demes). Hence came democracy. This body, which in the Homeric age, was termed the "demic evil" was termed a thousand years later by the military Romans, the "populace disease" (*morbis popularis*). Many examples in the various phases of Plebeianism, Tribunism and Despotism, at Rome, illustrated the ruin which "mob-sway" (or democracy) has brought on States. It is true that the "pure" democracy in the sense of the "multitude" was not reached at Rome, but that stage was approached when, as a lesser evil, the Empire was set up, as the better alternative, to preserve the State. The freedmen and their descendants, who formed the bulk of the multitude, were not a source of high class virility, or of political competence, or of political propriety. "Eleutherian freedom," as in "liberalism," has always been a mockery of generous, or ingenuous freedom, as it existed in the political community of the true State.

The worthy, the wise, the brave and the free, who had never been in bondage, as a body, had an instinctive regard for high principle and propriety, in every branch of political conduct. Death with honour, rather than life with shame, had been the motto of their race and, as a body, they had lived up to it.

(7) NON-ALLEGIANCE AND AVOWED FOES

There have always been, in the State, races so habituated to the Sanctuary and to the Guilds that they have been accustomed to move from one domain to another in search of protection, or to secure gain, without any co-relative liability. They have lived their lives, apart, without any bond of allegiance and without any sentiment of patriotism. The attractions of industry have

always induced free workmen to earn an honest livelihood where they could make new homes under the conditions of freedom. There have, also, been criminal classes, composed of desperate men, who have preferred licentiousness to orderly freedom, and outrage, depredation and rapine to honest industry. Such men were merely brutish, as human degenerates, and sought new domains because their presence was no longer tolerable in the regions of their misconduct. They were not schemers against the State. They were not ranged, on an organic basis, to attack the State, in order to acquire the supremacy. They were, however, the avowed antagonists of the State because orderly Government, in any State, strove to correct them and, in the suppression of public nuisances, tended to exterminate them. In the event of any friction, as between the State's Government and its subject community, and between this community and its parts, when dissension arose, the avowed antagonists of the State had their opportunities and used them for their own ends. As hirelings of desperate men these licentious persons were a peril to the State. When a renegade soldier became the military puppet of the Sanctuary the desperadoes then found a leader and the multitude, infected by one of its parts, has been influenced to support him. What has been the result? The small military community, and its Senate, have been set aside to make way for the Despot, or Dictator. These Sanctuary schemes, as in Greece, have often been well laid and carried out with success. Again, what has been the result? The use of wealth, taken by forfeiture from the community which had accumulated it, has been taken by the depredators and it has, then, given a great impetus to industrial activities. Such distributions of accumulated wealth have, then, for a brief period, raised a civilisation to a position of great brilliancy. The position was not permanent but changed when the store of abundant wealth was exhausted. The splendour was like a flash of light. The attraction of wealth was a temporary incitement to human efforts in every branch of industry. Such positions were illustrated in the cases of Phidon of Argos, Hiram of Tyre and Solomon of Jerusalem. Such positions, for the reasons mentioned, have usually been followed by periods of confusion and ruin. The evil combinations of the unscrupulous soldier, with the visionary priest and the voracious Guildsmen, illustrate the more ancient types of antagonism to the State. There were divergent tendencies within the several bodies in the combinations.

In the State, the Board of State, Monarchical despotism, Priestly supremacy and Popular control, as in mob-sway (or democracy) could not exist together. The Despot and the Multitude have a

certain affinity in brutishness. Their combination was natural. These more brutish elements, in combination, have, then, wrecked the magisterial Board of State (or the Senate), and, as a result, have left the Sanctuary and its effeminate priests in a helpless position. The Despot and the Priest were, then, usually inclined to co-operate for their mutual support against the Multitude. The degradation and the ruin of the Senate, which has always been the most characteristic part of the State's Government, have been the constant results of despotism and of multitudinism. The superior despotism of the Sanctuary, with the subordinate quasi-despotism of the monarch, as the Sanctuary's "shepherd of the people," have usually left the Guilds, more or less, under the Sanctuary's influence and have, thus, excluded them from any interference with the supremacy in the domain either on its priestly side, or on its military side. The Sanctuary's ideal of mutual support, as between itself and its puppet despot, has often made the supremacy very strong against foes within the State and against foes outside of the State. A familiar example was afforded, at Rome, by the Tarquins. The principle of this coalition had been followed, in earlier times, in other regions and, in much later times, it has influenced the careers of States in Europe. The converse position of the patriotic soldiers of the State domain, both as Senators and as Servitors, in support of the Senate, with the supremacy, backed by its military community, on behalf of the State, in a struggle against the pretensions of the foreign Sanctuary, allied with its despot and its Guilds, has illustrated the victory of the State. A familiar example is the case of Sparta, with its Senate of thirty members, including two kings, when Sparta was attacked by Phidon of Argos, allied with the Sanctuary of Apollo of Argos, and the Ægina Guilds. This confederacy, but for the Senate of Sparta, would have conquered Greece. Such conflicts have changed the course of history. They have shaken States to their foundations and have been the needless cause of much bloodshed and desolation. The guile and the artfulness of the malignant priest have been used, also, to cause unrest in the State, by fanning the embers of discontent with the purpose of infecting parts of the multitude and, ultimately, of making the whole multitude adverse to the State and favourable to the Sanctuary. The policy of this course is in the nature of intimidation. It represents a phase of "the fallacy of the greater number." It has usually been adverse to the property classes in the State. When the political community and the denizen population had come into conflict the Sanctuary changed its position, as the champion of the multitude, to pose as the arbiter between the State and its populace, with the choice,

in itself, to be adverse to the State and with the alternatives, either to support a despot, or to champion the populace.

(8) REVOLUTIONARY ANTAGONISTS

A fourth source of antagonism to the State was in the combination of agents of the multitude and of agents of the foreign Sanctuary. This position was akin to that of despotism. It contained an aggravation. It allowed, and it encouraged, servitors in the State to domineer over its magistrates. It implied, in principle, a subordination of the State to the Sanctuary. The populace was induced to hold the community in check and the Sanctuary held the magistracy in check. The position, at Rome, resulted in Tribunes, as it had resulted, at Sparta, in Ephors. The domination of demagogues was a consequence. These persons were, originally, in the nature of "ward-leaders," or parochial captains, as the official headmen of the denizen, or plebeian, class which was usually resident in these minor regions of an ancient State. The class rested on a personal basis in groups, within wards, or parishes, connected with the industrial system of the Sanctuaries. The Guild house was in the nature of a Sanctuary chapel. The religious basis of a Sanctuary agency, in respect of a petty region and its parochial Guild-folk, or "people," is traceable to a period more remote than that of the origin of the State.

There is a faint survival of these demagogues, as official persons, in the sidesmen (or "synodsmen") of churches, with warden duties, to inspect and to report to superiors what was found to be amiss in their regional populations. These men were a part of a spy system of the earlier Sanctuary to enable it to control its regional populations. This system differed from the report system of the military order, in its duty to keep watch and ward on the frontiers and coast line. It was connected, however, with a similar military institution, for police purposes, to denounce malefactors, within the domain, to maintain order.

It was a primitive system which, in principle, has survived in the system of grand jurors. It was illustrated in the spy system of Sparta, which was a military State. The frontier guard system was illustrated, in Egypt, as described by Herodotus, in the incident of the arrival of Paris and Helen. The point to be kept in view is the fact that the "demagogue" was once an official person. It was in the nature of usurpation for a private person to assume a public office without authority. It is enough, for the purpose in

hand, that "demagogues," as "ward-leaders" (or mob-leaders) had, originally, an official status which allowed them to express the needs of their populations to their Sanctuary patrons. They were servitors, or deacons. The earliest types of the private, or unofficial demagogues, as already mentioned, appear in the Homeric age, as illustrated by Thersites, in the "Iliad," and by the Dockmen of the Phæacians, in the "Odyssey." Nausicaa, the king's daughter, warned Ulysses against the latter type who were adverse to the civil community. Thersites was adverse to the military class. The fact that he was "woolly headed" had its significance in the pride of race. The best of the military order were insulted, with impunity, by the lowest type of Guildsman. These types of the demagogue are traceable throughout the intervening period. In Greece, as we have seen, no two States were alike. Corinth, in a way, was the most tolerant of the Guild class. Its moral tone was low.

(9) DEMOCRACY. CORINTH, ATTICA AND SPARTA

(a) Corinth appears to have been the chief city in which the Guild class was dominant. In this respect, it contrasted with the military class, at Sparta, and with the earlier feudal military class, in Attica. In Corinth, the Sanctuary and the Guilds were long undisturbed in the development of a civilisation which was more or less peculiar to that City State. Corinth had the Phœnician type of Sanctuary in which religion, defence, industry and trading were joined on a common basis. Nature and art went hand in hand and manliness and money were in unrestricted competition. Money became dominant and men servient. Human brilliancy and human sordidness dwelt together with their respective qualities of attractiveness and ugliness. Moral excellence was appreciated but it had not much influence, either in the business of State management, or in the conduct of life. Corinthian civilisation was eminently maritime in its long association with sea power. The coarseness of a low moral standard of the social relations of the population tended to lessen the influence of demagogues. There were the usual two classes in the free population. The political community and the denizen population, which was accessory to that community, tended to be mixed. The story was short and simple. The accessory population, at last, found a leader and the political community yielded to a fusion. The enlarged body then became subject to despotism. The principle and the form of the State

was lost. The degeneracy of the mixed community had its usual effect on the State. The State was warped to accord with the degraded Sanctuary and with the Mercantile Guild. The colonial system of Corinth became more mercantile than military.

There was political incompetency in the Government. In following the ways of the Sanctuary and of the Guild selfishness prevailed over the principle of public policy. The colonists followed the selfish and separatist principles of the Guilds. The generosity of the soldier, the public spirit of the statesman, and the wide sympathy of the patriot were absent. The Homeland and the Colonial lands did not realise the value of the united domain as being, with the supremacy, the basis of defence and welfare. The united domain of the State tended to be disintegrated. The consolidation of political power was neglected and particularism and regional independence tended to break up the domain and to weaken the State. Corinth was unfortunate in its extended domain. Its colonies favoured separation and independence and, in misfortune, they followed, to some extent, the fate of the parent State.

(b) Attica did not become a democratic State until after a struggle. The Attic State, with its higher civilisation, had a military origin and it had its own accessory military Sanctuary. The influence of the demagogues was, at first, a novelty. It was allowed to develop. It then became antagonistic to the political system of the true State and with fatal effects. Attica had, already, passed from a composite feudal State to a unitary State, on feudal lines, with four domain tribes (or tribal communities) which retained their ancient precedence. The fourth tribe appears to have been added, at the time of the generalisation of the older feudal community, with the then newly enfranchised denizen population. There was, however, after this date, a new denizen population outside of the domain community. There is a point to be noticed and it is never to be forgotten. The tribal gradations were a means of stability and strength. They were akin to the grades in an army, for systematic direction, in the use of power. The mixed community, when it becomes divided by a conflict between quality and number, then ceases to be disciplined and orderly in the manner of a high class military community. At Athens, the reaction between the extreme parts of the mixed community was very remarkable. The higher grade part was small in number whilst the lower grade part was very numerous.

The Delphi Sanctuary was at work to promote its own aims by revolutionary means. The attitude of the revolutionaries was antagonistic to the State and to its Senate, the Areopagus, with

the design to abolish its magistracy. The Senatorial system was assailed and undermined. The servitors of the community were put in control of the domain. Magistracy, with its domain basis and with its Control and Executive "from above" (*ex supero*) was set aside to make way for the representative servitors with their control and direction "from below" (*ex imo*). There was a populace-sway or deme-sway, or democracy. This had the character of Guild-sway, or parochial control. The multitudes, made up of the multitudinous parts of the tribal bodies, were the greater in number. Number, as the test of power, became dominant, and quality was subordinated. The democracy, as the phase of multitudinism, was adverse to the State and, in time, it became adverse to the Sanctuary. It existed for itself, alone. In this respect, democracy, as the offspring of the Guild system, was akin to trades unionism, as the more organic part of the multitude. Democracy, in its selfishness, became more brutish than human. The stages of its career are significant. At first the property grades in the community were a means of excellence and stability to prevent the domination of numbers in a demoralised population. It has been true throughout the historic period, in respect of the State, that the qualities of excellence in its community have been peculiar to the few, or the minority, whilst the qualities of baseness have been characteristic of the majority, or greater number. The possession of political power, without the possession of the necessary good qualities, in political management, made the democracy of Athens a peril to the State. The safeguards of the several economic grades had lessened the peril to a minimum but, when these safeguards were removed, after the Persian war, the State then lost its main support in the more excellent part of its community. The rule of the majority, with baseness, then became dominant and the Senatorial system of the magistrates, with the accessory servitorial system, which co-operated with it, were swept aside and the control of the minority with excellence ceased. In short, the mixed community was controlled by its baser part so that it was never again able to reform itself. The State became subject to a foreign supremacy. In this way, democracy, as the sway of the majority of the population, has generally marked the decadence of the State and it has been the forerunner of its fall. In Attica, the community had cause to be proud of the military origin of the State, with its feudal type of constitution, and of its national Sanctuary accessory to the State. Attica had possessed a complete and perfect State. The union of the two institutions, with supremacy in the State and subordination in the Sanctuary had raised Attic civilisation to a fairly high standard of excellence. The

State trinity of tutelar deities, in a receding trigrade order, indicated that the industrial population had not been neglected. The large Guild population could have been usefully assimilated and upraised to accord with the systematic reform of the State's constitution and, also, with the expansion of the State's domain. The foreign Sanctuaries of Delphi and Delos had an adverse influence, in their needless interference, in the Attic State. Its own domestic Sanctuary, at Eleusis, had a domain influence which strengthened patriotism. Delphi had an international influence. Delos had a maritime influence which was, also, international. The two foreign Sanctuaries fostered internationalism which has always been adverse to patriotism, which has a cohesive influence in the State, in the defence of its domain. In Athens the main demoralising influence was democracy. It undermined the State's supremacy and it was disruptive in the State's community in setting class against class, and in placing the most excellent part of that community in helpless adversity, held down by the multitude. The deme-sway (or democracy) became mob-sway (or ochlocracy) in fact. The corroborated evidence of the ancients stands. The minority of excellence was swayed by a majority of baseness. The State was distorted by demagogues. The sway of the more numerous but less competent populace prevailed against the less numerous but more competent better classes. Low class electorates and high class representative agents have always been incongruous. Thistles do not produce peaches. The domination of the lower classes, at Athens, produced a kind of political paralysis which hindered reform and prevented progress. The more versatile part of the Athenian population survived and Athens, after its fall, remained a centre of many-sided civilised life. The greatness of a few Greeks, in several branches of excellence, in utility and convenience, contrasted, at Athens, as elsewhere, with the general low level to which the racial multitudes of the Greeks had fallen. The masses, under the influence of their deme leaders, or parochial agitators, as demagogues, could not appreciate the utility of the State, as a specific institution. Eleutherian freedom, or liberalism, with its clap-trap, had carried its corrupting taint into the most excellent and exclusive political communities with the usual results in degeneracy which follow the fusion of military and serf-tainted races. Degenerate races may be for a time improved by their fusion with more virile races. The more virile races have no such compensation. They are never improved by such fusion but in time, in particular cases, become unreliable.

(c) Sparta. The direct conflict between the State and its antagonist, the foreign Sanctuary of Apollo, at Argos, has already

been mentioned in the attempt of Phidon, Prince of Argos and President of a confederacy, to conquer Greece when the Senate of Sparta vindicated the independence of its State. The same Senate, in its internal conflicts, had, also, successfully resisted the attempts of its lower classes, in its Common Council (or Apella) to domineer in the State. It had, again and again, set aside resolutions in the Apella and, as the magisterial body, with the supremacy in the State, had maintained this supremacy, as in the true State.

The Government was "from above" (*ex supero*) and not "from below" (*ex imo*). The Senate of Sparta thus defeated the direct attacks made on it by its most determined external and internal foes. In the later attempts, by indirect attacks, it was unsuccessful.

Agents within the State, influenced by a principal outside of the State, caused the ultimate downfall of the State. When the Apollonian fraternity had established itself firmly, at Delphi, with a Sanctuary Senate, composed of members of priestly families, a systematic policy was arranged. Its purposes were attained with skill and tenacity to secure a part-supremacy in the various States which were subject to its influence. Delphi patronised Sparta, as the leading Doric State, in the Delphic bond. The Sanctuary and the State co-operated. Sparta, under Sanctuary influence, became involved in conflicts which were not its own, but arose to further the aims of Delphi, which had shared in the earliest revolutions both at Sparta and at Athens.

The Delphi Sanctuary, in its Apollonian cult, professed to be versed in the management of States. Its arms "the golden sword and the silver bow" indicated warlike principles. The State of Sparta supported the influence of the Delphic Sanctuary and was, in turn, supported by it. In their mutual efforts entanglements resulted. The mill, in time, turned round the horse that first turned round the mill. The origin and the power of the Ephors, at Sparta, were connected with Sanctuary influence. The tribunes, at Rome, had a similar source. In this light the Ephors and the Tribunes are worthy of study.

These ministers were the indirect means of interference, by the Sanctuary, in the affairs of the State. In each case these ministers were persons of the accessory class of the population, as denizens, or they were persons of the poorer class, as opposed to the domain class, the proprietors of the State. In the case of Sparta, Delphi was a foreign Sanctuary. In the case of Rome the Sanctuary was native, and within the State's domain, but it was connected with the same foreign cult. It is enough, for the purpose in hand, to illustrate the existence of sinister influences in the State, and

adverse to the State. These influences caused a distortion of the State and, eventually, its downfall. This influence, in each case, had the religious veneer of the Sanctuary and, with it, was combined the greed of the populace in organised predatory attacks upon the political community. The struggle was economic. The arrogance of the Sanctuary needed pre-eminent power in the State.

The Sanctuary was not in need of worldly wealth. The bigotry of the populace was connected with its slave-taint and its eleutherian freedom. The populace sought to drag down to its own level the more excellent parts of the community. In Sparta, the Apella, as the Common Council, with magistrates and servitors, was not exclusively a military body but, in respect of the non-magisterial part it was connected with both the State and the Sanctuary. The equality craze of the Guild became the common characteristic of the multitude, or democratic class.

The predatory instinct was in the same direction to make the rich yield their wealth to the poor. In the combinations between the indirect agents of the Sanctuaries and the leaders of the multitudes, as the demagogues, the varieties of creeds made no difference.

The Sanctuaries and the multitudes, being linked together by common agents, the Sanctuaries were skilful in design and the multitudes were strong in the force of numbers. The Sanctuary priests, by their sophistries, operated upon the minds of the multitude. The more penurious parts of the multitude were moved by the hope of gain and the means of attaining it. The unrighteous ends and means in the minds of the more ignorant, needed only to be infused with religious ardour to accord with selfishness. Suggestion did the rest. When the minds of the more base and ignorant were rendered acute, as to selfish gains, and were blinded as to the duty to others, it was easy to fix them with a predatory intent on the wealth of those whom they deemed to be their foes. Sanctuary doctrines became antinomian, in the sense that they were pursued in defiance of morality and law. These doctrines were unrighteously pursued against the State, whose ordinances were the laws of the land, the safeguards of freedom and the necessary means of welfare for its community.

The Dorians were a mixed people with the predatory instincts of marauders. The Dorian Spartans being, relatively, a small body in a conquered land, had to follow a military life to secure their safety against the native population. The Dorians appear to have escaped from slavery, or bondage, and were in need of new homes. Eleutherian fanaticism in emancipated slaves and bondsmen, has been a source of union and strength, by the hope of gain and by the fear of loss.

It was illustrated in the case of the Hebrews in their escape from Egypt, and in their subsequent invasion of lands to which they had no title, based on law or morality, although their religious fervour led them to slay or enslave the true owners of these lands. The Dorian invasion of Achæan Greece was akin, in its nature, to the Hebrew invasion of the lands contiguous to Egypt. Religious fervour and ritual practices made the invaders self-centred, as a people, apart from the rest of mankind, and sheltered under divine favour. This sentiment then became ingrained in the populace. The Spartans, like the Hebrews, had crude theories of economy. They preferred precepts to principles, and they were non-progressive.

(10) ROMAN CIVILISATION. PROLETARIANS

In the evils of Latin civilisation, in an antagonism to the State, there were several which had similar precursors in Greece. Indeed, some of the evils which exist to-day, although they have different names yet they are, in fact, but survivals from earlier times. In Roman civilisation in 560 B.C. the feudal system fell and, under the influence of the Sanctuary, economic grades were set up in place of the earlier domain grades of the tribal systems. This was a first step to the fusion of the domain community (or patricians), and the denizen population (or plebeians). In this new economic system of taxation, in support of the State, the lowest of the five grades contained the poorest of the free classes found among both the patricians and the plebeians.

In the economic scale the poorer patricians were less fortunate than the wealthy plebeians. The proletarians, as freemen, with political duties, were among those who were bound to the State by allegiance, and they lived under its protection. It was deemed to be enough for them, in their duty to the State, to be industrious and self supporting in the maintenance of their families and in yielding their personal services for use in defence of the State. Their income was small and on this account, they were relieved from the burdens of taxation. The proletarian class, at Rome, was very specific. It differed from the democratic class in Greece, as the latter was generic. In Rome and in Greece, respectively, the proletarian class and the democratic class were less low than the populace. The populace contained the freedmen, as the emancipated slaves and the strangers who, together, were more numerous than the fairly wealthy free population. The modern free multitude, which includes the populace, may be, in spite of

its freedom and franchise, a source of greater peril to the general community than the ancient populace was when, with its extraneous parts and its absence of political status, it was excluded from interference in the State. The ancient populace, by its presence, was a permanent menace to the State and to its community, and this menace tended to unify the community.

This fact may account, in modern times, for the existence of the extremist class, as a most mischievous body, which includes extraneous elements. These elements are found in company with trades unionism and they give it a tendency to both social and political baseness. It is true that, even in the ancient States, the slaves were allowed to belong to friendly societies which existed in connection with the Sanctuaries and caused the slaves, as a body, to be inclined to the Sanctuaries which favoured them and made them antagonistic to the State which excluded them. The slaves, as a consequence, had a share in Sanctuary prejudices, and ambitions which were adverse to the State. This sentiment of a part of the multitude spread to other parts of it. In the long career of the State, as a specific institution, it is certain that efforts have been made, in various regions, and, at different times, by classes antagonistic to the State, to modify its fabric of Government. The purpose has been either to suit, or to satisfy, dominant parts of its population, without a due regard for the State as a specific institution.

False political doctrines and adverse political parties have been united, in party bondage, for this purpose. These party efforts have, at times, been blind and spasmodic and, at times, well aimed and systematic. They have resulted in some cases in the defeats of the attacking forces but, in other cases, in compromises which have been steps to ulterior success in political mischief. It is enough, here, to recall the stages of tribunism, at Rome. This evil of the multitude began in plebeianism, as a part of the multitude, in the domination of the accessory denizen population, and ended in pure multitudinism, as in the sway of the proletarian, or pampered, poor population which was humoured and kept in check by doles and by diversions. This last stage of demoralisation at Rome was seen in the provision of loaves and shows of the circus for the idlers who were supported by the State. The proletarians included patricians and plebeians under the mild term of the "multitude." The lenity of liberalism, as the principle of eleutherian freedom, caused these degenerates to be pampered instead of being made industrious, as worthy members of the political community, in support of the State. The ideal of the State had been well realised, in early Rome, by its military class. The able-bodied unemployed had been moved to new parts of the domain

and planted in military settlements. The earlier Roman had been virile, frugal and thrifty. In later Rome this ideal had been obscured. The urban multitudes were very improvident. Their means of support were limited. They were allowed to grow as their means of support were lessened. They did not realise that prosperity abroad was better than adversity at home. It was realised that free labour could not successfully compete with slave labour. In this way the proletarian class became parasitic. The State stood but the minds of men changed.

The mentality of the multitude had its effect upon the State. Statesmen (or "men of the State"), in their several capacities, as magistrates, as servitors and as members of the political community, became demoralised. The mob-leaders, as political agitators, were allowed to disturb the State. Politicians, as tradesmen in the affairs of State, were allowed to take part in its management. Mercantilism and individualism displaced statesmanship and patriotism. The most characteristic qualities of the military community, which had made the public interest the primary standard of propriety in the State, vanished. In place of the public interest, individualism, in its selfishness, tended to make private utility dominant. Individualism, in its selfishness, tended, in this way, to brutishness which contrasts with the human excellence of self-sacrifice, as the characteristic of a military population, in its defence of the State, for the welfare of its community. The eleutherian freedom of the Greeks contained this individualism which was prominent in the liberalism of the Romans.

In the intestine political conflicts between the patricians and the plebeians, the compromises which, step by step, resulted from revolutionary movements did not end, at any time, either in a complete victory, or in a complete defeat, for either party, but ended in the final collapse of the State.

Rome, however, in the fall of its Republic differed from Greece in the failure of its several democracies. In Greece, the overlordship of Rome came, at last, as a real benefit in the guise of a calamity. It put an end to the aims and the agitations of the degraded multitudes. These multitudes, in their blindness, could not realise that a democratic institution was in the nature of an enlarged deme (or ward or parish) which is an institution of a primary, or low order, and that it was very far from being a State, which is a specific institution of the highest order. The democratic Greeks, who were unfit to rule, came under Roman protection and learned to obey. Excellence and baseness, in Greece, could not dwell together up to that time nor could they co-operate on a voluntary basis. The State and the dominance in it of Guildfolk

were in the nature of incompatibles. In Greece, under the Roman, the soldier, the priest and the Guildsman were all levelled down in subjection to Roman supremacy. Roman civilisation, in proportion as it was more military, was more virile. It contrasted with the more effeminate civilisation of Greece which had been infected with the almost incurable evils of the Sanctuary, the Guild and the market place. In Rome, the democratic position was never reached. Proletarianism had been kept under control.

At first the emancipated slaves as freedmen had their place in the census among the four city tribes. Later, the *comitia centuriata* was so modified that the principle of the economic grades was maintained even when the actual grades were abolished. The proletarian multitudes in Rome were lessened from time to time by planting military colonies in the new lands of the State. Parts of the multitude which, in Rome, were a source of weakness and loss, when moved to their new homes, became a source of strength and gain. In Rome, at last, when the clash came between the multitude and the magistracy, there was the choice to be made between the despot and the multitude. The despot, as the lesser evil, was preferred and the Empire came into existence. At Rome, proletarianism, in the garb of eleutherian freedom, or liberalism, had been the antagonist of the State, by undermining the Senate, and it became the antagonist of the Sanctuary, by undermining the College of Pontiffs. In the means, the combinations, at the last, were significant. Cæsar was a typical renegade both as a priest and as a soldier. Augustus was a moderator. He reverted to the ideal of the State. He held, by his office of Pontiff, a control over the Sanctuary and, by his tribunitial authority, a control over the multitude.

The antagonists of the State saw the political supremacy which belonged to the Executive united in one person, who deferred to the other and greater political supremacy, which belonged to the control, the Senate. This control was again restored to the Senate, in form, but this Senate was not restored to its ancient vigour to rest on a firm foundation. The multitude consists of several parts which contrast in worthiness and in viciousness, in wisdom and in folly, in intelligence and in stupidity, in knowledge and in ignorance and in other respects.

CHAPTER IV

THE ROMAN STATE

(1) THE STATE AND THE CREEDS

IN Rome's great domain of many provinces the Greek region was like the Spanish region, or the Gallic, or the Italian, or the African, and the various other regions, in being characteristic, in respect of population and customs. Many political supremacies had been swept away and, in these regions of the empire, the Sanctuaries and the Guilds were no longer dangerous antagonists of the State. The foreign environment of Rome's great domain ceased for a time to indicate perils from the outside. The main peril was within the domain, in the Roman populace, at the seat of the supremacy. The supremacy, within the great domain, became an organic despotism. This despotism, however, as an uncontrolled executive, was operative in securing revenues to support the administration of the Government.

In the co-operation of the departments of this administration there was mutual support. The high central Government was located in a group of superior and subordinate officers who maintained the political ties between supremacy and subjection. In the earlier period of the Roman Empire the Senate, as the sub-structure of the Imperatorship, was not systematically restored, and it was not invigorated enough to be effective, as the supreme control. The political system, the military system, with the judicature system and the revenue system, were all organic. The several regional Sanctuary systems and the Guild systems had ceased to be organic in relation to the political supremacy. They were disorganised and had become defective. The variety of creeds and the competition of regional industries were sources of weakness in this respect.

The Roman domain contained varieties of civilisations, the relics of ruined States, of thriving industries and of shattered creeds. In the administration of justice the soldier had developed criminal law to secure orderly conduct, and the priest had developed civil law to secure good faith and fair dealing, and, from the Roman centre, these branches tended to be generalised, in their principles

and precepts, to suit the needs of the empire population. Wisdom as the result of reason, propriety and utility, was active in the promotion of human welfare. Philosophic theories influenced the growth of knowledge. The principles of law, morality and religion tended to be generalised and specialised. What had happened in earlier empires was repeated.

The Roman State had never ceased to pursue the principles which are requisite in State management and in communal existence. The best traditions of Rome were connected with freedom and progress on the military basis of the State. The new creed of the Christians came. It contained a generalisation of principles which appealed more particularly to virile humanity. It contained principles both old and new. Its place of origin was a small region, but its scope of influence was not limited to either race, or region, or to class, or grade, or to soldier, or priest. Its appeal was to mankind and to the wide world. The creed grew and it became developed. It then naturally came into conflict with debased creeds which either yielded to it, or fought it. Its principles advanced and spread throughout the great domain. It had many points of propriety in respect of which there was no novelty in theory, or in practice. In the Sanctuaries the mechanisms of management were not much affected by the modifications of the creeds. Societies of laymen became organic for the purposes of religious services. The military communities had always provided for such services. They had their own ministerial priests and in courtesy and goodwill, they allowed them a certain precedence, but without pre-eminence.

These priests were subordinate, as the soldier never tolerated the supremacy of the priest. In the new religious societies all classes and kinds of the population were included. The priests eventually became dominant and the laity became subservient. The educational movement caused by the generalisation of religious and moral principles was duly noticed by the State and was regarded by its provincial populations. There was freedom of choice. The tendency of competition was to specific excellence. The new creed became, more or less, organic in its principles and in its precepts. The State, the Sanctuaries and the Guilds in this respect, came into line. The State which owned the great domain, with its politics and its variety of services, was organic and it was in the nature of a great household. The several Sanctuaries, with their religious and moral principles, became organic. Each Sanctuary, with a variety of services, as a society, became organic.

There was a tendency for all, as an aggregation in a system, to become a great household. It thus resulted that, within, the

great household of the Empire State, there were many Sanctuary households. The State, as an organic institution, and the Sanctuaries, as organisms, rested on the same domain, as separate great households.

The State was already united. It was only a matter of time for the Sanctuaries, also, to be united when the ancient rivalry and the antagonism of the Sanctuary to the State might be revived. There were provinces of the Roman Empire in which the political supremacy was not contested by the Sanctuary and there were other provinces in which the Sanctuary had been supreme, as in Egypt, where the political power was subordinate and accessory to it. There were other provinces in which the supremacy had been divided, so that politics and religion were managed apart. There were still other provinces in which the State had the supremacy and the regional populations followed their own religious inclinations without any State interference. The new creed having grown and spread, on the private basis of freedom of choice, by certain subjects of the State, there were reactions, by other subjects, on the same basis, either to older creeds, or to variant creeds.

The State maintained its previous practices but with a certain amount of hostility to those who were introducing innovations. Politics and religion were, thus, in contact and came into conflict. This disclosed an apparent phase of sedition. There was political life in the State and, apart from it, there was a rule of life connected with the Sanctuary. The State was a specific institution for the general purposes of defence and welfare. The Sanctuaries were service institutions for particular purposes. There was a tendency to a divided allegiance. The population was very mixed. Among military races as in Britain, and, generally, in Western Europe, the State had been supreme and its Sanctuaries had been accessory to it. The Sanctuaries held their privileges from the military order. In the Roman State this had been the original position.

Among the Sanctuary populations, as in Egypt and in Babylonia, the priestly order had been supreme and the military order and the Guild populations had, originally, been accessories. In Egypt, at the time of the changes of creed, the Roman Emperors held the office of chief constable, subordinate to the several regional Sanctuary supremacies there. Egypt and Britain, in this respect, were contrasted. The system, in Britain, was akin to the systems in Assyria, in earlier times, and, later, in Media and in Persia. The soldier was his own priest. His accessory priests were ministerial, secular persons to whom, in courtesy, as already mentioned, he allowed precedence without pre-eminence.

There are abundant traces of this principle among the patricians

at Rome. The cult of "*pietas*," as defined by *Cicero*, does not countenance any thing like Sacerdotal supremacy, as it existed in Egypt and with the Hebrews and, also, to a limited extent, with the Dorian Greeks.

(2) THE FALL OF THE STATE AND THE RISE OF THE SANCTUARY

It is necessary for the main purpose in hand to compress the salient facts of the position of the State into a small compass, in order to fully appreciate the antagonism of the Sanctuary, in the Roman Empire. The successors of the Emperor Augustus, as princes and priests, tended to follow the type of Sanctuary despots but without the Sanctuary restraint.

There was instability in Government and, from time to time, there were reactions in various directions. There was a reaction under Hadrian (117 A.D.) to the State as a military institution. Italy as a capital part of the great domain, was divided into four provinces, under consular officers. It was a characteristic change, which accorded with the practices of the feudal State, for purposes of administration. The other parts of the domain were in a similar position. The Senatorial Council, in respect of its structure, as the means of control, was neglected. The Executive ceased to be under the control. Despotism then came into power. In respect of the supremacy the Emperor, as the supreme executive officer, had two Councils. In strictness the "Senate" was a magisterial body; and a "Council" was only, in part, magisterial and, in part, servitorial. The Council was not a control but only an advisory body. The two "Councils" mentioned were, in a sense, accessory to the executive officer.

The *Consistorium* was like a Senate, but it was without independence, because it did not rest on a magisterial substructure. The *Auditorium* was like a judicature but it, also, was without a firm magisterial basis. There was unity in respect of the domain and of its Executive supremacy and there was the variety of departments incidental to State services. The Emperor was principal and the quasi-Senate was accessory. In the true State, it will be remembered, the Supreme Senate is principal and the Executive Officer, as the First Magistrate, is accessory to it. The domain of the Empire, under Diocletian (284 A.D.) was partitioned into two parts, viz.: (1) the Eastern part, with its capital in Nicomedia, and (2) the Western part, with its capital at Milan. In each part

there was an Emperor (Augustus) with a Deputy (Cæsar) as his prospective successor. The Christians had formed private societies and they were out of favour, in the sense that the State kept on its course and followed the previous practices which were, now, met by religious novelties, in the way of personal associations, on a private basis. A time came when the Emperor Constantine (312 A.D.) was victorious over a rival. He alleged that a visionary fiery cross with a motto had appeared to him.

He then protected the Christians by the Edict of Milan (313 A.D.) so that the Christian creed was tolerated and later (323 A.D.) he placed this creed on a public basis, as being his own creed and that of the State. The State and the Sanctuary (or a variety of regional Sanctuaries) were, now, in union but, as particular households, they were not united. The churches were still private societies. The Emperor held, among his dignities, the office of (1) Imperator, which was military, and the office of (2) Pontifex Maximus, which was religious. He was, thus, the common head of separate households. The bishops and the priests of the Christian societies now had public functions. The first General Council was held at Nicæa (325 A.D.). There was in fact under Constantine a reaction to the Sanctuary, just as there had been a reaction under Hadrian to the military State, but with an inclination more to despotism, in the Executive, than to Senatorial control, by the magistrates of the domain. Constantine changed the capital of the Empire from Rome to Byzantium (330 A.D.) to which city he gave the name of Constantinople.

The State was now being modified by Sanctuary influence. Constantine founded, in the capital, a new Senate and a new system of Government. The management was re-arranged. The Empire domain was partitioned into four great Pretorian prefectures, with military commands. Each prefecture was divided into several dioceses for revenue purposes, and each diocese was divided into several provinces, for administrative purposes. This quasi-feudal, or quasi-hierarchical, structure was but a reversion to an ancient type, with new names for its parts. It had, at its head, the Emperor and under him, four Pretorian Prefects. These Prefects had under them the several Diocesan Vicars (or Lieutenants) as Treasurers. These Vicars had under them the Heads of Provinces, the Presidents, who were of two kinds, viz. : (1) Proconsuls, or (2) Rectors. The Rectors (by a metathesis of the name Rector, pronounced Raytor and changed to Roytar) gave rise to the official name of Roi (or King), with the diminutive, in a later age, of Roitelet (or Kinglet). The whole system, in its headships, was, in fact a departure from the "Board" rule of feudalism to the "one man" (or monarchical)

rule of the hierarchical system. The State ideal was distorted to accord with the Sanctuary ideal.

When Milan was made a capital, in 284 A.D., the position of Rome, as the capital, was lessened. The further change from Rome, the old capital, in 330 A.D., to Constantinople, as the new capital, caused the courtiers of the Emperor to fall into the ways of the East, as the Levant, and to follow the habits which had been derived from Persia, Babylonia and Egypt. The Emperor became a kind of Pharaoh. There was not a military Senate but there was a priestly entourage. The Sanctuary ideal prevailed, in respect of the patriarchal system and succession. The Empire domain was looked upon as the landed estate of a despotic dynasty subservient to the Sanctuary. The Emperor directed that, at his death, the domain should be partitioned between his three sons: (1) Constantine II, who had, as his share, the Gauls, Spain and Britain; (2) Constantius, who had, as his share, the East; and (3) Constans, who had, as his share, the Prefecture of Italy.

The headship in the State, with the despotic supremacy, was thus deemed to be a dynastic heritage. The uncles, and some of the cousins, of these princes were slain in order to secure the succession by an effective Oriental method. When Constantius as sole Emperor, died (361 A.D.) his cousin, Julian (a nephew of Constantine the Great), succeeded, he reverted to paganism and is known as the Apostate. In a short time, however, there was a reaction to Christianity. He was succeeded (363 A.D.) by Jovian, who was proclaimed by the soldiers. He accepted their appointment on the condition that they became Christians.

Jovian restored the Christian creed, as that of the State. He was succeeded in 364 A.D. by Valentinian I who joined with him, Valens, a younger brother. The Empire was now (364 A.D.) again partitioned into two parts: (1) the Eastern, and (2) the Western, under the two brothers, respectively, the Emperors Valentinian I and Valens. The Roman principle of official succession, as the Chief Senator, accessory to the Senate of domain magistrates, had ceased to exist. The Byzantine principle made the succession a family possession in a dynasty. Valentinian I, in 367 A.D., associated his son Gratian in the partnership. On the death of Valentinian I (in 375 A.D.), Valentinian II, his son (an infant in charge of his mother), succeeded him as the nominal head of the new dynastic partnership: "Valentinian II, Valens and Gratian." Valentinian II had Italy as his share, and he dwelt, with his mother, at Milan. The real authority remained in Gratian, who ruled the West. Valens ruled the East, at Constantinople, until his death (378 A.D.), when the authority reverted to Gratian, who

ceded it (379 A.D.) to Theodosius, who was an able soldier and was also a convert to Christianity. Sanctuary influence was becoming dominant.

An advance was now made against paganism. The worship of the heathen gods was prescribed by an Edict. The altar of victory in the Senate House, at Rome, was, also, removed in spite of the protests of the non-Christian Senators. Ambrose, Bishop of Milan, influenced this procedure. Gratian, in a policy of compromise with the barbarians, employed a body of Alani soldiers and he assumed the Scythian dress. He appears to have flattered these barbarians into a bond of friendship. He also went to the opposite extreme in repudiating Roman customs. As Emperor, he had become vested with the Augustan office of Pontifex Maximus. He now refused to wear its insignia, as being inconsistent with his Christian creed. He abolished the privileges of the Pontiffs and also, those of the Vestals, at Rome. At this point it will be realised that it was within the period of Gratian's reign that Christianity became dominant in the State and throughout its domain. Bishop Ambrose of Milan had an important part in the change. He had been a lawyer before he became a bishop. He was generally versatile, but particularly he was determined and punctilious in making the new creed secure. His episcopal influence invaded the province of politics, that is, the business of magistracy in the management of the State. His influence was not confined to the business of the Sanctuary as an institution for the performance of a special service which was accessory and subordinate to the State. The Tribunallike pretension of the Bishop was based on an ideal which implied that the Sanctuary was supreme and that the State, or what remained of it, was subordinate to the Sanctuary.

The fallacy was common with non-military persons whose forefathers had been managed by priestly superiors. This ideal of Bishop Ambrose appears to have been acceptable to his then impressionable quasi-pupil who became Bishop Augustine and transmitted the ideal to a later period when a new Sanctuary was erected, at Rome, in the ancient seat of the fallen Empire. This new Roman Sanctuary was managed by regional Presbyters and Deacons under a Bishop. The ideal of Bishop Augustine's "City of God" (*de civitate Dei*) had a far-reaching influence. The reign of Gratian marked not only the rise of the Sanctuary, but the fall of the State, due to a collapse caused by intestinal mischiefs. The Hellenic civilisation had a pestilential influence on the State. Valentinian II was an Arian whose views were more characteristic of Sectarianism, in the Eastern part, than of the general acceptance

of principles characteristic of the Western part of the Empire. A general synod of thirty-two Western Bishops was assembled at Aquileia in 381 A.D., and Bishop Ambrose was elected as President. Two Bishops were then deposed, as a consequence of their Arian tenets.

In the same year the Second General Council of the Church was held at Constantinople. The unity of the State implied the relative unity of the Church. This was the unity of the Church as a Household in its relation to the State as a Household. In the West, in Britain, where the State and the Sanctuary had existed, in their proper relative positions, from a remote period, long before the Christian era, the revolutionary system, in the State, supported by the Emperor Gratian and Bishop Ambrose, produced a reaction. Military races were virile, free and generous, as shaped by ancestral custom. The soldier, as a principal, was his own priest and he had, accessory to him, his own ministerial priests. Military races were not willing to be dominated by priests. The reversion of an ancient policy resulted in an insurrection. Maximus advanced from Britain far into Gaul, with a large army, and Gratian was defeated and slain (383 A.D.). Britain, Gaul and Spain were, then, held by Maximus for five years (388 A.D.) until he was, in turn, defeated by Theodosius and was slain. Maximus had threatened to enter Italy, but he had been induced by Bishop Ambrose, as the Envoy of Valentinian II, not to advance. However, at a later date, he entered Milan and then retreated and was finally defeated. This insurrection, with the revolt and the expedition from Britain, shook the Roman Empire to its foundations. It foreshadowed the Empire's fall. The weakening of the magistracy allowed intestine mischiefs to thrive and be followed by the insolence of the populace with the insubordination of the soldiers aggravated by the quarrels of priests and the dissensions of the multitudes. The evils of uncontrolled adventurers, in their political ambitions, had done the rest.

The main fact is now clear. The Sanctuary had become, relatively, stronger than the State. The expedition from Britain became memorable. In a later age it had its place in the Arthurian romance as the "March to Rome." The new dynastic partnership was Valentinian II, Theodosius and Arcadius (his son). The State had become subservient to this dynastic system, because there was no substructure of magistracy as the foundation strong enough to support a Supreme Senate, with the control. The Executive, without this support and control, was not strong enough to maintain order and justice in the State. The ideal of the State was lost, and the ideals of the Sanctuary and the Guild were confused

and they tended to prevail. The dominant power of the Sanctuary was well illustrated when (in 390 A.D.) Bishop Ambrose caused the Emperor Theodosius to do penance. The rule of the priest had its demoralising effects. A Supreme Senate of great magistrates, sitting as justiciaries in its Judicature, would have been able to correct its prince, or Chief Senator, for a crime, had a crime been committed, with a due regard for the dignity of the State and that of its First Magistrate. It would not have tolerated priestly interference in politics, and it would not have demeaned its First Magistrate but, for good cause, would have deposed him and would have put another prince who was more fit in his place. The new dynastic partnership, after the death of Valentinian II, was "Theodosius, Arcadius and Honorius" (as the father and two sons). The patriarchal principle of succession continued to be observed. Theodosius directed that at his death (395 A.D.) the domain should be divided into two separate domains, as shares, between his two sons, Arcadius and Honorius, respectively, and hence came into existence the separate Eastern and Western Empires which were never again united. In the completeness of the circuit of change it is, now, clear that the reaction from the military State, in the plan of Hadrian (117 A.D.) to the Sanctuary State in the plan of Constantine (330 A.D.) had been a fatal inclination which had produced its probable and expected ending. The State being a virile institution, was able to secure the safety of both the Sanctuary and itself, but the Sanctuary, being an effeminate institution, was not able to secure the safety of either itself or the State. The State had been weakened when its magistracy was usurped by priests and its foundations were sapped by democracy (or mob-sway), whilst the Sanctuary, relatively, grew stronger by usurpation, by its own forwardness and by the support derived from the fanatical parts of the multitudes.

In the Sanctuary, however, there was a latent weakness, due to a conflict of principles and forces. The rule of the hierarchical system has always been, and still is, "from above" (*ex superno*). The rule of democracy has always been, and still is, "from below" (*ex imo*). The priest of the independent Sanctuary could not tolerate either equality with, or subserviency to, the laity. He was the shepherd. He could not be one of the sheep. The sublime pastoral ideals inclined the priest to a relative loftiness. On the other hand the democratic principle could not tolerate superiority. Democracy has always been selfish, fond of the equality standard and inclined to level down the excellent to its own baseness. It has always been satisfied when all were together in the mire. Excellence, in the few, was objectionable, and the

equality principle made it an abomination. Baseness, in the many, was congenial. The sublime influence of religious principles had its effects. The spread of a creed, which satisfied many needs, had made itself generally acceptable. It was accepted by the multitude. It allowed the secular priest who supported it to have a certain pre-eminence, or superiority. In the congregations of the minor regions, both rural and urban, there were sober-minded persons who were, in this respect, superior to the thoughtless rabble.

There is nothing more characteristic of higher humanity than mental sobriety. Among the sober-minded were those whose intellectual powers and moral excellence raised them above the rest in each regional aggregation of men who met voluntarily for an excellent purpose. The leaders of this excellent class formed the earlier Christian societies. Worthiness, wisdom and utility were involved in the process. A certain superiority, or excellence, made those who came within this Sanctuary influence of the new Christian creed, defer to a certain exclusiveness, in superiors, in order to secure the necessary qualities in those who ruled and served in the Sanctuary. This worthy, wise and useful influence produced a reaction from a general human baseness to a particular human and natural excellence. The tide of sentiment had turned. A vast and very mixed population was affected by its parts and by its individuals. The reaction had a constant and a refining influence. It was associated with the hope of gain and with the fear of loss. Utility, wisdom, and worthiness were thus united and banded together, in a system, against their several and singular opposites. The Christian meeting-houses became sources of sobriety, in thought and in utility of conduct, throughout the minor regions of the domain. There was no novelty in this practice in the earlier military community of the State. The mixed community had been influenced, as already mentioned, by its parts and individuals, and it was being elevated to accord with a higher standard of civilisation. Religious and moral influence became a means of orderliness in the State which has the primary functions of maintaining defence, order and welfare.

(3) THE DIVIDED EMPIRE. STATES AND CHURCHES

The Emperors Arcadius and Honorius (395 A.D.) became separate despots, in the two independent parts of the severed domain, in the East and in the West. These despots had no magisterial

connection with these separate domains except such dynastic authority as they had derived, as sons, from their father, Theodosius. The doctrinaire theories of both the Sanctuary fanatics and of the Guild multitudes had, at last, prevailed. These theories were used to promote revolution, and when put into practice they resulted in disaster. These theories rendered the management of the State, by the magistrates and servitors and the communities of its domain, ineffective for working purposes. The proper guardians of the State, as its domain magistrates, were displaced by a despot's minions, and the servitors of the domain community were deprived of their magisterial principals. The Senate, as the headship of the State, with the supremacy, and resting on the bulwark of magistracy, had ceased to exist. The incompetence of the despot and his minions, in the management of the State, could be illustrated. It is enough that the barbarians pressed the frontier guards and then entered both domains. The Western Empire fell.

In 410 A.D. the barbarians sacked Rome. The blind leaders of the blind, when it was too late, found that their victory, in their antagonism to the State, was the cause of its ruin. When the State fell, the population became defenceless amid widespread desolation. The thoughtless and reckless miscreants who, for several generations, had helped the Sanctuary to domineer in matters which were outside of its province, were the main cause of the political disaster. These miscreants, in the Sanctuary, and in the multitude, by means of their false political creeds, had combined to oust from the management of the State the trained soldiers who, as Senators, as servitors and as the virile part of the political community, in co-operation, had been the real source of strength in defence and in welfare. They had maintained order, in peace, and safety, in war. These soldier statesmen were well versed in public policy, in State economy and in political propriety. They were experts in the management of their own institution, the State. The priestly Sanctuarymen, such as the bishops and the presbyters, with the deacons were, also, experts in their own institution the Church (*Ecclesia*). The "Church" was a term which varied in value according to its qualification. It might be very diminutive, as being relational to a small local congregation. It might also be very large as being relational to the domain of an Empire State. It might be still larger and be used, with an inflated value, to include all followers of the Christian creed. The priests, in the latter case, might have been affected by humanitarianism and internationalism so that their political duties, and even the State, itself, may, in their view, have been obscured.

The soldier statesmen, in contrast, have been sober-minded. They have had the duty, at the risk of their lives, to secure the defence of the State's domain and the welfare of its community. These conditions were requisite, to allow progress and development, in every branch of utility. In the West, in the interval between 410 A.D. and 795 A.D., whilst military statesmen, in regions of the fallen Western Empire, were raising again, on feudal lines, new political institutions, to be developed into independent States, with their own domains, the famous city of Rome, which had been the cradle and the seat of a military Empire, became the cradle and the seat of a new Sanctuary domain. The Romans had been as strict, in respect of religion, from a military standpoint, common to free and ingenious races, as the Hebrews had been, on the Guildlike basis of their tribes, after the departure from Egypt. The Roman Sanctuary had a character and a development that was peculiarly its own when the Christian creed came into existence.

(4) THE ROMAN CHURCH

The Church in Rome, as a local Christian institution, as in other places, had originated as a private society. The other places had not the pre-eminence of Rome which had resulted from it having been the seat of a Great Empire. Rome, as the seat of a Christian society, or of several such societies, was in a secondary position, like all of the other local society bodies which were junior to the original Church body, in Jerusalem. The Church, in Rome, before the year 383 A.D., could not have rested on the public and official Pontifical basis, because it was not until then that the Pontifical office was discarded by Gratian, as already mentioned, and that the Pontifical privileges were abolished. The Church body, in Rome, at that time, had no pretension to superiority, or to any peculiar privilege, or to any right of domination over any other Church body. The term Pontiff, however, was not peculiar to Rome. It was used, at Rome, and, in the Roman Empire, as in Egypt and in Britain, and elsewhere. The more this point is scrutinised the more clearly does the truth stand out, as to the origin and status of the Roman Pontificate. In Britain, Christian societies, as Churches, had been set up as early as 69 A.D. A little later their bishops were accessory to the princes of the native States. The structure of Church management followed a familiar model. There was (a) the Overseer (Bishop), and (b) the Elders (or Presbyters, or Senators), with (c) the Servitors (or Deacons).

In Rome the fourteen regional parts of the city area appear to have been the basis on which the College of Cardinals was erected. The collegiate structure of graded Senators consisted of Bishops, Priests and Deacons. The President and the Senators had the name of Cardinals. The President had the modest title of *Servus servorum Dei*, as the "Slave of God's slaves." This is one version of an office which may have been the executive office of the college. This structure, in its form and principle, illustrated the affinity, in respect of management, between the hierarchical system of the Sanctuary and the feudal system of the State but with a difference. The hierarchical structure terminated, at its eminence in the "one man" rule, as in despotism. The President was uncontrolled.

The feudal structure of the State, at its eminence terminated in a "Board-rule," as in that of a Senate. The regal President was controlled by this feudal Board. In the earliest times, in the Sanctuary domain, the High Priest was deemed to be the Vicegerent of the Deity. In the same age, the military order had, in its trinity of Deities, its theory of a Celestial Council. At Rome, in the later age, after 383 A.D., when the new Sanctuary structure was set up, the Superior Bishop, as President of the College, described himself, with much modesty, as already mentioned. There is reason to conclude that the description had another version. This was *Servitor Servitorum Dei* or "the Knight of the Knights of God." This implied a source of authority in the College of Cardinals. In earlier Rome, as in other ancient States, the two orders of Senators and Knights were relational to the principle of "Master and Servant," in co-operation in industry. The Senators and the Knights were, relatively, "the Magistrates and the Servitors." The assumption of the term "Senators," in the political sense, at Rome, by ecclesiastics, would have been a flagrant usurpation. The term "Cardinal," in place of Knight, was consistent with subordination to the domain supremacy. In other ancient States, it is true, a State Senate and a Sanctuary Senate, were not unknown. The expression *Servitor Servitorum* in a Servitorial Senate would have been equivalent to "King of Kings" in a feudal Senate of magistrates. It would have indicated the office of President. It follows that the College of Cardinals, as a servitorial body was not an inappropriate name for it.

It is clear too, that the President derived both his title and his authority from the college, and not from elsewhere. When the celestial title of "Vicegerent of the Deity" was assumed there was a departure from truth and from propriety. Whilst it may be admitted that the structure and purpose of the College of Cardinals, at Rome, may have been well within the scope of utility

and propriety, it can be contested that this college, neither directly nor indirectly, has any right to set itself, or its President, in domination over States, or princes, or peoples, or persons. The celestial title of "Vicegerent" is, also, defective when tested by the Sanctuary principle of patriarchal succession. It was not derived from the primary seat of the Christian society in Jerusalem. Rome, in this respect, was in a similar position to all other seats of the new creed. These seats were very numerous throughout the Roman Empire, and they were not limited to it. Nothing, in the way of authority, can be derived from the term "Catholic." It was a technical term and one used by Aristotle in the sense that a thing, such as a piece of gold, or silver, was the same, or similar, "through and through," as being "genuine," and not one thing in appearance, as outside, and another thing within, as in the case of a piece of gilded copper. The logical value of the word was "true." At the time when the Christian creed had to be differentiated from a pagan creed, and other false creeds, the expression *Ecclesia fidei Catholicæ* as "the Church of the true faith" was a fair one. The "true faith" is a more logical expression than the "orthodox faith" which is a psychological expression. This term "Catholic," therefore, is not to be misunderstood when the elliptical expression "Catholic Church" is used for the thing, "the Church of the true faith," or, as a system, the several "Churches of the Christian creed."

There is nothing discreditable in the term "Catholic," and there is nothing in it which appertains, exclusively, to any particular Church, or to any branch of the Church, when the totality of the Christian body is considered. The test of truth is not found in the sameness of opinion held by all, or by a majority of persons however numerous the totality may be. The test of truth is found in its accordance with facts. It is enough, for the purpose in hand, that a time came when the Sanctuary founded, at Rome, after the fall of the Western Empire, assumed a title of Divine authority and it, also, exercised an influence to revive Roman political sway for the uplifting of demoralised and barbarous populations. The position of the Roman Sanctuary, to the extent that its interference was untrue and incongruous with the existence and welfare of States, when affected by the antagonism of rival institutions, is a matter of concern to patriots in the several States. There is need to look to the past and to the future. The State is a more necessary institution than the Sanctuary and it has done more for human progress than the Sanctuary. It is a matter of policy and action whether the blindness, or perversity, of the Sanctuary, in the past, are to be still tolerated, or repressed. It is true that,

in remote antiquity, the earlier orders, in the Sanctuary domain, were the priestly and military orders. Both orders, in the early Sanctuary domain had a common status but different branches of duty. The priests had duties of a civil kind with varieties in grades and in vocations. The soldiers had the duties of defence and of keeping order, as police, and, without these supports, the Sanctuary could not have continued to exist and exercise authority.

The soldiers were the justiciaries, or magistrates. Both the priests and the soldiers, as equally servants of the Sanctuary, were termed "sons of the Deity." This term "son," from earlier times, and from the east to the west, as in Britain, has survived with one of its meanings as "servant." When the State was evolved from the Sanctuary the military order retained its priestly status, with its own ministerial priests servient and accessory to it. The "S.S." symbols, *servitor servitorum*, are still borne by the State's justiciaries. The supremacy is now in the State. The Sanctuary is neither the equal nor the superior of the State. If the Sanctuary continues to be an international nuisance, and a peril to the welfare of States, it may be necessary, either to put it under the control of the State, or to suppress it.

(5) THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE

The Roman Church acquired domain lands outside of the City of Rome, in the contiguous regions. Hence came the source of political power which spread and grew. It resulted that about 800 A.D. the Holy Roman Empire was set up. The Bishop of Rome, as the Pope, and the Emperor Charlemagne, were its superiors. There were two provinces of part supremacy. There was a concordat. The Sanctuary had the prior part supremacy and was the principal. The Emperor's "coronet" was the badge of the Sanctuary supremacy. The State was accessory to the Sanctuary. The Church, as the Roman Church, and the State co-operated. The sword was subservient to the crozier. The military State and the Sanctuary College were united, as conjoint institutions, with separate provinces of duty. The expression "Church and State" became common, from this time, even outside of the Holy Roman Empire. In Britain, it will be remembered, the separate military and Druid systems were, in Cæsar's day, in respect of supremacy, in the converse position of the separate priestly and constabulary systems in Egypt. Both systems had originated, in a remote age, and both had been accustomed to

co-operate. The Holy Roman Empire followed the Egyptian models in which the Roman Emperors, even long after the Christian era, had the status of chief constable. In Charlemagne's Empire the priest and the soldier, as master and servant, respectively, were not long in accord, in many ways. Western Europe had long been the home of military races and of their institution, the State. The soldier, with his feudal system and domain supremacy, and the priest, with his hierarchical system and Divine supremacy, had incongruous ideals. The issue soon arose as to which was to be principal and which was to be accessory.

There was rivalry. The soldier had to be true to his own particular domain and to regard the feudal supremacy. The priest had his pastoral theories and his vagaries, as to humanitarian and international principles. The soldiers and the small feudal communities were subjected to the ambitions of the priests and to the rivalries and to the restless greed of the various populaces, which were subservient to the priests. The ideal of Bishop Augustine's "City of God" (*de civitate Dei*) had become prevalent in the Roman Church. The rise of the new Holy Roman Empire was but an extension of an ideal which had contributed to the structure of the Collegiate Sanctuary at Rome. Feudal States, in the meantime had risen in the West. Ancient feudalism had never ceased to exist in Britain, but had kept on its way influenced by its own ancestral customs. Britain had never been within the Holy Roman Empire, and, to the last, it remained outside of it. It was however, at times affected and disturbed by influences from within that Empire. When the Western Empire fell the Eastern Empire had to a limited extent survived. In the East, a somewhat similar result to that in the West had followed.

The Sanctuary principle was as characteristic of the East as the feudal principle was of the West. In the West, Britain had suffered less, because it was protected by its insular position when the continent was overrun by barbarian hordes. Britain was, again and again, invaded by daring military and maritime races, but, where its native races survived, or were not completely exterminated, it still clung to its ancestral usages. In the seventh century Roman ecclesiastics had realised how unyielding was the tenacity of the Celtic ecclesiastics. In the East, as between the State and the Sanctuary, the unity in the Church became relational to each separate domain. The Byzantine Empire had its own Church. The Roman Sanctuary, within that domain, was there only as an intruder. In the West, this fact was more accentuated after, than it had been before, the rise of Charlemagne's Empire. The Church, as a totality, as between the East and the West, was

deemed to have been severed in 1054 A.D. There was an attempt, in the West, to revive the Roman Empire and to include Britain within it. This was but a reversion to earlier attempts and all were associated with the Roman Church. In Britain, from the early part of the sixth century to the early part of the sixteenth century, there was a conflict between the State, on its defence, and the Roman Sanctuary in its attacks, and in its attempts, to acquire a part supremacy in the domain. Britain became free soon after the mediæval millennium. The native Churches of Britain were more ancient than the Sanctuary at Rome, and they had resented Roman interference. The attacks by Gildas, a priest, on the five native princes in Britain in the middle of the sixth century illustrated the typical insolence of Clericalism. The later pretension of the Roman Church to put Bishop Augustine in authority over the native Celtic Churches, at the beginning of the seventh century, illustrated, also, the continuance of an insolent pretension. The Roman Sanctuary, in its design to restore the Western Empire, influenced the Norman Conquest of England. It, also, at a later date, influenced the English Conquest of Ireland. The Norman Conquest by strengthening feudalism and military customs, resulted in producing a reaction against the Sanctuary.

The soldiers, as statesmen (or men of the State) stood by the State and resisted the attempts at priestly domination. The less intelligent classes and the more lowly parts of the population were subject to priestly influence. It would be idle to trace the political and clerical intrigues involved in the vain dream of Papal Rome to revive the Roman Empire, or to detail conflicts, like those between the Guelphs and the Ghibellines, in the friction between these supporters of the Church and the State, respectively. These parties, in their rivalries and contests, involved the Western part of the Continent in bloodshed for three centuries. The Holy Roman Empire, for the reasons indicated, was in the nature of a monstrosity from its origin and it did not thrive. The State is a virile institution. The Sanctuary is an effeminate institution. No State, so far, ever has thriven in which the supremacy in its domain was not in its magistracy. The main point still remains clear. The State and the Sanctuary are separate institutions, related as principal and as accessory, with, respectively, the supremacy in the State and the duty of subordination in the Sanctuary, as a service institution of the State. The indications of political science in this respect are corroborated by the words "Render unto Cæsar," which appear to imply the precedence and the supremacy of the State.

These words, also, consistently imply the secondary position

of the Sanctuary. The ambition, the perversity and the tenacity of the priest do not accord with public policy, as the most ancient and permanent test of a free community, in respect of defence and welfare. The rivalry of the Sanctuary with the State, and its antagonism to the State, have been among the greatest evils which have impeded human progress and have blighted communal welfare in the State. The international Sanctuary is more dangerous to States than their own domestic Sanctuaries. The truths of religion, like the truths of science, exist apart, and are not controlled by human opinions. The errors, in respect of religion, have been continued and propagated by the common fallacy that the truth must be what the greatest number hold it to be. In the late Great War some theories as to a divine right in princes were causes which had their effects in contributing to bring about that calamity. Every State to be safe must maintain its supremacy in its own domain.

CHAPTER V

THE STATE'S SUPREMACY

(1) SENATORIAL JUSTICIARIES

THE antagonism of the Sanctuary to the State and its supremacy did not stand alone. The somewhat similar and kindred evil of the Guilds, in their antagonism to the State, could be traced in the same way. It is enough, here, in relation to both antagonisms, to indicate that matters of religion, of morality, and of justice, in one domain, are not necessarily linked with these matters, in another domain. Each State has the supremacy in its own domain, with the duty to secure the safety and the welfare of its community, and, with it, the duty to abstain from causing detriment to other States. The State has no need to tolerate any interference, in these matters, in its own domain, by persons outside of that domain. There is, also, a duty in the State neither to tolerate, nor to allow, such interference, either by its own subjects, or by aliens in its domain, in these matters, in a foreign domain. The national (or the domain) populations of a State may, severally, have a variety of religious creeds, moral codes and standards of justice, and all of these creeds, codes and standards, although varying within reasonable limits, yet they may exist together under the same supremacy.

Propriety and freedom of thought are not inconsistent. They are, also, the heritage of the free. Excellence and baseness, intelligence and stupidity, knowledge and ignorance, with keenness and dulness of the moral sense, and, with rectitude and depravity in the conduct of life, will vary greatly in the several persons, groups, and masses. The vagaries of malignant persons, in respect of religion, morality and justice have always needed control. This control, to be effective, has been well exercised by a body of Senatorial magistrates. The great magistrates of the Supreme Senate were virtually the Justiciaries of the domain. They had passed through the various tests, in the process of electoral exaltation, to attain the highest grade of magistracy. The great Senators were the most able and trusted exponents of human excellence. These Justiciaries, as a class, were virile, generous and just. They

did not flinch from severity where duty to the State made it necessary to be firm. It is the duty of magisterial statesmen, in their management of the State, to have a strict regard for propriety, in all matters of religion, morality and justice, in the performance of that duty. They are not to be daunted, either by the scowl of the despot or by the howl of the mob. Demagogues are of various kinds and use a variety of means to lead the multitudes and to attack the State and its community, but they are not to be spared. The State is the great household of the community and the Senatorial magistracy, with the supremacy, has the duty to keep order, and to cause order to be kept, within it.

In a generalisation of the powers and functions of the senatorial magistrates, these statesmen, on the grounds of patriotism and welfare, have the duty to be strict and unyielding in the contest against all of the antagonists of the State. These statesmen share with the community the duty, in this contest, to inspect all political creeds which may be involved. They have to distinguish between generosity and liberalism, as they would between truth and falsehood. Appearances are often deceptive, whilst the realities have to be appreciated. In generosity there is genuineness and in liberalism there is hypocrisy. Mistakes arise where, without any intervention of guile, the true is taken for the false and the false for the true. The cause of a mistake may be the observer's negligence and it may, unconsciously, be connected with favour or with prejudice. It follows that the seeker after truth, in order to succeed, needs intelligence, with thoroughness and perseverance, for a clear judgment. Haste and passion and prejudice are common causes of error. The more there is of passion the less there is of sense. These defects often affect parties, in the way of parts of the multitude, and party cries are characteristic of dissensions in the multitude. The State is an institution of such excellence and magnitude that error has to be avoided not only in its management but in everything that relates to it. The parts of the State and the details of its constitution, in structure and in principles, with the general management of the State, may be made clear to persons of ordinary intelligence. There are other persons who are defective and incompetent and pass through their lives without ever being able to comprehend the nature of the State, or to take any useful part in its management. The gregarious instinct is traceable in the multitude and, with it, is the sentiment of sway and being swayed which gives rise to another sentiment of power which the individuals in the multitude associate with supremacy. In the language of demagogues this power, associated with supremacy, is often referred to its source in "the people," with

the implication that the ultimate control in the State is latent in the multitude. It is enough here, if the State's supremacy is differentiated from the sway of the multitude. The business of statesmanship, to be understood and mastered, needs ability, study and experience, as much as does the business of seamanship. The ship of State needs a proper staff and crew. There is no need for any one to be discouraged in the study of the ship and its management. It is enough to realise that the ship's staff and crew are distinct from the ship's passengers. The necessity will, then, be obvious that its passengers should abstain from interfering with the ship, its staff and its crew. The control is not in the passengers, although they may have paid their fares. The State is an institution which stands by itself and its several functions, with their various purposes, may be clearly indicated as all of its parts co-operate, under the supremacy which is relational to the State, as a whole. The supremacy in the State's domain and the varying degrees of superiority, in the descending gradations of power, relational to dominions, provinces, shires, hundreds and parishes, with cities, towns and villages, require, from all ranks of persons, a due regard for order, system and discipline in the proper management of the State. Public and private utility, and the magisterial and the servitorial agencies have all to be regarded from the standpoint that the State is the principal institution in its domain. The State's supremacy, as its control, is the magisterial supremacy of a Senatorial magistracy, as a body, and the executive, under this control, is in the first magistrate, as a member of the Senatorial body. The State, the Sanctuaries and the Guilds have always to be differentiated. This duty is not difficult to the intelligent and it is not easy to the dull.

Political heresies and Guild usages, which have been transmitted from the distant past, through the lowliest grades of the population, as they have risen to higher grades, in the domain, are among the main obstacles to political progress. Political ignorance is the most common source of political depravity. The influence of false creeds, as to the supremacy of the State, begins to produce its mischievous effects, either in childhood, or in the stage of youth, or of early manhood. In the military State the necessary training for defence purposes acted as a corrective.

The State, as an institution, in respect of structure and the operation of its mechanism of government, under the control, which is its supremacy, is akin to an efficient army, in respect of order, system and discipline, which import self-control. This self-control is best illustrated in a man of the highest type and, in the State, it approaches perfection, in a small group of men of the

highest type, well versed in State affairs, as in the members of a supreme Senate.

(2) MAGISTERIAL CONTROL IN THE STATE

The State, in its self-control, is akin to an army. In an army a disregard of order, system and discipline, superseded by the domination of privates over the subordinate officers, and by the domination of the latter over the superior officers, would lead to such disorganisation that the army, in name, would not be an army, in fact. It would be a rabble band controlled "from below," instead of "from above." The control "from above" is the true principle of control. It accords with the "master and servant" principle of *status* and, also, with the "employer and server" principle of *contract*. In the State, the antagonism to it has never been more marked than in the pestilential influences which have emanated from the Sanctuaries and from the Guilds. In eleutherian freedom (or liberalism) and in the licentiousness which has been contained in it, there has been mainly one evil with two aspects. Liberalism is a false type of freedom which was derived from the populace and it contrasts with the genuine freedom of the true and brave derived from the military races. The false type of freedom contains, within it, the seeds of licentiousness which need only a suitable soil and conditions to enable them to thrive.

The antagonisms of the Sanctuaries and of the Guilds to the State can be reduced to issues of criminality, by completely excluding them from any interference with politics, in the sense of the business of management of the State. There is no need for the State to tolerate any such interference by subordinate service institutions, but there would even be a gain, in confining these institutions, very strictly, to their proper functions, to ensure a due performance of them, within their proper scopes of utility. This course of conduct, by the State, is well warranted by the principle of public policy. There are, also, in liberalism contagious prejudices which cause detriment to the State.

Nationalism, in its relation to the State's domain, as the patriotic union of all of the domain populations, has to be differentiated from a variety of racial groups within the several provinces of the domain. This racial nationalism has to be controlled by the State. There is a converse position of racial influence which is, also, at times, adverse to the State. There may be several populations of like races in different domains, and their kinship may

produce a phase of internationalism, between the subjects in these domains, with detriment to the political supremacy of one or more of the States. Here the sentiment of internationalism may become the negation of patriotism, in its disregard of domain duties. Gregariousness, as an instinct, as an inclination, and as a force, may affect the multitude, as it affects the lower grade of animals, in the brute creation. A similar gregarious tendency affects those who hold the same tenets, in respect of religion, morality and justice. There are inherent human tendencies and influences, which affect the various parts of the population of States, and they, sometimes, cause reactions against the State.

(3) POLITICAL DEGENERATES

The antagonism to the State of political degenerates, in respect of allegiance to the State, may produce political apostates. This class may include the unpatriotic followers of foreign Sanctuaries and of Guilds, both domestic and foreign, or the descendants of such followers. The Sanctuaries have inclined to an arrogant profession of humanitarian principles, as though they had a monopoly of knowledge and practice, in this respect. The votaries of these Sanctuaries, now, ignore the patriotic regard for the several States to which they are subject. They add to it a supercilious contempt which is characteristic. Traces of this inclination to ignore the State and to incline to the Sanctuary, may be seen in the Hebrew race, and in like races, with Sanctuary antecedents. This characteristic is, also, traceable in Christian sects, as in Romanists and in other religious denominations, as in Moslems and in Hindoos.

The cause and the effect may be compactly stated. These types are infatuated with their particular ideals which are more akin to the Sanctuary than to the State. This characteristic, in its existence, accords with the fact that the multitude, in each group, or sect, is much more affected than particular persons of the higher grades of men with more virile qualities. The latter, in their excellence, appreciate their duties to the State yet avoid any baseness in respect of their creeds. The Guilds incline to international principles, either on an industrial, or on an economic basis. The struggle for existence has had its effects. Their members are much wrapped up in their own selfishness and they disregard the allegiance owed by them, as subjects of their several States. Their industrial comradeship, on the personal basis, is stronger

than their patriotic allegiance to the State, on its domain basis. The political degenerates, who are easily lured away from their duties to the State, indicate the constant characteristics of liberalism and licentiousness, in place of generous freedom and its relative propriety.

Political laxity has always been associated with moral perversity. It is like the apathy and negligence which allows ill weeds to grow. In contrast to the political degenerates the opposite characteristics may be found, at the other extreme of the community. There is, usually, an excellent class in the State which, in number, contrasts with the multitude. Militarism, in its racial excellence, has usually been patriotic. It necessarily has an affection for the domain which it guards. It is, usually, imbued with the principles of order, system and discipline, in a service of defence, which is akin to service in the management of the State. The trained soldier, in his study of human nature, knows the sources of his own strength and, also, the causes of weakness and depravity which may be found in his foes. In an attack by a military State, in conflict with other States, the soldier knows that the opposed States, in their mixed communities, have sources of weakness and peril, in their degenerates, who are affected with humanitarian and international proclivities. These evils, by their thraldom, corrupt and weaken the mixed community, the State's political community on whose excellence rests that manliness which is necessary in the defence and in the management of the State. The more excellent class in the community, by its worthiness, its wisdom and its ability, is a source of pure gain to the State, but it is usually hampered, where there is a mixed community, by not being free to the extent that, in a regional body, it is affected by the influence of the degenerates in that body, who are held in the thralldom of ignorance and of political heresies. It is true that, in Britain, an effective remedy existed to lessen the evil of the mixed community, by allowing more freedom to excellence.

The trigrade electorate, which existed in England for a period of 620 years, went as far as human wit could go in alleviating a great political evil. The graded electorates of knights, citizens and burgesses, with their higher and lower qualifications, in both the electors and in the representatives, allowed excellence and baseness to go to their opposite extremes and the good and fair mediocrities to stand between them. It also formed a bond of union which prevented a war of classes. This ancient and excellent part of the famous Constitution, in its loss, in recent times, illustrates the evils caused by political ignorance and by political degenerates. In the exercise of the State's supremacy, to secure its stability

and safety, it becomes necessary to consider and to apply the remedies which are proper to control liberalism and its kindred licentiousness. The slackness and hypocrisy of liberalism have to be replaced by the strictness and the genuineness of true statesmanship. It is fairly obvious that political degenerates ought to be rigidly excluded from any political interference in the State to which they belong. An efficient State is like an efficient army. A State which has been deformed to accord with the type of a Guild cannot be efficient. The deformative effects in the State have been due to causes in the political community, in that part of the community which contains the political degenerates. The evil is either curable, or it can be lessened from being a peril to be only a nuisance which is controllable. It would be possible, and it would also be fair and useful, to formulate, as criminal issues, the breaches of political duties and the penalties to which, by misconduct, political degenerates would render themselves liable. Frivolity and licentiousness are not to be tolerated in the management of the State. These evils are intolerable in the management of a dominion, a province, a shire, a city, or a town. Freedom and worthiness are lessened where such evils exist. It is not mainly a question of pity for unfortunates who may be reformed. The main point to be considered is the safety of the State, with the stability of its Government, and the welfare of its community.

The State's supremacy and its proper exercise for the control in Government is an essential characteristic of the true State. It is, therefore, inconsistent with this characteristic, to allow to the Sanctuary either this control, or a part-share in this control. It is equally inconsistent to allow the parochial populations, either apart or together, to possess this control, or by direct, or by indirect means, to have a part-share in it, or by any means, to oust the supreme magistracy from its exercise, as by the Supreme Senate, with the headship in the State. Liberalism and licentiousness are species of a political disease which has always been, and still is, most baneful to the State's supremacy. It is a disease which, in the public interest, is well worth a thorough investigation. It has behind it a history of its origin and career which, if generally known, would render the evil innocuous to the multitude. The specific evils mentioned favour, and are favoured by, political degenerates, in the reckless and thoughtless multitudes. These evils are very prominent in the successors of the ancient industrial friendly societies, the workers' Guilds, which in modern times have taken the name of "trades unions." Their false tenets are propagated by pathetic rather than by logical appeals. The State is beyond the view and the grasp of these pitiable societies. It is

not to utility and the common good that they look but to wastefulness and to selfishness. Their members and supporters whine for a "living wage" and soon change their note to a "decent living." They advance, then, and clamour for "more pay and less work." Having combined against their employers and the rest of the community, in the furtherance of their own selfish and predatory aims, they reach the climax of their ambitions in "demanding" a "Labour Government."

In Britain, in recent times, the pernicious political heresies mentioned have gently sloped the way for the decline and fall of the State, that it may be replaced by a monstrous institution of the democratic type. It is no secret that international forces are at work, guided by mischievous political degenerates, and that, among their aims, may be included the disintegration of Britain's Empire. The bands may be small, and their purposes may be concealed, but keen and sober minded patriots are aware that the influence of "Hidden Hands" is not a figment.

(4) THE MAGISTERIAL STRUCTURE IN THE STATE

It is well for a moment to look at the State to notice the structure of its Government and the ancient and proper seat of its supremacy. The three seats of power in the State, as the three estates of the realm, it will be remembered, were—

- (1) The Crown (or Supreme Senate);
- (2) The Great Council; and
- (3) The Common Council.

The Common Council was divided into two Houses: (i) the House of Peers (or magistrates) and (ii) the House of Commons (or servitors). There were, thus, four bodies but only three estates which are all, necessarily, magisterial bodies. The House of Commons is not an estate because it is only a servitorial body. (2) The Great Council and (3) (i) the House of Peers were one and the same body in separate characters. The *Great Council* was the court of magistrates of the realm. (1) The Crown (or Coron, or Senate) was the court of *great magistrates* of the realm. It was the standing committee of (2) the court of Great Council. (1) The Crown (Coron, or Senate) was thus the court of *great magistrates*. The King, as the President of this Senate, held the office of First Magistrate, or First Peer of the Realm. His fellow great magistrates, in the Senate, held the several great offices of State which made them Intendants of the several departments of State.

This Senate of ten (or twelve) great magistrates, in Council, gave to these officers the *status* of Justiciaries. They had the supremacy in trust for the Court of Great Council, which, in turn, held it in trust for the shires of the realm, the peers having been the old domain constituents of the Court of Peers. The State's supremacy, it can now be seen, rested, exclusively, on the magisterial branch of domain agency. One of the best traditions of the State in Britain, has been justified by the conduct of the peers, in the fidelity with which, from time to time, they have preserved their trust, in resisting the attempts of the servitors in parliament from invading the jurisdiction of the magistracy.

(3) The Common Council, or the Court of Parliament, contained (i) the Peers (or the magistrates) and (ii) the Knights (or the servitors). The purpose of the Common Council was to allow the magistrates of the domain and the servitors of the community of the domain to meet, in Council, for the consideration of affairs of State, for the defence and welfare of all the regional communities of the State. The Crown (or senate) was the accessory of the Court of Peers, because it was the standing committee of that Court and not of the Court of Common Council. The servitors in the Common Council were, also, the accessories of the Court of Peers which was then constituted as the Court of Common Council.

(5) THE CONSTITUTIONAL MAGISTRACIES

It follows, from what has been stated, that the Court of Peers, as the Court of great Council, was the foundation of magistracy, in the realm, as distinct from the shires, and that its standing Committee, the Senate (or Coron) which had the supremacy (or control) known specifically as "the Government," rested on the great Council and was accessory to it. It follows, also, that the Throne (as the kingship) was, in turn, accessory to the Senate (or Coron) and was, therefore, also accessory to the Court of Peers. The King was the Executive Officer of the Senate. He was not a despot. He was not a monarch. He was a Constitutional King, or Chief Senator, subject to the control of his fellow Senators, the other great magistrates who were members of the Senate (or Coron). It follows, further, that when the Common Council (or Parliament) was divided into two Houses, as (1) the House of Peers (or magistrates) and (2) the House of Commons (or servitors), no change was made either in the structure of the Constitution, in respect of its three estates, or in the principle of magistracy.

The King remained as the First Magistrate, and as the accessory of the magisterial body. The House of Commons, also, remained, as the accessory of the same magisterial body. It follows, finally, that neither the King, nor the House of Commons, is an estate of the realm. It is, also, conclusive that the supremacy in the domain is, indirectly, relational to the King, as the executive officer of the Senatorial magistracy, and that this executive function does not rest on the House of Commons because that House is an exclusively servitorial body.

The partition between the magisterial and the servitorial branches of agency has to be kept clear. In the course of about five centuries the House of Commons has followed a policy of usurpation which has distorted the Constitution and has broken down some of its parts. The Cabinet, which is a purely ministerial body, has usurped the position of the Council of State, the ancient Senate, which was a purely magisterial body. The House of Commons, which was originally a worthy and an expert body of servitors, in three grades, has been debased, in part, by the abandonment of the several qualifications which were, and still are, necessary both for efficient servitors and for efficient electors and, in part, by lowering the three electorates to only one grade. In this debasement of the electorates quality has been abandoned to numbers and certainty and efficiency have been abandoned to chance and incompetence. It is, under these circumstances, as already mentioned, that political degenerates are "demanding a Labour Government" for the State. In the reaction against this political villainy the clash of opinions may arouse a patriotic interest in the State, its Government and its community which may lead to the prevalence of more sober views. The imminence of a real peril to the Empire may appeal to the responsible community of the Empire domain to stand by the State. The false tenets of eleutherian freedom, or liberalism, contain many of the fallacies and prejudices of plebeianism and, with them, the seeds of licentiousness. The holders of these false tenets have to realise that the Government, the Executive and the Administration are a trigrade trinity. The control, the kingship and the Cabinet, are all accessory to the State and to its supremacy.

It is not for the lowest grade of the population, by its servitors, the lowest grade in the House of Commons, to usurp magisterial power in the State and to domineer over the rest of the community. The claptrap of demagogues has found its way into the House of Commons and political pretences have been set up in relation to the State's supremacy which have no basis in fact. Vices and political terms have been imported from degeneratés, in fallen

States, in which corruption had had its way. The terms "monarchy," "aristocracy" and "democracy" are, in strictness, terms and things not known to the Constitution, in Britain. Such composite expressions as "Parliamentary Government" and "Limited Monarchy" are but loose expressions formed in the attempt to illuminate the minds of the multitude. It is enough, in respect of the State's supremacy, that there are, in the domain, internal forces which are antagonistic to the State, to lessen its supremacy. There are also, external forces which are hostile to the State, and these are not to be neglected. There are kindred internal and external forces, antagonistic to the State, and against these it is necessary, always, to be on guard. In the recent attempt of the Prussian dynasty to restore Charlemagne's empire by the expansion of the German domain, it is now clear that preparatory processes had been at work to disintegrate rival foreign States. Clericalism, with the vicious political tenets of the international Sanctuary, joined forces with those who held Marxian tenets, connected with the Guilds, or Unions, of operatives, to form international influences which were detrimental to prosperous States and, in particular, to Britain's Empire. The peril, for a time, has ceased. Prussian militarism is in the mire but Clericalism and Marxism are still unbroken.

In Russia and in Ireland the pernicious tenets of the creed of liberalism have been preached and practised. Political reprobates have been the means of attacking the State's supremacy by corrupting the more ignorant parts of the populations. In India, and in Egypt, in Australia and in Canada, in South Africa and in other regions of the Empire domain, political heresies have been fostered for the same mischievous purposes. These heresies, however, have been held in check by the intelligence and the patriotism of the more sober minded in the several communities. There have always been parts, in the domain population, as in the multitudes, which parts, by specimens, may be identified, and a generalisation of these parts may indicate such of them as are antagonistic to the State. The antagonists may be specified.

CHAPTER VI

THE STATE'S ANTAGONISTS SPECIFIED

(1) THE SANCTUARY ANTAGONISTS

IN the antagonism to the State internal and external foes have to be grouped apart from the State community. They differ from the common criminals who are only occasionally guilty of political crimes when they attack the State and its community. The real foes of the State are systematic in their aims and in their processes. The persons banded together are organic in their co-operation. The principle of their conduct is traceable in their purposes and in the means to attain them.

In Western Europe the antagonism of the Sanctuary to the State, as already mentioned, has been more or less systematic since the fall of the Western Empire. In the reaction to defence by the State, to maintain its supremacy against its rivals, no region of the earth has won a higher, a more useful, or a worthier record than Britain. It is true that military races and the feudal structure of the State were material factors in the strife of a thousand years when, at last, by a victory, the State, in England, became, again, supreme in its own domain. It is, also, true that the influence which was derived from these factors in the existence of a clear-headed and a stout-hearted shire gentry was adventitious. The mixed community was still represented by the three grades, in the magisterial branch and in the servitorial branch of agency, on behalf of the community. It is enough, however, that the State won a victory which had a worldwide influence in the revival and in the advance of civilisation. The State then excluded any interference in its management by the foreign Sanctuary and, also, subjected its own Sanctuaries to their due subordinate positions, as services, and confined them to their proper functions. The quality of the political community which took part in the management of the State for several centuries was an important factor. The higher classes in the domain were free and enlightened. These classes were independent in not being held by the tentacles of the less enlightened multitudes. The trigrade electorates had their relative graded representatives in the House of Commons. The knights

and the servitor citizens, like those of London, stood by the State. The servitor burgesses were not reliable and many of them were incompetent. Since the epoch of the Reformation the ideal of the State has tended to prevail with trained statesmen, but it has been less appreciated by the multitudes. This ideal of the true State has had a worldwide influence on the structure of the State's Government and on the management of the State. The effect has been greater in Britain than it has been on the Continent, where the reaction to the State has never been effective, in completeness. The incongruity of a state being, in form, independent in its own domain but, in fact, without its own Sanctuary, and having to tolerate the interference of a foreign and an international Sanctuary, in its domain and community, has been an incident of common occurrence. France, the nearest neighbour to Britain, is still without its own national Sanctuary and, in its public worship, is dependent on a foreign Sanctuary to which a large part of its population owes a sentimental allegiance. France is not the only State on the Continent in this predicament. The Continental States, within the region of the fallen Western Empire, have been liable either to yield to or to resist the political interference of the international Sanctuary. The bulk of the population has usually been influenced by this interference, with the result that the general population has exercised a certain sway in political affairs, as in the management of the State.

The State's toleration of the foreign Sanctuary's interference has never lessened that Sanctuary's pretensions but has encouraged and facilitated its machinations. Liberalism, in its variety of phases and follies, in this respect, has been a constant source of weakness in the State. It has been the cause of slackness in the State, on a point which is vital to the State, and on a principle in which strictness, in its regard for propriety, ought to have prevailed. There could have been toleration of what was good and useful with a rigid exclusion of what was mischievous. The improper pretensions of this Sanctuary have never been abated. Its aims are still incompatible with the safety of States generally, and with the welfare of their populations. These aims are, and have long been, incompatible with the safety and welfare of Britain's Empire. The State, in Britain, with its venerable origin and career, can well afford to meet the antagonism of this Sanctuary, without rancour, or passion, or prejudice. It can go further and, in a punctilious regard for propriety, it may help that Sanctuary to reform itself. What is good and useful in it may be preserved and kept free from viciousness.

If civilisation is to advance it will be within States and all States,

in this movement, as true States, must maintain their forms, their principles and their proper functions, for the defence and welfare of their communities, as against the evil influences of their common antagonist, the international Sanctuary, and irrespective of its creed. The Empire, as a true State, has a duty to itself.

(2) THE SANCTUARIES AND THE CREEDS

(1) *The Roman Church* may be indicated as being in a characteristic way the antagonist of States generally, and in particular of Britain's Empire State. This Sanctuary body is not subordinate to any lay superior. It professes to be a religious superior and, also, a political superior and not subordinate to any State but to be the superior of all States. Its pretensions are fine and large, but its origin and its career, with its growth and its decline, are all easily traceable and they do not accord with its pretensions. It is an organisation which exists for itself alone. It is managed by a priestly coterie which in part is Italian and, in part, is international. It competes, within Britain's Empire, with the several national Churches which are accessory to the provincial parts of the Britannic domain, and are in allegiance to the State and, in this allegiance, are wholehearted and patriotic, in being devoid of any foreign affinity.

The Roman Church is an intruder in every domain other than the Italian domain. The position is not altered by terming the Roman Church the "Catholic Church." The Roman Church, as a Christian body, has some peculiar foibles, in this respect. The domain of Britain's Empire is deemed by that Church to be in the regions of the Infidels (*in partibus infidelium*). The Roman Church has the desire to displace and to supplant the national Churches of the Britannic domain. It has other influences and aims which it is needless, here, to specify.

An international Sanctuary has to be considered in various positions. It may be antagonistic to States when it stands apart and alone, and, also, when it has a place in political combinations. The Roman Church, in this respect, has followed the practice of ancient international Sanctuaries. In recent times, the antagonists of the State, both within it and outside of it, have co-operated in their attacks upon the State in support of an ambitious political potentate who desired to set up a dominant State, with a world-wide supremacy. The militarist despot had said, "There shall be one empire and one Church." The despotic priests of the international

Sanctuary had said, "There shall be one Church and one empire." The sword and the crozier were to help each other in the common purpose. At the time of the pact it was a secondary matter as to which of these confederates was to have the supremacy and, if this was shared, as it had been shared before in Charlemagne's empire, which was to have the precedence. The renegade militarist despot and the renegade despotic priests, as the confederated antagonists of the State, contemplated a worldwide revolution. Wars were to cease. This was the main purpose of the Great War. It was not only to change the balance of power in Europe. The ultimate aim was to secure the conquest of the world. Had this co-operation, in an evil purpose, been successful, the true state, as a consequence, would have been suppressed. The distorted State would have come into existence, as a political monstrosity, with the united despotisms of renegade soldiers and renegade priests, at the summit, and with the renegade multitudes at the base. There would have been an unstable equilibrium.

Revolutions have their reactions. The foes of the free and virile community, the debased and unpatriotic proletarians, by their strength in numbers, would have co-operated with the united despotisms against the more substantial parts, the higher classes and the middle classes of the political community. In the end the military class, which contained the more substantial parts of that community, would have been ousted; and despotic priests, with the proletarian multitudes, would have won the final victory.

In a world ruled by one State, militarism must necessarily have ceased to exist except for police purposes. The State would, in time, have gone down and its political community would have been suppressed. The late war, on a large scale, had had its predecessors, on a small scale. In Europe alone there are records, and in Asia, as in China, and in Africa, as in Egypt, there are significant relics of revolutionary processes. In regions of Europe two wars of a type were characteristic. One was very notable. The renegade soldier king, the renegade priest and the renegade Guildsman were confederated. Phidon of Argos had a temporary dominance in the Greek peninsula. The other war was similar, but some centuries later. Tarquin of Rome had a temporary dominance in the Italian peninsula. In the recent Great War the influence of the foreign Sanctuary was traceable in the support of Prussia, and also in the antagonism to Britain's Empire. Priests, born within the Empire domain, but trained in the service of the foreign Sanctuary, were affected by the evil of the divided allegiance and were untrue to the Empire's political supremacy. The mischiefs

associated with priestcraft in Ireland, in Egypt, in India and in the Dominions, and the minor provinces of the domain, were connected with the same international Sanctuary. The headship of this Sanctuary has reverted to its mediæval pretensions. It is not satisfied with the term "international." In a recent profession, it has declared itself to be "supernational." It is, therefore, an antagonist of the true State because, in the domain of such a State, it has not, and it cannot have, any domain authority. In its vanity, its wilfulness and its perversity, it still pretends to have authority where, in truth, it must necessarily be only a mischievous intruder. This authority is sometimes termed a "jurisdiction" and, as such, it is clearly a false pretence. In this conflict between the State, on its defence, and the international Sanctuary, in its attack, liberalism, as the creed of the multitude, has taken, and still takes, the side of the Sanctuary. Liberalism, when it is called upon to review the history and the career of the State, in its conflict with the Sanctuary, is benighted. It is, at once, face to face with its own spectre. It sees its own origin and it is driven to review its own history. It is, then, confronted with the fact that it is, itself, a tissue of political hypocrisy and a by-product of debased Latin civilisation. Liberalism strongly prefers that its ancient ally, priestcraft, should be left alone. It admires astuteness and cleverness in the management of the masses. The traditions of liberalism have made liberalism itself hostile to the State, in the hereditary prejudices which survive in its dupes, in the multitude. The cult of "eleutherian freedom" was developed by the emancipated masses, as in plebeianism. Its hostility to the State remains unchanged in the fact that it cannot tolerate the Senatorial magistracy. This is a bond of union with the Sanctuary.

The virile freedom, associated with military communities, in their generosity and good-fellowship in patriotism and in welfare, was connected with feudalism, and was akin to patrician freedom, and, therefore, to political excellence. Worthiness and excellence, in the political community, have always contrasted with viciousness and baseness. There is still a wide margin, as there has always been, between the highest and the lowest classes in the population. The higher classes have been more virile and independent and did not tolerate the supremacy of the priest. The lower classes contrasted with them and have generally been subservient to priestly patronage. Liberalism has been a strong link between the Sanctuary and the multitude. It has united the Sanctuary and the multitude, in their prejudices against the State and against its political community, and it has favoured the aspirations

of the Sanctuary and the multitude to be dominant in the State.

The gulf which divides generosity, as the principle of ingenuous freedom, from liberalism, as the principle of eleutherian freedom, noticeable in emancipated populations, is as wide as that which divides the true from the false. It may, therefore, be concluded that the evil of antagonism to the State, indicated by the Sanctuary alone, or by the Sanctuary and the multitude, is not inherent in the Christian creed, and it is not inherent in religious principles. It is an evil not peculiar to the Christian period, but is a heritage from the past, as a survival from a decadent civilisation.

(2) *The Greek Church*.—The other Christian Sanctuaries are either international, as the Greek Church, which was, originally, relational to the Eastern Empire, or they are national. There are various independent Churches which have become national but with affinities either to an earlier regional Church, or to the Greek Church, or to the Roman Church, or without such affinities, where they have risen on their own foundations. There were Churches, in Britain and in Ireland, in Gaul (France) and in Spain, in the earlier Christian period, before the Roman Sanctuary had been set up. The Britannic Churches and the Gallic Church had illustrious origins and careers. These Churches have not necessarily been antagonists of the State.

(3) There are *minor national Churches* which were connected either with provincial regions, or with racial groups.

(4) *Private Churches*.—There are Private Churches which rest on a fellowship basis, as societies, and they are without any intentional antagonism to the State. They do not profess to take part in politics and their allegiance to the State is not divided. They have no taint of internationalism and their patriotism is unquestioned. Such are the Baptists, the Congregationalists, the Friends (or Quakers), the Methodists, the Presbyterians and many others.

(5) *The Hebrews—Judaism*.—The Hebrews have their own Sanctuaries and creed with variant tenets, and they live their lives apart from the various subjects of the State and they have affinities, in several respects, with the Hebrews in the domains of other States. The Hebrews derived their original principles from a province of Egypt where their early forefathers were in servitude. They still tend to follow in the ways of the Sanctuary and the Guild. They owe a sentimental allegiance to these two institutions and, to this extent, in a divided allegiance, there is detriment to the State. Their ideals, in these respects, make them, in a sense, the antagonists of the State. The Hebrew race has several deeply

impressed characteristics of the Sanctuary and of the Guild. This race, even in its prime, never possessed the true State. It has a great capacity for mercantile business. It has an aptitude in pursuing private utility rather than public utility. Its institutions have regarded the personal basis rather than the domain basis. In this respect, the Hebrew race is not patriotic, in the sense in which military races are patriotic. This is consistent with its racial defect, in respect of public utility.

The Hebrews, on their escape from servitude, having no fatherland of their own, obtained one for a time, by an unrighteous invasion. Here regional managements were set up, with a superior management, on a tribal basis. At the time of the migration from Egypt a *caste* phase appears in respect of the division of labour principle. Moses was the soldier and Aaron was the priest. Their ritual practices inclined, to some extent, to those of a military fraternity. Their ideal of management, however, was more akin to that of a Sanctuary Guild connected with industry. The divine kingship of the Hebrews was that of a military puppet under the Sanctuary. It contrasted with the feudal (or constitutional) kingship, in the state, subordinate to a Senate, with the magisterial supremacy in the domain. The Hebrews, therefore, had a latent connection with the international Sanctuary, although their own Sanctuary was national in its exclusiveness. The Hebrew race is like other races in that its individuals have their good and bad qualities, but, in some respects, the race is specially gifted. The bad Hebrews are usually termed Jews and good Jews are termed Hebrews. Individualism brings out the salient points in the racial character. The common vice of selfishness and the tenacious pursuit of private utility, with more wit than regard for principle, in the use of means to attain wealth, have been their marked characteristics. The Hebrews are keen wealth seekers. The Marxian economic doctrine is a specimen of the mischievous theories of the Guilds connected with the ancient Sanctuary. It emanated from a Hebrew mind and it is favoured by Hebrew minds, but it is incongruous in the State. The misguided application of this Sanctuary doctrine, to the State and to its community, is an indication of the subtle force of atavism and, also, of the distorting influence of a creed. It, also, illustrates the poisonous influence of the baser class of Hebrews, when they are allowed to meddle with the management of the State, in those domains where their presence, free from restraint, is tolerated.

The Hebrew race has also a great aptitude for internationalism which is useful to the State in commercial matters. It, however, has the drawback that it always lessens the tie of allegiance to

the State and is adverse to that patriotism which is a national bond.

The sublime regard of the Sanctuary for the celestial supremacy has usually lessened, in Sanctuary races, the due regard for the State, with its earthly supremacy. The main fault is with the State, in its laxity, in allowing those who are from any cause the antagonists of the State, to interfere in its affairs. What is harmless may be tolerated, but what is pernicious should be suppressed. This illustrates the wise principle of earlier times that the State needs to be exclusive, in respect of its magistrates, its servitors and its community, that is, its electorates, if it would secure efficiency in its management. The baser Hebrews, alone, are the antagonists of the State. Their interference in politics is to be deplored, so long as they continue to follow their racial ideals, and, in this way, to any extent, to reinforce other antagonists of the State.

(6) *The Hindoos*.—Hindooism, as a creed, is the growth and remnant of an earlier creed of an Aryan race. This race invaded India from the north, in a remote age. The Hindoos had the characteristics of a tribal community, with its divided magistracy of (a) priests (Brahmans) and (b) soldiers (Kshatriyas) and with (c) its community (Vaisyas) and (d) its outsiders (Sudras). The ritual and the ablutions, directed by the creed, allowed the first three classes (a, b and c) to be considered as the "twice-born" and the outside group (d) as the servants. The existence of an organic society was indicated by the relative parts of their chief divinity as being, respectively, (a) the mouth, (b) the arms, (c) the body and (d) the feet. There was rivalry for precedence and for supremacy, as between (a) the priests and (b) the soldiers. It was a relic of the old story of the Sanctuary and the State.

The priests were tenacious of their supremacy. Their effeminacy has characterised the non-progressiveness of their Sanctuary type of civilisation. Mysticism is characteristic of Hindooism. The military branch of agency, with its magistrates and its servitors, was hampered in its progress. The most military Hindoo States have the highest civilisation. The caste principles prevailed in the three classes and became multiplied, on a service basis, by a variety of conditions relevant to the religious standard. The economic results, in a non-progressive civilisation, corroborate the conclusion that the Sanctuary influence was dominant. The antagonism to the State is, therefore, traceable to the Brahman class, which is now not peculiarly priestly in its avocations, but, in its descent, assumes a caste superiority which is reinforced by a priestly office. The mischievous arrogance of priestly patronage, in the State, sets a bad example to others. The priestly class,

when dominant, demoralises the community and debases the multitude. The disciplined soldiers and the industrial class might otherwise be loyal subjects of the State in their regard for patriotism and for welfare.

(7) *The Parsees*.—Parseeism as a creed of morality, associated with the principles of religion, is also a growth and a remnant of an earlier creed of an Aryan race. This race had its home in Media and in Persia, in a remote age. It may have originated within the range of the ancient Assyrian domain. The creed, in its abstract principles, has a mathematical precision, and it is analytic and fearless in its search for the truth and in applying the tests of truth. It is, also, more military and virile in its characteristics than priestly and effeminate. In principle, in these respects, it is associated with Western civilisation, in being akin to Druidism. It contemplates purity, supported by a good spirit and host, assailed by foulness, supported by a bad spirit and host. Worthiness and viciousness are in conflict and, in the end, it contemplates with hope and trust, that goodness will prevail. There is no caste. The conduct of life is shaped by the light of reason. The cult is free from the domination of priestcraft.

There are traces in this creed of a common origin with Hindooism and then of a conflict with it. It is a creed which is characteristic of a high grade free community. There is no trace of any antagonism to the State. The Parsees live their lives apart from the rest of the community merely as the results of race and creeds and accidental circumstances by the presence of other races and creeds.

(8) *The Buddhists*.—The creed of Buddha is not racial but humanitarian in the wide sense of being in touch with Nature. It is a code of morality, for the conduct of life, based on the light of wisdom. It was an offspring of earlier creeds of the Aryan race. It was a departure from Brahmanism, in its priestcraft and caste, and it was an approach to those principles which were, to some extent, regarded by the Parsee, in his search for truth, with an open mind. Buddha, in this way, was a Reformer who would restore a regard for principles from which the Brahman had strayed. His creed contained old principles with new applications, codified for the use of a later and changed social system, and made preceptual, to be intelligible and suitable to all of the social parts of a population. The creed had a personal basis and it was inclined more to the Sanctuary than to the State. In its humanitarianism it is international. There is a divided allegiance. The creed is not antagonistic to the State. In its regard for duty there is loyalty to the State.

(9) *The Mahomedans.* Mahommedanism originated, as a Reformer's creed, to suppress idolatry and to teach monotheism. It regarded mainly the regional population about Mecca to raise it from a condition of demoralisation. Its founder relied, to some extent, on Hebrew and on Christian scriptures. The creed is inclined more to the Sanctuary and to the Guild than to the State. Mahomet's professed character was mainly that of a Prophet or a Missionary, and his successors (Caliphs) have been his kindred, or his descendants. In this respect the creed is antagonistic to the State. The State is an institution superior to the Sanctuary. It is not to be controlled by creeds. The "Caliph" principle involves *caste*, but the main principles of the creed are humanitarian and, to that extent, adverse to *caste*. These principles, in their humanitarianism and in their internationalism, disregard States and their domains.

The religious and moral precepts of the creed are, in part, crude and incomplete and, in part, they are refined and excellent for the original purposes of the creed. In one respect the tenets, on the military side of the creed, are akin to those of Christianity, but with the difference that whilst Christian militarism is defensive, Mahommedan militarism is aggressive. In general, these creeds are consistent with life in the State. Mahommedanism is non-progressive. It has virile elements but its limited scope of application, to tribal systems, fails to meet the needs of an exalted institution like the State. Its failure to meet the needs of high-class and progressive communities has had disastrous consequences. It has failed, in respect of the State, but it has been successful, in respect of regional or local managements. It is capable of reform. Its aim to secure a rule of conduct worthy and useful, as a rule of life, and its regard for honesty and good-fellowship are its redeeming features. It is a good fighting creed but it is a bad political creed. Its inclinations to the Sanctuary and to the Guild lessen its allegiance to the State. This defect necessarily results in a divided allegiance. Its regard for democratic principles appeals to the multitude, but it does not support magistracy in the government of the State. The fact that the Mahommedan creed relates to communities and their managements and, by construction, by the followers of Mahomet, the second fact, that there is an implied authority in his successors (Caliphs), involve the Sanctuary and the creed in the management of the State.

The subjects of various States, when these subjects are Mahommedans, become involved in a position which is politically untenable. These subjects are, by their creed, pressed to follow the dictates

of the Sanctuary rather than their political (or allegiance) duties to their several States.

(3) THE SANCTUARIES AND THE CREEDS REVIEWED

In a review of the Sanctuaries and their creeds, as being antagonistic to the State, it will be easily realised that the principles of religion and the dictates of morality, as standards of conduct, remain what they have always been. These principles, as being included in a natural standard, are beyond the power of man either to vary or to increase, or to lessen them. Religion, in this respect, as a natural standard, differs from the numerous creeds. The creeds are all made by man. They have been shaped, under various circumstances, to approach the common, or natural, standard with more or less success.

The subject matter of truth exists with its quantity and quality. The truth is first discovered and then it is related. It does not follow that the truth, when it is even most clearly related, is correctly appreciated by all. The light has to be evolved from the darkness. Even the Christian creed, as a developed creed, had to be evolved from limited material. There are other creeds which have needed similar treatment. Racial and regional usages have tended to variety among Christians and utility has been regarded and adopted in practices which existed before the Christian era. Such practices were as widely apart as those of the Hebrews, in the East of Rome's Empire, and those of the Celts, in Western Europe. In the practices of the early Christian Churches there was something in common with those of the Hebrews. In dress, as in the surplice and in practice, as in tonsures, there was something in common with the Druids. Thus utility and decency were not novelties introduced by the Christians by whom they were not opposed but were approved and preserved. In this way, it may be concluded that Christianity rests on its own foundation and not on Judaism, nor on any other specific basis than its own. It was generous, it was free and it was eclectic. Among the Christian Churches in the world there is freedom and not domination, on any ground, whether specious or not specious, by any one Church over other Churches. Utility and propriety have the same force to-day that they had in earlier times. The State, as a specific institution, is warranted in providing public religious services for the several needs of its populations. Birth, marriage and death, production, industry and consumption, with

the conduct of public and private life, have been associated with a regard for religious principles, from time immemorial.

Policy, both public and private, is sometimes involved in morality. Morality may then be associated with religion and with law. Wherever a creed is involved in the succession to property, there policy also is involved, and with it, law, and with law, the State which makes laws. Creeds, in this way, come into contact with the State and not in this way only. Utility and propriety, in respect of religion, have their public and private sides, and both sides need to be preserved. It becomes incongruous, however, for the private side to become dominant and to usurp public duties in the State. It appears, as a consequence, to be consistent for the State in relation to the several creeds tolerated within its domain, not to interfere on the private side. It is also consistent for private Sanctuaries and international Sanctuaries not to interfere on the public side. Honest, intelligent and worthy priests, being able to perform their functions in subordination to the State, deserve well of the State and of the State's community. Perverse, or ignorant and vicious priests, who are malignant in their influence, in respect of the State, and are bad examples to the population, in their conduct, belong to the class of dangerous criminals. It is in the nature of criminal negligence, in the State, not to suppress them. It is no excuse that they belong to a particular creed or to the sect of a creed. Christians should have no privilege in the State, in this respect, but should be taught to behave with honesty and to set an example of propriety to others. The State, such as an empire State, with a large domain, may have, under its supremacy, a variety of races and a variety of creeds. True excellence, in the Sanctuaries and in the creeds and in their professors, will allow a proper regard to be had for the State and for its magistracy, in the management of the several communities and populations of the State domain. There is, as we have seen, an international Christian Sanctuary that is never at rest. It has a propaganda system which is relational to this Sanctuary centre, in a foreign domain, at the seat of a fallen empire, which it has made continuous efforts to resuscitate. This Sanctuary, in a changed world, is a survival from the past and it regards the past, with aims as to the future, which appear to be not consistent with international policy, nor yet with national policy outside the Italian domain. No State desires to oppose those who conduct religious propaganda, with proper aims and proper means. On the other hand, in the past an international Sanctuary has usually been a source of mischief. It has become an institution in the nature of a monstrosity which

existed for its own ends in a scheme to dominate States and their communities. The Sanctuary policy and the several State policies, being incongruous, have come into conflict.

In Britain, and in its Empire domain, where generosity, freedom and toleration prevail, there is need to be on guard against the evil influences of the international Sanctuary. In Britain, the State won the greatest victory ever won against the intrusion of the international Sanctuary in the State's domain. In the few centuries which have rolled by since the Reformation, the Sanctuary, which was then defeated, knows well that, in the meantime, the community has become enthralled by the increased influence of the multitude. If the multitude can be enthralled by the influence of the international Sanctuary, the problem that arose at the time of the Reformation can be reopened and the victory, then won, can be undone.

Liberalism contains a set of principles and democracy, akin to it, contains a set of practices which are demoralising and degrading in the State. The intrusion of the international Sanctuary's influence, within the Empire domain, is a matter for trained Statesmen in considering public policy. In public policy the main purpose of all Sanctuaries is service, by ministerial priests, on behalf of the laity, for whose convenience and welfare that service exists. The Sanctuary, in a high-class community, which is principal, ought to be controlled, as an accessory. The international Sanctuary, in this respect, has ceased to be controlled by the laity. It has assumed an air of superiority towards the laity. It has confused its own human ministerialism with the superiority of the Divine majesty. It has imposed upon either the simplicity, or the ignorance, or the superstition of the populace. It is by means of the populace only that it can hope to attain an influence of superiority in relation to the general community. It is not consistent with public policy that the services of religion should be made the trade and the monopoly of priests. The position is aggravated when this evil is the result of intrusions by foreign priests. The international Sanctuary of Rome remains the chief source of antagonism to States and, among States, to Britain's Empire State. This Empire is in no need of the ministrations of this foreign Sanctuary. The domain of the United States of North America is in a similarly independent position. In any conflict between that Sanctuary and either of these States, the same definite State policy may be observed. It is enough for each State, in its self-defence, to prevent political machinations and to avoid popular demoralisation. In the efforts, by these States, to attain excellence, by means of reform, there is need for states-

men to act discreetly. The Sanctuary's reform would allow such good influence as it may have to be preserved. It is for the State, in shaping its public policy, never to forget the origin and the career of the State. If the State would prosper it has no alternative but to guard itself, with thoroughness and effectiveness, against the international Sanctuary, as the most subtle, elusive and tenacious of its antagonists.

There are no vices which cause greater corruption in the State than hypocrisy, and knavishness in politics. These vices had their primary fountains in Sanctuary populations, whence liberalism and licentiousness were derived, to spread demoralisation in States. Hence came the greatest fallacy in politics that "the multitude, in the State, cannot have justice unless it has control." On this fallacy of liberalism the great evil of democracy has gained a footing to attack the State and draw it within the control of the multitude.

(4) THE MULTITUDE ANTAGONISTS

The Guilds, alone and apart, as antagonists of the State, have been less dangerous than the foreign Sanctuaries because they have not been so united, systematic and persistent in their mischievous influence. They have been nuisances rather than perils. In the Sanctuary domains, in earlier times, the priests easily mastered the Guildsmen, by a policy of segregation, which confined their activities to a small region. In States, from earlier to later times, military statesmen have, again and again, suppressed the Guildsmen to maintain the safety of the State. The States had the alternatives, either to suppress the Guildsmen, or to be destroyed by them. In Greece, the multitude became revolutionary. The evil was not confined to the conflict between the masses and the classes within the same State. In Greek colonies the class and mass hatred was a cause of conflict between city States. The good and evil forces at work, in the Greek race, were well illustrated in the conflict between Croton and Sybaris, in 510 B.C. Sybaris had a low class population, with a relatively low class Government. Croton was in the opposite position. Croton was attacked by Sybaris and it had no alternative but to destroy Sybaris, or to be destroyed; and Sybaris, with its baseness and corruption, was destroyed.

In the long interval many States have been wise, in time, and have nipped evils in the bud with the result that the Guilds,

within States, have been much modified. The equality craze of Guildsmen has been the main source of mischief. This equality craze would be intolerable, in an efficient army, and it is intolerable in a well-managed State. It has been the inherent principle of democracy, from its origin, and it remains as the bane of the multitude, in the State, to-day. It was absent from the originally free community but it has always been present in slave-tainted populations. The "equality" craze contains a fallacy, based on the figment that equality, in utility, indicates perfection, whereas the fact is that "inequality," as in the fingers of the human hand, is a source of greater utility than equality would have been.

It is right, however, to regard the gregarious instinct, in the multitudes, which see themselves as groups apart, and are then led to conclude that they ought to be assimilated with the political community.

The origin of the mixed community has been indicated and how it has been followed by demoralisation, with the result that the multitudes have interfered in the management of the State. It has been universally true that, as the control in the State has descended from the higher classes and the middle classes in the community to the lower classes, or the multitude, so excellence, in the management of the State, has declined and the process of corruption has extended. The multitudes have contained a variety of individuals of great ability, and these men, as demagogues, or leaders of the multitudes, have often been successful in political strife in which even trained statesmen have failed to secure the State and its community against them. Honest and able statesmen, in their aims at reform, when absolute utility has not been attainable, have had to fall back on the next remedy and to rely on expediency. These statesmen, when the State has been disorganised and its community has been demoralised, have done well in saving the State by yielding to lesser evils to prevent a greater evil. The mischiefs, in a State, have often been allowed to accumulate until they have become difficult to control. The multitudes, in many cases, have been neglected in being allowed to become licentious. These multitudes, when led by unscrupulous demagogues, seek to secure for themselves some temporary gain. The multitude, in its distress, hungers for something. The greater and the lesser demagogues and the larger and the smaller parts of the multitude become self-conscious of sympathies and antipathies. The cravings of the multitude are not always bad. Its parts are numerous and there is a variety in their inclinations. There are in the multitude elements which are always susceptible of specific influences, and in the demagogues there are natural

co-relative powers. In the pursuits of temporary gains the multitudes and the demagogues cease to be mindful of the State because the State, as a specific institution, is rarely appreciated by the populace. The masses and the mass leaders become equally indifferent to patriotism and to the welfare of the community. This is the final result of the State's neglect of the multitude. The State has neglected its first duty to make its multitudes amenable to life in the State. It is clear, beyond a doubt, that in all human aggregations there are great varieties of men who can be graded from the more excellent to the less base, and that, in the multitude, there is always much good.

The State's neglect of the good elements, in the multitude, is the main cause which allows the evil elements to get out of control and to become a source of peril to the State. The State, by its organisation, has the means of using the better elements, throughout its domain, to suppress the evil elements, in its minor regions. The strength of the multitude, in the State, has thus arisen from political defects, such as weakness in the State and incompetence in its magistracy. These defects have been closely connected with the heresies in political creeds and in false precepts and popular fallacies. These heresies, false precepts and popular fallacies, when they are examined and compared, are evils which are not novelties, nor are they the products of modern civilisation. They are traceable to a common source and to a time when the State, as an institution, in the eyes of the multitude, was overshadowed by the pre-eminence of the Sanctuary, in the patronage of the Guilds. The prevalent opinions of multitudes can be traced, for long periods of time, and comparisons can be made between these opinions in different domains.

The Sanctuary domains and the State domains can be contrasted. The habits and the usages of the multitude, in respect of industry, livelihood and freedom, can be specialised and generalised to indicate their main characteristics, as shaping influences which, from earlier times, have left their effects both on communities and on States. The Sanctuary, in its own domain, was inclusive. The population had no electorate, in respect of the Sanctuary domain, and control in the Sanctuary. The Guildsmen, who formed the multitude, consisted of a great variety of groups, with limited powers, in respect of the several Guilds. The overseers of the Guilds and the military who, as police, maintained order, were not controlled, in any way, by Guildsmen. There was a contrast with the State. The State, in its own domain, was exclusive. In this respect, it was orderly, systematic and well-disciplined, like an army.

(5) THE MULTITUDE'S ASPECTS

The Guilds under the State were a refuge and they were necessarily affected by the forces of economy which were controlled by the State. The Guild influence with the multitude thus appears, in Europe, in the Homeric age. It appears, also, never to have been extinct since that time. In the interval, the main difficulty has been to separate the parts of the population, so that all parts could have justice, in the State, without allowing the thoughtless, the reckless, the incompetent and multitudinous parts to become dominant and to use their power to cause disasters in, and to, the State. The aspects of the multitude, as the democracy, have not varied much with the course of time. Even in the age of Plato, and amid surroundings where democracy, as the control by multitudes, had caused great disasters, the ideal of the State was lost, to the extent that its principle was not realised.

The opinions of the best of the Greeks was adverse to democracy, but the inclinations of the Greek multitudes favoured it. Plato's ideal, as indicated in his "Republic," is proof that whilst he was adverse to the democracy he was influenced by the ideal of the Sanctuary to such an extent that he appears to exclude the State, as a specific institution. He inclines to a composite institution which is but a modification of the Sanctuary. He was a visionary and a theorist. He almost parodied the Brahman theory. He favoured three orders in the community, and these were to be relational to the human faculties: (1) the Intellectuals would have the Government; (2) the Military order would represent the Will; (3) the Working Classes would represent (a) the Passions and (b) the Appetites. Plato confirms this theory in his "Laws." He would have secured "absolutism," in government and "freedom," in the population, by mingling "monarchy" with "democracy." These opinions, in an ancient leader in political thought, separate the theorist from the practical statesman.

It will be remembered that "monarchy," as despotism and "democracy," as multitudinism, have been the two main sources of evils in the State. Since the time of Plato to the fall of the Roman Republic, and from the rise and fall of the Roman Empire, followed, in the West of Europe, by the rise and fall of the Holy Roman Empire, nothing has been done, by the State, to educate and train the multitudes to enable them to take their true place in the State. The State has as much need to prevent itself from becoming the victim of multitudinism as it has from becoming the victim of despotism. The worthy, wise, able and substantial

classes, when united and strong, form the best safeguards against the restlessness, the waywardness, the excesses and the predatory instincts of the masses.

In the feudal States, which arose in Western Europe, the restored orderliness in the State, under the supremacy of magistracy, taught the multitudes the value of government by trained statesmen. In Britain, a joint magisterial and servitorial system, derived from the feudal State, became a bulwark against both despotism and multitudinism. As the result of inconsiderate changes this system has been lost. In England, the Senate, the Great Council and the Common Council, were the three powers which took part in the management of the State. All contained magistracy and not one of them was controlled by the multitude. The multitude was constrained to behave itself. The Common Council contained the magistrates and the servitors of the domain, as Statesmen in Council. Both branches of this dual agency considered what was good for the State and for its community. This was the constitutional structure of Government in England. It had been derived from an earlier system which had survived, in Britain, long after it had ceased to exist on the Continent.

In the military, or feudal, State the free community was more virile and it was well disciplined. It realised that, in a State, as in an army, the Government (or the Control) to be excellent in wisdom and effective in administration, must be "from above" (*ex supero*). This main principle of the State stood like a rock. It was not shaken by multitudinism. Statesmen, in Britain, in the earlier period, and in the mediæval period, had retained traditions of the true State. They were not unaware of the political evils which had ravaged Greece and Rome. The fact has often been overlooked that, with the Celtic population, in Britain, there has been no break in the continuity of race, language and knowledge, from the earlier period of the native civilisation, through the Roman and post-Roman periods, to the present time. The local military defence systems remained relational to the domain lands; and the supremacy, until recent times, remained relational to the domain community and not to the populace. In England, the magisterial and the servitorial agents, as trained statesmen, in consultation, were more capable and more trustworthy in securing the welfare of the community, as well as the defence of the State, than were the adventurer politicians who attained political power as demagogues, or leaders of multitudes, after the manner of Guildsmen, in their Guilds. Guild management had been widely prevalent in industry and in several other branches of utility. Guild influence, in the State, relying on its superiority

in number, always became arrogant and bigoted. Hence had come that kind of management "from below" (*ex imo*) which the Greeks, in their city States, had termed "democracy." The multitude had the control. The demoralised Greeks, in the later part of the post-Dorian period, had lost the ideal of the true State.

The classic system of (a) the Senate, (b) the Great Council and (c) the Common Council of the earlier Achæan Greeks of the Homeric age had departed and left only bare and scattered relics behind. These bare relics, at a later period, in the times of Plato and Aristotle, were seen by theorists in (a) monarchy (b) aristocracy and (c) democracy, in combination, as a means to secure stability and excellence in the State by a balance of influences. These theories, it will be remembered, were, later, viewed with approbation by Cicero, and, about a century later, by Tacitus, but with reservations. In a later age, these points have been deemed to indicate the more excellent elements in England's famous Constitution.

(6) THE STATE AND THE MULTITUDE

The State, in its relations with the multitude, has always been characteristic in its exclusion from power of a body which could not manage itself and, being unmanageable, was not fit to take any useful part in the management of the State. The structural combination, in the State, in Britain, had existed, also, in earlier times, in Attica and in Sparta, as a relic of military feudalism. In Greece, generally, after the Dorian invasion (with the two exceptions mentioned) the balance of powers was not kept. The Greeks, after the Dorian invasion, were like the Hebrews, in their divided allegiance to the State. Both races failed in their management of the State. The Greek and the Hebrew theories of the State are, therefore, unreliable. These theories require a close scrutiny to lay bare their fallacies and to prevent military races from being misled by them. There is, still, greater need to prevent the multitudes from becoming the victims of political fallacies and then the perpetrators of political mischiefs. The Romans, who were more military than the Greeks, and were more expert as statesmen, realised the causes of failure in the Greeks, and they knew, also, the causes of their own defects. The Roman State had been undone by tribunism, as the agency of plebeianism, which was akin to multitudinism, which in turn had been influenced

by the Sanctuary theories and ambitions. The military Roman Statesmen had been hampered by the vagaries of the multitudes whose minds had been poisoned by the political heresies of the Apollonian fraternity, imported from Greece.

Rome, at the fall of the Republic, followed the patrician instinct and wisely avoided the baseness of democracy, in its control "from below" (*ex imo*). The Romans, as we have seen, deliberately preferred despotism "from above" (*ex supero*), as the alternative, and the lesser, evil. Hence came the Empire, with a reaction to the State, in the revival of the Senate, as the control, with the Emperor, in form, as Chief Senator (*Princeps Senatus*), or First Magistrate. This reversion to the State was to the ideal of the State, in the Homeric age. Augustus posed as King Alcinous, without the name of King. The Principate was the office of Chief Senator:

At Rome, at that time, after a great calamity had shaken the State to its foundations, there was need to reconcile various schools of political thought, in order to save the State and to evolve a sound system of government. The principle of military command was an important factor in reform. Rome, under the earlier Republic, had been overwhelmed with plebeianism and, later, had been swamped by freedmen. The "multitude" became the name for the "mass" of the population, as a colourless description of "the many," who could not exercise any useful function in the management of the State. A great empire could not be improved, in its management, by such a worthless body which had nothing to recommend it beyond the fact that it dwelt in the capital city of the domain, which had once been a city State, with a military community.

There were several other multitudes, in the Roman domain, no better and no worse than that of Rome. The Roman multitude had never had any title to control in the State. It had, for a time, usurped power. It was, now, realised at the fall of the Republic and the rise of the Empire, that the multitude which interferes in politics, as in the management of the State, and especially in an empire State, is a dangerous nuisance. The political education of the mixed population was very crude, or imperfect. Political theories were discussed. Hence came the Latinised form of the Greek theorists in, respectively, (a) the *regal*, (b) the *optimales*, and (c) the *populares* elements in government. Hence, too, came that school of political thought whose supporters were *liberales*. This latter term imported a concession by wealth to indigence. It implied a concession of eleutherian freedom, in the sense of equality. It implied, also, a certain moderation

in policy. It avoided the contrasts and the antagonism between the "patrician" and the "plebeian."

(7) THE MODERN REVIVAL OF MULTITUDINISM

When the great change, at Rome, took place it is well to consider what was the position of the State, in relation to the multitude. Sylla and Cæsar, as soldiers and as statesmen, had been Reformers. The Emperor Augustus reaped the fruits of these reforms and he had generalised, in his own person, several offices and, among them, that one which included the poisonous tribunitial power, which had been the virtual instrument of plebeianism, as something akin to democracy. What is the relative position to-day in Britain? The modern revival and the extension of the pestilent democratic theory, in the State, with the creed of liberalism, in the multitudes, is, again, producing political demoralisation. The democratic theory is involved in the practice of trades unionism. This theory has invaded the domains of the Britannic races. The principle of friendly co-operation in industry was not discreditable to the older and freer political community in Britain. The earlier State favoured all useful industry but it did not tolerate associations which were, in form, industrial but, in fact, political, to enable attacks to be made on the State and its community. Industry and politics were wisely kept apart. The older community, in Britain, had excelled in the management of the true State, with its Senate, its Great Council, and its Common Council.

The mixed community, for a time, had followed the older and more military community. Clericalism and multitudinism, in their antagonism to the State, eventually modified the ideals of the population. The discredit for the spread of the democratic heresy rests with these antagonists of the State who were its misguided promoters. The popular theory of the Constitution is a modification of the feudal theory but much attenuated and distorted. It is (a) the "King," (b) the "Lords" and (c) the "Commons." When it is realised that (a) the Kingship and (c) the House of Commons are merely fragments of, respectively, (A) the Senate and (C) the Common Council, it can easily be seen how far the multitude, which is not the community, but only the mass of the population, with its democratic heresies, has carried the rest of the community. It can be seen, also, how degraded the electorates have become by reducing the triggrade system of electorates of

knights, citizens and burgesses to the level of the ungrade electorate of burgesses. The burgesses are in the thralldom of multitudinism and the knights and citizens are now involved in the same thralldom. The more excellent grades, which were sources of stability, in the State, and of strength and progress, in its community, have been displaced to give more power to the unreliable multitude.

This change was the sinister work of demagogues who had truckled to the multitudes, for electoral support, in the appointment of servitors to the House of Commons. The general population, although it is greater in number, yet it is inferior in quality to the more excellent classes which form the substantial part of the political community. The general population, as the multitude, is devoid of the technical political knowledge which is necessary in the management of the State.

A simple test will indicate the laxity which liberalism, in its recklessness, has introduced in the State. This test is seen in a comparison of the Legislature with the Judicature. In the Judicature, the agents of the litigants, as the Counsel and the Solicitors, are trained for their work, for the conduct of litigation, which is decided before trained Judges. The Legislature ranks above the Judicature. The House of Peers, as magistrates, is a well-trained body. The House of Commons, as servitors, is an untrained body. Neither the members, nor the electors, of the House of Commons necessarily have any training. Many of the members are, in fact, well trained. Some of the members, as the agents of the multitude, are untrained. The constituencies, in respect of the Legislature, are more important than the litigants in the Judicature and the State, of which the Legislature as the most important agent, is the principal institution in the domain. In former times there was a greater regard for propriety. Both the members of the House of Commons and their electors had to be qualified for their respective functions.

The higher grade servitors were excellent, in quality, and they were men of substance. The higher electorates were, also, relatively select. Liberalism came into power. It favoured the domination of multitudinism. It has resulted that the excellence in the Legislature, well contrived, in its origin, and well maintained, for centuries, by wise and patriotic statesmen, has been impaired, in later times, by the baseness of democracy. The multitude now tends to domineer over the rest of the community. The principle of democracy (or Guild influence, as in trades unionism, or multitudinism) and its interference in the management of the State, has reopened the question of constitutional

policy in the Britannic Empire. Liberalism, as a false political creed, and democracy, as a pernicious political practice, have much in common. Both evils sprang from degraded populations and they have been the means, during their long careers, of infecting and demoralising many excellent political communities. In two domains there is a likeness and, in the career of the earlier State, there is a moral for the modern State.

It may now be again asked what was the position in the Roman domain when the Republic fell and the Empire arose and what is the position in the Britannic Empire to-day, when faced with the similar evil of multitudinism? It can be said, with truth, that a similar evil was more or less common to the two States. There was nothing heroic in those Roman Statesmen who faltered in the work of reconstruction. There is nothing heroic in their modern followers who will not face the difficulties in the necessary reconstruction work in Britain's Empire.

(8) PUBLIC POLICY AND THE MULTITUDE

The principle of public policy is a fundamental principle, in the State. The Roman statesmen, as already mentioned, instead of laying a strong and firm foundation for the Senate, as the seat of the supremacy, preferred to truckle to the multitude, for its passing favour and for its unstable support. The supreme Senate, for the exercise of the State's control over its Steward, or Executive Officer, required a foundation of rock. The Roman Statesmen temporised with the evil instead of facing it. The material work of reform was, thus, neglected and never completed. In the ancient State the magisterial branch of agency excelled in being organic, strong and versatile. (1) The Great Council was its foundation; (2) the Senate was the committee of the Great Council; (3) the Executive Officer, as a steward, was the accessory of the Senate. The Senate, with the control, was the main bulwark against despotism and multitudinism. The supreme Senate, at Rome, had been destroyed by the kings. In Attica, as the "Areopagus," and in Britain, as the "Coron," it had survived. In Rome, at the rise of the Empire, the last effort to save the State was lost because a material part in the work of reconstruction was not completed. It was right that the Government should be accessory to the community. It was right that the more excellent and the more substantial parts of the community should be the means of control rather than that these parts

should be pushed aside by the multitude which, relatively, although it was more numerous, was less competent, less substantial, or was impecunious, and more predatory. The impecuniosity of the multitude and its privations, which have usually been due to an excessive increase beyond the needs of industry and the regional means of its support, have often led the multitude to fancy that it was oppressed by the rest of the community.

The condition of the multitude has been due mainly to natural causes and to the artificial circumstances of life in the State vitiated by incompetence. At Rome, in respect of its Empire, which contained many provinces, there was not the slightest reason why the regional multitude of the capital city should have control in the Empire domain. The same principle is true to-day in the Britannic Empire. It resulted, at Rome, that the struggle for victory, by the State, against the multitude, was not fought out. This result may have been due to a regard for another branch of policy, in securing the next best effect, as in expediency, where that of absolute utility could not be attained. The Romans, in their statesmanship, were experts in diplomacy. Military generosity had inclined them, even from early times, to apply lenient terms to ugly things. The term "multitude," in this way, was deemed to be less offensive than "the populace." It also had, in practice, a good effect. A small group of excellent men, as Senators in Council, with their well-balanced views, had more all round ability than a single great Statesman who was even a superman. The increase in number of a Council never adds to its excellence. "As many men as many minds" remains universally true of Councils. If the ability is lessened and the number is increased, the inutility of the multitude is provable by a *reductio ad absurdum*. At Rome, in addition to this view of the multitude, there was no common measure between honesty and dishonesty.

Excellence and baseness were incompatibles. The higher classes, as the *Optimates*, were the less numerous and the lower classes, as the *Populares*, were the more numerous. The rivalry between these parties could not be settled in favour of excellence if, at elections, numbers were to prevail. It was a lesser evil to avoid having elections. It was expedient to have a Dictator. It was expedient that he should have the military command and be Imperator, or Emperor. It was expedient that he should be the chief Senator to be influenced and controlled by his fellow Senators. The Senate of Rome was virtually the Great Council, and it was degenerate because its members consisted of the three grades of ex-officers of State who had been appointed by a popular electorate,

In the dormant rivalry of parties, which had been united to save the State, the main part, in the work of reconstruction, was neglected. There was no efficient substructure provided for the Senate. It originally had a tribal property basis with hereditary eligibility in succession. It was then modified by appointments made by the censors and by the retention of ex-officers of State who had been originally elected to their office by the *Comitia Centuriata*. The practice of election to the Senate, by co-option of the existing Senators, was common in the feudal States, and, by custom, it was but a step in a like direction to allow the Chief Senator to appoint new Senators up to a limit. At Rome, this custom was followed. The result was unfortunate. The Senate which ought to have been supplied with a solid foundation of domain lords to enable it to be not dependent, either on a despot, or on the multitude, remained a feeble and a dependent body. Had the substructure of the Senate, in the reconstruction work, been secure, then stability and strength would have enabled the Senate to maintain its control both as against despotism and as against multitudinism. Public policy required that both evils should be held in subjection.

There was nothing novel in the principle of public policy in this respect, as its practice, in Europe, was more ancient than the Roman State. The feudal State, in Rome, had ceased in the kingly period, in 560 B.C. The kings went out and the Republic came in, as a distorted State, and it remained distorted until it fell, because the dual branches of agency, by Senators (or magistrates) and knights (or servitors), had been unified. The Senators, in time, were those who had been office-holders elected by the *Comitia* in which multitudinism prevailed. Magistracy thus rested, to some extent, on multitudinism. This reliance on the multitude strengthened the multitude's belief in the fallacy that the multitude was "the people." This is a parochial fallacy and it would be idle to demonstrate it. It is enough that, at Rome, when the Republic was succeeded by the Empire, the Senate had ceased to rest on a domain basis. There was need to restore a strong magisterial foundation to the Senatorial Committee of the Roman Senate, which had the supremacy, to enable this Committee to properly exercise its control over the Executive. The evils, on that side, need not be pursued. The evils, on the side of the multitude, have to be noticed. The populace was infatuated with the belief that it was "the people" and, also, that it was the "political community." It had, also, deluded itself into the fallacy that it was the source of the magisterial supremacy. This point has to be considered. On the principle of public policy, and on

the political position and circumstances, at Rome, when the Empire was set up, the feudal statesmen, in Britain, in a later age were well versed.

In the present position of the State, when the domain has been expanded from a realm to an empire, and the constitution is in great need of repair, it is well to look back at Rome's Empire and not to repeat, in the work of reconstruction, the mistake of truckling to the multitude.

(9) THE MAGISTRACY AND THE MULTITUDE

The source of the magisterial supremacy is the true point by which the Guildsmen's theory, or the multitude's pretension, to control the State, by the greater number, can be tested. The edifice of the magistracy is the pillar of the State. Magisterial power, to exercise an effective control in the State, needs the constant support of the worthy and the wise and the substantial part of the community. This part, to be reliable, must be exclusive and it must not be offset by the multitudinous part. The political qualities, necessary in Government, such as worthiness, intelligence and ability, to secure defence for the domain and welfare for its community, are not universal, nor general, nor common, even to a large part of the community. Nature distributes her gifts and the combination of the necessary qualities has been, and still is, limited to the few. The more excellent of these form but a small part of the few. It is a matter of good sense and manliness, in the patriotic few, to stand together, in the duty of self-sacrifice and good-fellowship, to support the smaller body, the more excellent few, to help the latter to secure the welfare of the great community. It follows, naturally, that the incompetent multitudes must be excluded from interference in the State. Such interference, in its result, cannot add to the strength of magistracy but it may hamper and lessen it.

It follows, further, that the basis of magistracy does not rest on the multitudes. The multitudes, as a consequence, contrast with the substantial part of the community. The primary position of the magisterial agency, as the principal, is followed, in most respects, by the secondary position of the servitorial agency, as its accessory. The servitorial agency requires the combination of necessary qualities, in the agents, and in the electorates. The system of magisterial and servitorial agencies was derived from the military community and it thus came into the State from the

military order. It was the product of a virile, a sensible and a well-disciplined community. The Servitors were not appointed until it was proved that they were acceptable to the magistracy after their election. Their antecedent election, too, had not been made until it had been proved that they were eligible. This policy, in the servitorial agency, followed the lines of appointment in the magisterial agency. The policy itself was consistent with the principle of control "from above" (*ex supero*). The representative principle, in the election of servitors, by the several communities, originated, as a concession which was due to good-fellowship, in a military community. The delegation of members of both agencies, by regional communities, to a common Council, was common, in earlier times, in Europe. It is necessary, in contrast, to look at the practices of the Sanctuary and of the Guilds to expose the fallacy that the multitude was ever the source of the magistracy. In the Sanctuary, the election, in all grades, was "from above" (*ex supero*). In the delegation sense of the term "representative," there was no representation by servitors.

The hierarchical system, in this respect, differed from the feudal system to the extent that it never tolerated interference by inferiors, and servitors were inferiors. In the hierarchical system, as in the feudal system, the superiors ordered and the inferiors obeyed. The hierarchy, however, required passive obedience. It is conclusive that the multitude had no control in the Sanctuary. In the Guilds, under the Sanctuary, the Guild superior was an agent of the Sanctuary, but the members managed themselves within limits. They rested on a personal basis. Their policy was limited to private utility. The parts and the whole were balanced in the considerations of their own welfare. They had no domain authority. They had no control in the Sanctuary. They came into the State with their own leaders. They had no control in the State but found it to be a refuge, as a place of safety. Their inclusion in the State did not destroy their former usages. The new association caused these usages to be modified. Economic forces were at work to supply the means to maintain the defence. The Guildsmen, as the intelligent and industrial part of urban populations, became liable to taxation and to military service. They then desired to have a position similar to that of the military community, as being the "political community." They had a position which allowed limited rights to accord with limited duties. Then a new stage was reached. The multitude desired to be assimilated, in every respect, with the political community. The old story had several variations. The "multitudinous evil," from ancient to modern times, has been the result.

The political evil of the control, in the State, by the majority of its population, has been the second main evil in the State. Multitudinism, at the base of the State, and despotism, at the summit of the State, have been the two main sources of disasters in the State, during the historic period, in Europe. At the fall of feudalism, in Attica, in 594 B.C., and at the fall of feudalism, in Rome, about 560 B.C., the fusion of the military and of the non-military populations, on an economic basis, led to a differentiation of economic grades. In Attica, in Rome, and in England, the fallacy of the multitude, that it was "the people," appears to be traceable to atavism. We have seen that, in Rome, at the time of the fall of the Republic and the rise of the Empire, the delusion of the multitude, that it was "the people," was not eradicated. It still contended that it should have the control in the State. The politicians of that day used guile and sophistry to humour the populace instead of making such pretensions criminal offences. In modern times, in Britain, liberalism, as a false political creed, tends to foster the ancient fallacy that the "rule of the many," as in democracy, is consistent with government in the true State. The recent calamity of the Great War has had a sobering effect, in certain communities. In the causes of this war, in the restlessness of industrial populations, the creed and projects of liberalism have not been guiltless. In respect of the multitude, and in the means to control it, the more sober-minded may look back, with regret, to the loss of the excellent trigrade system of servitors, which has been destroyed in recent times, by mischievous politicians.

(10) THE TRIGRADE SAFEGUARD AGAINST THE MULTITUDE

Britain, in its time, has provided a remedy for every evil from which the State may suffer. The qualification of both servitors and electors was an excellent part of the Parliamentary system of England and, later, of the United Kingdom. The trigrade electorates of servitors, as knights, citizens and burgesses, was swept away, in recent times, after a notable existence of 620 years. It was displaced by the unigrade system, which has revived and restored the evil of multitudinism, after it had been excluded in 1429. This inveterate evil had been let in, in 1406, to be excluded in 1429, and it remained so until 1885. In the interval, the exclusion had been approved by generations of able statesmen.

Multitudinism, under any of its names, as plebeianism, or as democracy (as ochlocracy, or mob-sway) has always been one of the greatest evils which can exist in the State. The trigrade system had been established by great statesmen, in 1265, as the extension of a more ancient system in which there was a select electorate.

In the intervening centuries, in England, the trigrade system had been reviewed and approved by grouped bodies of statesmen who had tested it, from time to time. The system allowed all grades in the economic community, as the political community, to be represented and, with a due regard to the relative proportions of the representatives, or servitors, in relation to the interests of the several grades of electors. All of these electoral grades were bound together, by this means, to consider the common good of all and to prevent the pernicious political evil of the war of classes. The lower grade of burgesses was enabled to express its grievances which could, then, be considered, for remedies, with a due regard for the rest of the community. The extremists could indulge in antics but they were powerless to hurt the State. The trigrade system, in this respect, in Britain, had excelled any system which is traceable, in any other domain, as having existed, in earlier or in modern times. The fact that some of the borough electorates needed reform, in 1832, or 1867, or in 1884, or later, marked the scope of reform, in relation to the electoral system of servitors, by knights, citizens and burgesses, as an entire system. The parts and the whole required a due consideration for the principle of representation and, also, for consistency.

The system itself was a barrier against both despotism and multitudinism. It, also, strengthened the magisterial system, which had need of its co-operation, which had the value of support. The higher grade servitor representatives had been accustomed to co-operate with the domain magistrates and the citizen and the burgess servitors were, afterwards, influenced by the knightly servitors. The peers and the knights, as representatives of the domain community, differed only as magistrates and as servitors. The power of the multitudes to do mischief in the State, either by restlessness or by revolution, was lessened to a minimum. The multitudes were rendered helpless for purposes of mischief. The unity in the State and the unity in the community was a source of strength, where dissension and timidity would have been sources of weakness, and would have countenanced revolutionary movements, by truckling to the multitudes. The Guildsmen's craze for obtaining the control, by means of "the greater number," and the

multitude's pretension to control, on virtually similar grounds, were defeated by the trigrade system. The multitude's predatory inclinations, towards the rest of the community, could never surmount the dual branches of agency and the trigrade barrier of the servitor branch, which defended the community and gave stability to the State. It may now be asked why this excellent system was swept away to open the door to such an evil as democracy. The answer is a simple one. Politicians, who were enthralled by the fallacies of liberalism, had got the upper hand, in the State. There was an appeal to the multitude. A demagogue who was a politician, wanted the support of a new party. It was to be "a Tory-democracy." The name and the thing were both incongruous. There was, at the time, a vogue for political change. It was a thoughtless mistake which caused to be removed a bulwark which, as late as 1832, had not only been deliberately maintained, but had been strengthened. It was an instance in which the main principle of a policy had been lost, in considering its minor details. The system, as a whole, has never been thoroughly revised since its origin, in 1265. If any attempt were now made to restore the classic trigrade system, the votaries of liberalism would be horrified and would become hysterical. The more patriotic statesmen, however, should never forget that this primary excellence of the world famous Constitution had made the evil of multitudinism as helpless for mischief as a caged tiger.

In the mediæval period, in England, this evil had broken loose for about twenty-three years (1406 to 1429) and, in parts, it was mischievous until the old trigrade system was restored on a modified basis, mainly by the virile influence of the knightly class. The plain terms of the later statute, also, indicate what, at that time, was deemed to be the political value of the multitude in electoral matters. It is clear that the reaction which has taken place in the interval between then and now, as from feudalism to democracy, in England, has been from excellence to baseness. The great bulk of the population, to-day, is probably ignorant of the fact that the State had ever had such an excellent system as the trigrade electorate, and of the fact that it has lost it.

The community, if it was awakened to the mischief, might be neither too apathetic nor too timid to seek to have it reformed and restored. The timid might fear that reform would arouse the clamour of the multitude and excite the masses against the classes. This conflict is but the old one of the multitude against the rest of the community. It is this multitude which is, in substance, the democracy. It is the banded multitude which, from the dawn of European history to modern times, has never changed its nature

as being one of the more formidable evils in the State. It has had two characteristics. It must control "from below" and "the majority must have its way." It is, therefore, inconsistent with the control of magistracy, in the State, and it prefers brutishness to justice. Its affinity with liberalism and licentiousness is consistent with its own origin and nature. In the true State there can be no yielding to this evil. If there is to be excellence, in the State, in its agents, there must, also, be excellence in their electors. Excellence in the electors of both magistrates and servitors, implies exclusiveness, and this exclusiveness, which will admit only the fit to interfere in the management of the State, as it descends the grades of the community, must necessarily shut out the multitudes. When it is realised that the State is the highest and greatest of all human institutions, it may be concluded that there is no greater licentiousness than in allowing its management to be possessed directly or indirectly, by the vicious and the incompetent. The worthy, the wise and the able statesmen are the proper agents of the community to be in charge of the State. In recent times, in England, democracy, as the lower and the multitudinous parts of the community, has not been satisfied with breaking down the trigrade electoral system but, following the groove of its ancient "equality" craze, it has striven to obtain a "one-man-one-vote" system. It has introduced other evils. It, also, ignores the existence of magistracy, and it would convert the kingship into a puppetship, accessory to the Cabinet, and it would make that ministerial body a standing committee of the House of Commons. It calls this ministerial Cabinet by the magisterial name of the "Government." It associates itself with industry, because a large part of industry is connected with manual labour. The ultimate seditious aim of democracy, and it is openly asserted, is to ignore the magistracy and to set up a "Labour Government." In recent times, the increased use of machinery, in productive work, has lessened the need of human labour. The tendency is to lessen it to a minimum. This machinery is a form of wealth. The wealth is, mainly, the product of industry and self-sacrifice, by the wise, the worthy, and the able part of the population, which contributes the greater part of the means necessary for the support of the State. Democracy, as the organic multitude, relies on the false adage that "all men are equal" (*Homines omnes equales sunt*), and this phase of the older Guildsmen's "equality" craze, by a light and fantastic movement, in the minds of the multitude, is deemed to be the principle of the relations between the individuals who are comprised within the population of the State. The State is not an industrial Guild.

The false premiss of the democratic theory is as old as the State. It has been necessary to combat this heresy of the multitude, from the earliest to the latest times, in Europe, which is the region of the earth in which the State attained its greatest excellence. In the decline of the State, despotism and multitudinism have been the main causes. The exclusion of the most incompetent and the more vicious parts of the multitude from interfering in the management of the State, has been due to a proper regard for the State and not to lessen the welfare of the excluded part. In matters of justice and welfare, the excluded parts were not neglected, in the military States. In the policy of exclusion, in England, the "pure democracy" down to recent times was an expression which was equivalent to the multitude, as opposed to the trigrade system. On the Continent the problem of multitudinism had to be met and, there, doctrinaire theories were advanced. In the middle of the last century these theories gained a footing in England. The remedy of these theorists to curb multitudinism has been given the generic name of "Proportional Representation." There are several species of voting, but none of them approach, in value, the simple and practical method of the trigrade system. The Proportional Representation principle rests on fallacies and has mischievous effects which are not worthy of the State. The election, by lot, of the Athenian democracy, involved the element of chance, as in a gamble, where human integrity, intelligence and patriotism ought to have prevailed. Political paganism tends to be revived, by a reversion to ancient degraded practices. It results, finally, that the evil of multitudinism, having been revived in the State, the ancient alternatives which arose out of that evil must, also, be considered.

The State must either suppress the evil, or be destroyed by it. In the domain of a great Empire, the self-respecting provinces are not infatuated with the antics of democracy, or multitudinism, in the capital province. It is not likely that these provinces will be fascinated, by the pretensions of the House of Commons, on a basis of democracy, or multitudinism, to have the control in the State. Magistracy, in the State, needs to be strengthened, and its basis needs to be widened to enable it, effectively, to meet the great evil of multitudinism. Multitudinism is many-sided. Its various aspects are to be seen in its samples, when analysed, to examine the component parts. A few of these parts, as the Extremists, the Proletarian class, the Server class, the Trades Unionist class, with the Communists and the Socialists, may be sufficient. All of these parts are involved in the forces of the economic system. This system, in turn, has its parts which widen,

from regions, provinces, and the State domain, to the domains of other States, and the world. Some of the economic forces are controlled, as by art, and some are natural and, in part, controllable and, in part, uncontrolled. The multitude is less competent than experts. The multitude is not to be allowed, by specious combinations, to take part in politics and to attack the State.

CHAPTER VII

THE MULTITUDE AND ITS PARTS

(1) THE EXTREMIST GROUP

THE Extremist Group, as a part of the multitude, is an antagonist of the State. The group is more or less common in every State, and it has been so throughout European history. The forces of economy have been among the greatest influences which have affected States and their communities, and some of these forces have been beyond human control. The land, with its control and use, has always had a determining influence, either directly or indirectly, on the State through its community. The higher, or the patrician, class, as the domain proprietors, and its opposite, the lower, as the plebeian, class of conditional occupiers of the land, have been the usual products of every domain. Each of these classes has contained specific parts in which the economic power has varied from a maximum to a minimum extent. These two great classes have some relation to lords and tenants. These classes have continued, to some extent, by descent, but they have been modified by several varieties of change. The extremist group, as a part of the latter class, has often been the most dangerous. The higher, or the patrician, class contained, as a rule, the remnant of the higher domain community, with landed interests and with industrial interests, which included wealth. This wealth was sufficient for well-being, without need to resort to avarice, or oppression, or ungenerous treatment of the poor and without any unworthy conduct detrimental to private, or to public interests. The principle that kings, princes and headmen should have sufficient wealth, so that the holder of these offices should be independent and be superior to avarice and even to temptation was a principle which was widely prevalent in the State. It was not peculiar to Europe. The land which has been settled by military races still bears marks which indicate that local and provincial regions have been associated with the management of the community, in respect of defence and welfare.

The land services indicate political, industrial, religious and

utilitarian purposes. The clan system, in its relation to the land, left traces of provident purposes connected with charities. There are traces of the free and of the slaves. There are traces of the higher and the lower grades of the free in the economic welfare of those who dwelt together, in the same region, about the same time. The landed class were the gentry, in several degrees and kinds, but all, as a class, possessed a fair amount of wisdom, worthiness and wealth. Nature has always had her geniuses and her fortunes as well as her misfits and unfortunates, respectively, in the ascending and descending processes which are incident to the courses of the successive generations. In particular cases, the uniformity of classes has constantly been varied, either by development, in excellence, or by degeneration, to baseness.

Although the virtues and the vices, grouped apart, are opposites and often exist in clusters, as grapes, yet, in degenerates, there is generally left some good even when much badness is present. Where the domain communities and the general populations have been fused the varieties, with mixed qualities, are to be found, throughout the community, in the wide sense, including the higher classes and the multitude. The wise, the worthy, and the wealthy, in the State, involve these different qualities, in varying proportions, so that these qualities, in their plenary degrees, are not the universal characteristics of the landed class. This class, however, contrasts with the opposite class which is defective, generally, in respect of its folly, its viciousness and its penury. The extremists, in the State, have usually contained desperadoes and ill-conditioned men who, as a last resort in misfortune, have preferred to attack the State and its community rather than be reduced to perish by distress.

In ancient States, many instances occur of an extremist group. In the Roman State, this type of misconduct came within the scope of the most serious crime. *Perduellion* (or "felony") was the crime of making war on the State, or on its community. The public safety was a principle of primary consideration. The safety of the community included the safety of its individuals. In the military State, the existence of such malefactors was inconsistent with the primary purpose of the State. The State has the duty to vindicate the freedom and the safety of its subjects. The extremist could not be allowed to be licentious, in interfering with the safety, the freedom and the welfare of his fellow-subjects. The malefactor who did so was, by construction, "at war with the State," and hence the extremist had the name of "felon." In modern times, the sophism of "self-determination," as a false

doctrine of political degenerates, comes within the scope of licentiousness and, when put in action, within the principle of felony. In feudalism, in England, the military courts adopted the Roman principle.

The experience, in the Roman State, and in the English State, was similar. The landed class, as being the proprietary class in the domain, had the duty to support the State and to maintain good government. This position left the State and its community no alternative but to suppress extremists, or to be destroyed by them. The extremists, it may be concluded, are in the nature of revolutionaries who would prefer their own selfishness to the public good. It will, now, be realised that the extremist group has usually contained those who had come from all parts of the community and from the general population. The extremist leaders were often fearless men, with keen minds and stout hearts, which indicated a descent from virile and from degenerate types, in which case the type of the degenerate follows the nature of ill weeds. There were several causes of degeneracy, apart from the reduction to slavery of freemen, as a consequence of conquests, and the emancipation of slaves, as a consequence of policy. These degenerates, in the State, as parts of its multitude, have often been averse to earning their livelihoods by industry and, pressed by necessity, they have become revolutionary so that they have drifted into crime and become the foes of the State and its community. The policy of the State, in respect of extremists, was clear. As antagonists of the State, they were malefactors and outlaws, whose apprehension and conviction tended to their systematic extinction. Ill weeds ought not to grow in the State.

(2) THE PROLETARIAN CLASS

The economic test is the best indication of this political class. It appears always to have existed. It ranked in the Roman State as the lowest economic grade. It contained both patricians and plebeians. It came into existence at the time when the Census grades, for taxation purposes, were set up, in 560 B.C. The proletarians were self-supporting and it was enough, as a contribution, for the State to use their services in war, as accessories of the army. In later times, as in a modern State, the so-called Proletarians, as parts of the multitude, belong to the lower economic grade of the population. In the ancient State, and since then, down

to the modern State, there have been groups of men, with mental, moral and physical defects, aggravated by poverty, and these have been troublesome, in the State, as a result of their misfortunes. In the battle of life they have had to live as those do who maintain a hand to mouth existence. In the presence of wealth and, in comparison with others who have wealth but are not free from many defects, like those of this unfortunate class, the proletarians are embittered. They become obsessed with the sentiments that they are friendless and oppressed. The effect of sentiment is often more potent than the force of circumstances. The individuals are derived from all classes. In the ups and downs of life, one who has risen from a lower grade is happy and prosperous, whilst another who has fallen from a higher grade and has reached a precisely similar position to that of the one mentioned, is unhappy and in adversity. Sentiment, the means of existence, and the environment, tend to shape and to group all of the proletarians. They have to meet the needs of existence in respect of food, clothing and housing, and the means to do so are derived, mainly, from the rewards of industry. In respect of regional management, this class contributes something in the way of rates. In respect of the State, this class contributes but little in the way of direct taxation. In respect of their income, their earnings are derived, either directly, as workers, for themselves, as principals, or as workers who are accessory to others, as principals. In their work, in either capacity, they necessarily have some wealth which is in the nature of stored up value to be used, as and when required. Their earnings are usually made as the result of competition. Where all of the competitors cannot gain this reward the relative result is the absence of gain by some who may be few, or many. The principle of close economy, in the struggle to gain good and to avoid waste, has been an age-long lesson taught as the result of necessity. In this respect, persistent thrift has to be differentiated from avarice. Thrift is characteristic of the wise, the worthy and the able. The proletarian class, in its defects, contains within it the causes which account for its relative position, in the population, and, as part of the multitude. In its quantitative analysis it is probably never less than one-fifth part of the whole population. In an old and thickly populated region, this class may increase to more than a third of the whole population. In a new and thinly populated region, as in colonial provinces, where land is abundant, in relation to a population which is small but of a high class and of an energetic type, the proletarian portion may tend to disappear. The multitude, in a sense, ceases

to be the multitude when there is a thriving and a prosperous population.

In densely populated regions the contrast of the few, with wealth and leisure, and the many, or the multitude, in poverty and in a constant struggle to earn a livelihood, is an incident of life in the State. When this incident is viewed, in relation to cause and effect, the historic aspect has to be considered. An excessive population, relatively to the productiveness of the domain, has been an evil common to States from remote times. It indicates that the economic balance has been lost in the State so that the relative classes have ceased to live prosperously, for their mutual convenience. When the lower economic grades cease to thrive, because their numbers are in excess of their means of support, then these grades, as parts of the multitude, come into competition with the rest of the population, in respect of the relative shares of wealth. There is, then, a new phase of life in the State.

Industry is the main means of accumulating worldly wealth. Industry, with material, as in production, is a coefficient of wealth and, without material, as in service utility, it may be in a similar position. In industry manual labour, relatively to mechanical power, is now a smaller element in the production of wealth than it was even a few generations ago. Labour of the manual kind has been to a large extent displaced, and there tends to be a surplus of it in the population. The use of mechanical power has multiplied the forces of economy. This power, directed by a relatively small part of the workers, can plough, sow, reap and thresh. It can also grind and bake and carry to the consumer. It has successfully competed with manual labour in an almost infinite variety of industrial utilities.

Mechanical power, like human industry, is thus a coefficient of wealth and, being procurable by wealth, it illustrates one of the ways of the reproduction of wealth which exists without the need of the producers to be dependent on the labour class in the community. In this new phase of life in the State, by the reinforced means of industry, the industrial classes must realise that a redundant supply of their classes, in excess of the needs of the community, has brought them into competition with wealth, as with one of the forces and means of economy. This excess of the industrial classes may be burdensome to the community and it may be a nuisance to the State. This conflict between wealth, used by its possessors who are industrialists, and potential industrialists of the labouring classes, without wealth, or with but little wealth, has been termed, by demagogues, the competition

between "Capital and Labour." The forces of economy, both natural and artificial, as they are traced in narrowing circles, from the world to the several States, and, within their domains, to provinces and minor regions, can be regulated only within limits and conditions, in the State, to accord with the perfect standards of public and private utility. The problems which arise require for their solution the expert skill of trained statesmen well versed in the principles and the practice of economy. The salient points which affect the surplusage of the potential labouring classes are simple. When machinery becomes inferior, or less useful, it can be scrapped and more efficient machinery can be obtained. Private utility is the standard of conduct. The position of the human labourers is primarily a matter for themselves. If they are incompetent and are not versatile in applying the surplusage of labour to supply other needs than those which are satisfied their helplessness brings their position within the scope of both public and private utility. The proletarian class has suffered, in earlier times, in part, as an incident of policy, and, in part, as an incident of necessity. The State had to bear the antagonism of this class for effects which had resulted from causes in remote times. The competition of a slavery system with the industrial labour of the free population lessened the power of the proletarian classes to earn their livelihoods. The effect, on this side, was akin to the effect of machinery in recent times. The fallacy of the "Capital and Labour" conflict has raised a false issue.

The ancient competition, in a small community, between employers and servers, when money, as a measure of wealth, was of less account, allowed the mutual needs of employer and server to be supplied by their personal standards of economy. The local, or regional, standard had all of its various branches related. The false theories of demagogues, as remedies for economic evils, have affected some of the proletarian classes. These false theories have caused these classes to wage a kind of economic war against the more wealthy classes in the rest of the community. The wealthy classes have been falsely deemed to be the adversaries of the multitude in which the main proletarian class, as a part, is included. This conflict, associated with the false doctrine of "Capital and Labour," has been a political link between the proletarian class and the democracy, as the multitude. As the terms "Capital and Labour" import two elements, as wealth and men, each of these, when taken apart and analysed, merely discloses combinations. Wealth is an economic implement, in the promotion of industry, and it has its coefficients. The wage of the labourer is wealth and

it is derived, as such, from the employer. It is as much capital with the one as it is with the other. The two parties to a service contract are men and this contract, if it is truly such, rests upon mutual volition. It is voluntary and it is based on terms which have been arranged by freemen. The proletarian is not satisfied. He alleges that he is, or was, pressed by necessity in making his contract. He wants the employer to be bound by the State whilst he, the server, is to be free. He wants, in fact, a modified contractual bond. It would be a mixture of *status* and contract. This would cause freedom and enterprise in industry to be lessened. The national and the international positions, in industry and in economy, are, also, to be ignored to suit the false theories of the proletarians.

The evil is then extended. The demagogue, as a politician, invites the proletarians to take part in politics and to share in the management of the State. The State is to appoint its overseers to shape the *statual* conditions of industrial contracts. The proletarians, as parts of the multitude, are, also, to be drawn into the democracy. They are induced, in their restlessness and ambitions, to go further and to become the antagonists of the State which shelters and protects them. The proletarians are a burden on, rather than a support of, the community which is the source of support to the State. The proletarians are, thus, the foes of the rest of the community and they are not a means of support to the State. It may be that they have no plan, as against the State, beyond making themselves a nuisance in order to draw the attention of the rest of the community to supply a remedy as a means of relief. They illustrate a part of the multitude which might be heard, in Council, in the smaller regional parts of the domain, but which ought to be excluded from taking part in the management of the State. Their votes in the scale, at election time, are an attraction to unscrupulous politicians and, so long as these tempters are left outside the scope of criminal procedure, the State will suffer detriment from its multitude.

(3) THE SERVER CLASS

The server class, as such, differs widely from the proletarian class and it has many grades in which only the lower grades as wage-earners form parts of the multitude. The server class is relational to the employer class which differs from the landed class, as being a wealthy class, in respect of its property in business

concerns. The two branches of the property classes having, respectively, property in lands and property in things other than lands, are among the chief employers. These two classes, either individually, or as stock holders, in public and private companies, are more or less permanent employers. These companies are, also, in the position of employers. They possess the combined wealth contributed by individuals and they exist for various utilitarian purposes. These companies are like economic giants when compared with individuals. They may supply services, or undertake production, or exchange, or carriage, with an infinite variety of purposes. Their wealth and power cause them, as employers, to be deemed the associates of the more substantial parts of the community. All of these employers are bound to observe the main principles of economy in the course of business. These businesses are, directly or indirectly, the means of livelihood to many. These employers are in touch with the servers by means of contractual relations.

The server class, as an industrial class, is very large and it may be taken to include those who serve the State, in its various services, and those who serve the greater and the lesser employers, under the State. The great army of industry, or of organised industry, is composed mainly of servers. All servers, therefore, may be divided into the higher and the lower grades. The lower grades, alone, may be considered within the scope of the multitude. The lower grade of servers, for the purpose in hand, may be subdivided into contrasted types. These, by the moral standard, become the worthy and the vicious. The worthy are those who are independent, honest and deserving, and the lowliness of their service, or the smallness of their economic reward, does not detract from their worthiness. They honourably make the best of their lives, in industrial occupations, with a due regard for the State and for the rest of its community. In the contrasted type are the vicious servers of the same grade. These have the opposite qualities. They are, generally, banded together, in thought and in conduct, in their professed self-interest, against both their employers and the community. They are not satisfied to have the means of securing food, clothing and shelter. They want as much as they can get. They strain the bonds of economy to the utmost limit and, when these bonds snap, they do not realise the true relations between effects and their causes.

In banding themselves together to promote their own interests, exclusively, they were blinded by the zealous pursuit of their selfish aims and ends. They forgot that they had not the means to set up businesses for themselves. They were, also, not businesslike

enough to be successful. Their greed, their negligence and their incompetence tended to disorganise and to render unprofitable the businesses of their employers. All business, at times, for its success, requires a considerable and a timely self-sacrifice. The servers, however, in their selfish indulgence, were extravagant and, in their unexpected but consequent poverty, they were dissatisfied. Their condition of discontent was aggravated where they saw that their employers, by their thriftiness, remained opulent. This server class of the lower grades of servers and of the thriftless, or vicious, type, form a very considerable part of the multitude. It pities itself and, when it is pitied by others, such as agitators and demagogues, it can be easily duped. At election time, it remembers its grievances and, especially, against the employer class of the community. If, under cover of the ballot, it can show its sympathy for the demagogue, as the measure of its hostility to the employers, it does so. The unmanly system of the ballot, which was derived from a foreign and degenerate political institution, is thus used to aggravate an evil connected with the multitude, as an antagonist of the State.

In the degradation of the multitude and, in the contrivances which aid petty villainy, in politics, the pretended friends of the multitude but, in fact, its worst foes, have been more mischievous than the multitude would have been if it had been left to itself. The server class is connected with the more organic class termed trades unionists.

(4) THE TRADES UNION CLASS

This class is a part of the great industrial class of servers of the lower grades and of the vicious type. The trades unionists are banded together to put pressure on their employers, by means of strikes. Many of these unions have been federated to put pressure, by any means in their power, upon employers and, indirectly, upon the community. They have been allowed, by the State, to go further and to take up politics to serve their own ends. In this way, trades unionists have become associated with political parties and, as a part of the multitude, they have become antagonistic to the State. The position which has been reached is an invasion of the principle that industry ought to be divorced from politics. It is, also, in defiance of another principle that the multitude ought not to have control in the State. The industrial system is in the nature of a service which is subordinate to the

mastership in the State. The trades unionists are within the industrial system and they, also, are accessory to it. They are, also, within the scope of party influence, in politics, to the extent that they interfere in the management of the State. In this respect they are akin to the proletarians, in their parasitic nature, and they are akin to the servers of the lower grade and of the vicious type, in their hostility to the employer class. In their present stage of development, from innocuous friendly societies, and in the circuit of change, after long periods of time, trades unionists have reverted to an early type so that they are most akin to the Guildsmen of ancient city States. These Guildsmen, at first, became a part of the mixed community and then became the founders of democracy. To-day, the trades unionists have advanced in their pretensions.

In Britain, in comparatively recent times, these trades unionists were evolved from friendly societies which existed for worthy and utilitarian purposes. They provided for the welfare of working men by mutual help, as an extension of self-help. Clubs, for such purposes, have existed from a remote age. They were indigenous in Britain, and, in the earliest times, they were highly developed, for economic purposes, as a means of industry and livelihood. They were not peculiar to Western Europe but are traceable in its earliest civilisations. In Attica, some of the earliest legislation was restrictive to keep clubs within the scope of private or public utility in the observance of the standards of propriety. The friendly societies, as clubs, having become trades unions, have gone outside the scope of industry and they have gone beyond the bounds of propriety. They put their case with point and simplicity. They must have a "living wage." They put this proposition in a varied form. They must have a "decent living." They either induce, or press, all of those who are employed in industry, as servers, in the lower grade, in the many branches of industrial utility, to join forces with them, to attain their nefarious ends.

The spirit of class gregariousness then becomes prevalent. It does not matter, at all, whether some of these servers are satisfied or not with their employers. They must all join, or it will be worse for those who do not join. The army of servers of the lower grade must follow the banner of the servers, as a class, and it must observe order, system and discipline. The unwilling members of a trades union are thus drawn within the grip of a gregarious bondage, and they find that comradeship has some advantages and some disadvantages. The union is more powerful than the individual. It can stand by him and support him when he is unfairly treated by the employer, who has other servers in the

trades union. This is the effect of the artificial system of trades unionism. On a natural basis, the employer and the server should do their best for each other. It is a false presumption that all employers are iniquitous. On the basis of trades unionism, the servers must stand together, to get for themselves all the good they can. They demand a maximum wage for a minimum of work with a minimum of time. Moderation is not consistent with these extremes. This demand marks three points in an economic principle. It indicates the nature of the vitiated server as an instrument, that can be used in the co-operation between employers and servers, in the work of production. In nature, both in animal life and in plant life, every organism has its own accessory economic system which affects the existence, the quantity and the quality of its life.

The parable of the body and its members was older than Rome and its influence was widespread. In artificial organisms, in every variety of industry, and even in the State, the greatest of the artificial organisms, there is the accessory economic system which affects its existence, in the due performance of its several functions. The State needs to adhere to its own economic system, for its stability and defence, as well as for the security and the welfare of its community. The State's economic system, in respect of its perfection, is affected, in its excellence, by the perfection of its industrial system. It is, also, adversely affected by the imperfection and by the defects of the same system. The State, too, is affected, for good or for evil, by the condition of the accessory economic system which is relational to the industrial power of its community. As greater principles govern minor principles, so the State, with the supremacy in its domain, with the control of its own economic system, is not to be controlled by its minor and accessory economic systems. The principles of public utility and of public policy must prevail. The State, in its duty of defence and welfare, has, therefore, no alternative but to secure the efficiency of its industrial system in which the employers are mainly the principals. The servers are mainly the accessories. The trades unionist servers, in their combinations, have, therefore, need to observe their duty, connected with patriotism and welfare, which is not to consider themselves alone, but to regard the State and the rest of its community.

The State is not an institution in which the industrial servers can be allowed to domineer and, as parasites, to follow their predatory inclinations against their employers and the rest of the community. The State is an institution in which the multitudes,

in its domain, cannot be allowed to domineer and to debase its management. The State, under such circumstances, could not remain even tolerably perfect, as an institution, in the nature of the true State. If the State is to retain the mastership in its own domain, this mastership, or the supremacy, cannot be shared with the multitudes. The less competent and the less substantial parts of the population ought not to have the control in the State. Trades unionists, in this respect, have the alternatives, either to observe and keep their subordinate place, in the State, or to take the consequences of their misconduct. If they attempt to usurp political power and domination over their employers and, indirectly, over the rest of the community, then the State will have the duty to exercise the proper remedies. The first step, on the part of the State, is to enlighten the vicious parts of its regional multitudes, as a means of correction and, as a timely warning of the ulterior steps which are proper to be taken, to exterminate pernicious evils in the State.

Much of the mischief of trades unionism has been due to ignorance in the multitude. The multitude is incompetent and it cannot rightly appreciate the subtle processes of economy in the State. The parochial multitude may be versed in parochial affairs, but the parish, in the scope and in the complexity of its economy, is widely different in these respects, in its comparison with the State. The multitude can, however, appreciate that evils should be nipped in the bud. Much can be done by the State, in respect of these evils, to lessen them both in childhood and in adult life. In ancient States, instances indicate the utility of this policy in the free population. The neglect of children, in not securing their education, as to propriety in the ordinary conduct of life, has been a primary source of mischief in the State, as a source of the evils in the multitude. In adult life, this neglect has allowed the multitude to be led astray. A secondary source of mischief is the toleration of demagogues, as the blind leaders of the blind. In both the primary and the secondary sources of this mischief, either the State itself, or a provincial, or a sub-provincial, management under the State, is mainly responsible for the neglect, either to obviate, or to remove, these evils. It follows that, in tracing effects to their causes, the trades unionist is usually what this negligence, with his own viciousness and his environment, have made him. The personal part and the business part, in trades unionism, can thus be severed and the business part can be considered alone. Another aspect is apparent. All that is worthy, and useful, in trades unionism, could have been attained, within the scope of the original friendly societies,

which could have been confined to the minor regions of the domain.

The economic evils which have to be met and remedied are, always, relational to such regional conditions. These evils are, also, relational to consistent economy, in respect of utility, and to the standards of value, in production. This regional economy, by stages, is connected with domain economy and with international economy and, also, with the world economy which neither men, nor States, can control. When an economic reaction is caused, even within a small region, the employers, as the producers of commodities, cannot control their keen competitors who exist in all parts of the world. There is a strenuous competition, in all free and civilised States, to maintain quality and cheapness in production, in order to secure a profitable exchange, in all markets. Trades unionists are not expert economists. In their ignorance of the State and of their own position, in its community, their thoughtlessness has made them unduly selfish and their selfishness, in its short-sightedness, has made them brutish. When the servers, such as the trades unionists, strain the costs of production, to the extreme limits, in order to gain a maximum of wages for a minimum of work, then the employers, as a consequence, cannot conduct their businesses at a profit. Industry suffers detriment and the regional community ceases to be altogether prosperous. This position is comparative.

Two regions may be compared. If, in one region, the workers are worthy, wise and thrifty, and, by these means, have become their own employers, by a company business of their own, in a particular branch of industry, then their efficient co-operation, in production, at lower wages, and for a longer time at work, may so lessen the cost of production that they can secure markets for their products and make great profits. The employer interests, and the server interests, in this case, are not in conflict. The servers may have a common interest but their interests may be far from equal. In their mutual co-operation there is an inducement, to an extent, to increase the gain and to lessen the waste, with the result that the shares of profit may be proportional to the interests at stake, or roughly so. If, now, in another region, the workers, as servers only, are trades unionists and are, also, unaccommodating towards their employers and stand out for hard terms which render their services either unprofitable, or not sufficiently profitable to allow the employers an elastic margin of profit, to meet the fluctuations, which are incident to industrial undertakings, then the usual results follow. Business ceases. There is loss on idle capital which when not idle had been profitable

not only to the employers but to the servers. There is unemployment, also, and the waste, to some extent, is measured by the loss in wages.

This loss, however, is only a part of the waste. Trades unionists, in their efforts to control their employers, employ any pressure which they can exercise. When they fail and are in distress, then they look to the local, or the regional, community, or to the State, to support them. In the State, on the basis of the 'unigrađe' electorates, they still seek a means to control their employers. One evil breeds other evils. In the State, with its mixed community, from earlier to modern times, nothing has caused more demoralisation and corruption than the multitude's influence in politics. In the ancient State the multitude, as the "many-headed beast," was deemed to be a political monster. The popular assembly of ancient States was the means whereby corruption was spread in the attacks upon the State.

In Britain, trades unionism has been pampered when it ought to have been corrected, in its first stage of excess, in its licentiousness. Evils ought to be nipped in the bud. The true point to be kept in view is the evil, its gravity and its remedy. There are evils which can be checked and cured, by fines, and by imprisonment. There are other evils which affect the State and its community and which are associated with political licentiousness. Severity is necessary for their repression. Flogging and hanging are usually effective deterrents. In any event, hanging is not too severe for crimes which, when analysed, amount to something like treason against the State.

The trades unionists would act, in the State, as though authority had been delegated to them to control their employers and the rest of the community. The State has to consider the standards of justice and the control of its economy as well as matters of defence and welfare. The evil which trades unionism has the aim to prevent is the oppression of the server class. The compass of fair treatment, within the scope of the service contract, remains, therefore, as the main point to be considered. This point unites the servers, as a class, and as a part of the multitude. It is quite true that extortion exists in the State and that it has, always, existed in connection with service contracts and with other contracts. There are sharks in most seas. On land the rack-renting landlord, the extortionate moneylender, the monopolists of the food and clothing and of the other necessities, requisite for existence, in the State, are evils as much as the oppressive employer is an evil. All employers are not oppressive. All of these evils have specific remedies. It does not follow

that the multitude, or any part of it, is to prescribe and apply the remedies. It is for the State to maintain justice and to provide remedies for the evils of injustice. The State, by its Legislature and by its Judicature, can abate most evils, without allowing either the multitude, or any of its parts, to usurp power and to assume the functions of the State. The multitude has, already, been allowed to lessen the excellence of the electorates and, indirectly, the excellence of the servitorial branch of the Legislature. The evil of trades unionism has been aggravated by its organic system, which has been extended by federations, to disturb the several economic systems of widely separated regions, in respect of their natural balance. The extortion and the oppression, by servers, has made victims of the employers.

Trades unionism has become involved in politics so that it allows the tentacles of multitudinism to invade the servitor branch of the Legislature. The multitude, by this means, attempts to revive the greatest evil of ancient States. Demagogues, again, preach the same false doctrine as of old. "The multitude cannot have justice unless it has control." This raises a plain issue. The truth is that the State is the master in its own domain and the multitude has not the control in the State. This is the point on which all issues can be raised and tested in respect of the multitude's antagonism to the State. The consequences are obvious. Trades unionists can never be corrected until they have been reduced to observe the principles of public policy and to keep within the scope of mutual support, as servers, without any control over employers. In this reduction to a due regard for political propriety, trades unionists should be deprived of any right to interfere in politics, in the sense of taking part in the management of the State. This severance of industry from politics, in the attempts by organised servers to derange the course of industry, by strikes, or by combinations, or by political influence, will remove one of the greatest evils which has blighted both industry and the State. The State has the power, on the basis of truth and justice, to correct industrial malcontents. The freedom of competition, in industry, can be maintained by proper means.

In every parish, and hundred, and shire, institutions, in the nature of friendly societies, could be formed, with persons of probity and substance on their committees of management, to help the servers, in every branch of industry. The regional limitation, to shires, is wide enough for a working man. There need be no class hostility by the worthy, the wise, and the substantial parts, against the industrial parts of the community. The generous

treatment of the genuine and self-supporting servers would tend to relieve the State and its community of a dangerous nuisance. The membership of these friendly societies need not entail political disfranchisement. When a regional refuge is opened, for those who are liable to be oppressed in industry, there need be no hesitation in dealing, effectively, with the graver evils of trades unionism, in its antagonism to the State. In the international competition of States, industrial efficiency is becoming vital to the safety of the State and to the welfare of its community. What has happened before, in the State, may happen again. Flood waters often flow where they have flowed before. The lessons of the past, as to the pernicious influence of the Guildsmen, in the State, by means of the mixed community, appear to be applicable, in several respects, to trades unionists, in connection with the electorates.

The ungrade system of democracy, in the ancient Greek States, at first, allowed the multitudes to debase the political communities, and then to distort and to ruin the States. In Britain, as we have seen, the triggrade electorates were a source of stability and were a barrier against this evil. The servitors of the graded community were the representatives of all of the several parts of it. The excellence of the servitors of the higher grades could not be swamped by the baseness of the servitors of the lower grades. The servitors of the higher grades, in their worthiness, wisdom and ability, were akin to magistrates, in their ability to remedy injustice. The servitors of the lower grades could ventilate their grievances but they were powerless to hurt the State or its community. The State's system of economy was not allowed to be disorganised by concerted movements of the multitude. The criminal classes were duly corrected and, where correction failed, they were steadily reduced. Progressive communities, in the true State, knew, by traditions from the past, what the alternatives were which were open to them. They had to be wise in time. Evils were not allowed to grow in the State. In a review of the careers of States, and in a scrutiny of trades unionism, there is no difficulty in the diagnosis of this malady of the modern State. It is like a malignant fiend. It will destroy unless it is itself destroyed.

Every age has had to slay its dragons. In the reform of the State, as in the development of the State, no region of the earth has excelled Britain. Here many dragons have been slain. In England, despotism on the Throne has been effectively swept away. Here, too, ministerial despotism has been more than once destroyed. Here, in a conflict of a thousand years, the domination of the Sanctuary over the State was destroyed. The tyranny

of trades unionism is the domination of an organic part of multitudinism. This fiendish part of the multitude may pose as a fearsome dragon, but things are not always what they seem. The vital parts of trades unionism may be easily stricken by the State. The safety of the State and the welfare of its community will be well served, if the State does its duty, with thoroughness. Trades unionism is no ordinary antagonist of the State. It was cradled in liberalism and it has thriven on licentiousness. The qualities of honesty and common sense, which are latent in the general population, have only to be aroused to aid the State to rid itself of an intolerable evil. The natural goodness, in the multitude, is akin to that of the middle classes. The viciousness of trades unionism has already recoiled on itself. It has produced a cult which accords with liberalism and licentiousness. This cult has attracted the attention of extremists who are the common foes of the State. Trades unionism has departed so much from a due regard for truth and justice that it has no longer the moral vigour to reject the advances of international political malefactors, who are the antagonists of all States. Trades unionism, because it is organic and is widespread and it contains many witless dupes, forms a ready means whereby the international political malefactors can permeate the multitude, in every State, with their pernicious doctrines. The Marxian heresy is a specimen. Its relation to economy and to life in the State is but a link with other antagonists of the State, in its multitudes.

There is nothing more fit than that the task of the correction and the suppression of trades unionism should be undertaken by the State, in Britain, and be carried out with such thoroughness, effectiveness and completeness that other States could apply the like remedies and gain confidence and courage by their success. The federations of trades unions, and their obvious political aims, warrant a declaration by the Legislature that they are treasonable associations. Their existence, after a day stated, might be followed by forfeitures of their funds and by penal liabilities for their members. Political disqualifications and capital penalties need not be delayed. The crimes which are worse than murder in their detriment to the State, need proper penalties.

(5) COMMUNISTS AND SOCIALISTS

The communal life, on a small scale, is an economic system which is more ancient than the State. It is traceable throughout

the world. It existed in regions as widely apart as China, Egypt, Britain and Peru. It is an old-world system and suitable to small groups of human beings, in minor regions. It has phases, in wild life, which had been observed by the ancients. Hesiod, as a teacher in touch with Nature, noticed the habits of bees and applied their principle of work in the conduct of human life. The system of communism is capable of extension, within limits. Its principle, however, is found, as a basis, in civilisation. In the development of communism limits are soon reached, in various directions. There utility ceases and waste begins. Even a small city State was too large, and too complicated, to follow the simple and primitive lines of a communistic institution. There is no trace of a communistic State. There are traces of small communistic settlements, within States, but these bodies had no control in the State. Individualism, within communism, was hampered in respect of enterprise and progress. The indolent shared what the diligent had won. Property and industry, used for a common purpose, required for the success of the system, an exclusive body which observed a high standard of conduct. When the body contained degenerates, and these had the control in the community, the refugees from ancient communism found safety and justice, in the domains of the Sanctuary, and the State. Communism was non-progressive even in the Homeric age. It was illustrated in tribal communities.

In Socialism, the equality in fellowship and in property, as the result of association, needed only time to produce effects similar to those of communism. In each case the property belonged to the community and it ceased to belong to the members, as individuals. The management was not by all. It was in a chief, with a Board of trustees. There was precedence and there was pre-eminence. There was superiority, in the control, and there was subjection, in the members. Socialism of this kind was in the nature of a private Guild. In Egypt, and in Britain, such fraternities existed for industrial purposes and as a means of livelihood for the members. Communism, as originating in tribalism, appears to have rested on a natural basis. Socialism rested more on an artificial basis. The principle of both was similar. In the Celtic family system elaborate provisions existed for setting up households, for the sons, as accessories of the father's household, so that the youngest son succeeded the father. The Roman family system, by tradition, had a basis, relational to the father's side, whereby the succession belonged to the males, on the death of the agnatic ascendant. The State recognised an equity in the sons, until testamentary power, developed later, had modified

the earlier system. It is clear that communism did not cease on account of its worthiness and utility, but on account of its vices. The dreamer and the visionary, as theorists, see communism and socialism, as ideals, which have had only an imaginary and not a real existence. The industrial Guild has had many modifications. There has, however, never yet been a communistic, or a socialistic, State. An empire State is too large an institution for such wrong-headed groups of the multitude, as communists and socialists, to be allowed to experiment with.

There are, however, spare regions, in the empire domain, where political fanatics of these dangerous types could be gathered together, in suitable institutions, in which they could be made to work and be rewarded according to the utilitarian results of their industry. If there are communists and socialists who desire to realise their theories, in practice, there appears to be no reason why they should not set up institutions of their own, on the basis of private utility. They would have the duty to regard public utility and political propriety. The communists and the socialists are classes, apart, as groups, in the multitude and, as Nature's misfits, they are in an incongruous position, when they are allowed to take part in the management of the State. They are like dull-witted children who have grown in stature but not in mind. They are defectives. They have left the normal type. They have become extremists. They cannot realise the fact that the State is a specific institution. They are not large in number, relatively to the rest of the multitude, but they are sources of bad examples to others and they are liable to be made the dupes and to become the agents of political malefactors. They complete the circuit of the relative parts of the multitude, as the second great antagonist of the State. Their exclusion from all electorates and their subjection to constant police supervision would have a corrective influence sufficient to hold this evil in check.

It can now be realised that the multitude, as a considerable body of the general population, may be almost harmless, in itself, if its parts were segregated and inspected, to weed out bad characters. The multitude is rendered antagonistic to the State, because it is allowed to be permeated by evil influences which emanate from a comparatively small part of it. The extremists, the proletarians, the servers, the trades unionists, with the communists and socialists, are all, more or less, influenced by the adverse forces of economy, and they feel the pinch of poverty. The use of mechanical power has aggravated evil conditions, in some respects, and, in other respects, has lessened them. A

particular region, from its own sources, can support only a limited number of human beings. The world, as a whole, by means of its carrier system, is in an artificial position in respect of its food supplies. The multitude, which had no part in the evolution of the State, can never be trained to be of any use in the management of the State. Its evil influence can be lessened to a minimum.

CHAPTER VIII

POLITICAL BASENESS

(1) THE DISTORTION OF THE STATE

THE antagonists of the State having been delineated, the effects, in detriment of the State, may now be more easily traced to their primary causes. The greater part of mankind is not depraved. All human nature does not stand still. Certain human beings are progressive ; certain of them are non-progressive ; and certain of them are retrogressive. In respect of the latter group there is, in the State, as a contrast to excellence, a tendency to baseness, having its cause in the retrogressive part of the population and its detrimental effect on the State. In a State, the greater part of the population is probably more honest than dishonest. The evils which arise in the population of a domain have to be considered, in relation to the community, in the sense of the political community, as a much smaller body than the population. The political community can interfere, by its magisterial agents and by its servitorial agents, in the management of the State. This community, being a smaller body than the general population, contains, within itself, a still smaller but more select body which, on account of its excellence, is the more responsible part of the political community. It is usually the landed class, with the greatest stake in the domain. The political community, in the widest sense, when it is viewed, in respect of virility, and wealth, as having the qualities of worthiness, wisdom and political ability, with substantial economic means, may be partitioned into three parts. The parts, as a rule, are not equal in respect of number. They may, however, be referred to as thirds and as being, respectively, the upper, the middle and the lower third. The partition is rough and it is not exact. It is, however, useful, as an aid to reach the truth, for the purpose in hand.

The lower third part, as it contains the greater number in the community and in the population, may be deemed to include the multitude. This body, as the joint effect of various causes, differs appreciably from the upper third and from the middle third of both the community and the general population. These thirds;

in fact, have combined qualities and numbers which indicate variances in the parts of both the community and the population. There are variances in Nature, in respect of the land structure, as in hills, in plains and in valleys. There is equality in unity, as to what is common to all, but in variety, as to what is not common to all, there is a difference. In differences there may be contrasts. These have to be kept in view to appreciate the truth and to avoid fallacies. The precept of decadent Roman law that "all men are equal" contains a fallacy which is disclosed as soon as the tests of universality and generality are applied. The parts of the community and the parts of the population can, also, be indicated by an application of these tests, with sufficient clearness to reach what is true, or is approximately so. In a State, and especially in a great empire State, the domain may contain several varieties in its population, from the most excellent and the most advanced to the most base and the most backward. This fact is true not only of the domain but of its several parts, as in the dominions, the provinces, the shires, the minor regions and in the cities, towns and villages.

It follows that, in political management, a due regard must be had for the State and for provincial and minor regional managements, as they appear, in their receding positions of superiority, relational to their several regions within the State's domain. It is necessary also, to view the State as a specific institution. This point is important. The nature of the State does not appear as clearly to all in the population as it does to some. There are those in the State who do not appreciate, even in a general outline, what the State is. There are others, too, who are so blinded with ignorance or with inaptitude, or with prejudice, or with viciousness, that they are unfit to take any useful part in the management of even a small region under the State. There is, consequently, a need that proper persons should be selected for the purpose of efficient management. The State, when compared with its various subordinate managements, stands out as the greatest institution in its domain. It follows that the management of the State needs the aid of the worthiest, the wisest, the ablest, and the best, men in its community. The State is a virile institution. It cannot be efficiently managed by priests, by Guildsmen, or by women. Its management is not a business for the multitude. The State, as we have seen, is rightly managed, "from above," by its magistracy and not "from below," in the sense of control by its multitude. There are other parts of both the community and the population, which are either more fit, or less unfit, than the multitude to interfere in the management of the State. The upper third and the middle third, as parts

of the political community, apart from the general population, are more able and more trustworthy than the multitude. In spite of this fact, a false belief was prevalent, in the multitudes of ancient States, that the multitude was "the people," in the sense of being "the community," as the principal in the State domain.

This was a fallacy. It is traceable as having existed in the lowest grade of the population, in Athens, in Rome and in England, long after the Norman Conquest. This fallacy and this false belief have been evils, rooted in the multitudes, and having mischievous effects in the careers of States. The fallacy may have originated in village communities, among the free populations of ancient States, to the extent that the minor regional communities, in their subordination to the State, had large powers in their own managements. In Britain, some of the manorial managements were, originally, set up by freemen and the manor stones have existed from a remote age. In the interval, the manorial populations, as a result of conquests, had ceased to share in the management of the State and had begun to form a part of the lower third of the general population. They had become a part of the rural multitude. These regional managements were not States. Their powers were limited and they were always local. This origin of the fallacy may account for the myth and for its survival in a population which had passed through a period of servitude. When the fallacy is carefully examined there appears to have never been, in any State, such a condition of things that the magisterial and the servitorial agents derived their powers, or their authorities, from the multitude. The existence of the feudal system was inconsistent with any control by the multitude.

The descent of authority, in the State, has always been "from above." The subordinate magistrates derived their authority either directly or indirectly "from above," as from the superior magistrates, or from the supreme magistrates. The position of servitors on behalf of the community differed in this respect, from the position of the magistracy. In accordance with law, as laid down by the magistracy, the servitors were appointed by the community in its regional parts. These servitors, to be eligible, had to be men of probity and of substance as well as of ability in statesmanship. Their eligibility and their election allowed their appointments to be confirmed by the magistracy. These servitors were never appointed by the multitude. They were appointed by the upper part and by the middle part of the community, in its regional parts. They were bound to use their official powers for the good of the State and for the welfare of its community. They were not controlled in any way by the multitude.

They were always controlled by the magistrates. The needs of the community, in its regional parts, were, in respect of the remedies, expressed by petitions to the magistracy. The servitors had no authority, either to make "demands," or to give "mandates," either by themselves, or by their constituents. It is clear that the multitude, in this respect, was not in a better position than the community. The State, in its Government, was managed with the virility and the ability, in system and order, which are characteristic in the command of an efficient army. Just as the privates were not the army, so the multitude was not the community. The fallacy and the false belief of the multitude, that it is "the people," that it is the source of magistracy and that it controls the servitors of the community, are not extinct, to-day, even in England. The ideal of the manor and the ideal of the State have something in common in their structures consistently with the fact that the manor, as a small organism, is a regional part of the State, as a great organic institution. In respect of the part and the whole, on the point of dimensions, the fallacy appears to be traceable. In respect of the false belief, and especially in a domain which was under the feudal system, the error appears to have originated in a servile taint in the population. Britain is a very notable region in which the State reached its full development, in eminence, in utility and in vigour.

When the State, in England, had passed its zenith and had declined and its community had become mixed and had degenerated, then, the old fallacies, from Latin and from Greek civilisations, were revived to become the sources of new political baseness.

The Constitution was deformed and parts of it which were excellent became debased. The multitude, directly or indirectly, had a part in influencing the change. The multitude, in quite recent times, has renewed and has extended its ancient pretensions. In recent times, also, there has been a counterpart default to meet and to resist these pretensions. In Britain, the custodians of the State (as the domain magistrates have such duty of custody) have failed in their duties and have yielded to the pretensions of the multitude. The lower class electorates, which are now unigrade electorates, influenced by the regional multitudes, have professed to give "mandates" to the regional servitors to do things which are not in the discretion of servitors to do. The multitude, in a Constitutional State, has assumed, in this way, what may be termed "democratic" theories where such theories, when attempted to be put into practice, are antagonistic to the State. The multitude attempts to dictate to the magistrates what is to be done in the State. The trigrade electorates, in respect of this evil of

the multitude, and in safeguarding the State against it, had been the most excellent in the world. These famous trigrade electorates, in recent times, have been surrendered to the multitudes by the false custodians of the State. This trigrade system, as already mentioned, had contained the true principle of proportional representation which held the three parts of the community bound together to co-operate for the welfare of the whole community.

In place of this useful, well tried and venerable system a new and a fantastic system of "proportional representation" has been propounded by doctrinaire politicians. The new system contains a gambling element to moderate the mass movements of the new democracy set up by the unigrade system of electorates. The "pure" democracy, as the absolute multitude, had for centuries, been resisted by the trigrade system. The partition of the Court of Parliament into two Houses of, respectively, magistrates and servitors, was based on a system of relative excellence. The servitors in worthiness, wisdom, wealth and ability were the equals of the magistrates. These two branches of agency had different functions in the Court of Parliament. The peers, in their earlier years, had been trained as knights. There was no social friction. The knightly servitors were a bond of union between the two branches of agency. When the electoral qualifications were lowered this bond of union was weakened. When the trigrade system was degraded to the unigrade system and the electorate was enlarged to include the multitude, the effect was seen in the lowered quality of the servitors. High class servitors, released from the former necessary qualifications, were not to be expected from low class electorates.

This first position indicates the nature of the degradation of the servitor agency by placing it within the thrall of the multitude organised as a democracy. The second position indicates the undue influence in the House of Commons gained by the multitude where formerly the whole community, in its three grades, had been well represented by three grades of servitors, in a relative proportion to the economic interests affected. The third position indicates the distortion in the State. The high class magistrates have to co-operate with low class servitors. The magistracy is face to face with a servitorial agency which is dependent on the multitude. The result is rivalry and hostility between agencies which have the duty to co-operate. The weakening of a high class magistracy and the strengthening of a low class servitorial agency have lessened the stability of Government and have been detrimental to the State. The present distortion of the State is enough to warrant a reform of the State but, in place of reform

the distortion, unless it is stayed, tends to be aggravated. The fourth position has to be considered. The electoral sway exercised by the servitors, in the House of Commons, as a consequence of competing parties and of their power in numbers, and, also, of the influence of a majority in that House (which is exclusively a House of Servitors) has made it the means of support of the Cabinet. The Cabinet is a ministerial body subordinate to the First Magistrate and, also, to the Crown, as the magisterial body to which the First Magistrate is accessory. This Cabinet, when it has had the support of the House of Servitors, has assumed the pretension, under erratic Prime Ministers, to domineer in the State. The Prime Minister has thus become, in the minds of the multitude, the Master in the State. This new popular doctrine, as to the powers of the House of Commons, is unconstitutional.

It has corollaries which are also unconstitutional. One of these doctrines is that the occupant of the Throne must do what his ministerial advisers tell him to do. Another of these doctrines is that the magisterial body is not to counsel its Chief Executive Officer adversely to the advice of the Ministerial Cabinet. There is, also, the latent theory that, although, in form, the Cabinet derives its authority from the First Magistrate yet, in fact, that the Cabinet derives it from the majority in the House of Commons. This false doctrine is but an extension of the fallacy of the multitude—a fallacy as old as European civilisation—that the “greater number” must win. The false doctrine is, also, connected with another fallacy and a false belief, as already mentioned, that the multitude is “the people,” with the implication that it is “the community.” It follows that, in the theory of the new democracy, the Prime Minister, as a despot, is, indirectly, accessory to the multitude, as the principal in the domain. On this basis an anomaly must then result. In the mind of the multitude it must follow that the First Magistrate and his principal, the magisterial body to which he is accessory, have only an apparent but not the real control in the State. This raises the main issue as to the source and residence of the supreme control in the State. This is an issue which affects the supremacy in the empire State. The supremacy in the State does not reside in the House of Commons because this House is only a servitor body, and the supremacy in the domain belongs to its magistracy.

The fallacies and the theories of the multitude, that the House of Commons has the supremacy in the State, come into sharp conflict with the facts. They are specimens of political baseness, in its evil influence, as a means to distort the State. There are a few other theories of the multitude and they are termed

"democratic" theories. In fact they are light and airy doctrines connected with the House of Commons and with incidents which are deemed to be precedents. The danger to the State of countenancing these doctrines is manifest from the review of the means and of the processes whereby the House of Commons assumed the economic control and then used that power to gain political control in the State. The whole of these means and processes need to be very carefully reviewed and, where necessary, revised in order to undo the mischiefs which have been caused, in the State, by allowing the servitorial agency to exceed its province and to invade the province of the two magisterial agencies. The safety and the welfare of the empire State have to be weighed against the excess of power assumed by, or yielded to, the House of Commons. The following democratic theories indicate the tendencies of the multitude. When the Cabinet ceases to support the Prime Minister, he is to be free to recast it, but subject to his having the support of a party majority in the House of Commons. This implies that the State, and its welfare are, for a time, to be dependent on a minister. This contrasts with the virile system of the feudal Board of State which kept its control against despotism on the Throne. It indicates, also, the distortion which has been caused in the State by the loss of the Board of State, the Council of State, which was strong enough to control the Prince. The lords of the Council, the former standing committee of the Great Council, are not now constitutionally appointed, with the results indicated.

The Cabinet, a ministerial body, tends to act as the Council of State, which was a magisterial body. Another theory of democracy is that when the majority of the House of Commons is no longer willing to support the Cabinet, then, the Prime Minister is to be free to have a new general election. The presumption is that the multitude is to give a new "mandate" and that the party leader, with the majority, is to be the Prime Minister. This implies the exclusion of magisterial control and the co-operation of something which is akin to "a despot and the multitude." The party system is relational to the House of Servitors and to the electorates of the servitors. It indicates incidentally, the swing of opinions prevalent, in the community, on various subjects of political interest. These opinions do not bind the House of Magistrates and they do not bind the Lords of the Council who, in strictness, were the standing committee of these magistrates. These opinions do not bind the First Magistrate who was, and is, the accessory of the Council. The Cabinet, being a ministerial body and a committee of the extended Council (or the Privy Council),

is subordinate to the Council, and members of the House of Magistrates have an inherent right to attend Cabinet Councils. It follows that the Cabinet is not accessory to the House of Servitors. In the mind of the multitude is the firmly fixed fallacy and belief that the electorates control the House of Commons and that the majority of this House controls the Cabinet and that the Cabinet controls the King. There is a similar fallacy and belief that the Cabinet is "the Government" and, also, that "Parliamentary Government" is, in an indirect way, the Government by the House of Commons. The mind of the multitude is quite clear on these points. The Cabinet, in form, is "the Administration" but it is, in fact, "the Government." Loose language, in this way, facilitates the progress of forces which tend to political baseness. The fact is that when the electorates have discharged their duties, by the election of the servitors, these servitors have duties to perform, as Councillors in Parliament.

Their duties are limited. The servitors are not to be interfered with outside of Parliament, even by their constituents. In spite of this fact, democratic doctrines have grown up which imply that the servitors are the deputies, or the delegates, of their constituencies and that these constituencies are the true sources of power in the State. The mind of the multitude does not comprehend the fact that the magisterial agency is the principal branch and that it does not rest on the servitorial electorates and, also, that the House of Magistrates does not depend, in any way, on the House of Servitors. It is the independence of the House of Magistrates and its freedom from the thralldom of the multitude that has enabled it to remain the most expert, the most illustrious and the most venerable magisterial body in the world. As the House of Commons is not a magisterial body its members, the servitors, have limited powers which can be extended beyond their due limits only by usurpations and by invasions of the magisterial powers of the House of Peers, as magistrates, the Lords of the Council who derive their powers from the House of Peers, and the First Magistrate who is the accessory of the Lords of the Council. The First Magistrate is the Executive Officer of the supreme control. The mastership in the State is in the domain magistracy. It is not in the Throne and it is not in the House of Commons. The party system in the State was, originally, limited to parties in the Council and, then, to parties in the Common Council termed "the Court of Parliament," which, in 1407, was divided into two Houses. The Lords of the Council were under no disability, when considering variant policies, in consulting together, in groups, to attain the public good. The Commons, as servitors,

both in Parliament and out of Parliament, were like privates, or non-commissioned officers, in an army. In strictness, they had no right to impose their opinions either upon the magisterial agents, or upon one another, as the servitorial agents. They had, and still have, the position of petitioners. The Commons, as a class, are bare subjects of the State, with rights, as members of the political community, to take part in certain electorates for the election of servitors.

This is the true source of the servitorial authority. When it is remembered that this authority originated in the State, and was derived from the feudal system, it can, then, be concluded beyond a doubt, that the pretence of the House of Commons, to be the superior of the magistracy, is ill-founded. The theory that the multitude is the source of magisterial power in the State and the theory that it can give "mandates" to the servitors are simply "democratic" heresies. At the back of it all there may be a heritage from a past age derived from the gregarious multitude. The latent threat of "the greater number" is manifest in trades unionism. It is a survival from the Homeric age. In England, with its well preserved records, it is possible to go far into the mediæval period and to rely on State papers to confirm the conclusion mentioned. The Cabinet was, originally, kept under strict control, by the Lords of the Council, who were great magistrates, or justiciaries, and the King, as one of them, was only the chief magistrate. He could not control his fellow magistrates in Council but he, as their accessory, was controlled by them. The "King in Council" is the proper position of the King, as the Executive Officer. These great magistrates as justiciaries, were the safeguards against despotism and against puppetry. The term "monarch" is foreign to the Constitution. The definition "limited monarchy" is as untrue and improper as the definition "parliamentary government." The expressions are marks of political baseness and, as means, they facilitated the distortion of the State. The Tudors, from the first to the last, kept the House of Commons within its proper bounds. The Tudors strengthened the House of Peers and saved the State. The Stuarts were infected with the evil principles of debased Roman law. The virile political forces came into conflict with principles which tended to political baseness and to the distortion of the State.

The Great Rebellion interrupted the State's career of development and left a chaos behind it. When the first German dynasty came to the Throne of England the great peers, as justiciaries, had ceased to exist, with the exception of the King and the Earl Marshal. As King George I did not understand the English

language, and was not expert in a knowledge of the Constitution, the Cabinet Ministers met without him. The other Lords of the Council had a duty to be present. It follows that, in the distortion of the State two important bonds, or links, have been lost. If these were restored and strengthened, the State, to that extent, would be reformed. The two links are (a) the Lords of the Council, as the Standing Committee of the Court of Peers (as the Great Council of Magistrates); and (b) the control of the Lords of the Council, over the Cabinet Council, at which, at least, two Lords should always be present. The Lords, in the Cabinet, as ministers, would differ from the Lords of the Council, as great magistrates. The evil of not appointing "Lords of the Council," as the approved agents of the Court of Magistrates, arose as a result of despotism on the Throne. Except for the appointment of Receivers and Triers of Petitions, in 1305, this evil has never been remedied. The terms of the grant whereby, in 1407, the House of Commons came into existence indicate the jealousy of the Throne, in respect of the Lords of the Council, as a separate body. The evil of allowing the Cabinet to evade the control of the Lords of the Council is much more recent, as already mentioned. The powers of the Lords of the Council, like the powers of the Receivers and Triers, are still latent in the House of Lords, in its character of the second estate, as the Court of Great Council. The Senate of England (termed the Coron or "Crown of England") was a corporation.

It was the Standing Committee of the Court of Great Council. The Privy Council was an extension of the Senate of England by the inclusion of the Knights attendant. The Cabinet, in turn, was a Committee of the Privy Council. It follows that the Cabinet is accessory to the Privy Council which, in turn, is accessory to the Senate, or Crown, which, in turn, is accessory to the Court of Great Council which is but the House of Peers, in its character, as the second estate of the realm. The Lords of the Council, as the virtual Senate, have the duty to maintain the magisterial powers of the supremacy and not to allow them to be usurped by ministerial persons, either on the ground that they are the ministers of the Throne, or on the ground that they are members of the House of Commons, and are supported by its majority, or on any other ground. The House of Commons, as a servitor body, is but a fragment of the third estate. The Privy Council is but a fragment of the first estate. The Cabinet is but a fragment of a fragment of the first estate. The Lords of the Council are still the virtual possessors of the first estate.

In earlier times, as in 1382, the Commons in the Common Council had petitioned the King and the peers in it "that there be put

about the King and of his Council the best lords and knights that can be found in the realm." This petition indicated a strict regard for constitutional propriety in the derivation of political authority.

The position has not changed. The position has only been obscured. The Privy Council, as an extension of the Council of State, includes knights attendant on the peers of the Council of State. The Lords of the Council, including the King, were a purely magisterial body. The lords and the knights of the Council were a separate body in which the magisterial authority was derived from the lords. The knights, apart from the lords, had no authority. The supremacy in the State still belongs to the magistracy of the domain. The Lords of the Council, therefore, still have a duty, as custodians of the State and as the control, to regulate the Executive and the Administration. What still remains of the powers of the Lords of the Council is the result of the tenacity of the peerage in an age-long struggle against despotism on the Throne, ministerialism under the Throne, clericalism in its rivalry with or in its antagonism to, the State, and multitudinism in its antagonism to the State and its community. The magistracy of the domain is the main pillar of the State and the Lords of the Council are, in strictness, its Supreme Committee. The peerage (i.e. patrage) as such magistracy, exists not for itself but for the State and its community. In the long struggle in the State, in Britain, extending through many centuries, the peerage has remained the most characteristic agency of the State. The peerage, in its career, has been modified, or reformed, on several occasions, to invigorate it and to enable it to perform its various functions under changed circumstances.

It now needs to be made representative of the empire domain to enable its headship, the Council of State, as the Lords of the Council, to exercise an effective control in respect of the Executive and in respect of the Administration but, most of all, in respect of the House of Commons. The empire State and its safety and welfare are the first consideration. In the events which have happened the distortion of the State and the political baseness which has caused, or influenced, that distortion, have to be kept within the scope of relevancy, in respect of cause and effect, in the past, and in respect of ailment and remedy, in the future. The loss of the Senate, or "Coron of England," was the beginning of the distortion of the State. The "abasement" of this body was a lament of the Lords Ordainers, in 1311, and the remedies relied upon, at that time, were, more or less, successful. The political baseness associated with clericalism, ministerialism, and, later, with multitudinism allowed the State to be distorted and its

community to be distracted by influences in its population which were not derived from the more excellent but emanated from the baser part of the population. This is the hard fact which has to be realised in modern reform. Popular prejudices must be discarded if the truth is to be realised and is to become the basis of reform in the State. Two points stand out as the beacons of patriotic reform, associated with excellence and opposed to baseness.

The first point is the fact that the State, as the true State, is controlled by its magistrates and "from above." In other words the State is not controlled, either by its servitors, or by its multitudes, or "from below." The second point is the unwarranted pretension of the House of Commons, which is the House of Servitors, that it can domineer over the House of Peers which is the House of Magistrates. The House of Commons, even when it was a highly respectable body, which rested on the triggrade electoral system and was representative of the whole community, in respect of the relative grades of servitors and the relative classes of electors, made no such pretension. Now that the House of Commons has ceased to be representative of the whole community, in respect of its graded parts, because its triggrade electoral system has been levelled down to its lower grade, as a unigrade system, any such pretension is more than ridiculous. The economic control in the State never belonged to the Burgess servitors, nor to the Burgess class. The history of the usurpation of the economic control, by the House of Commons, can be traced through every stage of the process and this usurpation has never been corrected. The position has been aggravated. The attempts to convert the economic control into the political control indicate the greatest peril of the State and, especially, of the empire State. Multitudinism, both in its crude form, and in its organic forms, as either plebeianism, or democracy, has always been a peril to the State. In England, in the mediæval period, it appeared in the garb of plebeianism. It was associated with clericalism and it was antagonistic to the military class and to the landed gentry. It had its party in the Common Council and it had a part in the partition of the Common Council, in 1407, when the House of Commons came into existence. In this it followed the evil example of clericalism. The partition of the Common Council into two Houses, defeated the main purpose of the Common Council, as a consultative body. The House of Commons, as a new body, was still affected by plebeianism, in its lower grades of servitors. It then became erratic and domineering. Instead of co-operating, as servitors, with the peers as magistrates, it became the rival of the House of Peers. The multitudinism was a source of political baseness.

It prevented the higher grades of servitors from fulfilling their duties. The Tudors alleviated these evils of the State and its community by appointing, as ministers of the Throne, men who were members of the House of Commons. What began, in policy, in courtesy, and in political propriety, was perverted, in time, by the usurpation of the House of Commons.

There was, at a later time, an undue yielding, by the magistrates, to this usurpation, until the mischief was allowed to develop into a great political evil. It is true that the House of Commons advanced extravagant pretensions until Cromwell, who had corrected despotism on the Throne, also corrected usurpation by the House of Commons, when it had become affected by multitudinism. The lesson of the Cromwellian era has been forgotten. The new garb of multitudinism is that of democracy. The false political creeds are still sources of political baseness, with results which tend to distort the State, still more, at a time when there is the greatest need to reform and to save it, that it may hold its own in the rivalry and the competition of the rest of the world's States. The pretension of political miscreants, to-day, is that the multitude is to control the House of Commons and that the House of Commons is to control the Cabinet and that the Cabinet is to control the Premier, and that the Premier is to control the Kingship. These pretensions are but links in a chain of fallacies. These fallacies indicate the existence of organic evils which have been allowed to grow up in the State. They also display a system of viciousness akin to what is traceable, as between cause and effect, in the disruption and in the ruin which overtook ancient States. The greatest sources of stability in the State, of welfare in its community and of progress in its civilisation, have been the worthiness, the wisdom, the ability and the general virility of its supreme magistracy.

The destruction of the Supreme Senate and the contemplated, and attempted, destruction of its foundation, the Great Council, or House of Peers, by the servitors of the House of Commons, and, by the multitudes, as the lower and incompetent part of the community, or population, are, as they have always been, characteristic aims and movements antagonistic to the State. In Britain, almost alone among the regions of the earth, the State was saved from degradation. Its Constitution became a model for the world. In Britain, as a cause of shame to its fanatical miscreants, the tendency of the agitation which resulted in the Parliament Act can now be realised. The magisterial structure, which rested on its foundation of rock, was to have been displaced by a servitorial structure, which rested on the multitude. Democracy was to

most often led to reform in the State. This good, therefore, is not to be ascribed, either to the multitude, or to the democracy. It was under such circumstances that, in England, in the year 1407, the Common Council of the domain was divided into two Houses differentiated by the magisterial and by the servitorial qualifications of the respective parts of the Court of Common Council called "the Court of Parliament." It was from this time that the House of Commons, having come into existence, began to develop its political sentiments which permeated the three grades in the political community. The gregarious instinct and self-consciousness affected the several parts of the community, and the servitors of these parts, in Parliament. In the cities and in the towns, where the populations were more dense than in the rural regions, the struggle for existence was more intense. The usual concomitants followed. There was long suffering with social bitterness and ill-will to the powers above, as to the State and its agents. There was a prevalence of parochial ideas, with an ignorance of the nature of the State and, also, the political incompetence to take part in the management of the State. In the shires, apart from their cities and towns, and, therefore, in the rural regions, the gentry, the yeomanry and the peasantry, had their troubles but these rural composite groups differed widely from the urban populations.

The rural and the urban populations were organic and to some extent were interdependent in their economy. The rural population could provide for its own needs and had an abundance of raw products. The shire managements were very similar to the management of the State. There was a harmony between these regional managements and the domain management by the State. In earlier times, the feudal State was closely knit together for its defence services. In a later age, the State, in England, in spite of its faults and its drawbacks, ranked, in matters of management, but not in the size of its domain, as one of the foremost States in Europe. It had departed but little from the form and principle of the feudal structure, in passing from a composite State to become a unitary State. In the consecutive stages of political development England was, beyond a doubt, the foremost State in Europe. In both internal development and in international competition, the State papers of England, from the later half of the mediæval period to modern times, are very creditable to English statesmanship. The statesmen of England were a match for their foreign political opponents. They were more than a match for the foreign and domestic clerics. Their diplomacy was characteristic of military sobriety. They were generously fair in combating the evils of

multitudinism. The organisation of multitudinous power, for the expression of plebeian principles, in the House of Commons, was met with the soldierly good-fellowship of the shire gentry.

This mannerly treatment disarmed it and deprived it of any grievance. The bulk of the clergy had sprung from the military families and retained the sentiments of patriotism. Many of the citizens and burgesses had served the State in war, and they, too, retained the sentiments of patriotism. The duty of defence developed the bond of patriotism and the duty of justice developed the bond of good-fellowship in welfare. The fusion of classes had been proceeding, for centuries, in England, when the general community of the realm, such as the commons of the State and the commons of the Church, as subjects of the Crown, found themselves united in one House of Parliament, as servitors, with the goodwill of the other House, as magistrates. The bishops and the abbots were deemed to be barons (*patroni*) or trustee-lords, in respect of landed estates. The Senate of England, as the Council of State, contained expert statesmen, with a variety of ability sufficient for the effective inspection and control of every department of State.

The realm of England, relatively to the rest of Europe, was great and free. The common law and its spirit, the public good, rested on national foundations as old as European civilisation. This excellence had survived from the high class community. It had not been derived, in any way, from the multitude. The poisonous heresies of plebeianism and the mischievous interference of foreign clericalism, had influence enough to become nuisances, but the firmness in the Government of the State prevented these evils from becoming perils. The bonds of nationalism, of patriotism, of loyalty to the State, and of welfare in the community, were united. The House of Commons began well, as a body, to possess intellectual and moral faculties. It perceived that there were proper aims and limitations of policy in all matters which concerned the State and its community. The House of Commons realised that, in Council, it had duties to the State in carrying out policies which affected the economic basis of the State. Industry in development, as the source of worldly wealth, with the restriction of waste and the appropriate limitations in expenditure, became matters for careful consideration. The peers and the knights had blended interests. The knights, also, had blended interests with the citizens and burgesses. All of these interests regarded the State and were united in patriotism and welfare.

The multitudes, throughout the domain, realised that they had become connected, by means of the servitorial agents in Parliament,

and, as a body, being a numerous part of the commons, they, also, began to develop their intellectual and moral faculties and to perceive that they had social aims in securing the betterment of their conditions. The multitudes and the burgesses were the parts of the population which were most in contact. The citizens were more akin to the knights who had charge of the interests of the more substantial part of the community without, in any way, neglecting the interests of the multitude. The burgess class of servitors thus became the main agency of the multitudes. This class was also most subservient to clerical influence which was in touch with it in every parish. The pressure of taxation, on all classes, produced a certain amount of resistance in a common cause. A time came when, in support of their burdens, the clerical commons preferred to withdraw themselves from the Parliament for the closer union of their own class in Convocation. In the light of the past it is now clear that clericalism was retreating, in a lost struggle, and was concentrating its strength for a last stand in its resistance to the State. Multitudinism, on the other hand, was advancing and growing in strength and, especially, in the unity and in the clamour of its servitors in Parliament.

It was in accord with clericalism to lessen their contributions to the State. The Reformation came and nationalism and patriotism rallied to the State, in its struggle with foreign clericalism.

The higher classes of the blended races of England, trained in feudalism, had advanced in knowledge and education and especially in the department of politics, as the business of State management. The foreign clerical pretensions had been excluded and the domestic clerical system had been reduced to strict subordination under the supremacy of the State. The State had become free and the master in its own domain. The clergy were still taxed in Convocation. The House of Commons, of its own motion, then excluded clerics. This effect left the trigrade system of servitors, as the servitorial agency of the political community. The three grades of servitors in Parliament, and of classes of the commons outside of Parliament, were then specifically related. The knightly class and the citizen class were fairly well versed in the structure of the Constitution and in the methods of the management of the State. The servitors of the burgess class were timid, as individuals, but turbulent as a group. The good-fellowship of the other servitors, as a rule, allowed the needs and the complaints of the multitudes to be voiced, with vigour, where there was a good ground of complaint.

Under these circumstances plebeianism and its extravagances which had been the bane of Latin civilisation were revived and developed in England, both outside of and within the House of

Commons. The more virile principles of the high class feudal community were invaded by degraded and foreign sentiments. The political heresies and false precepts were the result of plebeian theories. The burgess classes of the multitude were in a condition of deplorable ignorance as to the nature of the State, as to its mechanism of Government and as to the principles of the management of the State. The political incompetence had its source in the multitude, and its debasing influence was only a matter of cause and effect in the distortion of the State. In proportion as the House of Commons, the servitorial agency of the community, grew in power, so the part of it which was most closely related to the multitude became erratic and turbulent. This part, akin to the multitude outside, had the clerical failing of being vociferous. The gains of the House of Commons, in the way of usurpation, as the House advanced along the lines of least resistance, were credited to the multitude.

The multitudinous influence was in existence in the Common Council before it had been divided into two Houses. The combined influence of the clerics and of the burgess servitors, as champions of the multitude, had already been used for propaganda purposes. Hence came the tales about the "Witangemot," and about "the people" and "the people's King," and "the King's people," which tended in plain English to unify the relations between "the multitude" and "the despot," as a Sanctuary ideal, in which the despot was the agent of the Sanctuary and "the shepherd of the people." The forged treatise called the *Modus tenendi parliamentum* indicated the intended policy of excluding the lords, as the magistrates of the domain, when grants were to be made to supply the King with the means of Government. It disclosed the aim of usurpation, by the servitors, to gain the economic control. In the light of the past, the similarity of methods used, in destroying the magistracy in ancient States, were very significant. The soldier, in England, was, however, on guard against the priest and the multitude. Magistracy which, in Britain, had been the pillar of the State, from prehistoric times, survived and saved the State. Nothing but political incompetence could have allowed the more honest and patriotic clerics and multitude to be deluded so as to make themselves the most mischievous bodies in the State. It is needless, now, to consider, in detail, the various evil influences under which the House of Commons was cradled and grew up. It is enough that this House, as a fragment of the third estate, has assumed powers which are inconsistent with the main relative parts of the Constitution. This usurpation of powers, unless it be abated in time, may be fatal to the existence of the State. The

ailments of the State, either in allowing them to arise, or in not remedying them when they have arisen, have been due to political incompetence.

(3) POLITICAL IGNORANCE

The multitude, which is only the lower and incompetent part of the community and population, has never reformed itself and the democracy, as an organic form of the multitude, is, also, in a similar predicament. The House of Commons, since the trigrade system came to its end, has ceased, as a body of graded servitors, to be the agency of the whole community. Now that it has been weakened and is not representative of the whole community but mainly of the greater number, as the democracy, it pretends to be superior to the House of Lords, which is a body of magistrates. Popular theories connect the House of Commons with the multitude, and the importance of that House has been magnified to such an extent that it is deemed to be the Parliament. These popular theories indicate how little the State and its Constitution are appreciated to-day. These theories account for much of the erratic conduct which has been, and still is, tolerated in demagogues. These demagogues, by means of the House of Commons, have domineered, and still domineer, in the State. Their evil influence is felt in the Empire domain outside of the United Kingdom which, as a region, is now but the capital province of the Empire domain. The "Crown" which, as the "Coron," was, and, in the political theory, still is the Supreme Senate, or the Council of State, is deemed, by a popular fallacy, to be connected with the King's Coronet. The King's Coronet and the "Crown of England" are not the same thing but different things. The Crown, as the first estate, the Supreme Senate, to which the Throne itself is accessory, has no more to do with the King's headgear than it has to do with the King's boots.

The Crown, as the Senate, is accessory to the House of Peers. The confusion originated in the sophistry of clericalism. The sceptre was the emblem of the State in the office of its First Magistrate. The coronet was the emblem of the Sanctuary supremacy worn by its subordinate despot. In the ancient feudal States the kings did not wear coronets, which were the badges of subserviency to the Sanctuary. The mystic meaning of the coronet easily rooted itself in the ignorant and imaginative mind of the multitude. Another specimen of political ignorance may

be noticed. The "peers," as the magistrates, were so called from the mediæval Latin word *pares*, for the Latin *paires*, yet this term *pares* was deemed, by a popular fallacy, to be the same as another word *pares*, meaning "equals," or mates. This fallacy was, no doubt, the result of a sophism. In the mediæval period, before the House of Commons had come into existence, the Commons, in the Common Council, suffered from the "equality" craze, common to the multitude, plebeianism and democracy, and claimed to share in the magistracy which was peculiar to the "peerage." The rivalry of the Commons, as servitors, with the Peers, as magistrates, thus, was derived from a fallacy rooted in political ignorance.

A third specimen may be taken. The *barons*, as magistrates, were so called, in mediæval times, by this term, for "lords-possessors," or trustee-lords, as having been derived from the Latin *patroni*. But this term "baron," by a sophism, inspired by clericalism, was deemed to be derived from *baro*, a "blockhead." The inferences from false premises were also false. The kingship was unduly magnified. The State was minimised. It followed, by a popular fallacy, that the King who, in fact, was the accessory of the Coron, or Senate, as the first estate of the realm, was deemed, by the populace, to be principal, instead of the accessory. The Senate, as principal, had the supreme control; and the King, as its agent, had the office of the Supreme Executive.

The mind of the multitude did not appreciate the relative positions. The "King in Council" is the "King controlled by the Lords of the Council." If these lords were merely puppets of the King they would not have control, because they would be accessory to the King, as principal. The "Lords of the Council" are, however, a body known to the Constitution and their powers were inherent, as the control, and were derived from the peerage body. The Senate, or the Council, as the first estate, and the First Chamber, has vanished. The kingship, its accessory, remains, as the prominent magistracy. The lost first estate, as a political power, has, in fact, reverted to its source in the peerage, as the domain magistracy, where it is still latent, or dormant. The Crown, as the Senate, or Council of State; the Great Council; and the Common Council were, and are, all "Courts," as being magisterial bodies. The House of Peers, as the Court of Great Council, is, still, rightly termed the Second Chamber. It is a court in itself, apart from its separate character, as the House of Peers, as the magisterial part of the "Court of Parliament," which was called the "Common Council."

The mind of the multitude did not realise this fact and the House

of Commons deluded itself into the belief that it had, in some way, either superiority over it, or equality with it. Hence arose the popular fallacy that the House of Peers is deemed to be the "Second Chamber" in relation to the House of Commons, which is not the First Chamber. The Crown, as the Senate, or Council of State, was, and is, the First Chamber. The House of Commons is only the servitor fragment of the third estate, or Third Chamber, which was the Court of Common Council. The peerage, as the magisterial body, was primary to the knightage, as the original servitorial body. The burgesses brought up the rear of the trigrade servitorial system. It follows that, as the House of Commons, when it was at its best, with servitors of the three grades, which made it representative of the whole community, but left it outside the magisterial system, it is not in a better position, now that it rests on a unigrade basis and is representative mainly of the burgess part, which is the multitudinous part of the community. The mind of the multitude has its prejudices. The "people" and "the public" as the multitude, or "the majority" ought to have its way and ought to be able to do as it likes. The fallacies which support these delusions are characteristic of political baseness and of political incompetence and political ignorance.

It is enough to realise that popular fallacies and the unconstitutional efforts of multitudinism, both outside the House of Commons, with the multitude, as a principal, and inside of it, with certain servitors, as its agency, have been, and still are, a constant source of mischief in the State. It has been indicated, already, that multitudinism, in two of its main parts, proletarianism and trades unionism, has become organic and parasitic, with the fixed determination to become dominant over the rest of the community and to assume political powers, as a step to control the State. This fixed aim is, however, subject to the alternative that the State and its community may be aroused, in time, to prevent it. The better classes, as the substantial classes in the community, have, so far, vainly expected that those who have had the custody of the State would have done their duty. The failure of this expectation allows the alternative course to be taken by the community. The evil of political ignorance is not confined to the multitude. There are those who are demagogues outside of the House of Commons and politicians within it. The mouth-pieces of the multitude outside of the House of Commons, when they act seditiously, or treasonably, may be dealt with by Grand Juries. Political ignorance is not confined to the House of Commons. Party politicians become office seekers and ministers. The Cabinet is not an exclusively select body. It is not kept within constitutional

control by the Lords of the Council. The King's ministers are, indirectly, the ministers of the Crown (the Senate, or Council), which has the supreme control on behalf of the State.

The Control, the Executive and the Administration, all vary in the degrees of power, or authority. The Throne is but a fragment of the first estate. The House of Commons is but a fragment of the third estate. Ostrich tactics by servitors, or by ministers, to the extent that they do not see, or do not understand these principles of the Constitution have only a negative effect. They are pleas of political ignorance. The truth is none the less the truth, although certain politicians, trained in a particular school of political thought, fail to see and to realise it. Recently, ministers of the Throne strove to expand the powers of the House of Commons, as the servitorial agency, and to narrow the powers of the House of Peers, as the magisterial agency, merely because the House of Peers, having withstood the usurpations of the House of Commons, did its duty. The First Magistrate was asked by the Prime Minister to give a "guarantee" which would have enabled that minister to "pack" the House of Peers, in order to break its powers. Here was political ignorance where it was not to have been expected. In the long history of the State, in England, no greater political outrage has been perpetrated by a minister than this attempted breach of the most fundamental part of the Constitution. The episode remains, in the Parliament Act, as a standing monument to liberalism and licentiousness, as the offspring of political ignorance. The House of Peers has always been an obstacle to revolutionary movements and, until its powers were broken, the domination of multitudinism, in the House of Commons, could not advance.

This attack on the House of Peers, by political renegades, was at once a confession of political ignorance and a tribute of honour to that House to the extent that it indicated, what the multitude had long realised, that the House of Peers was the main source of stability in the State. The great statesmen who, in a remote age, first set up the structure of the Constitution, knew well that the supreme power in the State must rest, for its effectiveness in control, on the firm foundation of magistracy. The most malignant foes of the State, where they have succeeded, have always attacked either the headship, or the foundation, of magistracy. The fallacy, as to the source of kingly power, and as to the Executive duties of the kingly office, was consistent with the speciousness of the attack on the foundation of magistracy. The "Parliament Bill" was presented by a Cabinet and it was passed by the House of Commons. It was rejected by the House of Peers. The attempt was made by ministers to use, or to misuse, the King's prerogative

powers in the creation of peerages. These powers are not inherent in the kingship, but were delegated to the Throne, and they ought to be exercised for a proper purpose and in a proper way. These powers are in no way exercised, or rightly exerciseable, by the Cabinet, or by the House of Commons. The original powers were inherent in the Court of Great Council, which has never been abolished, and that body is still the independent and the primary form of the House of Peers, as the second estate. The Great Council belongs to the Empire, and it is not within the scope of the Parliament Act.

The prerogative was entrusted to the First Magistrate, as its delegate, and, as its Executive Officer, when the Crown, or Senate, reverted to its source. All of the branches of political agency come within the same principle of trustee powers with an implied liability, or other remedy, for breaches of trust. The kingship does not exist for itself, but for the good of the State and of its community. The peerage and the knightage were in a similar predicament. The occupant of the Throne holds it by hereditary right, but the Throne may be vacated, under statutory provisions, for misconduct. Where that misconduct is small, relatively to the greater mischief of joining with ministers and a majority of the House of Commons in weakening the political supremacy, and in destroying the peerage, as the foundation of that supremacy, the greater default of the Cabinet, in seeking a guarantee from the Throne, can be appreciated. Those who would palliate such a default may ascribe it to political ignorance, to a democratic atmosphere, or to party venom, but those who are patriotic and have a patriotic regard for the venerable and excellent Constitution may take a far different view. Those who would scuttle the Ship of State should not be allowed to escape on a plea of political ignorance. The conduct of the House of Peers was creditable to it and to the State. The tree that bent to the storm fared better than the tree that was broken by it. It was not the first conflict into which the House of Peers has been drawn by the House of Commons, on the false presumption of the servitor House, that it had the mastership in the State. It was the repetition of an old story.

It illustrated, as between cause and effect, the peril of political ignorance not only in the multitude but in the Parliament and in the service of the Crown, in its various departments of State. It proves the potential destructiveness of political heresies and of false precepts when put into practice, by professional politicians, in the House of Commons, and ministers of the Executive, under the Crown. These political heresies and false precepts have been generalised under the head of "Liberalism," as the quintessence

of Statecraft. Liberalism, in its materialism, has been used as political bird-lime to catch the dupes in the multitude. It is, also, held out as a spiritual force by a fraternity of politicians. It is a cult of the occult with nothing in it but passing shadows. "Liberalism" was systematically developed in 1902, in a treatise by a certain Herbert Samuel, with an Introduction by a certain Herbert H. Asquith. This treatise is well worth inspection by students of the State. It contains many curiosities. There is a "policy" which is called "National Liberalism." It has principles and tendencies which ought not to be tolerated in the State. The State, in Britain, was the most notable in the world for its excellence and for its resistance to political baseness. It had nothing to learn, except what it should avoid, in Hebrewism, in Hellenism, and in Latinism. In Britain, whilst the Constitution remained tolerably sound in its foundation of magistracy, the State advanced with safety and its civilisation moved in an upward and onward direction. There was freedom and there was justice for all.

The tyranny of multitudinism has been revived, with its creed of political paganism. The multitude, in its political ignorance, has reverted to its belief that it cannot have justice unless it has the control. It is, however, faced with the hard historic fact that it has never had control without becoming predatory. The revived power of proletarianism and of trades unionism has tended to increase, to the detriment of industry, to the lessening of the welfare of the whole community, and to the weakening of the State, in respect of its stability and of its economic basis. The cult of the multitude has always been unwholesome in the State. The organisation of the multitude, to enable it to domineer over the rest of the community, has enthralled the House of Commons and made it an unreliable factor in the management of the State. It is in this respect that political ignorance associated with political depravity have become perilous to the Empire. The earlier realm has a duty to the later Empire. The Empire can be united and strong only on its foundation of magistracy.

The Empire, to be united, needs the restoration of the Senate, or Council of State, to exercise the supreme control. The Empire, to be strong, needs the representation of all the provinces in the House of Peers, as the foundation of the Senate, or Council of State. The House of Commons has no *locus standi* to obstruct this reform in the State. It is the reorganisation of the magisterial agency of the domain. The House of Commons is a purely servitorial body and, as such, its excellence, in gradation, in competence and in political ability, has been lessened. A high class House of Commons is not to be expected from low class electorates. The

electorates of the House of Commons have been degraded and the multitude has been affected by the contagion of political ignorance which pervades the fallacies of Liberalism. The House of Commons could be reformed so that, according to its goodness, it could be made a factor of goodness in the State. A high class House of Commons, composed of worthy, wise and able servitors, trained and qualified as the defence service officers are trained, would be of the greatest utility to the State. A low class House of Commons may be a source of greater evil to the State than an adverse combination of its foreign foes, among the States of the world. Liberalism and licentiousness ought to have no place either in the House of Commons, or in its electorates. Pure politics are as necessary for the political community, on moral and on utility grounds, as pure water is necessary for the population on sanitary grounds. Light and truth are better than darkness and error. The State needs for its management the best men in its population and, on the ground of consistency with this principle, it has a duty to exclude the opposite class. There is need to restrict those who pervert the community and corrupt the population by spreading the precepts of political depravity.

The teaching of political science to those whose intellectual and moral faculties are developed may effectively defeat the aims of those who spread political depravity. Political ignorance is a curable evil and a preventible evil and prevention is better than a cure. The light of truth disperses the darkness of political ignorance and enables what is good in the State to be selected, and what is bad to be excluded.

(4) POLITICAL DEPRAVITY

When it is remembered that the State, as the true State, is a virile institution for the defence and welfare of its community and that, in its structure of Government and in its management, it is akin to an efficient army, it may be concluded, generally, that whatever impairs this structure, or debases this management, is related, in cause, or in effect, to depravity. The goodness in structure and in management in its origin was derived from human goodness. The State is an artificial organism and the highest and greatest human institution. The multitude in it is not the best part of the State's community or population. If every allowance is made for prejudice in the comparison of the higher, the middle, and the lower grades of a political community

there remains the hard fact, noticeable everywhere and at all times, that a difference has existed, and still exists, in respect of quality, between the extremes of excellence and baseness in the population and in its parts, in respect of intellectual and moral characteristics, as well as in respect of vigour and economic characteristics. The two extremes, as opposites, have between them a part which is mixed and, within limits, is neither altogether good, nor altogether bad. It may be inclined to be more good than bad in that it may have much excellence and may be devoid of much baseness. The excellent part and the tolerably good part of the entire community, or population, compare favourably, therefore, with the third part, or the lower extreme part. In Nature's own work quality and number, like quality and quantity, tend to exist in an inverse proportion. In political communities similar relative incidents appear to have always prevailed. The ancients, in their view of this fact and in their estimates of their fellow men, were not altogether the victims of prejudice when they likened the lower extreme part of a population to a "many-headed beast." This generalisation indicated, by a fair standard of humanity, a degradation which was associated with depravity.

The tendency, in such degeneracy, is to recede from humanity to brutishness. The effect was unquestioned. The cause may have been due to degeneracy, or to ill-treatment, or to misfortune. It is only the effect that need be considered and, especially, in its ulterior influence in demoralising other parts of the population. In the effect language, in its many varieties, has left on record the contrasts between the worthy and the vile, and has associated vileness with an extreme lower part of the multitude. The evil of ill-treatment, or of misfortune, as the cause of depravity goes back to remote antiquity when man first enslaved man with a due regard of moral grounds and of utility. In the struggle for existence there were sharp contrasts in the results. There were those who fought out the fight to victory, or to death, and preferred death with honour to life with shame in the bondage of slavery. The victorious races of the survivors have treasured their freedom, and, from age to age, have paid the price to maintain it in States which secured both freedom and welfare. Military races and feudal States were counterparts. The brave, the free, the generous and the good, realised the need there was to maintain the necessary virile qualities to secure for military races the State, their own institution, in its complete perfection, because it was their main means of welfare. Freedom allowed them the full range of development which is consistent with a wholesome life in the State. The descendants of the slave class developed characteristics

which contrasted, in specific respects, with those of freeborn races.

The ancients fully appreciated the good and the evil effects in slavery. The economic value of slavery was a means of strength to the State. It allowed the fighting power to be increased to a maximum, in the free population, whilst the industrial power was maintained for the purposes of production by the slave population. The slave's moral deterioration, tested by the human standard, was very great. In particular cases, either on account of ability, or merit, there were compensations which resulted in freedom. In general, however, in warfare by land and sea and in industry, the freemen, man for man, were of more value than slaves, in reliability and in work. It followed, in the State, that the admission of slaves to the ranks of freemen introduced a source of mischief which might be termed political depravity. In time, excellence, as the heritage of the brave and the free, was lessened by latent evils in the heritage from the slave. In the reaction against slavery the political evil of the mixed community was aggravated by constant emancipations of slaves, in great numbers. The fair balance between the old freemen and the new freedmen was lost, and, at first, the community but, later, the State, was deteriorated. In England during the period of change, from the condition of a feudal community to the condition of an industrial community, the shire gentry were the backbone of the political community. The main credit is due to this class for the firmness and the moderation which carried the State safely through a process of change to accommodate it to new conditions. The peculiar outgrowth in the Constitution which caused the House of Commons, in 1407, to come into existence, was an incident of this period of change. The rise and the fall of individuals, in social rank, in economic power and in political grades, had for a long time been chronic in England, as elsewhere, and these effects have continued as the common incidents of life in the State, as its vicissitudes had been in previous times. Military races had an abundance of slaves and bondmen, as the result of conquests, so that, in military States, the freemen and the slaves, as the opposite extremes, had been sharply contrasted.

The former, relatively, had been few and the latter many. In spite of emancipations the types and habits and kindred characteristics of the population of servile origin could easily be differentiated from the types which had possessed ancestral freedom. In the perilous period of change, firmness in the magistracy and the repression of outrage and licentiousness, were necessary so that the class distinctions were not forgotten and the repressed part

of the population retained a grudge, in the nature of a class hatred. This incident of fusion was inevitable and it was not peculiar to the change in the feudal community, in England, but had been traceable, under like circumstances, in ancient States. The feudal ruling classes were modified, as they adapted themselves to new conditions connected more closely with industry than with defence, yet retaining their aptitude in the management of the State. In the effect of the change manliness, in a sense, has yielded to money. The soldier statesman has been succeeded by the business man statesman. The economic basis of the State has favoured it. The State is based on property. The blood of the gentry is now traceable in the multitude and that of the descendant of slaves is equally traceable among the higher, the wealthier, and the better classes. This fusion has not lessened but has increased the evil of political depravity. In the course of the last ten generations slavery and bondage in England came to an end. They had been decreasing for centuries. The reaction against slavery continued in England until the end of slavery was decisive, and the reaction has continued to spread from England throughout the world. Human freedom has become a fixed principle of political policy. Humanitarian and political principles have been associated and, then, have been confused. In the State, in quite recent times, an excess of zeal, on somewhat similar lines, has caused the electoral franchise to be widened and to be lowered.

The object and purpose of the franchise has been mistaken. Zealots have striven that as many as possible might share in the franchise as though the absence of the franchise was akin to the absence of freedom and to the presence of political bondage. In fact, on this point, the "equality" craze of the Guildsmen of earlier times has been revived, as one of the evils associated with the multitude, and, especially, in its organic form of the democracy. The zealots have missed the true aim of the franchise and, as the victims of political depravity, have lost their way. The undue enlargement of the franchise is based on several fallacies associated with much false sentiment. If an attempt was made to give to the multitude, instead of the qualifying bodies, the right to choose persons to act as physicians, or lawyers, or engineers, or judges, the moral sense of the community would revolt against such an impropriety and this revolt would be justified on several grounds. The State in its management is a more important institution than all of these qualifying bodies, together, and statesmanship, in its perfection, requires many excellent qualities. It would be consistent with political depravity for the community to allow the multitude to control the State. The enlightened community has

concluded that it will not allow it. The zealot combats this conclusion. He contends that there must be "no taxation without representation," and that the multitude, as the greater number, must have the relatively greater number of representatives. These must control the State. This is a democratic doctrine and it must be maintained by "the people." The doctrine is crude. The zealot forgets, if he ever knew it, that, in the true State, the magistracy has the control and that the magistracy does not rest on the multitude.

In the distorted State, the servitors may be the agents of the multitude. In such a State, "the rule of the many" is pandemonium and "the rule of the one" is despotism. There is no moderating mean and there is no control. The "no taxation" doctrine is fallacious. The protection which a State affords to its subjects has a value, and it is the means of safety and welfare. The State rightly exacts its due whether the subject is, or is not, competent, as an elector of servitors, to take part in the management of the State. The fact that such a subject is incompetent, in the respect mentioned, does not lessen his liability to pay taxation. In the feudal State the freemen had to qualify themselves to take their part in the defence services. In addition to this burden they were not eligible to take part in the political service of State management until they had reached the qualifying ages of sobriety and experience. In the taxation of the subjects, where there is political baseness, in the way of political incompetence, ignorance, or depravity, an addition to taxation would act as an inducement to the subjects to be relieved of the additional taxation on becoming qualified as competent, enlightened and worthy subjects of the State, fit to possess the franchise. The additional taxation would lighten the burden of the well qualified subjects. The exclusion of the unqualified subjects would prevent them, at election time, from offsetting, or nullifying, an equal number of well qualified subjects.

The safety of the State and the welfare of its community are paramount interests. The evil of the organic multitude has been, directly, or indirectly, a main source of ruin in States and their communities. The wanton extension of the franchise to those subjects who would use it to attack the State and its community is a specimen of political depravity. It, also, brings to the front to be seen by all, an evil which ought to be nipped in the bud. On the one hand slobbering liberalism sides with the multitude against the rest of the community. On the other hand, sober-minded statesmanship sides with the higher and the middle grades of the community. It supports the State against the extravagances

of the multitude. Political excellence and political baseness are incompatibles. All the time matters of principle, which affect the State and its community, are involved and grave issues have arisen fit for the decision after mature deliberation by the most competent statesmen to be found in the State's domain. These issues cannot be satisfactorily decided by numbers in the votes of the multitudinous electorates. These issues are of a nature that they do not primarily concern the multitude, but they seriously affect the rest of the community, the higher and the middle economic classes of it, as the substantial parts and the virtual proprietors of the State. The landed classes, in the feudal State, were the virtual proprietors of its domain and the landless multitude realised the significance of its relative position. The landed classes of the empire State have an interest in the State which is paramount to that of the landless multitude of the capital province. The more competent and responsible parts of the State community have the duty to defend and to uphold the State and its magistracy against the evils of political depravity. These evils, as ailments of the multitude, are, in a sense, the ailments of the State and they have to be viewed not only as they present themselves now, but, also, in the light of the past, even with other names, in their ravages in ancient States. The remedies for these evils have to be sought and to be applied by statesmen.

When the Constitution was in its prime and the servitor candidates and the electors had the necessary qualifications, in order to attain the proper ends by the proper means, the choice and the election of suitable servitors was the limited scope of the electorates. The consideration of measures was a matter, not for the electors, but for the servitors in the Common Council, under the supervision and direction of the magistrates. It was not for the servitors to direct the policy of the State, nor to be recalcitrant in the supply of means, nor to usurp the economic control. The Great Council had the power of taxing magisterial persons. The Common Council taxed all persons but the taxing power did not belong to the servitors, and, least of all, to the burgess class. The servitors were not delegates but councillors. The bulk of the taxes, then, as now, was derived from the substantial classes. The State was managed "from above" and not "from below." The substantial classes left the administration of the State to the Government, in trust, for the community. The incompetent and distrustful multitude thought that it could manage the State, in its own way, and do better. The multitude has always been predatory. It has always been incompetent. It has always been the victim of its own selfishness and a main source of political

depravity. In England there were often factions in the Council of State with inclinations for, or against, certain lines of policy. There were, also, at times, great issues as to public grievances, which caused public-spirited persons, in parties, to exist outside of Parliament. These parties began to seek relief by means of the servitors within Parliament. They presented petitions before they granted supplies and, at times, made their grants conditional upon favourable answers to their petitions. These parties, on the principle that in union there is strength, grew in power. In England, there had been several parties before the time when national issues divided those who were termed the Whigs and the Tories.

The French Revolution had modifying influences on the English parties, which, as a consequence of competition, in their profession of seeking the "public good," were at variance as to the particular end to effect this purpose, or as to the means, or the measures. These parties, in their competition, had already modified each other. Britain, at the time of the French Revolution, was a true State with its own Sanctuary. It was far in advance of any Continental State, in political progress, in respect of co-operation between the State and its community, by means of its magistrates and its servitors in Council. England, under the Tudors, had led the way in recovering for the State the full amplitude of its supremacy against the Roman Church, in respect of its pretended part-supremacy. This great victory of Britain had affected most of the States of Europe. The emancipation of the English State from interference by the foreign Sanctuary had effects in international relations. England became the first free State in Europe. The spell of clericalism, on the Continent, was broken. England about a century after the Reformation had again advanced and, at great cost, it had effectively suppressed despotism on the Throne and tyranny in the House of Commons. The Roman Church had still a dominant influence on the Continent and, especially, in France where mischief had been made and aggravated to disturb the domestic relations, in the State, between Great Britain and its colonies. The State, in Britain, and the State, in France, differed in many respects. In France the despotic rule, with the economic pressure caused by war, and the backward condition of the population, resulted in turbulence and outrage by the multitude. A military caste and a clerical caste were dominant. The military body followed the State. The clerical body followed the international Sanctuary. The Government of France was overturned. The Revolution followed the lines of Latin civilisation. A Republic came into existence, with the watch words, "Liberty. Equality. Fraternity."

Crude political theories were then developed, and liberalism, in its main tenets, then came in as a political creed. It was, in fact, an old creed revived and put into a new dress. In England the Tories, who had always stood by the State, and whose credit for patriotism was unimpeachable, now came under the reflection of Continental liberalism. The cause was that the Tories, in England, had supported the classes which were similar to the classes which had suffered in the Revolution in France. The Whigs had favoured the masses. They supported the pretensions of the multitude. The Whigs, at a later date, became wrapped up in Continental liberalism and they were carried by the stream into Revolutionary theories which were inapplicable to political affairs in Britain. These Continental theories were relational more to the multitude than to the community and to the State in France, and not to the State in England. These theories, in relation to the Constitution, in England, were not only fantastic but they were unwholesome and disruptive in respect of the State. The Tories, in a reaction against these theories, at a later date, adopted the name of "Conservatives" in order to follow the policy of keeping what was good in the Constitution. The term "Conservative" was specifically relational to the Constitution. The conservatives strove to limit changes, in this respect, to what was needed as a consequence of deformities. In Britain, where the State had reached perfection, some of the best reforms in its Constitution had been reversions to previous conditions. In this way the conservatives made a systematic and statesmanlike resistance to political depravity.

The multitude was being swayed by false political theories, until it was bent on the destruction of a Constitution which it had not even the capacity to understand. The party system had in it, in respect of the multitude, a direct incentive to depravity. The value of political offices became dependent on majorities in the House of Commons. The servitors, who desired to belong to the majority, needed majorities among their electors. The party seeking office held out baits to its followers in the offers to attain what the multitude most favoured. The multitude was never without grievances and its appetite was keen and constant. The remedies for the relief of grievances were in the nature of bids by demagogues for the support of the electors at the polls. Thus politicians made a trade of parliamentary business. The electors, the servitors and the ministers tended to fall into party lines for their common purposes. The servitors, as parliamentarians, became debaters and developed specific qualities. The demagogues, outside of Parliament, became politicians within it. They differed

from statesmen as advocates differed from jurists. Many parliamentarians had more tongue than brains, and more guile than patriotism. They were versed in human foibles, but they were not versed in an expert knowledge of the State. In the arena of debate they often acted like advocates to make their case appear to be the better case, in spite of its defects. Their opponents were consequently often in the wrong. To the party in opposition the Administration was generally in the wrong.

The appeal to the multitudes was made more to the selfishness of the larger part than to the patriotism and the generosity of the whole community. The appeal to the multitude, on account of its numbers, was more effective in procuring electoral support for that grade of servitors. The Administration, in turn, when the triggrade system was ended, had an inducement to look more to the multitude than to the community. The need for parliamentary support made the ultimate support of the multitude necessary. The resultant effect was that the multitude became a drag on ministerial conduct and it produced a conflict between a regard for private interest and the proper regard for public duty. Utility and propriety, as beacons, had formerly guided and kept ministers, in their official duties, to a due regard for the State and its community, and to a disregard for their private interests and for the greed and clamour of the multitude. The State does not exist for its multitude. The duty to the community makes impartiality necessary in servitors and in the State. It is an invasion of the rights of servitors and, also, of their duties to the State, to subject them to pressure, either in their constituencies or elsewhere. The facts and circumstances of the Revolutionary waves which swept from France into the British domain have to be considered in relation to the creed of liberalism and its effects on the Constitution. The State, in England, had been distorted, and its Constitution was deformed.

The domain had been expanded without provision being made for magisterial representation in the House of Peers in its character as the Court of Great Council. Ample and generous provision had been made for regional managements in the Colonies. The Supreme Senate, the Crown, had only a *notional* existence. The Privy Council, as the extension of the Senate, when it was the Council of State, had become enfeebled. It was treated as the "King's" Privy Council. The Throne and the House of Commons were becoming the dominant factors in the State. The kingship was becoming subservient to the Cabinet which, although it was only a branch of the Privy Council, yet assumed a position of importance because it was supported by majorities in the House

of Commons. The Throne, the Cabinet, and the House of Commons were tending to come into line. There was a cause for it. The lords of the Council, the Throne and the House of Commons, were not always in accord. The domination of the House of Commons was growing. The common law doctrine of precedents had been perverted and then adopted by the House of Commons, to extend its influence, by means of the Cabinet, to control the Executive. Wherever the Throne had yielded to the Cabinet, or to the House of Commons, it was deemed to have yielded to the community, or to "the country," to use the former military expression derived from the feudal system. This yielding by the Throne to the community, was liable to become a yielding to the multitude, if, as the "pure" democracy, it should prevail. The "pure" democracy, as the absolute multitude, in its organic form, was within the aims of the revolutionary liberalism.

The Cabinet, as the Administration, was tending to render itself accessory to the House of Commons and that body, by its Burgess servitors, was liable to become, by an expansion of the franchise, accessory to the multitude. Revolutionary liberalism, had it gained its end, would have reduced the community under the domination of its part, the multitude. In this way, by links, the multitude and the Cabinet, by means of the House of Commons, would have been enabled to drag the Executive to follow "popular courses." It was a matter of indifference whether these courses would have been right or wrong. The *vox populi vox dei* doctrine may flatter the multitude, but it is fallacious and it has often been the antithesis of the truth. Liberalism, in its hypocrisy, posed as the associate of divinity. It is enough to realise that, where a State has been driven to take an evil course and this course has resulted from the control of the multitude, by a series of links within the principle of democracy, there the political depravity, in its effect, has been shared between the multitude and officers and ministers of the State. The multitude may have been responsible for the pressure but the Executive would have been responsible for the yielding, as a breach of duty. This point has to be qualified. The weakening of the peerage and of the knightage have weakened the Throne. The steadfastness of the State, in its various branches of policy, in respect of utility and propriety, had been maintained by the Senate, or Council of State.

This excellent body had been free from political depravity. It was free from the evils of multitudinism. It was the support and the guide of the Throne. In its strength, on its peerage foundation, it had restrained ministerial and servitorial usurpations. The weakening, the loss and the non-restoration of the Council

of State is, itself, a specimen of political depravity. The magistracy, as the supreme magistracy of the State, ought to be excellent in quality and of strength sufficient to maintain the supreme control and to support its Chief Executive against all usurpations by agencies under the control. The Cabinet, which is subject to the drag of the House of Commons and to the drag of the multitude, may be excellent, but the Council of State, excellent in itself, and free from the drag of the House of Commons and the multitude, may be more excellent in its impartiality towards the whole community and in its steadfastness of purpose. The steadfastness of the State which, in England, in former times, was exemplified in the Senate of great magistrates, had a record of worthiness and utility which remained unblemished to the last. It never yielded to despotism on the Throne, to tyranny in the Parliament, or to depravity in the multitude. The Great Council which elected that Senate still exists and great statesmen, such as the great magistrates who were members of that Senate, still exist. The Constitution which had a prior place for that Senate is not yet too dilapidated to allow that Senate to be restored. It was, originally, a corporation until it was dismembered and "abased" by the usurpations of clericalism and despotism, when it was succeeded by the Council of State, on a changed basis and with the bond of union, its source of strength, weakened.

The Empire, to-day, is more able to supply the few great statesmen necessary for the supervision of its domain than the realm was in former days. When the causes of political depravity in the State are reviewed it is not at all to be concluded that there are no remedies for this great evil which is common to all States. It is certain that the lost steadfastness of the State can be restored. It is not obvious that the State must continue to tolerate usurpations by a Prime Minister, or by a Cabinet, or by the House of Commons, or by the multitude. The empire State ought not to be prejudiced by curable evils which have grown up in the realm State. The empire State might be made a model State, strong in its defence and perfect in its welfare. It has all the materials and the means to secure strength and prosperity. Liberalism in its relation to Latin civilisation, in the fallen Western Empire, and, in later times, to the decadent Latin influences which were involved in the outburst of the French Revolution, has been a dangerous guide in Britain. The multitude does not yet realise that the French Revolution was only a side show in relation to the career of the State in Britain. France, then, was relatively backward, and its ruling classes were corrupt. France had not its own State Church but was dependent on a foreign Sanctuary.

Britain, relatively, was advanced and, as a true State, had its own State Churches which were severed from international Sanctuaries. In Britain, the ruling classes were genuine, experienced in politics, and high principled. The Constitution in its structure, although it was defective, was yet the most useful and the most renowned in the world.

The State's community and general population were more free and lived under better conditions than the like bodies in France. The foibles of the multitude that it was "the people" and that it suffered from the "oppression of the classes" were well understood, and were not causes of resentment in these classes. Indeed these classes knew their own foibles and, in their moods and tenses, when things were adverse, would say that they were all "going to the dogs"; but this was only an incitement to vigilance and activity. These were racial foibles more or less common throughout the community. The defects of Republicanism were known to the more intelligent classes and, in comparison with constitutionalism, in their own State, had no attractions. A republic was good enough for a degenerate population and, if it captivated some of the multitude, the result was usually beneficial to the extent that it turned their thoughts to the State to study its nature. Liberalism, as an import from the Continent to Britain, was a foreign product which could supply nothing useful in respect of either the structure of the Constitution, or the management of the State. Liberalism has had a demoralising tendency on an advanced community in throwing it backward. It has excited class bitterness in inducing the multitude to seek ends which are inconsistent with the safety of the State, and to use means which are not free from political depravity. The federation of trades unions, to affect the carrier system of the State and the supply system of the community, would have come within the scope of treason against the State, under Roman law, because it was a lessening of the State's supremacy.

This misconduct, on a part of the multitude, was tolerated by the State because the moral sense of the Administration had become habituated to the depravity of liberalism and had been rendered callous. Another specimen illustrates the like depravity. "A fair opportunity for all," as a principle of a new political creed, implied that caste and oppression existed in England where such evils are absent. This propagation of calumny is like the adversary's mischief of sowing tares in the night. When demagogues were stirring up the multitude in their process of engineering a revolution the "equality" craze was appealed to in the cry of "a fair opportunity for all." This root of a new mischief supplied the

material for politicians to associate the grievances of the multitude with changes in the State to be made at the expense of the State and its community.

(5) DEPRAVED POLITICIANS

The party system, in Parliament, and, in the service of the State's Administration, has introduced peculiar evils into the State. These evils arose, partly, in consequence of laxity, due to weakness in the superior magistracy of the State and, partly, due to promises made by servitors of what they would do if placed in power by the support of the majority in the House of Commons. So much of the evil as was due to laxity could have been prevented, under a proper system, by the exclusion from office of political reprobates, by disqualification for misconduct. Promises to do what was unconstitutional, or detrimental to the State, or its community, could have been invalidated as being contrary to propriety. An oath of office could have been so shaped as to make a renunciation of improper promises, or tenets, a condition precedent to holding any office under the State. The giving of a "mandate" by the electorates and the giving of a "pledge" by servitors, or by ministers, is unconstitutional. Where the "mandate," or the "pledge" was to do something which could be done only by the consent of the magistracy, then, the usurpation, by the electorate, or by the servitor, was manifest and it was relational to good or evil. It is true that, in each case, a mere "recommendation" that a certain course should be taken would have removed the usurpation. The good, or evil, of the mandate, or pledge, would have remained to be tested. Seditious and treasonable propaganda are evils in themselves, and when involved in party strife they may set in motion forces which would distract the State. The magistracy, within limits, may observe moderation and exercise discretion in dealing with propaganda and agitation which excite the prejudices, or affect the vagaries of the multitude. In free populations a certain amount of political turbulence arises, from time to time, when firmness and moderation allow it to pass away, to be followed by a long period of political quietude.

There are, however, other evils of party in which the middle classes are involved and party groups become subservient to ministerial coteries which, in turn, make changes in the law, or in the economic system, or in the State, in respect of its constitution. Whilst the ancient Senate stood, and, later, whilst the Council of

State retained its vigour, changes in the economic system of the State were well considered, from the standpoint of the State, in respect of public utility. Party influences and private utility were not dominant. Grievances were expressed in Parliament and remedies were provided by legislation initiated by the Throne, or by its ministers, directed by the Council. In England, among the knightly servitors, as the shire gentry, ancestral customs, which had survived the feudal system, continued, in principle, to prevail until Stuart times. These customs left, with the better classes, a regard for system, order and discipline, which continued through the long period of agitation which preceded the Reform Act of 1832. A lull had then come, after a long period of warfare and of civil commotion. The Reform Act of 1832 marked only a stage in political modification. The methods of industry, in the United Kingdom, had changed, and the economic system of the community had become more complex by the development of new internal and external forces, and by the decline of others.

An agricultural population was being lessened, when more food products were needed from the land, and the manufacturing population was being increased, in new urban centres, without sufficient accommodation for its needs. The rural and urban industries were being readjusted. New types of men, of the middle class, were in Parliament. The political parties in the House of Commons were divided on economic issues which, in their effects, involved, in different ways, the classes and the masses. It resulted that State policy, in regard to economy, and the causes and effects, in respect of public and private utility, were drawn within the range of parliamentary strife which was complicated by popular demands made to serve variant and conflicting interests. In England, in an earlier period, the trained statesmen had been expert in the knowledge and practice of State economy, on both national and international principles. These statesmen had held their own in competition with foreign statesmen. The principles of State economy were not peculiar to modern States, nor was a knowledge of these principles the monopoly of modern men. The details, when applied, had some regard to novelty. The novelty of the position was due to the domination of the House of Commons and to the contention in it, and in its electorates, as to what principles ought to prevail. The multitude wanted what it fancied was due to it and the politicians were accommodating.

Neither the multitude, nor the politicians, were expert in State economy. The tangled problem was fit for solution by expert statesmen in Council. The then existing corn laws had been modified, in 1815, to suit the agricultural interests in their relation

to foreign competition. The changes in the interval, in the economic position of other industries, had destroyed the balance of benefits which formerly had suited the whole community. A remedy had to be found. The problem, for its solution, required that the best economic measures should be provided. The matter was left to ministers, to servitors, and to the multitudes, to be settled by numbers in support of party nostrums. This result was less satisfactory than a new economic solution, which could have been reached by expert statesmen in Council. This compromise indicated a lapse by the Administration and the State into political depravity. The State and its community became enthralled in the party craze of "Free Trade" precepts. This was like the "Equality" craze, with some of its concomitants, which disregarded proportions. The craze required that a universal course should not be varied even where a general or a particular course was more appropriate. The ultimate effect of this political depravity was that the Empire, in the process of its expansion and development, was hampered by the economic theories of the multitude and of the House of Commons. The true economic solution of the adverse position could have been discovered and applied. It followed that foreign States, aware of the true principles of State economy and not hampered by popular economic heresies, were enabled to advance, in the international competition, with a relatively detrimental effect on the British Empire.

Whilst the popular heresies prevailed, in the United Kingdom, the true principles of State economy were observed, in the great provinces of the Empire, so that their economic progress was not impeded. It was not realised, in the United Kingdom, by the "Free Trade" party, that, in the international environment, "exchange between States" and "exchange within the State's own domain" were differentiated. The causes and the means of exchange were similar, but the grounds and the conditions led to different effects. "Trade" as the exchange within the State's own domain differed from "Commerce," as the exchange between Britain's Empire and foreign States. Neither the politicians in the House of Commons, nor the multitudes in the constituencies of its servitors, realised that national industries need to be defended, with a due regard for the principles of State economy and State supremacy. International competition affects industry and production just as it affects domain power, sea power, man power and armament power. Industrial power, in its defence by the State, was a source of welfare to the State's community. When a conflict arose in the United Kingdom, between the various branches of industry, it became necessary, in removing the conflict, and in

abating its mischiefs, not to forget that it was a domestic conflict. The State's economic power required an adjustment which was beneficial to itself and to its own community. The State had a duty to defend itself, its industries and its community from the attacks and the depredations caused by the economic invasions by foreign States.

Several national industries, in past times, had been set up, fostered and defended, through a due regard for public and private utility, in accordance with the principles of State economy, which had been observed by the Council of State. English industries had thriven and the State, in respect of its economic system, was, relatively, to the Continental States, advanced as it was, in respect of its political system, the Constitution. There were, in its domain, branches of national industry which were material to the convenience, the well-being and to the existence of its community in independence of foreign support. Some of these industries would have drooped and withered like trees had they been deprived of any element necessary for their support beyond the limited period of endurance. State economy and the due care of the economic practice had been, in England, a branch of expert statesmanship. The spirit of the multitude revolted against what it could not understand. The electorates controlled the servitors in the House of Commons. The servitor politicians became ministers and were controlled by the majority in the House of Commons, by supporting the Cabinet. The Cabinet, in turn, not controlled by a proper Council of State, induced the Executive to yield to its influence, and to take a "popular course" where a proper statesmanlike course was necessary. The result, to-day, is that the Empire is not consolidated, as a true State. The magisterial supremacy is not united in a Council of State, which would have been impartial, in its regard for every province, and a source of strength to the whole domain.

The Empire still remains unable to unite its maximum economic power in its competition with foreign States. The Empire is, in fact, the most backward State in the world, in respect of a principle and a policy in which the realm State was, once, most advanced. This result is, in a great measure, the effect of political depravity in politicians. The party system is involved in it. The removal of the trigrade electoral system has aggravated it. The introduction of the "one man, one vote" principle indicates the ultimate aim of political depravity to subvert the State, by distorting it, to suit the dreams of visionaries and the vagaries of the multitude. These dreams and vagaries are but the heritage of an evil which has to be met and mastered by the more virile part of the community which has retained a due regard for freedom and political sobriety, as its

own ancestral heritage. The ancient conflict between good and evil, in a limited world, in its political aspect, is not confined to the English-speaking regions, yet it has a peculiar significance, both outside of the Empire and within it. This significance is relational to the destiny of civilisation and to the factors which will be involved in it. The intellectual and the moral faculties do not attain their greatest excellence in the multitude. The multitude, in the United Kingdom, tends to domineer over the rest of the community; and its agency, in the House of Commons, as a servitor agency, tends to domineer over the House of Peers, as the magisterial agency. It further tends to assume by means of a Cabinet the powers which are properly exercisable by the Council of State. It looks to the Prime Minister, as to the superior of the Executive Officer, the occupant of the Throne, who has the stewardship in the State.

The First Magistrate needs the firm support of the magisterial foundation of the Throne. It is not enough that peers should hold certain offices in the Cabinet. The position of a peer, as a Cabinet minister, differs from the position of a peer, as a Lord of the Council. The Lords of the Council were the magisterial moderators and the "Lords Intendant" of all of the departments of State. The Council of State was "the Government," and the Cabinet was "the Administration." The misnomer of political functions is a cause of confusion to the multitude; and the politicians, by laxity in thought and speech, as well as in political duty, have conduced to the depravity of the multitude. In passing from general to particular depravity the party system is involved in several grades. An incident, in recent times, indicates the source and the ramifications of political depravity, and especially in the toleration of industrial unions, allied with political associations and parties, to the detriment of the State. Trades unionists, as a body, are but a part of the multitude and they have become accustomed, in airing their grievances, to make "demands" which implied an intimation of their wishes, in regard to employers, or the community, or the State. In internal, or domestic affairs, this eccentricity has been good-naturedly tolerated. The incident indicated an extension of interests. A committee of trades unionists attended on a Prime Minister, on a matter of State policy. It was to express the views of trades unionists in respect of international affairs.

They desired the State to favour certain parts of the populations in foreign States, and particularly in Russia. They had sympathy or cohesion with these parts. The international fraternities are not friendly to the better classes in the State communities, and they are not conspicuous for their allegiance to their several States.

It is not consistent with good faith and fair dealing for ministers of the State to be on friendly terms with those who are the foes of the State. The persons who have been most to blame, in countenancing political depravity and its resultant mischiefs, have not always been of the lower classes, or of the multitude. Some of these persons had a fair social status, but were imbued with false political principles. Some of the middle classes, from which many servitors have been drawn, have become involved in the party system and, in preferring popularity to patriotism, have favoured policies and measures which have been detrimental to the State. Some have been blinded with party zeal and have truckled to the multitude and pandered to the electorates to secure majorities in the House of Commons. Eminently respectable persons may be chosen to illustrate the evil indicated. Two of such persons, who were of opposite parties and were contemporaries, may be mentioned. These two persons, within three years, by their quack remedies, as politicians, instead of proper remedies, as statesmen or physicians of the State, brought great evils on the State and its community. They undid or destroyed, good work which had been done by expert statesmen of earlier times.

These two politicians, Mr. Disraeli and Mr. Gladstone, belonged to the middle class. They did not belong to the multitude and, therefore, in respect of the multitude, they had no class grievances of their own to be remedied. They assumed a voluntary patronage of the community and its parts without any incumbent duty imposed by the State. They had taken to politics, as young men take to a profession, or a business. They started, within their own class, with a political party bent. Mr. Disraeli was a Radical and Mr. Gladstone was a Tory. These two politicians were the causes of material changes in the State with far reaching consequences. Mr. Disraeli, in 1867, championed a Reform Bill which modified the franchise. Mr. Gladstone, in 1869, championed the Irish Church Disestablishment Bill. The Reform of 1867, so far as its promoter, Mr. Disraeli, was concerned, was "a leap in the dark." The Irish Church Act of 1869, so far as Mr. Gladstone was concerned, was a "sop to Cerberus." There was, at this time, a great competition between the Conservative party and the Liberal party to obtain a majority in the House of Commons. Both parties professed to have a common aim in seeking the public good; and they went to opposite extremes, under their leaders. These leaders were not much influenced by their respective followers, who had to be satisfied with what was promised. The political party was led by its chief, on the military principle. It had not yet degenerated to be operated by its tail, on the democratic principle. In England,

political leaders had been, more or less, expert statesmen and men of character who, as patriots, were trusted by their followers.

The Franchise Bill was in the nature of a concession to include a larger part of the population. Both parties were competing for the support of the new electors and the old electors realised that their position was to be modified adversely to their interests. The increase of voters had no rational connection with the dispensation of social justice. The dissentient and tumultuous influences of the multitudes, at the elections of servitors, was contrary to a fixed principle of the Constitution, affirmed in 1429, which had been approved by generations of statesmen and it had been, again, affirmed by a deliberate national accord, in 1832. The party leaders, on both sides, had, since then, been pandering to the populace for its support to turn the party scales. The fact was overlooked that a policy, or a measure, may be right, or wrong, in relation to the standards of propriety or utility, and whether it be supported or be opposed by one man, or by a million men. The victims of a dominant idea, in the opposed groups, desired a consensus of opinion to enlarge their group. They were affected, like religious zealots, as though the assimilation of opinions could alter facts. In the fight for victory the regard for principle was lost. In the struggle to obtain a majority of servitors in the House of Commons each party seeking office was impelled by the hope of victory and by the fear of defeat. The main aim was a majority. The State and its community receded from view and were far away in the background. The party leaders were politicians, engaged in the game of tactics, in the arena of debate. They were not statesmen. They failed in the knowledge of statesmanship which is necessary for upholding the State and its Constitution in the defence of its domain and in the welfare of its community. The classes and the masses in the community were deemed to be contrasted in quality, in wealth and in number. The masses, as the multitude, in flattery of the multitude, were, by politicians, deemed to be the main sources of worldly wealth and the sole support of the State. This was an ancient as well as a modern fallacy. The economic grades, in Attica and at Rome, as sources of great stability in the State, had gradually yielded and been swept away under the force of prejudice of this fallacy. In England wisdom had been learned from the defects of fallen States, and the utility of the economic grades had been restored. The degradation of the electorates was an evil which had been guarded against by the precepts of national statesmanship.

The quality of an army, in efficiency, made that army, although it was small, a more useful instrument than a larger army of lessened

quality. The electoral and servitor systems, in the State, had followed the principles of quality and efficiency which had made English armies more than a match for Continental armies, which had relied for success on magnitude. The economic grades in the English electoral system allowed the Constitution, in this respect to possess an excellence which was not found in any other State in Europe. The kindness of the general community, also, favoured justice. It was adverse to the oppression of any part of it by the rest of the community. It was consistent with gentlemanly feeling for the strong to help the weak and for the rich to help the poor. It is true that an evil creed infected some of the lower classes with a class hatred which was a heritage from the past, but this evil was multiplied by the mixed community which had dissentient parts, and these were at cross purposes through an absence of common regard for the State. There was party enthusiasm and party bitterness. There was more zeal than discretion. The true paths were left and the goal was lost to view. Excellence vanished and baseness came in. The leaders who were inclined to rectitude found, too late, that they had been the promoters of depravity. "The Whigs were dished." The trigrade franchise system was unbalanced. The door was opened to a mischief which would distort the State. The Conservative party did not approve what had been done by its leader.

His apologists, however, argued that had he not gone so far the Liberal party would have gone further. In 1866, before the franchise struggle had been decided, it is clear that the Liberal party had contemplated a departure from the most fundamental principle of the Constitution, in respect of its trigrade system of servitors and their electorates. The "Essays on Reform" (Macmillan & Co., 1867) had an effect on Mr. Disraeli's conduct in 1867. As a politician he then took that "leap in the dark" which was unworthy of the traditions and the high principle of an English statesman. There were genuine English statesmen who were strongly averse to what the party leader had done. The "Essays on Reform," by the twelve Essayists, of whom Lord Bryce was one of the last survivors, contemplated the "Reform of the House of Commons" which was then more expansively referred to as the "Reform of Parliament." It was, however, the beginning of a morbid deformity in the Constitution which posterity has a duty to cure to prevent a fatality. It is true that the twelve Essayists successfully confused the issues. Their knowledge of the State and its needs was not improved by the influence of liberal tenets, which were incongruous with excellence in the State, and tended to debasement.

In 1885, the mischief of 1867 was followed by a complete change which converted the trigrade system into the unigrade system. It was influenced by a party which was of a nondescript character. It was termed "Tory-democracy." The trigrade system, after a useful career of 620 years, was swept away under the demoralising influence of liberalism. In 1885 there were, again, party bids to the multitude. This evil involved both parties, and all parties, in truckling to the multitude for its votes, instead of standing by the State and seeking its support from the more substantial parts of the community. In the degradation of the electorates the quality, tone and power of the House of Commons was lowered, in its influence for good, and the State, itself, was lessened in its stability and self-control. In turning to the mischievous conduct of Mr. Gladstone who in 1869 had an active part in the disestablishment of the Church in Ireland, the evil of the depraved politician is not less manifest than it was in the case of Mr. Disraeli. The position of a Church, as a service under the State, with an undivided allegiance to the State, was consistent with a principle of true statesmanship, as well known in Britain as in any region of the world.

The evil of the foreign Sanctuary had remained an evil, in Ireland, long after it had been reduced in England to the condition of a mere nuisance. The better classes, in Ireland, were akin to the like classes in Britain, as in England, Scotland and Wales. The tendency was for these classes to be united, in the realm, in an undivided allegiance to the State. The Irish multitude was much influenced by the Romish priests. The Celts, as a race, and, especially, in its higher grades, had the military instinct of standing by the State and of not being dominated by priests. The priests were generously treated and their ministerial services were not allowed to be degraded. The population of servile origin had always been subservient, on a point on which the higher grades retained traditions of virile independence, in their regard for religious principles and duties. The backwardness of the multitude, in Ireland, had been lessened by systematic education. There was a latent conflict in which the Roman Church influenced the multitude and was, itself, antagonistic to the established Church and to the State to which it owed allegiance. There were plenty of precedents for States, in earlier times, tolerating variant creeds and the toleration of variant sects came within the same political principle. The State, in its toleration, required a due regard for propriety and that its population should not be demoralised, or debased.

In Ireland, the State, in its toleration of the Romish Church

and priests, had been not only just but generous. The provision of education and the generous treatment of the foreign Church had produced an excellent effect on a good-natured and talented but backward population. There was religious rivalry and there was seditious sentiment which had been causes of dissension for generations. Under firm government there was progress, interrupted, from time to time, by conspiracies; and the ramifications were always racial, with politico-religious associations, both in the domain of the State and in certain foreign domains. The main sources, centres, and means of intrigue were well known. There had been such a conspiracy and, in connection with it, there had been an outrage at Clerkenwell. Mr. Gladstone had become imbued with the principles of liberalism and he was a typical politician and had a ready tongue. The emergency due to Irish discontent and the outrage mentioned had to be met. The shallow politician, with the ready tongue, thought that something must be done. Instead of dealing with the mischief, as crime should be dealt with, in a State which is true to itself, in making a right use of its supremacy, he decided to propitiate the Roman Church. This novel policy, in exchange for a favour, would allow the waywardness of the multitude, in Ireland, to be lessened by the control of Roman priests.

The political tactician was true to liberal principles. Instead of facing the evil and completing the work of earlier statesmen, by exacting a proper regard for the allegiance due to the State, by the usual remedies of criminal procedure, the work of the earlier statesmen was undone. To truckle to truculence was characteristic of that political effeminacy of Continental origin from which liberal principles had been derived, but it was a flagrant departure from that political virility which had been characteristic of steadfastness in the State, in its duty of defence and welfare. To give a bone to a restless dog, to divert it, was intelligible. The relative positions of the State and the foreign Sanctuary required, respectively, supremacy and subjection, with obedience and the absence of malignancy. Mr. Gladstone did not realise, until it was too late, that his false move on the political chess-board had consequences which he had not foreseen. Priests are never better behaved than when they are well supervised and corrected. When a national Church was struck at, to appease the jealousy of a foreign Church, which was an intruder and a source of sedition to the multitude, the State ceased to be true to itself. This mischief was done by the politician. It was open to the State, instead of disestablishing its national Church, to have placed the foreign Church on an established basis, and,

subject to the condition that every priest who was allowed to officiate should possess a State licence in the nature of an *exequatur*. The principle of toleration could then have been secured against abuse and none but high-class persons could have filled the priestly offices. The multitude would have received due care to prevent its abasement, and the State would have been satisfied in having a prosperous and a well-behaved population.

The politician's false step, in 1869, was the cause of the subsequent evils. It may be termed a false step, in mitigation, because the motive and the aim were innocent. The false step indicated great simplicity and, also, the error of a miscalculation. The Romanist part of the Irish population had a sentimental grievance in the existence of a State Church which was deemed to be a rival Church to that of Rome which was, in fact, intrusive and as foreign to the population in Ireland, as it was to the population in Britain. The idea of propitiation, at the cost of the State, to serve a temporary party purpose, on a matter of principle, could not be justified. The trained statesmen of England knew well that there was a limit which would, at some time, have to be put to the toleration of Romanist propaganda, in its usurpations and demoralisation in the State. England was not the only State which had resented this nuisance; England was the one State which, in its thoroughness, had been true to itself, in regard to political propriety, in this respect, and it had set an example to other States.

The propitiation of Irish malcontents, in 1869, was in the nature of a bounty to induce further concessions by the State. Home Rule, with all of its sinister associations, became the source of new mischiefs, as in the Parliament Act which, in its enormity, was to be outdone by the final surrender in an "Irish Treaty." We may now look at the psychology of the two politicians who, by an absence of regard for statesmanship, in the study of the State and its ailments, brought great calamities on the State whilst they were influenced by the crude theories of liberalism. It has been noticed that Mr. Disraeli and Mr. Gladstone were gentlemen of the middle class and that neither of them had any particular interest in the multitude. They were politicians, party leaders and astute parliamentarians. They were not skilled statesmen. They were Ciceronian rather than Cæsarian. They were not men of thought and action, with the qualities of the fearless silent statesmen, such as England had known, generations apart, in Cromwell, in the Black Prince and in the Earl of Pembroke. They were not Englishmen, whose ancestors, with military instincts, had been defenders of the domain and upholders of the

State, as a source of strength, in its management. Mr. Disraeli was of the Hebrew race, the son of a literary man, and a Christian, but with many racial characteristics. Mr. Disraeli had made a study of the Constitution, in its parliamentary aspects, and his "Letter on the Constitution" (1835) indicates the influence of Burke, who had confessed that he did not know the origin of the House of Commons. Mr. Disraeli might, also, have confessed that he had but a superficial knowledge of the Constitution. The House of Commons has never been an estate of the realm but, always, has been no more than a fragment of the Third estate. This had long been a popular error and it was akin to another that "the Crown" was relational to the regal "Coronet," with a mystic meaning, instead of being the ancient "Senate," the lost First estate. Mr. Disraeli had done much good work in arousing patriotism and in promoting welfare. He was expert in a knowledge of international affairs and, in helping to consolidate the Empire, he safeguarded its national interests. Since his death his good qualities have been appreciated and his "leap in the dark" has been palliated. His policy of a "united Empire," in the use of its strength, for the defence of its domain, made him a popular hero. The Primrose League was instituted in his honour, to perpetuate his principles of Empire patriotism, in support of the State. Mr. Gladstone was of Scots lineage and the son of a merchant. He was naturally gifted and had been trained at Eton and Oxford. He was an Anglican Churchman and he was a classical and a mathematical scholar. He was well versed in the relations of Church and State. He had started his political career as a Tory and he became a Liberal with Radical tendencies. He was an idealist, who had been influenced by Hellenic studies, and he was a gifted speaker. His world was the House of Commons. There he could hold his own, in debate and, with a fine flow of language and sentiment, could retain the attention of opponents whom he failed to convince. He prided himself on his astuteness as an "old parliamentary hand," and, as he became expert in liberal principles, his means and methods of politics were lowered and were not free from guile. He was a patron of the multitude, as "the people," and a champion of the House of Commons, in its relations with the Crown and the House of Peers. His main opponent, Mr. Disraeli, who had started as a Radical, had become a Conservative, after he had become aware of the fallacies of liberalism.

Mr. Gladstone's position was embittered by the skill and tenacity of an opponent who was more shrewd and versatile than himself. Mr. Gladstone, also, had a wayward genius, with a high opinion

of his own abilities; and the defects of a visionary, in being warped by his own views, made him obstinate. It was, in this state of mind, that the disestablishment of the Irish Church, in 1869, was undertaken. It is clear, now, that the mischief was connected with folly and depravity. His later escapade, in respect of Irish Home Rule, may have been due to a like influence. Liberalism was the atmosphere which accounted for the departure from propriety. His fascinating personality had given an air of respectability to liberalism. He and a group of gentlemen, of his own social position, had made a cult of liberalism, in the patronage of the multitude, as a political party-bond between the classes and the masses. The "Home Rule Bill," for a time, put an end to this cult. He was left by his friends and followers of the better classes. Their loyalty to the State, their patriotism to the Empire and their regard for the welfare of the community, would not allow them to take part in political depravity. The remnant of the Liberal party, in the House of Commons, in the same atmosphere of liberalism, began to barter with factions which were opposed to it, to make a new majority, on terms. The result was the Parliament Act. The attack on the House of Peers has not lessened but has increased the patriotic regard for that magisterial body.

¶ The implication of a constitutional principle, which cannot be shaken, indicates that this body, as the domain magistracy, has a jurisdiction, as the supreme control, which is co-extensive with that of the First Magistrate, as the supreme Executive. These magistracies are related as principal and agent. It follows that the House of Peers holds, in trust, for all provinces of the Empire, until they are exercised, the several capacities of the magisterial agencies of the domain, pending the appointments to these offices. The fallacies of the multitude, of democracy, and of liberalism, may have obscured this point. The depravity of politicians and the excesses of ministerial pretensions, when examined, bring to light the true limitations of power and authority in the State. The abasement of magistracy is one of the ailments of the State and it can be remedied. The excellence and the strength of the magistracy are the first requirements of the State, to ensure its safety against the political debasement which has most often been caused by depraved politicians. The excellence, in the command, which can render an army efficient, has a like excellence in the magistracy which can restore efficiency to the State.

In a review of the careers of States, it may be concluded that the depravity of politicians has been a source of greater evils in the State than the depravity of the multitude. There is less

depravity in a great multitude than there is in a few politicians who dominate it. The regard for the multitude, instead of for the magistracy, has usually marked the turn towards the debasement of the State. This turn has been the constant forerunner of the fall of the State. On the other hand, the restoration of excellence and power, in the magistracy, has marked the turn, in the reform of the State, and to the suppression of depraved politicians who, as political miscreants, in disturbing and misleading the multitude, have been greater foes to the State than malignant priests. The garb of respectability has often concealed systematic viciousness applied, adversely to right, in the work of destructiveness. In the decline of excellence in the State, and in the fatal turn which indicated its final fall, the preference of the blind multitude, as the substitute for the expert magistracy, has been significant. The institution of Ostracism, in Attica, and the institution of Tribunism, at Rome, marked departures of the State, on its downgrade course. In Britain, the reform of magistracy, under Magna Carta, when despotism was suppressed, and the kingship was bridled, and, again, subjected to the control of magistracy, an upward turn was made, to restore excellence in the State. This change was, for a time, successful. The multitude had no part in this movement.

In 1305, the peerage, in the institution of Receivers and Triers, again, made a successful effort in the same direction. The multitude gained by it but had no part in it. In 1311, the Lords Ordainers, acting as great peers, were successful in the repetition of reforms. Much of the good then done was soon undone by the miscreants who were in league with the Executive. All of the movements, to reform the magistracy, by the peerage, itself, were in the same direction. There was no aid from the multitude. Turbulence in the multitude, and intrigues by clericalism, had to be resisted. The relapse to debasement was, at last, met by the first impeachment and the parasitic ministers and the politicians, in the Common Council, were corrected. The House of Commons (1376) had not yet come into existence. A few years later "the peers in parliament" that is, in the Common Council, when the peers and the servitors were assembled, made their famous declaration as to reforms in the State. These were to begin with the magistracy, and its first member, and to extend downwards to every degree. There was no flattery of the multitude. The policy of that time was clear. The domain magistracy, as a body, regulated the Executive magistracy of the Throne and, also, maintained its own defence against the political malefactors who calumniated the magistrates and the better classes. The statutory provisions

as to *scandalum magnatum*, or "the calumnation of superiors," which had existed for a century, were reviewed and strengthened. There was a clear issue as to whether the magistracy, or the multitude, should have the mastery in the State.

The maintenance of worthiness, wisdom and strength, in the magistracy, as settled at this time, marked the upward and onward progress of the State, in its career, to modern times. The depravity of politicians affected by Hellenism, again, tends to the magnification of the multitude. The ancestral custom of Britain, where the State has thriven in its excellence, has had more regard for propriety and put its trust in the worthiness and strength of an expert magistracy. Baseness, as in Hellenism, and excellence, as in Britanism, are incompatibles. The inclusion of the one implies the exclusion of the other. In the remedies necessary to secure the State there may be a resort to the principles of earlier times. It is open to the State, and to the peerage magistracy, to appoint a Board of Censors to review, and to report to the House of Peers, incompetence, defects, or misconduct, in magistrates, that the same may be corrected. It is open to the State, and its Legislature, to set up a College of Grand Jurors, with a part of the members to be appointed each year, to serve for three years. Every shire would be represented by the worthy, the wise and the most substantial persons in it. The Grand Jurors would hear informations and, where necessary, put great malefactors, who have attacked the State, on their trial, by a branch of the Judicature, to be set up for the trial of political crimes. It would be possible, by such means, to cleanse the House of Commons, and its electorates, of depraved politicians in order to increase the safety of the State and the welfare of its community.

The Reform movements by the peers, in the reign of Richard II, and their stalwart stand against the evils of multitudinism, are as worthy of regard to-day, in securing the welfare of the Empire, as any example of political propriety which can be drawn from foreign States. The co-operation between the Government of the State and its public-spirited community, in England, may, also, be illustrated by the use of Grand Jurors, to attack dangerous and powerful malefactors, by putting them on trial, in order to cleanse the community. Depraved politicians, in the service of the State, either as servitors or as ministers, can be inspected and tried. The useful process of impeachment, by the House of Commons, has ceased to be operative because that House has assumed such powers in the State that it has become inconsistent for it to impeach those whom it supports. It is true that a new majority

may do so, but such a majority may not come into existence, except after a general election. The mischief may, then, have been done and there is the risk of vindictiveness in politics. A College of Grand Jurors, as an additional impeaching and indicting body, would be not less respectable and not less powerful than the House of Commons. It could have a Standing Committee, as a Board of Grand Jurors, co-operating with the Board of Censors, as mentioned, for a systematic weeding process in the cleansing of Parliament.

The excessive pretensions of the House of Commons could then be reduced to their proper limits, to restore the balance to the Constitution, and to free the State from its greatest evil, the predominance of depraved politicians. In the Common Council of London, the ancient practice has been preserved, for the exercise of the censorial powers of the Aldermen, as the magistrates, over all members of the Common Council. The Councillors, as Servitors, are well controlled. This practice formerly existed in the State. It is not to be forgotten that informations, impeachments and indictments rest on a common principle and that, when the facts are proved, the law is applied by the magistracy. As prevention is better than cure, the Board of Grand Jurors could act, at once, on the *Quia timet* basis of injunctions, to prevent impending harm to the State, or its community. The depraved politicians could then be prevented from doing their threatened mischief. It is enough that the evil of depraved politicians needs provisions which, in thoroughness and completeness, will circumvent and defeat these miscreants, in every stage of their career, from the multitude, in its various parts, to the Parliament and, thence, to the Cabinet and to all branches of the Administration. No minister should be allowed to attend the King except in the presence and hearing of a Lord of the Council. No Cabinet Council should be held without the presence of a Lord of the Council. The Lords of the Council should bear the responsibility of the magistracy and support the Throne. Ministers should be kept within the scope of their authority and regard the State and their public duty rather than the majority and the party interests in the House of Commons. This system, had it prevailed, would have prevented the secrecy and the surprises which preceded the Parliament Act and the Irish Treaty.

CHAPTER IX

POLITICAL EXCELLENCE

(1) THE REFORM OF THE STATE

IT may now be realised that the State is a specific institution, with organic parts, which are definite and relative to the whole organism. The State, as the true State, in its relation to other institutions, such as the Sanctuary and the Guild, differs from them just as a man differs from a bird and a beast. There are, also, States and States, as there are men and men. The true State, by the ideal standard of perfection, is equally relational to the more perfect man by the ideal standard of perfection which raises him, at least, to the higher type in contrast to the lowest type. The latter type may be the travesty of a man, in likeness, with a mentality akin to that of a gorilla. The State, in a similar way, has a range of types. This range, however, is only within the limits of perfection and its opposite extreme of imperfection. The State ceases to exist beyond this point, and another kind of institution may then begin to exist.

The State, in its scope of utility, in respect of defence and welfare, will be differentiated, in development, as it increases in magnitude. In this magnitude a great State, as an empire State, will differ widely from a petty State, or a city State. It is necessary, therefore, to realise that great States and petty States have not much in common and that the development in a great State, will cease to follow the lines which may be suitable in a petty State. It follows that, even by growth, a petty State may need that corrective modification, which is termed reform, even where the existing deformity is, in fact, the result either of an absence of scope for development, or the presence of something that is an insufficiency, or a surplusage, in development. Natural organisms, in their perfection, have proportions in their parts. In imperfection, the absence of this proportion is illustrated, in cases of acromegaly, where the parts are out of proportion. In the stages of development, however, physiological changes cause the proportions to vary in order to reach a final perfection in the whole organism. The boy, the youth, the adult, and

the man, in full vigour of body and mind, differ as the result of development.

It is so with the State. Rome rose from a village to be a town, a city, a realm and an empire. It became a great State, as the result of development, under set circumstances, over which it had not control. The internal forces were affected by their environment. The period of development was about 1,200 years, from the rise to the fall of the State. During the greater part of that period the supremacy of the State existed whilst the domain, which was relational to that supremacy, was expanding and contracting. The community was, also, expanding by the inclusion of accessory populations of many varieties. The fact that the supremacy belonged, originally, to a small political community, of a vigorous military race, gave a political, or a State-like, character to that community, and this character prevailed throughout the subsequent stages of State development which included expansions of the political community. Ancestral aptitudes, in the ruling classes, tended to survive in practices, customs and usages, in defence and in welfare. At all of the stages, as progressive points in expansion, difficulties arose as to the inclusion of political, or State-like, persons and as to the exclusion of other than political persons, in the management of the State. Defence and welfare, as principles of State-like conduct, held the political community together. Ancestral aptitudes maintained a formative influence until the State, as an institution, changed its nature. The mastership in the domain had to be maintained by agents, or by trustees, of the political community.

The populations outside of this political community, in the new provinces of the domain, had to be secured a certain amount of welfare, which was consistent with justice, or with humane treatment, to allow the subject populations, at least, the minimum of freedom to enable them to live in peace and to be self-supporting by their industry. The alternative would have been turbulence and its suppression. The Roman State, relatively to the remote era, when States first came into existence, is, in relation to that era, to be deemed a comparatively modern State. The Roman State is traceable throughout all the phases of growth and decay, from its origin, as a village, to its end, as a fallen Empire. This fact allows that State to be used both as a standard of comparison and, also, as a store of political knowledge. That State is the source whence much good and much evil have entered into the later States which have grown up within the regions of its great domain. In viewing the State and its population, it results that the State, as an institution, with its structure of Government,

has to be kept clear of all associations with its subject regional populations, in respect of the necessities, the conveniences and the utilities of life in its regional groups. These regional groups are under subordinate managements which are controlled by the State, but neither the groups nor their managements have any control over the State, or its magistracy. These regional groups may have a great variety, in their composite parts, in their circumstances of livelihood, industry and prosperity.

The wholesome existence of regional populations is derived from all of those things, whether universal, general or particular, which are necessary to supply the needs of human beings to enable them to live, with sufficient freedom and protection, under the State. The State and its politics, as the business of State management, may be severed completely from the regional populations. The provisions for the managements, in the regional parts, are matters for the State. The provisions for the management of the State are not matters, either for the regional populations, or for their managements. These provisions are matters for the magistracy of the State. The State is principal and the regional parts are accessory to it. Each regional population, in respect of its system of existence, and the economic conditions of its population, groups and individuals, may be considered, apart from the State, as an institution, with its structure of Government, as its constitution. The many and various regional managements contrast with the management of the State, as the State's Government.

The business of a regional management may be termed "demics," in contrast to "politics" as the business of State management. The confusion of these separate and distinct businesses, as demics and as politics, respectively, has been the source of great evils in the State. It has been the source, also, of much that has tended to the deformity of the Constitution, as well as to the degradation of the State. The welfare of the many regional populations could have been secured by the regional managements not only under the State but, in the several degrees under it, as in its subordinate ranges of management, by great provinces, provinces and sub-provinces. Such habitations, as come within the economic principles of communism and socialism, based on private utility, could exist and thrive within the region of a parish. If, however, these habitations were based on public utility, or were expanded beyond a small group of persons, or beyond a small region, their nature and organisation would be changed. Institutions of other types would come into existence. In the lower grades of the regional populations the presence of vague ideals, as relics of the past, from the system and ritual of the Sanctuary and the Guild, and the absence

of the sense of due proportions, in appreciating the circumstances of life in the State, have to be taken into account. There is a heritage from the past which is adverse to the State. It is a blind force which is always tending to distort the State. The capacity of regional managements is sufficient to control this evil.

The basis of public utility and the protection of the regional management are sufficient for wholesome freedom. City populations, and town and rural inhabitants, have thriven, apart, under their regional managements, although they had no voice in the management of the great State. They had their existence in its domain, as bare subjects of the State, without any part in its control. These regional populations have prospered, although they were not allowed to interfere in the management of the State. The State suffered no inconvenience from the absence of interference by these regional populations. In the subordination of regional managements, grade by grade, under the State, the various scopes of utility and policy, to secure welfare, have due attention. Demics and politics, considered apart, prevent confusion in thought and conduct and they indicate co-operation in the division of labour, as between the parts and the whole, in the organic system of the State. In respect of regional management, the system of demics was illustrated, in cities, under the Roman State. Athens, when it ceased to be a sovereign State, and was relegated to the position of a city, under its subordinate regional management, was more prosperous than it had been before. The wellbeing of its population was greater than it had been when its multitudes had raged with political ambitions and had wasted the energies of its community, in the dissensions of party strife, instead of using them in industry and in soberminded pursuits. Communal welfare and individual excellence were improved by the change.

Before Athens came within the Roman domain it had passed through many vicissitudes. It had risen to power as a petty feudal State. It had been deranged and modified by Solon. It had risen to a certain excellence under the despotic managements of Pisistratus and his sons. It had declined and fallen under democratic managements. Demagogues and multitudes were the cause of its undoing. The demagogues, as politicians, at last ousted the statesmen. In successive stages the political power was lessened and, with it, the maritime and the mercantile power of the city fell. Athens continued to thrive, as an industrial and mercantile centre, and it became the seat of social and educational culture. It became wise when its wisdom could no longer avail it as a sovereign State. Athens, in its subject condition, was but one of

several instances, in the Roman domain, of regional populations which had all the means of prosperity, although these populations were not allowed to interfere in politics, as the business of State management. Demics, as a term, relational to a region, or deme, appears, therefore, to be necessary to contrast with the term politics. A similar position, in relation to the State and its regional populations, had existed in Persia. In the vast domain of the Persian Empire, under Darius, the Empire management, as the business of politics, was a business for the Senate of Persia, which inspected and controlled all of the provinces of the great domain. This Senate included only seven magistrates, as the kings, princes, and chieftains, who were its graded members. The several provincial Senates, under the supreme Senate, were in charge of their respective provinces and were in touch with it. These provinces, in turn, were subdivided into regional districts, with their subordinate managements. In a sense, these local, or regional, parts, in their business of management, illustrated the principle of demics. These regional parts were controlled by the province and the provinces were controlled by the State. This was the method of feudal management. The reversed position, as in democracy, was not tolerated. The control of the higher management by the lower ones was anomalous.

In the feudal State, politics controlled demics but demics did not control politics. The State was like an army, in its method of management. All of its Divisions were under the command of Headquarters. The true State is controlled "from above" and not "from below." The degradation of the States of Greece was due to the ousting of the magistracy, with the supremacy in the domain, by the multitude which exercised "the sway," or the control, "from below," and, thus, dominated the former control "from above." The cause of this change was due, in part, to weakness in the political community and, in part, to the increased power of the multitude which had usurped what did not belong to it. The "greater number" had prevailed over the lesser number with the better qualities. The practice of the industrial Guild was followed in the towns. In the deme, or town, the demarch, or mayor, was the chief of the regional population, or the democracy. The town type of management became the multitude's ideal of the State. The deformity of the State resulted from this debasement. In other regions, where the ancient military community had retained its vigour, the ideal of the true State continued to be observed. The subgradation of regional managements is a system as old as the State. This point is confirmed by a record of the Homeric age in the systematic settlement by those who first

peopled the island of Phæacia. The domain was partitioned into provinces and into minor regions. There was devolution of power from above, as in the State, and not evolution of power, from below, as in a Guild. The State, with its politics, was considered, apart from its minor regions, so that each region had its own demics. This point has to be kept in view in the Reform of the State. In the true State, the domain magistracy with the supremacy, to be efficient, must be free from the control of the multitude. Excellence and baseness are incompatibles.

The State exists for the defence and the welfare of its community. The fallacy of the multitude that it cannot have justice, unless it has the control, is the first evil which has to be eradicated. It is an evil which needs to be suppressed, with thoroughness, if wellbeing is to prevail in the State. The due subordination of the regional managements could deal effectively with this evil, within the scope of demics, and, thus, prevent it from emerging within the scope of politics. The multitude is a body of many parts. It deserves great care from the regional managements that it may have the best treatment and, in any event, that it may not be either a peril, or a nuisance, to the State. The domain and its defence, against the international environment, are not within the scope of demics. The supervision of provinces and sub-provinces is in the same position. The defence of the domain and the welfare of its political community and of its general population fall within the scope of politics, as the business of State management. This business is fit for the Supreme Senate with the aid of the Great Council and that of the Common Council of the domain.

In attaining excellence, in the management of the State, it is not enough to have excellence in the structure of its Constitution. The great provinces of the domain, with a due regard for the provinces and the sub-provinces, can supply the three grades of magistrates and the three grades of servitors for the business of State management. It is not the large number but the high quality and fitness of these agents which, by worthiness, wisdom and ability, can give efficiency and strength to the State. It is not the large number of electors that can add any good to the management of the State. Where the electorates have but low grade qualifications, so that they are swayed by the evil influences of the multitudes, there the degradation of the State follows, as the inevitable effect. The system of well qualified agents has always been the means of excellence in the State. The excellence of the electorates is, therefore, a fundamental principle which has to be observed in the reform of the State. To maintain this system it is necessary to have a due regard for the structural parts of the

Constitution of Government, so that the magisterial and the servitorial branches of agency may, in their three grades, be efficient. These dual branches of agency ought to rest on the domain. Each grade ought to rest on its own foundation.

The domain grades of the magistracy ought to be the most exclusive because it is the principal branch of agency and, also, because none but the duly qualified, in every necessary respect, ought to be admitted to it. This policy has usually been maintained, by means of co-option, but subject to the right of impeachment, at any time, for unworthiness, incompetence, or misconduct, to be followed, on proof, by disqualification and removal. The domain grades of servitors rested on a similar basis, as to qualifications, but on a different basis, as to election. The right of impeachment, and its consequences, were similar to those in the case of magistrates. The maintenance of proper qualifications cannot be too firmly secured. The demagogue and the multitude have been the main sources of weakness and corruption in the State. They have, always, had their origin in the community, or in the populace. They remain, to-day, as the sources of the most pernicious evils which afflict the State. The mischievous element is much less in the multitude than in the demagogue. The demagogues, as political degenerates, demoralise the multitudes so that many weak-witted persons, without any particular viciousness, become infected with political heresies. These persons, like Circe's victims, become intoxicated and then delight to wallow, like pigs, in the mire of democracy. Their enthusiasm, in the work of distorting the State, then leads them to root up and tear down what comes in their way because they have lost the human sense which regards utility and even propriety.

The Reform of the State is, therefore, not enough, if it only restores the structural system to a fair condition of perfection, but neglects the cause of baseness and corruption, in the electorates. The Reform, to be effective, must secure the constant maintenance of the means of perfection. It may even go further and fortify the approaches to the respective electorates. The State will then be guarded against despotism and multitudinism, as the two main sources of evil in the State. The principles of political conduct, in statesmanship, differ widely from the principles of business management, in the minor regions, as in parishes, towns, cities and shires, as the lesser provinces. The State, as a great State, or an empire State, has its main function in the exercise of the supremacy relational to its domain, to secure its defence and the welfare of its community. The great provinces and the other provinces co-operate with the State, in control and supervision

in internal and in external affairs. The international environment, in relation to the defence of the domain and its supremacy, is the primary business of the State. The supervision of its domain is the secondary business of an empire State. Such a State, in its structure, is like a feudal State to the extent that the organisation of the regional parts, in co-operation, accords with the system of a natural organism. The State controls, directs and regulates. It can leave to the subordinate greater and lesser provincial managements what is necessary in the provisions for the welfare of the particular, or smaller, regional populations. These populations exist under such a variety of circumstances, in respect of necessities, utilities and conveniences, associated with their industries and means of livelihood, that the State is too remote, from the particular regions, to exercise its direct care from the seat of the supremacy. When, however, particular regional managements have become debased, incompetent, or untrustworthy, they may be controlled, reformed, or corrected, from above, by a superior management. In the last resort, as a remedy for injustice, the lowliest subject may appeal to the State, with the supremacy. The right of petition is a right of the subject which has survived from the feudal State. It is mutually beneficial to the State and to its subjects of every grade and class.

It follows that the Reform of the State must be differentiated from the reform of regional managements. It follows, further, that the State and, especially, a great State, or an empire State, is an institution which, in its structure of government, ought to be shielded from interference by its multitude, or by the multitude's gratuitous advocates, the politicians. As against the multitude, the foundations of both the magistrates and the servitors have to be secured by allowing them to rest for their support, on the best parts of the community having property interests which are relational to the great domain. As against the politicians, tests of capacity and qualifications are as requisite, in the Legislature, as in the Judicature. The qualifications which are necessary, in officers of the army and navy and in other branches of the State's services, have their appropriate necessary equivalents in the magisterial and in the servitorial agencies of the State. The form of the State, in respect of its Constitution of Government, has to be retained, in its best condition, just as the form of a man has to be retained to secure the amplitude of health and strength. The State, as a virile institution, needs to exclude effeminacy.

The true State has worthiness and excellence, in its Government, and, to retain these qualities, it needs to exclude viciousness and baseness. At the head of the State, the Senate of great magistrates

should have the supremacy in the domain. This Senate should be excellent in quality and small in number. It needs to have unity in statesmanship with variety in ability. A large Senate tends to be weak, as cohesion is lessened by dissension. This results from variety. Where there are many men there are as many minds. The evils of a too small and of a too large Senate have become traditional. Ten or twelve great Senators are enough to ensure sobriety in thought and deliberation in its conclusions. It is large enough to secure, in its full utility, the office of the kingship, as the State's Executive, and to prevent despotism on the Throne, or the usurpation of power, by the ministers of the Executive. It is, also, able to prevent usurpation of power, by magistrates, or by servitors. The Supreme Senate should rest on the foundation of the Great Council of the magistrates of the domain. These magistrates should reach a competent standard, to be qualified, or, in the alternative, be excluded. Some of the magistrates should be induced to attain special ability, as in statesmanship, and to reach the standard of excellence. A sufficiency of wealth, in domain lands, is, and always has been, an inducement to generosity and a safeguard against avarice and corruption.

The Common Council of the State should include the magistrates of the Great Council, and the servitors of the domain provinces and, in two or three grades of economic variation, roughly akin to the economic classes, in the provincial communities. All of the servitors, to be qualified, ought to reach, in every respect, a competent standard, or be excluded. The Electorates should be graded into three grades, on economic grounds, and be made select to secure political competency in the electors. In respect of the State, the multitude should be excluded; but, in respect of sub-provincial electorates, the worthier, the wiser and the wealthier parts of the multitude should be induced to take part in communal affairs, in order to school public-spirited persons in the business of regional management. The State ought not to be prejudiced by the incompetence and the erratic movements of the multitude. The servitor grades, in the State franchise, should be based on direct taxation. A reasonable gradation is necessary. The outline may be suggested. The electors of knight servitors should be those who contributed, in direct taxes to the State, £50 a year, or more. The electors of citizen servitors should be those who contributed £25 a year, and under £50. The electors of burgh servitors should be those who contributed £5 a year, and under £25.

Every elector of knight servitors should, also, be an elector of citizen servitors and of burgh servitors, and every elector of

citizen servitors should be an elector of burgess servitors. The relative contributions of the three grades should be found, approximately, in each shire, in order to form the basis of the relative proportions of the grades of servitors, as knights, citizens and burgesses.

The exclusion of the multitudes, from even a tendency to domineer in the State, would be the first and best step to secure a reform of the State. The tendency for the State to suffer from the evils of multitudinism, in modern times, is even more detrimental to the State than its tendency to suffer from the evils of despotism was, in earlier times. Some of the best reforms in the State have been reversions to ancient practices. The trigrade electoral system, in England, was the most perfect means of securing stability in the State and progress in its community. This system was not excelled in any other State. The higher grade servitors had, in its prime, formed its majority. Its minority could state grievances, and suggest remedies for them, but it was without power to shake the State. The trigrade system, in its effects, tended more to worthiness and to excellence and it was adverse to viciousness and baseness.

It was better for the State to have a majority of servitors, who were enlightened and generous and a barrier to the depredations of the multitude, than to allow the multitude to become predatory towards the rest of the community and to be the support of mischievous politicians. The mob-leaders, or demagogues, as politicians, by means of the lower electorates, become servitors and ministers, and, then, are the main means of mischiefs in the State. The absence of a property qualification, for servitors, and the payment of an allowance, for their attendance, have revived evils which, in earlier times, expert statesmen had wisely excluded. The addition to the electorates of the women's votes, without the relative qualifications of direct taxation contributions has lowered the quality of the electorates. Effeminate men and masculine women are defectives in relation to natural excellence. The entrance of effeminacy into the State, which is a virile institution, is an incident of political demoralisation. It will have its effect in the degradation of the State. The feudal State favoured excellence in women and sheltered them from the evil influences of business. The State, in its debasement, has taken another course. The votes of women are used to lessen the power of the more revolutionary elements in the multitude. Occupiers' votes have been duplicated, in the cases of married men, so that the restless husband retains one and the sedate wife has the other vote. A residential vote has, also, been given, without the qualification

of a direct taxation contribution to the State. The resultant effect, on the economic basis, is that those who are the more substantial supporters of the State tend to be outvoted, at elections, by the less substantial supporters, who are reinforced by a multitude which, in respect of direct taxation, can be described as non-supporters of the State.

It is needless to ask whence this new mischief came and with what political creed or heresy it was associated. It is enough that the confusion of thought, which fails to separate politics from demics, was involved in the change, which is retrogressive. It indicates the puerility which associates the State with the village community. In the Reform of the State, to remove its distortion, the cause of the mischief indicates the remedy. The separation of politics from demics allows the State to be considered as an institution, by itself. A fairly large regional management, as that of a shire, can, then, also be considered, apart, to allow it, and its minor regional managements, to secure the welfare of its particular part of the multitude. This duty is remote from the proper business of the State. The shire can have its own electorates, with all of the suitable qualities of excellence, so that what is incompetent, and unfit, may be restrained from any intrusion into the management of the State. The State, in this way, can maintain its unity with variety in its parts. The shire, in its management, may follow the State in its dual agencies of magistrates and servitors, and the trigrade system of electorates, in order to secure stability and progress.

Demics, as the business of regional management, can, then, be developed, in the direction of perfection, when freed from the distraction of politics. Politics, as the business of management of the State, can, then, follow a like course, when freed from the distraction of demics. The distortion of the State was, originally, due to the forces in the lower grade electorates which were, to a great extent, held by parts of the multitude. All of the industrial classes are of value to the State which, in its economic aspect, is a great industrial hive, but all industry is not confined to manual labour. Manual labour is not the highest, or the greatest, part of the industrial body. Manual labour is not the monopoly of the multitude. The more substantial parts of the community can be usefully expert in manual labour, as freely and as effectively as the particular part which is generally occupied with it. The expansion of mechanical power, in recent times, has been so great that more work is done, by such means, than is done, or could be done, by the manual labour of the entire population of the domain. The business of politics, in the management of the State,

is carried on in the interest of the industrial classes and of all other classes, but there is nothing in the nature of the State which necessitates the control of the State by the labour class of the population. It would be as incongruous for the State to be controlled by the labour class, as a part of its industrial body, as it would for an army to be controlled by a particular part of the body of its private soldiers. The ideal of the State is not fully appreciated by the labour class which sees the State only through a mist and then it is obscured by other ideals which are foreign to the State.

The outline of the reform of the State may not, therefore, accord with popular ideals. The reversion to the classic system of the State, in its excellence, indicates the existence of an institution which, in respect of its constitution of Government, possesses utility, simplicity and strength. The gradation of the managements from that of the domain to that of a township, goes back to a remote antiquity, when the feudal structure was more perfect. There was a family likeness in all of its graded parts but varied to accord with the functions of those parts. In Britain, there are relics of regional managements, among the most ancient in the Western world. In Japan, similar relics still exist, and they are survivals of an origin not less remote in the Eastern world. The popular prejudice is adverse to feudal principles but, in spite of this prejudice, there are no regions of the earth in which the State, in its excellence, has risen higher than in Britain and Japan. In the Reform of the State it is, therefore, necessary to keep clear the ideal of the true State, as a specific institution, and to avoid the evils, adverse to it, which have been derived from rival and hostile institutions.

(2) POLITICAL COMPETENCY

The management of the State, to be excellent, requires that its various agents, as great magistrates, magistrates and minor magistrates, and, also, as great servitors, servitors and minor servitors, should be as able, as well versed and as competent to fulfil their respective duties, as the officers of an army. As the strength of a chain is no greater than its weakest link, so every agent, in the management of the State, in order to be reliable, ought to reach the standard of competency. The range of this competency, from the great magistrates, as senators, to the minor servitor agents, includes a variety of types of men with aptitude,

ability and training, to fit them for their several duties. The State requires efficiency in its control, its executive, its administration and in its various accessory services for defence, order and welfare. The cost of this competency and efficiency is, also, not to be too burdensome to the political communities within the State's domain. Competency, in its economic relations, is a means of gain just as incompetency is a cause of loss. The excellence in the management of the State is derived exclusively from human excellence and, within the scope of political competency. As an effect it is traceable, in the supremacy, to its causes in the foundations, on the best elements in the community.

This competency is most necessary in the great senators, including the King, who is the chief of these senators, and the Executive officer of the Senate, which, as the possessor of the supremacy in the domain, is the Government, or Control. The office of the kingship has been so defined by usage that the ancient practice of hereditary aptitude and fitness has been sufficient, with senatorial control, to secure the necessary competence in the occupant of the Throne. The continuous practice of a Council of State, with the continuous additions of new members, as the aged ones retired, has usually been sufficient to maintain, in its members, as a body, the specific competency necessary for the performance of its functions. The structure of a Senate and its functions, in relation to utility, is a typical institution of ancient origin which has prevailed, very widely, with military races, not only in the State but in minor societies, such as tribes, clans and village communities. Its utilitarian purpose implies the need for competency. The principle of selection, also, warrants the practice of exclusion. This principle is a standing monument against the interference of the multitude. It has been observed, throughout the world, not only among the advanced, but, also, among the less advanced, races in their progress in civilisation. In the State, the system of Senates, with chiefs, as higher and lower groups, has been characteristic, as a means of welfare, based on competency. In respect of succession, the regard for competency was so great that the principle of exclusiveness was, in practice, of prehistoric origin. It appears first as hereditary eligibility which yielded a wide circle of competency for the choice of the most fit.

In the constitution of a large magisterial body, the average competency was sufficient to allow hereditary eligibility to be followed by hereditary right, but subject to disqualification, for incompetency, or its equivalent. This policy has survived in the State. In general, where the domain magistracy is, in part, hereditary and is, in part, non-hereditary, the gradual additions

of the most suitable persons to both classes of magistrates, to be included in the Great Council, has been sufficient to maintain political competency. This usage has existed, in Europe, for a period of more than 3,000 years. It has not been a universal usage. As a particular usage it existed in the Homeric age and it has survived to the latest times, in Britain. In the interval there have been many instances of the application of the principle. In the Roman Senate, when the hereditary practice failed, the senatorial body was completed by the addition of those who had held magisterial offices in the State. Age and experience were the conditions of competency, to fulfil the official duties. There were three grades of *curule* (or magisterial) offices which, from the higher to the lower, were consulships, prætorships and ædileships.

In the servitorial branch of agency were the offices of quæstorship, which was the primary office to be held in the service of the State. It was attainable in the twenty-seventh year. The consulship was attainable in the fortieth year. This policy was not peculiar to Rome. It indicates the efforts of ancient statesmen to evolve refinement out of crudeness and order out of chaos. It was a check upon the choice of the multitude. Competency, in statesmanship, thus became a source of strength to the Senate. The low class electorates of Rome, when they became unigraide, became characteristic of the decadent State. The multitude and the demagogues became dominant over the better classes of the community and were then the main source of weakness in the State. Excellence and baseness were in conflict where competency alone was in issue. In all of the services of the empire State the tests of competency prevail, with certain exceptions. In the Judicature the judges, the advocates and the solicitors have all to reach the standard of competency.

In the Legislature the magisterial body has maintained, for many centuries, a standard of efficiency which has ensured more than competency. It contains hereditary ability of a high class, improved with the advantages gained by education and training and by the development of the better qualities which are usually acquired by a wealthy and a leisured class. In the same Legislature the servitorial body, in its several grades, has, also, maintained a standard of efficiency, as to parts of it, and of competency, as to parts of it, but it has failed, as to other parts. In earlier times the terms of the electoral writ required that the candidates should be competent. The principle of public utility prevailed. The writ remains but the qualifications have been modified, so that what was formerly requisite has ceased to be so.

Here there is scope for reform. If the trigrade system was restored the requirements might include a variety of suitable ability in order to strengthen the House of Commons, as the Servitor House of Parliament. This House contains many servitors of the worthy, wise, wealthy and leisured class, like that in the House of Peers. It also contains many men of business with similar good qualities. These members have to divide their attentions between the duties of politics and the activities of business. The House of Servitors also contains those who do not come within either of the two classes mentioned. They do not represent the best parts of the community. They do not reach the standard of political competency; and the evil can be remedied.

The servitors of the better types, in the House of Commons, if they predominated in it, would enable that House to co-operate, more effectually, and free it from any foolish rivalry with the House of Peers, as the magisterial House of Parliament. In the Court of Parliament men of probity, ability and substance, as men of character, are more necessary for the representation of the electors who, after all, are but parts of the same community which is represented, by the magisterial agency, in the House of Peers. The electorates of the trigrade system, if restored, could include the standards of competency requisite for the respective grades. The whole community, in its respective grades and qualities, would then be represented and the improper domination of the multitude would be prevented. The existing evil is not a novelty in the problems of statesmanship. Roman statesmen faced it with keenness and tenacity, as well as success, until, at last, their work was undone by political reprobates. In Britain, this problem of statesmanship was neither unknown nor neglected. The feudal statesmen did well in opening the doors to the competent and in excluding the incompetent. The multitude was well cared for but it was not allowed to become mischievous to either the State, or to the rest of its population. In England, in the feudal period, the higher grade of the servitors was well qualified.

Even at a later date, when the knightly class, in fact, was lowered to the classes of esquires and yeomen, but with the status of knights, the higher grade remained fairly well qualified. It was proficient. The landed classes included the peers and the barons with the knightly class and the esquires and the yeomanry. All had interests in the domain lands and were liable to military service. They knew the value of discipline and the duty of patriotism as well as the needs of the public service of the State. The middle grade of citizens formed a respectable body. The citizens of London were eminent for their public spirit. The cities and towns

of each shire allowed the urban populations to be represented apart from the rural populations. The lower grade of burgesses from this urban population formed a mixed class. It was timid, inexperienced and unreliable. This burgess class tended to be represented by servitors who were in excess of the economic importance of the burgess class and they were, also, in ability below the standard of political competency. In time, by changes, due to various causes, old boroughs decayed and new towns grew up. The new manufacturing towns were without the franchise and they were multitudinous in the classes of their population. The old boroughs which were decayed retained the franchise and passed to the landed proprietors. Industrial populations had a grievance. They were not represented in Parliament. It was a grievance, also, that land-owners were the possessors of decayed boroughs and nominated those whom they chose, to serve as burgess servitors.

It did not follow that the possession of the franchise, by the multitudinous towns, would have been a source of strength to the State, or that the exercise of the franchise of decayed boroughs was a source of weakness to the State. It was in the public interest that competent servitors should be in the House of Commons and that incompetent persons should be excluded. The "pocket borough" was a cause of prejudice, the ground of a fallacy, and, yet, a source of public utility. It was the means whereby not only competent persons but persons who excelled in political competency and in statesmanship were able, as servitors in Parliament, to be a source of strength to the State, during an eventful period, when such strength was necessary. The effect of the Reform Act of 1832 was to expose the fallacy and to confirm the prediction of those who had pointed out that low class electorates were not the sources of high class representatives.

Some of the "pocket boroughs," which, before the Reform Act, by means of the landed gentry, had sent efficient servitors to Parliament, were more useful to the State than the reformed boroughs which, after that Act, by the multitudinous electors, failed to elect servitors of the same excellence. Had a necessary qualification been provided for the servitors and, also, for the electors, the Reform Act, in its purpose, would have been more successful. The multitudinous electorate, where it prevails, allows the more excellent electors, who are usually few, to be offset, or outnumbered, by the less excellent electors who are usually many. The result of such electoral action is that excellence is defeated and that mediocrity, or baseness, prevails. The State and the parts of the multitude, in the regional populations, have but little

in common. Politics and demics have different scopes of utility. Multitudinism, in its blind prejudice, tends to defeat the sober-minded and responsible electors. It tends to support parasitic proletarianism, predatory trades unionism, with communism, socialism and kindred groups, which are allowed to marshal their forces against the State. The multitude, as a determinate body, is always the greater number and the less efficient part of the population. It contains groups which are detrimental to the State and are burdensome to its community.

The worst groups in the multitude survive, as a heritage from the past, with inherent qualities which are the results of degeneracy. It would be a gain to the State and it would relieve its community from a burden if the worst groups could be exported from the domain. The State would gain by the removal of a cause of contamination. The State has an interest in possessing a population which tends more to perfection than to degeneration. In the struggle for existence, which began in the past and always regards the future, freedom and welfare, with excellence in the State and in its management, have been the results of virility, in its prudence and self-sacrifice. The multitude, and the worst groups in it, are involved in the problems of preservation and progress in the State, as the subject matter of political competency. The magistrates and the servitors of the State, by means of their political competency, have to regard the form and the wellbeing of the State, in order to preserve them, and, where these have been impaired by evils, defects and mischiefs, whence ailments have arisen, these agents, within the scope of competency, have the duty to cure, or lessen, the ailments. The community, itself, is not relieved from care in this respect. The multitude, also, so far as it can appreciate what the State is, and what is necessary for its management, has to realise its relative position, or to bear the consequences of its own incompetence.

It may, then, be concluded, generally, that the exclusion of the multitudes from the State electorates would be a source of gain to the State and not a source of loss to the multitudes. The multitudes would have their wellbeing secured, within the regional managements of the shires. These shires are under the supervision of provinces which, in turn, are under dominions and the State. The shire can be as well organised as a petty State. The City of London is a shire, as well as a city, and the equivalent of political competency has, for centuries, been a means of efficiency and progress. The multitude does not attempt to domineer over the community. The Councillors, as servitors, do not domineer over the Aldermen, as magistrates. The Aldermen have a due regard

for their chief magistrate, the Lord Mayor ; and the Sheriffs, as ministers, observe their proper duties. The wards of the City have their own regional managements and, thus, relieve the City management of minor matters, in the wards.

The presence of the multitude, in the low grade electorates, has always supplied material for the demagogues to prey upon its ignorance, its prejudice and its credulity. The demagogues, as servitors, and as politicians, by means of the multitude, have then been enabled to climb to power, as ministers, and, by an absence of political competency, with a disregard for propriety, have become sources of grave mischiefs in the State. This evil could be removed by proper legislation. The tests of political competency could be applied to warrant admission to all electorates. The same tests could be used as the basis of disqualification. The doors could be closed against political incompetence. In the case of persons qualified, in respect of wealth, but not qualified in other ways, appropriate fines could be imposed. Incompetent persons would not be allowed to take any part in State management. The State would be more respected and it would not be hampered by its multitude.

The franchise is not to be made the plaything of the multitude. It is not to be used by the demoralised groups of the multitude as a weapon to attack the State. The franchise should be used, by competent persons, for the choice and election of competent servitors, fit to perform a variety of duties, as a means of well-being in the State. When it is remembered with what care and by what means physicians, justices, admirals, generals, engineers and other classes of professional men are elected, in their several professions, to use their skill, to secure health and welfare in the community, similar care and means may be requisite in the case of servitors of the State. In the State, the principle of political competency, which ought to have been kept clear, has been obscured, by fallacies and sophisms. The maintenance of this principle is, however, vital to the welfare of the State. The vagaries of multitudinism and the doctrines of liberalism are united against it. The multitude calls itself "the people" and falsely implies that it is the community. The multitude has not the mastership in the State. The multitude does not contribute to the State, by way of taxation, the relative equivalent contributed by the other parts of the population. It does not contribute enough for the cost of regulating it.

In England, a popular doctrine connected with the House of Commons held that there ought to be "no taxation without representation." A new doctrine, imported from abroad, and

connected with licentiousness, is that of "self-determination" which was the basis of the "Home Rule" fallacy. A similar pernicious principle is contained in the "one man, one vote" tenet. The "equality" craze of earlier times has affected the modern multitude. The State in its defence needs to protect its foundations.

(3) POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE

The knowledge of the State, as an organism, and of its structure of Government and of its methods of management, is the knowledge which is primarily necessary for the welfare of the political community and of the general population of the State's domain. It is the knowledge which is most necessary in statesmanship. The scope of this knowledge, for its limitations, must extend to the three factors of the State, as its domain, its supremacy and its community, and to the three estates, in its system of government, as its Senate, its Great Council and its Common Council, in the general exercise of its control. The political community was, originally, a body very definite in its character and it was differentiated from the rest of the population. This difference still exists and, if the State is to be regarded, it must always exist to a greater, or a lesser extent. The political community, as the proprietary body, may be less than the municipal community which bears the burdens of the State. The political community, in any event, has to be differentiated from "the people" in the vague sense of the general population. It has also to be differentiated from "the people," in the ludicrous language of demagogues, which makes the multitude, as a part, greater than the whole, the community and the general population. "The people," as the parochial population, or the lesser body, "the congregation," in the terms "the parson and the people," implies a Sanctuary basis which differs from the State basis. It is not the same as the political population, or the community.

The members of the community, in the State, have been called the commons, as a general class, just as the soldiers in an army, of the similar class, are called common soldiers, or privates. The commons, as political persons, have variant characters as the private and the public sides of the same individuals. This may be extended, on the private side, by the variant *conditions* of two separate individuals where these conditions were, at one time, akin to *status*. This may be illustrated by the relative positions

of "master and servant." A variant condition, or status, was implied in each in this relationship. The master was the principal, with the right to order, within limits, and to exact obedience, and the servant was accessory, with the duty to obey. This was an ancient principle of co-operation which was more ancient than the State in which it has continued to survive, as a standard of conduct, even in political co-operation.

The Government and the community in the State are related as master and servant, but subject to certain qualifications. This relation did not result from evolution but from devolution. The history of the State is involved in the knowledge of the State as political knowledge. The origin of the State has been mentioned. The State was derived, in a remote age, from another institution, the Sanctuary, of which it formed the military part as its defence service. The structure of the State's Government had already been evolved before its community had become its political basis. In the State, therefore, in relation to the magistracy, with the supremacy, and the community, in subjection to it, on the "master and servant" principle, the public and private relations of the several individuals followed their capacities and characters and not their individualities. It remains, to-day, in the State, that all magistrates, in some of their private capacities, are commons, or private persons, but all commons, or private persons, are not magistrates. In England all peers were commons, but all commons were not peers. In the same way all military officers were soldiers, but all soldiers were not officers. The line of partition and distinction still needs to be observed. The servitors of the community are commons (or commoners) and, as such, in their capacities as servitors, they are subordinate to the magistrates.

It follows that the Government of the State, as the true State, is never subject to the control of servitors. It is still less liable to be subject to the control of bare commoners either, apart, as individuals, or in groups, or as one body, as the community. The Government is still less liable to be subject either to the multitude, or to the general population. The origin, the nature and the purpose of the State indicate that it is an artificial body. Its limitations, as an organism, with the structure of its Government, as its mechanism of management, follow, in its general outline, the structure and the mechanism of an army. The State, as a systematic organism, is traceable to a remote era, as having prevailed for more than 5,000 years, in its survival, to modern times. The State's origin accounts for its excellence and the continuity of its existence in regions where ancient military races have prevailed. Such regions, as Britain and Japan, although they are far apart,

have been more alike, in this respect, than nearer regions over which barbarian hordes have often passed and have destroyed the more ancient political structures of feudal origin. The less ancient structures of a distorted type have come into existence in the devastated regions.

The perils of the State have to be well considered in making provisions for its safety. It follows that the most necessary part of political knowledge is that technical knowledge of the State which is equivalent to the technical knowledge of an army, requisite in a soldier, as an expert military officer. In the subordinate parts of an army the training of soldiers and the drill of companies, battalions, and regiments, are constant. In the control of a great army the organisation and the efficiency of the whole will require excellence at headquarters. It is the same with the State. The knowledge of the State, as political and technical knowledge, leaves the point clear that the source and the maintenance of excellence, in the State, is in its headship, as being in its Senate, with the control. This supreme magisterial body, with the supremacy, cannot hang from the air. To be efficient and strong it must rest on another excellent magisterial body, as on a foundation which, itself, in turn, needs a basis, as that of a rock, in the constant support of the best parts of the political community. The magistracy of the Senate must have the supremacy in the State and this Senate, as an accessory body, to be controlled, must be controlled by the magistracy of the principal body of magistrates, the Great Council of the domain.

It is not for servitors to have the control in the State. They have a servient duty to the magistracy. They are minor agents of the community. In the technical political knowledge which is necessary to appreciate the operation of the mechanism of the Constitution, in the management of the State, it is enough, at this point, to realise that the Throne is accessory to the Senate, and that the Senate is accessory to the Great Council and that the Great Council is accessory to the domain and to the best parts of its provincial communities. The Senate, as the final Court of Appeal, entertained petitions from even the lowliest in the domain and these petitions could not be intercepted, either by the Executive Officer, as the occupant of the Throne, or by any minister, or by the Cabinet, or by any persons who were subordinate to the Senate. This excellent function of the feudal Senate, in England, was preserved by the system of Receivers and Triers of Petitions, appointed by the peerage magistrates, at every new Parliament. Although the State is an artificial organism it has, in it, something akin to the nervous system of a natural animate organism. The

nervous system increases in development, in complexity, and in excellence, in its effect, as it rises from the more lowly organisms to higher ones and, especially, in its highest and most excellent type, as in a man. The result is that in the true State, as the work of ancient men, a principle of utility was followed, either by instinct, or reason which, in this respect, allowed the State to approach an excellence which existed in a natural organism.

The State, as a true State, in its dual agencies, by magisterial and servitorial bodies, thus ranks above a Republic, as a quasi-State, with one agency as a servitorial or a magisterial agency, and resting for its support on the general population. A Republic, in turn, as a quasi-State, ranks above a Democracy which is operated "from below" by the multitude, in an organic form. Among the perils against which provisions have to be observed by the State is the liability of its distortion, to debase it, and to deform its Constitution. The State has two other rival institutions which, unless they are restrained, may become antagonistic to it and cause its ruin. These are the Sanctuary and the Guild. Political knowledge, as to the nature of the State and the ailments which affect it is necessary to preserve the State in safety and prosperity and, when it has become affected, also, to cure, or remedy its ailments. In a province of the domain, as in the rural parts of a shire, the peerage, the knightage, the gentry, the yeomanry, and the peasantry, all are characteristic groups. These groups in grades and classes, all have their places in private life, in public life and in the economic balance of the shire community and population.

In the same shire, in its urban parts, the cities and the towns are in a like position. The shire, in this respect, is characteristic, as the part of a province and the province, as part of a Dominion. These Dominions, as great provinces, are but parts of the empire domain. The empire State itself, on a large scale follows the lines of a Great State. It acts for all parts of its domain, in the relations with foreign States. The unity of the domain, with the patriotism, in its defence, and with the generosity and wisdom necessary for securing the welfare of its community, and general population, outline the main branches of political knowledge which is requisite in the management of the State. The empire State, in its perfection, is like a standing camp, on its defence against the rest of the world, yet with military generosity and readiness in the duty to help other States. The State remains, always, strictly on guard against all kinds of attack and treachery, both from without and from within. No races have appreciated the nature of the true State more thoroughly than military races, and

no races have more fully realised the consequences which arise from the weakening and from the distortion of the State. The non-military races differ in this respect. The descendants of the earlier Sanctuary populations and the descendants of the earlier industrial Guild populations, as classes, appear to inherit an instinct which inclines them to adhere to their former aptitudes, with the relative inaptitude to follow the State.

In political knowledge it is necessary to know the qualities and the abilities of the various types in the populations, and to know the tests which, when applied, will indicate what the truth is, in this respect, with sufficient clearness to prevent it from being obscured by errors caused by favour or prejudice. The qualities and the characteristics which prevail in the communities of the domain of a great State will vary widely. Discrimination is necessary. The parts of the provincial communities, which are apt in political knowledge and in the management of the State, can be made most efficient in support of the State. The parts which are less apt ought not to be allowed to hamper the progress of the State. The habits and tastes, with the aptitudes and the inaptitudes which are the heritage from the past, through many generations, cannot be changed in a single generation, or even in a few generations. The State, with its supremacy, supported by the more capable parts of its provincial communities, needs to be always on guard against the movements of the more incompetent parts of its provincial populations. In the Sanctuary, the populations were taught to ignore the State. They were taught to regard the supremacy as being that of the Divine majesty (*coram deo*), and that the priestly body derived its title to rule from a celestial source. The industrial populations were then under priestly patronage and guidance. The military body was in feudal service to the Sanctuary. The ideals derived from this ancient system are not extinct.

In the State, these ideals have been displaced. The State, with its supremacy, in its magistracy, derived its authority, originally, from the same source as the Sanctuary so that, in its independence, there was, and is, a directness in its source *coram deo*. The magistracy has the supremacy in the State. The magistracy always had a priestly *status* so that it was not inferior to the priestly body, in this respect. The supreme magistracy, with the control in the State, has no superior, as an earthly superior, and it has no equal. In the State, as a consequence, the priestly class is in subjection. It has the duty of loyalty to the State. Political knowledge, therefore, as a guide in statesmanship, will contain what relates to the origin and career of the State relatively to its

population and to the erratic influences which may distract and mislead the non-military parts of that population. The political knowledge which supplies to the mind the ideal of the State now needs more care than it needed in military States, some generations ago, when the ruling classes, in the State, were subject to military training. The defence of the State was then the standard of public duty. In later times, the changes in the type of civilisation and in the methods of education have had some evil effects.

The ideal of the State has tended to be obscured, even in childhood and in boyhood, by the ideals derived from Hebrew, Hellenic, and Latin literatures. These latter ideals, to the extent that they are wrong political ideals, need either to be modified, or to be eradicated. The Hebrews, the Greeks and the Romans are to be deemed to have helped in the work of human progress, but not to the exclusion of all other races and, also, not free from faults, apart from the matters in which they excelled. The development of the State is a subject in which Britain excelled all other regions of the earth and helped in the work of human progress. The State arose from a civilisation more ancient and more excellent than that of the Hebrews, the Greeks and the Romans, and the State, as the true State, may, again, tend to predominance and to endure. The main points, as to the origin of the State and as to the foes of the State, connected with both the Sanctuary and the Guild, have been indicated. The wrong ideals derived from these sources are to be excluded. The domain power and the sea power of an empire State involve defence power and economic power, as the main elements, in the State's political power. The economic power includes the industrial power which ought not to be left to the mercy of the multitudes. The multitudes, when uncontrolled and allowed to become licentious, can affect the welfare, the safety and even the existence of the State.

It is at this point that politics and demics are most closely connected. Political knowledge is inclusive. The knowledge of demics has a particular scope. The welfare of the regional populations, as being within the scope of demics, can be secured without these populations being allowed to domineer in the State. An empire State, as an institution, is, in its nature, far removed from a city State. It is, also, far removed from a regional management within its own domain. The subject of demics, apart from politics, marks a point where both the Sanctuary and the Guild tended to diverge from the line of politics, as the business of State management. That tendency has continued in the State and it has often been a cause of detriment. The State ought to be free from any interference of this kind. The State is self controlled

and it exists for the sake of its great community and population. The State, for its existence and prosperity, has, as the main source of its wealth, many necessary industries with a large variety of branches. The State, in this respect, may be in competition, or in rivalry, or in hostility, with other States. The State needs to be always on its defence against other States which form its environment as the rest of the world, although it is bound with them in the mutual duties of international propriety.

In the advance of civilisation, in industry as in production and its kindred branches of utility, the uses of chemical and mechanical powers have lessened the need for slavery and have increased the power of industry, to such an extent, that the general industrial burden of the world's population has been lessened. The State's power to wage war, with the aid of art, has been greatly increased so that decisions in war are now attainable by the indirect, or subtle, use of the economic forces. The attempts of the multitudinous parts of the population to control the industrial power in the State, by strikes, as by paralytic shocks, to parts of the industrial system of the State, in order that these multitudinous parts may attain political power in the management of the State, indicate the existence of an evil which is more perilous to the State than the hostility of a powerful foreign State. The state does not exist for its multitudes but for its community and its general population, of which its multitudes are but accessory parts. These multitudes, with their groups, like all other parts of the population of the domain, deserve generous and considerate treatment, to enable them to make the best of their lives within the scope of those great principles of the State, as defence and welfare, for which the State, as a political institution, exists.

The State and its politics have, thus, to be considered apart from the regional managements and demics. The nature and the qualities of multitudes may be considered in the light of history in ancient States and in the light of experience in modern States. A general conclusion may be drawn that although these multitudes have contained groups of worthy and deserving persons and groups of defective and vicious persons, yet there were with them groups of criminal persons. The latter group has usually contained, as a part of the multitude, a proportion of criminals in excess of the proportions found in other parts of the community and population. A further conclusion may be drawn that there is, always, a percentage of a surplus population which ought to be pitied and be helped, but it ought not to be allowed to become the source of organic mischief in the State. In dealing with this evil the State must be deemed to be principal and its stability and safety against the

attacks of the multitude must be maintained, with determination and with tenacity, as against foreign foes of the most malignant kind. Those who mislead the multitudes and incite them to attack the State, or the rest of its community, come within the class of dangerous criminals. In attacks upon the State fines and imprisonments are inadequate, either as deterrents, or as punishments. As correctives their leniency may render them ineffective as remedies.

Prevention, in the provision of education, as to the nature of the State, and, as to the duties of the subjects, may be a remedy for the evil which would be better than its cure. The lash is the best remedy for political ruffians who are the causes of mischievous conduct, in the misguided multitudes. The use of brutishness is a remedy for brutishness. If the lash is ineffective then hanging, as the ultimate remedy, ought not to be too long delayed. It follows that political knowledge, in its completeness, must extend to include not only the State and its community, for the maintenance of health, and, where this health is lost, for its restoration, but it must be more inclusive. The removal, or the abatement, of political ailments requires political knowledge whereby the distorted State can be corrected, the deformity of its Constitution can be amended, the evils in the management of the State can be removed and its political community and population can be reformed. In the light of the past, much knowledge can be gathered, for the direction of the State, in the future. The neglect of such knowledge is obvious, in its effects, as a factor in the causes of the fall of certain ruined States. In the future great States, such as maritime empires, by means of political knowledge may be made strong so that, without aggressiveness, they may be able to advance in prosperity.

A great maritime empire may have, at all times, a sure defence against the empire's external foes and, with it, there may be a means of welfare for all parts of its community and population. Political knowledge ought never to fail it, in respect of fundamental matters. The State which rests on an unstable foundation can never be stable. The unstable multitudes may have provided for them, trained guides, to lead them. The multitudes cannot with safety be allowed to domineer in the regional parts of the domain. A point must be reached, at the parting of the ways, where the State and its community, and the multitudes and their demagogues, have to choose which paths shall be followed. There are the right paths and the wrong paths. The beacons of rectitude, or depravity have, also, to be considered. Worthiness and utility may go hand in hand. Viciousness and waste may

also go their own way. The past has its lessons ; and storm waters flow where they have flowed before. Where the multitudes have been allowed to domineer there the State and its magistrates have not been free from blame. Those who, without resistance, suffer wrong, or countenance wrong, fail in their duty to the State and share the blame with those who perpetrate the wrong. The domination of the multitude is a sure sign of decadence in the State, and of degradation and depravity in its community and population. The regard for public duty considers the State first. Political knowledge in its utility regards political propriety.

(4) POLITICAL RECTITUDE

In the management of the State, as in all human affairs, principle and policy have to be regarded. The maxim holds good that "honesty is the best policy."

Political rectitude, as a personal standard of conduct, in worthiness, in wisdom and in utility, in the due regard for the duties of statesmanship, is the best, and the main, source of stability and strength in the State, both in defence and in welfare. It contrasts with political depravity which has brought great evils and disasters upon States and upon their populations. Political depravity is the greatest blight which can overtake the State. As the State is the most virile of all human institutions, so virility is the most excellent quality in statesmanship. In virility there are worthiness, wisdom and utility and, with these qualities, there is a due regard for truth, with the determination and tenacity to seek and to find it. Except on the basis of truth, the dimensions of facts, existences, and certainties, cannot be appreciated and the relative political duties cannot be adequately performed. Except on the basis of truth, justice can never be properly administered. In the management of the State, sobriety of conduct, with good faith and fair dealing, have always been characteristic of political rectitude.

The feudal principle in the State required, in military races, the several virile qualities which allowed mutual trust and a regard for propriety to supply great strength to the State in peace and in war. These qualities, in a small group of excellent men, as in a Senate, gave to the State wisdom and power which made this Senate of more value to the State than a multitude of effeminate persons. Hence came the fort, the walled town and the strong city. Hence came the development of virile communities, in economic strength, for defence which allowed a large population

to have the means of welfare within the State's domain. In the use and development of these virile qualities the great State came into existence, and political rectitude was the most necessary characteristic of its magistracy. The servitorial agency, which co-operated with the magistracy, had similar virile qualities. The community and the general population, for whose defence and welfare the State existed, learned to appreciate the political rectitude of those trusted agents who had the management of the State. Those agents were not appointed by, and they were not representative of, the subject population which, in a later age, has professed to manage itself and the State.

In respect of economy, in an ancient State, the cost of management and the relative burden of taxation borne by the community, cannot now be strictly estimated because the economic value of slavery was, then, virtually the product of property used for the welfare of the State's community and free population. There is, however, no doubt that, in the progress and growth of a wholesome civilisation, industry and frugality were the means of thrift, and that generosity, with good fellowship and hospitality, were characteristic of social relations in the State. In the home, in family relations, the same principle of propriety was observed. Rectitude caused a due regard to be had for the principles and precepts of religion, morality and law, in respect of the State, its community and its general population. In the Homeric age, life in the feudal State, as in Ithaca, has been well delineated. The treatment of slaves then followed a highly humane standard. The quality of political rectitude could be tested at many points in the Senate, in the Assembly, in the palace and, also, both at work and at play. It regarded the various standards of propriety. It was, in both its observance and its breach, the characteristic of a military community and it indicated a type of civilisation. In the west of Europe, among the Celts of a later age, the ancient usages which had survived, as to political rectitude, were well illustrated. The breaches of some of these usages were the grounds which disqualified kings, princes and chieftains from retaining their offices. Lying, cowardice, stealing and receiving stolen goods were proofs of disreputable conduct. The principle survived where the precepts had ceased.

In England political rectitude continued far down to a later age, in a due regard for moral propriety, as a standard which was accepted by military races, as being honourable, or worthy, or fit to be observed by all men and especially by gentlemen. All men did not concur in this regard. Knaves followed the opposite standard of depravity and relied on tricks, dodges, frauds and shams. The

standard of propriety remained and the rectitude which held it in regard was respected. The men and women who ceased to be truthful ceased, also, to be gentlemen and ladies. A standard of propriety was widely recognised, and those who conformed to it were respected even by those who did not conform to it. When the well-born or the highly placed, or the possessors of abundant wealth ceased to regard the standard of propriety, they lost caste and ceased to be held in credit. When they fell into crooked ways their birth, their place and wealth, in this respect, ceased to avail them. When however in spite of the drawbacks of lowly birth, or of humble position, or of poverty, there were those who observed the moral standard of gentlemen and ladies, they rose in esteem and were held in greater credit than those who observed the same standard but were without any drawbacks. This same moral standard indicates the nature and measure of political rectitude, in its regard for the State, in its defence and in the welfare of its population. The friends of the State were those of its subjects who stood by it to support it against its foreign foes. These men were patriots. The internal foes of the State contrasted with them. Foreign foes were termed "enemies" as being the agents of hostile States. Internal foes were more dangerous. They were mainly of two classes and were termed either traitors or depredators. The traitors were those who were false to the State; and the depredators, as plunderers, were false to its community. Political rectitude thus contrasted with political depravity. In general there was, in matters of principle and policy in the State, either a high standard of regard, or a low standard, and these standards were characteristic, respectively, of the higher and the advanced classes and of the lower and the backward classes. There is little doubt that racial influence was the main cause of difference between the higher and the lower classes in the ancient State and, especially, where military races were predominant. The effects of quality are as noticeable in breeding in human beings as they are in the farmer's live stock, or in wild animals. Among military races similar characteristics are still traceable. Relics of ancient usages, in war and in peace, relating to excellent qualities in defence and in welfare, survive, but their causes, or origins, have been forgotten. The populace, either as the result of ignorance or of prejudice, regards the feudal system and its relics with intense dislike and favours the usages of the multitude. None the less, when political rectitude is considered, in respect of its grounds and aims, which have existed from earlier times, feudal usages have left some relics of rare excellence in objects which were reverently regarded and kept within the scope of principle and policy.

The State, the tribe, the clan, the family and the individual all had their places, but the State and the home were held in peculiar reverence. Women and children were treated with generosity in respect of natural development, and with severity, in respect of discipline, training and education, that they should tend to perfection rather than to imperfection. The soldier's home was wholesome, and it influenced life in the State. The grades which had always existed, in the military order, allowed a high standard to prevail with princes and the followers could not fail to be aware of it. The soldiers of all grades had to be alert and observant in their duties. The objects of constant esteem were truth, nature and the home and, in the home, the position of women and the care of children. In Europe, among its more ancient races, truth, in its fixity and in its unchangeableness, in relation to facts and to the inevitability of events, appealed to human intelligence as being something over which human beings had no control. The Romans, as a military race, of later origin, had the adage "the force of truth is great and will prevail." The Celts, of earlier origin, had realised the same principle in their adage, "the truth against the world." They realised that it was strong enough, in itself, to need no aid. The Celts, also, had the counterpart, as to a statement of the truth supported by an oath. "If I say what is not true," was followed by the imprecation of three evils of which the last was: "may the sky fall." This was the source of the Latin *ruat cælum* in the administration of justice. In rectitude, there was, thus, a due regard for the discovery of the truth and for the relation of the truth. The principle was extended to the impartial and fearless administration of justice. In political rectitude, the same regard was maintained. In respect of "Nature," there was a similar reverence. The Celts had their triad in the maxim of excellence: "an eye to see Nature, a heart to feel Nature, and courage to acknowledge Nature." Nature was the model of perfection. The woman had her place in the home which military races guarded with the greatest care and strictness. The home was the main source of moral propriety and of true freedom. It was devoid of all licentiousness. The Celts, in a triad, had the fixed points of excellence in the quality of womanhood. "A worthy, wise and beautiful woman is the most perfect work of God." The *Demeter* (or "Earth-mother") worship was characteristic of military races.

The home, with the training of children, was associated with worthiness and utility. It was a miniature State. It was controlled "from above." The head of the house was the chief of the male line, who, as the agnatic senior, was head of the family which

might have contained, and often did contain, several generations. The family was an economic institution ruled "from above" with the powers of life and death in earlier times possessed by the paterfamilias. These customary practices of the Romans were traceable among the Celts, but with various modifications such as the due settlement of the male offspring on the land of the family. This land was relational to the family, the sept, the clan, the tribe, and, finally, to the domain community of the State. The system contained economic provisions for all the needs which were incident to life, in the family, and in the tribe. Political rectitude, in its various bearings, was, thus, inculcated in childhood, with military training, and it remained to old age, fixed in its regard for the primary duty to the State and to its supremacy. In the body of elders, as the tribal Senate, political rectitude had several aspects relational to religion, morality, law and economy. It was the source of customary procedure. At this point, it has to be viewed relatively.

Political rectitude, in its regard for duty to the State, was differentiated from political popularity, as the personal esteem gained from favouring the multitude at the expense of the State and its community. Political rectitude is associated with the sense of honour and it is not to be drawn aside by the attraction of popularity, nor is it to yield to any other interest, or influence, than duty to the State. The statesman is not to indulge, either himself or others, by following a policy of yielding to popular desires, or of favouring the multitude, at the cost of the State. The statesman is not to be capricious in yielding to his own tastes, or sentiments, or prejudices. He is a trusted agent to act for the State and its community. The statesman, in the execution of his trust, is to be impartial. He is not to be intimidated, either from above, or from below. He must disregard fear, favour, and affection. It follows that, in political excellence, it is not enough to have the true State free from distortion, with its Constitution free from deformity. It is not enough for the statesman to have political competency, with political knowledge and political rectitude. The mere possession of qualities, such as platonic ideals, have no value, except to shape thought and conduct. Political excellence can be attained only by statesmen who are upright and are equipped with the knowledge and experience which are necessary in the proper management of the State. At this point, it is, again, to be remembered that politics, as the business of State management, differ widely from demics, as the business of regional management, in the regulation of the local population.

The State economy differs widely from the regional economy

of the many and various regions within the State domain. The State controls these regional populations and it is not controlled by them. Demics, as the business of regional management, within the true State, are subordinated to provincial managements and are disconnected with the exercise of the State's supremacy. A regional multitude, also, differs widely from the State's community. The regional populations have a variety of occupations and, in their means of livelihood, when there is need for regulations, or for a reform of regulations, they need to be considered in relation to the business of industry which, in turn, is involved in the system of economy which varies in its range. There are border lines between the scope of politics and the scope of demics and causes within one scope have effects in the other scope. Hence has come a source of confusion. The fact that the regional populations pay taxes to be used for the support of the State does not warrant the conclusion that these taxpayers control the State, or ought to control it. This fallacious conclusion arose, in England, as a House of Commons doctrine. It never had any foundation in fact. The error arose from the application of parochial principles in the management of the State. It might be classed among the Anglo-Saxon political fictions which were used to give an undue importance to the House of Commons. The taxpayers were not all on an equality. They were graded. The many did not pay so much as the few. The many did not pay so much as the average amount of taxation.

There were three grades of taxpayers, with the relative grades of servitors. The community has dual agencies in Parliament, as magistrates and servitors. Even the highest grade of servitors was subordinate to the lowest grade of magistrates. The mere payment of taxes, by the regional populations, does not warrant the conclusion that these populations have, or ought to have, any control in the State. The fallacious maxim of "no taxation without representation" and, in taxation, the further fallacious maxim of "one man, one vote," do not carry the regional populations any further in their attempt to control the State. These fallacies have been included in the principles of the new democracy. The democracy, as an organic form of the multitude, is representative of the lowest grade of the taxpayers. Multitudinism, in its form of democracy, is one of the greatest and the most ancient of the evils which affect the State. Where its ravages had been greatest it ceased to exist by the fall of the States. In the mediæval period, where the feudal principles prevailed, there democracy was excluded. The revival of democracy in modern times indicates political decadence. As an evil it comes within the scope of demics, as the

business of regional management. Political rectitude, in its regard for duty to the State, has, at the base of the State, its greatest adversary, in democracy. Its other kindred adversaries are the accessories of the democracy, viz. the demagogue, the politician, and the trades unionist.

The basis of several secondary popular fallacies has long been the fallacious use of the term "people," in its parochial sense, for the term "community," in its political sense. In the support which is termed "popularity," where a demagogue, or a politician, or a servitor, or a minister, has the multitude's sentimental approval, or support, there is need to separate this popularity from political rectitude. It has, already, been related that "mandates" are not within the power of electorates to give; that they are still less within the power of the multitude and that the position of a multitude, or of all the multitudes of the domain, is not strengthened by being termed "the people." The "pledges," in turn, are not within the power of ministers to give, because ministers are no higher than servants of the magistracy; and "pledges" by politicians, whether as ministers, or as servitors, or as demagogues, are of still less value. They are in excess of any authority, or power, in the givers. Ministers do not control the State but serve the State and they are controlled by the State. When political rectitude is considered, in its relation to the "people," and, in its relation to "mandates" and "pledges," there is need to be on guard against being deluded by political fraud. The mastership in the State does not belong to the multitude. The multitude is not to be placated and its "demands" are not to be obeyed.

The State and its community, with the proper magisterial and servitorial agents, have to be kept clear of the multitude and its accessories. Political incompetence, ignorance and depravity have been associated with democracy from a remote age. The heretical creeds and precepts of liberalism, as generalised, from earlier to later times, for use in decadent Latin civilisations, need to be closely scrutinised and tested. The truth will not be affected either by a review, or by a test. Much must be rejected by those who would be safe and steadfast in following the principles of political rectitude. Politics will be kept separate from demics. At this point, the subject of demics marks a departure, because the evils of democracy come within its scope for consideration. In demics, as the business of regional management, the rural and the urban populations have, always, varied in their needs and in their treatment. Their economy, although it has much in common, yet it differs, on material points, and it may even be contrasted with State economy. Where there is a liability of confusion, or

mistake, it is well to be analytic and systematic, to reach the truth and to avoid error. In demics, as a study apart from politics, the use of particular terms, as the Latin terms "rustic" and "urbic," to differentiate the rural from the urban branch of demics, as the business of regional management, will allow the mind to pass from what is generic to what is specific. In each branch, in respect of industry and the means of livelihood, there will be need to observe the systems of economy which are most suitable to each branch, separately. It may be found that the "rustic" branch, in regard to production, is more closely associated with raw products, and that the "urbic" branch is more closely associated with finished products. The raw products, in a sense, include the food supplies, in their primary condition, and, for these products, the urban populations may be dependent on the rural populations which in turn, may be dependent, for some of the finished products, on the urban populations.

At this point it is enough to notice that there is a mutual dependence of the parts of a domain, or provincial, population. There is a consequent need of mutual service between the parts for the welfare of the whole population. This result is but one of the many incidents of mutual service between the parts of the entire population of the State domain. It is necessary, for clearness, to go a stage further. In "demics," as a study of the business of regional management, there are the branches of "rustics" and "urbics" relational to, respectively, the rural and the urban populations. As a rule, in urban populations, the regional area and the number of the population are in inverse proportion. The urban region has often a crowded population. In general, the food producing power of a region is relational to the support of a limited number of persons. When this limit is exceeded the struggle for existence is intensified. There are remedies which may allow foods, as raw, or as finished, products, and all other necessary products, to be derived from other parts, either near, or distant and from within or from outside of the domain. It is enough that human existence is more artificial in urban regions than it is in rural regions. Industry, in the urban regions, as a means of livelihood, is more intricate, because its branches are more various and more dependent. The urban population, in spite of the intricacies of its regional system of industry, may reach a high degree of prosperity by having a due regard for worthiness, wisdom and utility.

In the absence of these qualities, and subject to the dominance of the opposite qualities, viciousness, folly and waste, the urban regional population may be the victims of adversity. The size of the region and the density of the population are factors in the

effect. The rural population may, also, suffer although its economic relations are less intricate than those of the urban population. It may be concluded that there is as much need for excellence in demics, as the business of regional management, as there is in politics, as the business of State management. Politics, as a business, in its completeness, includes demics, as a business which regards the management of regional populations rather than the management of the State. There may be found in the "urbic" branch of demics a source of knowledge most useful for maintaining the welfare of regional populations and, where that welfare has been impaired, a means may be indicated as a remedy for ailments. There have been ailments in the urban populations connected with economy either in relation to industry, or to livelihood, or to welfare, which have been the causes of other mischiefs. Industrial populations, affected by ailments, have, then, in their viciousness, folly and wastefulness, brought the greatest evils on States. Revolutionary movements have been the means; and ideals foreign to the State have been the aims. Industrial populations, when infected with economic heresies, and, when subject to economic pressure, have been more inclined to follow their private interests than to regard public policy and their duty to the State. Their revolutionary movements have aimed at the "control" and to operate it, from below, as in a Guild. This was the model which was best known to a regional multitude. Hence came democracy. In its primary sense, a democracy was the regional management of an urban population which was engaged in industry. The stages of its progress have been related. In the State, the political community, as the domain community, was principal, and it existed apart from the industrial population, which was accessory to it. Both parts of the total population were organic. The community later, became mixed and, by stages, the political community, which was military, became outnumbered by the general population, which was industrial and, in time, it became predominant. Quality and number were in inverse proportion. Multitudinism, as "the greater number," at the base of the State, was the most ancient evil known to the State. In modern times, it, again, tends to become mischievous, in its revolutionary aims, to distort the State and to degrade it, to make it conform to the ideal of the industrial Guild. The immediate aim is to satisfy the greed and selfishness of revolutionaries who, in their insensate folly, do not appreciate what would be the effects of their mischievous conduct. These mischievous persons have either never possessed, or have lost, the sense of proportion when, in their blindness, they think that a parochial Guild, as a small and primary institution,

for specific purposes, can be expanded to perform the functions of a State and, especially, an empire State.

It is in a review of the past and, in its comparison with the present condition of things, that the mischief of multitudinism, in regional populations, can be best appreciated. The causes and the motives remain, to-day, what they were, in earlier times. Political rectitude requires that the difficulties caused by mischiefs in the State shall be faced and met with the same determination and tenacity with which the difficulties of the State caused by its foreign foes are met. The regional populations have to be repelled when they attack the State. The vagaries of these regional populations are the political vagaries which may be expected to prevail with the untutored multitudes. These vagaries, in some respects, are similar to those of the criminal classes. There are proper remedies for the mischief. The sufferings of the multitude have causes and remedies. The multitude has, often, been its own worst enemy. Where its viciousness has caused its sufferings it is not to be allowed, in its need, to satisfy itself by taking what can be taken of the wealth of the rest of the community. In urban populations, the lower third part is often in a needy condition, and, as a consequence, it is often inclined to be predatory. This tendency to depredation has always been a characteristic of the multitude when pressed by necessity. In demics, therefore, as being subject to politics, the branch of demics termed "urbics," as being the business of management of an urban region, contains the study of the multitude, and, especially, when pressed by necessities and made restless, with a liability, in its blindness, to become antagonistic to the provincial superiority, or to the State supremacy.

Thus multitudinism, in its antagonism to the State, has to be considered within the scope of relevancy as to cause and effect. It is included within the "urbics" branch of demics, apart from politics. Multitudinism, as an evil in the State, has, also, to be viewed from the purely political side, in its antagonism to the State and, in comparison with other great evils, as ailments of the State, connected with usurpation. Thus, when the Executive becomes stronger than the Control then despotism comes into existence, as where the occupant of the Throne professes to have the ultimate supremacy in the State. Again, when the servitorial agency of the community becomes stronger than its magisterial agency, and ignores that agency, a servitorial usurpation comes into existence, as where, in England, the House of Commons professed to have the ultimate supremacy and abolished the Throne and the House of Peers, which were the magisterial bodies. Lastly, when the multitude becomes stronger than the community, or

stronger than the rest of the community, which contains its better parts, multitudinism comes into existence, as where, in ancient States, the industrial classes became dominant, as in a democracy. All of these evils come within the scope of political rectitude.

The upright statesman has to find the truth, as to the goal of duty, and having found it, he has, then, to observe the conduct which is proper to attain it. Steadfastness and tenacity of purpose are, therefore, requisite in political rectitude. In the issues which arise in politics, in respect of the evils which have their origin within the scope of demics, the duty of political rectitude may be arduous and it may be perilous, but the upright statesman is not to be daunted. Despotism, unruly servitorialism, and unruly multitudinism, have much in common. All of these evils have to be reduced to allow the State, as a true State, to be controlled by its magisterial supremacy. Multitudinism, when compared with the other evils, is the greatest of the three. It has a history behind it and, in the light of the past, the path of duty, in the future, is obvious. The evils of multitudinism, which have their main source in the branch of demics termed "urbics," are closely connected with economics and, especially, in relation to the struggle for existence which is aggravated by competition in industry. The server class of the population may be in excess of the requirement of the employer class. In the hives of human industry there are difficulties in co-operation. There are good and bad employers, and there are good and bad servers. The issues which arise all come more within the scope of demics than within the scope of politics. The reactions which arise from regional economic pressure more often result in attacks by a penurious part of the population on the rest of the population. In remote times, in these reactions, the Guildsmen became obnoxious to the State and, especially, to the ancient city State, as in Greece and, as in the case of Sybaris, in Italy. Where the domain was larger than that of a city State there the regional nature of the mischief became more apparent.

When the Roman domain had expanded, then, the more densely populated parts began to contrast with the less densely populated parts which were free from the mischiefs of multitudinism. The Roman statesmen appear to have been well aware of the causes and the effects of the mischief. The military statesmen applied the proper remedies. The excess population was used in planting new colonies in sparsely populated parts. The criminal law was strengthened and it was effective where it was enforced. The types of offences, which affected the State, were four: such as incitation and sedition with depredation and treason. The modern types of offences are very similar. Trades unionists have become

more obnoxious to the State than the earlier Guildsmen were. The great State, of modern times, is in a stronger position to resist and to suppress such mischiefs than the smaller State of earlier times. The State, to-day, has the same alternatives which were open to the ancient State. It can resist these evils and be safe, or it can yield to them and be shaken, or ruined. Political rectitude has the duty to stand by the State, and this duty is as incumbent upon political bodies, such as the Legislature and the Judicature, as it is upon the individuals who are the magistrates, the servitors and the ministers, and as it is upon the members of the political community. As the evils of multitudinism, in their origin, are within the scope of demics, as the business of regional management, so the right remedies should be applied within the same scope. This conclusion is corroborated by the fact that there is a great variety in the regional circumstances and in the causes, the effects and the remedies.

It is primarily necessary that the subject of multitudinism, as an evil which has to be suppressed, should be kept clear of politics. Where the evil of multitudinism takes the organic form of the democracy, or the organic form of trades unionism, the possession of the franchise (which is relational to the State Legislature), by the multitude, may cause the servitorial part of the Legislature to be drawn within the tentacles of democracy, and so render that part inefficient, in its duty to co-operate with the magisterial part of the Legislature. In every well-ordered State, the great provinces, the provinces and the sub-provinces, need support "from above," as from, respectively, the supremacy, or the relative superior, so that order may be maintained in every part of the domain, as against the evil of multitudinism. The true State is managed "from above" and not "from below." And this fundamental principle of the State must be preserved, if the State is to exercise its proper self-control. The State ceases to be a true State when it is controlled "from below." The defence of the domain, and the maintenance of order within the domain, are consistent only with the power of self-control. The regional managements can then derive strength "from above," in addition to their own magisterial support "from below." At this point the true relation of politics to demics, in respect of the evil of multitudinism, is evident and, in the suppression of this evil, to secure the safety and the stability of the State, the duty of political rectitude is equally clear. It can be admitted that, in allowing an ancient evil to be revived, and to continue its existence, more blame attaches to the State, and to its magistrates and servitors and community, than to the misguided multitude.

Statesmen should be competent and upright in the performance of their duties. The multitude, or parts of it, have always been inclined, under circumstances of economic pressure, to be licentious and outrageous, when not held, by a firm hand, to regard their duty to regional managements and to the State. Leniency and softness are less wise and less useful than firmness and severity. Liberalism, as a creed, without intending it, has been an incentive to this mischief. If, on the grounds mentioned, the State did its duty, and made provisions for the purpose, it would be open to the higher and the lower regional managements to find and to apply the best remedies for the industrial, or the economic, or the livelihood, evils of the regional populations. In such a region, as a shire (or other sufficiently large region), it would be enough to set up a Guild, or Corporation, and by means of the several Guilds within it, to make the best provisions which can be made either to remove evils, or to lessen them, or to alleviate their effects, or to reduce them to a minimum. The circumstances may be infinitely various. The discretion of worthy, wise and able persons, with a due regard to principles, may be more effective than cast-iron regulations. The regional management should always be stronger than the regional multitude and the regional Guild should have the support of the regional management. The Guildry of a shire, on its partly public basis, could be made more expert and reliable than the banditry, on its wholly private basis of trades unionists and proletarians.

The main gain to the State would be a relief from the burden and from the peril of revolutionary movements, by a part of the population which ought not to be allowed to interfere with the State. Guildsmen should have the burgess franchise, within a shire, but trades unionists should be deprived of the franchise, so long as they remain trades unionists, and for five years afterwards. Politics would, by this means, be divorced from industry and from multitudinism, in its organic form of trades unionism. The corrupting influence of the Guildsmen, or trades unionists, would then cease to affect the State. It is for the State to control its industrial classes and not for the industrial classes to control the State. The proper control of the regional populations would allow the various regional managements, with the aid of the relative Guild corporations, backed by the regional magistracy, to become progressive in their excellence. These managements could, then, solve, with ease, the economic and the industrial and livelihood problems which, had they been left to the State, would have been difficult to remedy. These problems, in their solutions, would have been involved with political issues by means of the regional

electorates using the State franchise. The servitor branch of the Legislature needs to be released from the influence of regional multitudinism and, especially, from the tentacles of trades unionism. Trades unionism is but one of the evils which has its source in the scope of demics and its mischievous effects in the scope of politics.

The lengths to which this mischief has been allowed to go affords cogent evidence of the demoralisation which has affected both the community and the general population. The evil arose, in recent times, and it is not a heritage from the past. It was an effect of setting aside the trigrade electorates for the unigrade electorates. The door was opened to let in an old mischief which could not have entered had the door been kept closed. The regional multitudes have but little knowledge of the State. The ignorance of the multitude, in respect of the State, exceeds, by far, anything in the nature of dishonesty, or in a disregard for patriotism, or for justice. The multitude is still its own worst enemy, as it has always been. Advances in knowledge, on many subjects, have been made, in modern times. No advance has been made, by the multitude, in its knowledge of the State. The study of the State and its management, in modern times, has been greatly neglected by persons who are otherwise well informed. These persons, as a consequence, have but crude and vague ideas of the structure of the State's Government and of the methods of management of the State's various populations. The sympathies and the antipathies of party politics have added confusion to political ignorance. This ignorance has resulted more from apathy and indolence than from any difficulty, either in the subject itself, or in the intellectual capacity of the persons who have a duty to study the State. It is obvious that all persons who have the moral sense, in the virile quality of political rectitude, and have the duty to exercise this quality must first realise the nature of the State and of its management.

The trades union is like an industrial Guild which is a primary and a crude, institution, in the nature of a club. It was, originally, limited to a small area in which it was an isolated body existing for the mutual help of its members, in respect of industry, as a means of livelihood. It had no connection with politics. It had to keep clear of conspiracy and sedition. In more recent times, these unions, or guilds, or clubs, or societies, have been organised on the system of a league. They have also been associated with political movements of a revolutionary nature adverse to the State and to the rest of its community. It was, and is, in the power of the State to suppress trades unionism, either as a political peril, or as a public nuisance. The State has not taken this course.

Trades unionism has been petted and pampered. The political mischief has been countenanced and encouraged. Trades union leaders, as being members of a class which is favoured by a particular political creed, are linked with a political party. The pretence of trades unionists is that they are parts of the pitiable multitude which is oppressed by the crooked wealthy classes, such as employers, landlords and capitalists, in the rest of the community which is favoured by the State. They are obsessed with this idea; and a gregarious instinct causes them to group themselves together. They seek to gather in all who will join them, and they exercise pressure for this purpose. They think that they are the "greater number."

They are so numerous, in fact, in particular regions, that when there is an election of a servitor to sit in Parliament their candidate can secure a majority of votes. They next conclude that they should have the control in the State. They take part in political dissensions and they seek to get all that can be got for themselves, or for their class. They do not realise what the State is, and they have vague notions of the structure of its Government and of the nature of its magistracy. The State and the trades union are organisations and they, who belong to the trades union, prefer their own institution. They have a prejudice against the State, and they are striving to change its form and nature to make it approach an ideal of their own. They do not realise the enormity of their conduct in the political mischief which is caused by their efforts to disorganise the State. The ideal of a primary institution, which suited and was favoured by men of a brutish type, in earlier times, suits and is favoured by men of a similar type to-day. Their ideal is a democracy. The first duty of the community is to defend the State. The next step is to remove the darkness of ignorance from an incompetent part of the multitude by applying to it the light of knowledge. If this remedy fails, on account of the innate brutishness, the State must, none the less, be preserved. It is not brutal to cast out brutishness from humanity, even with the lash. The leaders of the multitude, as the perpetrators of political frauds, in the false doctrines which mislead the multitudes, are more to blame, for the resulting mischiefs, than their dupes, the victims, who have been misled. It is not brutish to awaken these perpetrators to allow them to have a right regard for their political duties. Under feudal rule it was a wise and chivalrous policy to punish the perpetrators of fraud with severity and, especially, ringleaders, and to spare the dupes who had been victimised.

The same principle of justice is worthy of regard to-day. It is

not cowardly to raise the fallen, nor is it unmanly to help the oppressed. It is not brave to yield to ruffianism and to intimidation when duty to the State requires that this ruffianism should be suppressed. The victims of trades unionism are among the fallen and the oppressed. Trades unionism has impaired the productive power of the community and, with it, the industrial system and the means of livelihood. It has paralysed the transport system of the domain, which is akin to the circulatory system of an animate body. It has attacked the State. It aims at its control. It seeks to shape the foreign policy of the State and, in the ranks of trades unionism, are to be found those who take an active part in international machinations which are adverse to all States. A political community, in order to be prosperous, needs to be cleansed from corruption. Trades unionism, in spite of its associations with communism, socialism and bolshevism, has been petted and pampered by politicians who follow party principles derived from political baseness.

The mischiefs of trades unionism and proletarianism are not to be underestimated. They are mischiefs which come within the scope of criminality of the worst kind. These mischiefs weaken the State when it needs to be strong, in respect of the international environment, to perform the function of a State in its competition with all other States. These mischiefs are inconsistent with patriotism. They are, however, consistent with treason, in its wide sense, as treason against the State. Trades unionism and proletarianism have gone outside the State to attack the State on the basis of humanitarianism and internationalism. These mischiefs weaken the State, on its domain basis, in its function to secure the safety and the welfare of its community. All subjects have a duty, in a spirit of good fellowship, to help the State. In this respect the State, in England, at one time, excelled all other States. The suppression of grave political evils is the first duty of the State and its community; and, to give effect to this duty, statesmen require the most virile qualities, such as a regard for truth, justice and valour which are but aids in the exercise of political rectitude.

(5) UPRIGHT STATESMEN

There are statesmen and statesmen. They differ in many respects. There are statesmen who know the nature of the State and who are expert in its management. There are, also, those who

bear the name of statesmen but, in fact, are not statesmen. Their employment in the service of the State has not made them statesmen. Such persons are numerous and they have a variety of aptitudes. The apparent statesmen may not be real statesmen. Those who take part in the management of the State, as the agents or as the deputies, of statesmen may differ widely from their principals who have the knowledge and the ability of statesmanship. A complete and a perfect statesman is a rarity. The Parliamentary differs from a statesman who may be a comparatively silent man and not a party man. Statesmen, also, differ in respect of their branch of political agency. Magisterial statesmen have great political responsibilities where servitorial statesmen may be no more than advisers. The servitorial statesmen may not be liable for what they advise, or do, in good faith and to the best of their ability. They are accessories only. The magisterial statesmen are principals and they may differ in degrees. There have been great magistrates who, as statesmen, were of the highest degree in the State and were members of the small Senate, or Council, which exercised the supremacy, or the control. The magisterial officers, as a body, had the duty to aid the Executive Officer in the management of the State.

The Senate, as a body, was the Government. The Senatorial Council was in strictness an extension of the Senate, by the addition of non-magisterial persons, such as the servitorial assistants, who were knights attendant. The Senate was, in fact, an estate of the realm, as the first estate, which included the King. The Senatorial Council was an inferior body which contained lords and knights of the Council. The lords, as the Senators, were necessarily peers (or magistrates). They were great peers who rested for their support on the peerage body. The Senate was, in fact, a standing committee of the peerage. The great magistrates of the Senate had to bear the responsibility of political conduct. The King, as the Executive Officer, within this Senate, could do no wrong. If wrong was done the Senate and not its Executive Officer, the Administrator, was responsible. This is the most ancient tradition of the Constitution. The King was not a despot. Long after the time of the Norman Conquest the great magistrates, who were fellow magistrates, in the Senate, with the King, excelled, in their duty, as statesmen, and restrained the kings from despotism and their ministers from usurpation. These were the great magistrates who, with unsullied reputations, left behind them for posterity the highest standard of upright statesmen. Although the ancient Senate, as the "Crown," has, now, but a *notional* existence and is replaced by a Council, without the peerage support, and with an

authority which is much attenuated, yet the tradition of its former greatness remains. The expression "limited monarchy" represents only a popular theory of later times which, in earlier times, was unknown to the Constitution.

It is enough to notice the relationship of the Throne, as an accessory, to the Senate, as the principal. The magisterial Senate, to be clear, was, in strictness, a Court, as the "Court of the Coron." The term "Council" implied a body with subordinate authority. When the ideal of monarchy was advanced by Clerics and Ecclesiastics the Coron, or Senate, which had been principal, with the King, as its accessory, was dismembered, and its place was taken by a "Council" which appeared to be accessory to the King, as the principal. This Council, in time, was termed "*The Council*." The Privy Council was then deemed to be the extension of it. This point has always to be remembered when considering the standard of upright statesmanship. The State is never to be lost to the view of statesmen. The Throne is not the State. The Senate of England, which was termed "the Coron of England," and had the supremacy in the domain, was an expression equivalent to "the State of England." The State is now relational to a domain of which England is but a small part. The Crown, or Senate, although it has now but a *notional* existence, is still to be regarded as the headship of the State to which the Throne remains accessory. The King has not ceased to be the First Magistrate. The "King in Council" is, therefore, equivalent to the "King with his fellow magistrates in Council," as in the ancient Senate. The *notional* existence of the ancient supreme Senate is still a beacon of conduct and a standard of upright statesmanship both in patriotism and in political excellence. This was the standard which was observed by great statesmen, such as the Earl of Pembroke, in obtaining Magna Carta, and the Earl of Kent and the Earl of Leicester in the reign of Henry III, and the Earl of Hereford and the Earl of Essex, in the reign of Edward I, and the Lords Ordainers in the reign of Edward II.

The same type was seen in the Black Prince in the reaction against ministerial usurpation at the time of the first impeachment. The same type was seen among the peers in the reaction against the mischiefs which required reforms in the State, in the reign of Richard II. In the Tudor period this standard of upright statesmanship continued to prevail. In the reaction against the mischiefs of the Stuart period the personality of Cromwell stands out, as a moderator, against despotism on the Throne, against usurpation in the House of Commons and against licentiousness in the multitude. In the range of evils from despotism on the Throne, in earlier times,

to licentiousness in the multitude, in later times, the State, with its domain, its supremacy and its community, has been, and remains, the main beacon of conduct to upright statesmen to secure its safety and the welfare of its community. All party interests are of no account when put into the scales against the safety of the State and the welfare of its community. It is the community, with all of its parts, and not the multitude, its part with the greater number, that is the main care of upright statesmen. The party creeds which have been derived from the multitude and stored up in principles and in precepts by astute politicians have to be rejected, if the principles of statesmanship applicable to the management of the true State are to be observed. If it may be concluded that the great magistrates who held the great magisterial offices of the State and, with the King, as their President, were the supreme Senate, have set examples of propriety, in past times, it may be enough to look at States, generally, and to regard the future of the empire State. If the offices of these great magistracies should, to any extent, be restored, as Intendencies, for the supervision of all of the departments of State for the review and for the consideration of State affairs, by a supreme Senate, the great magistrates, to hold these offices, ought to be statesmen, in fact. They ought to be upright statesmen. They ought to be chosen by the peerage magistrates and for support, in the proper conduct of their respective offices, they ought to rest on the firm foundation of a strengthened peerage magistracy. In their duties, as Elder statesmen in Council, they would consider the State's international and its domestic affairs unbiased by class interests or by party strife or by the drag of the multitude on the servitorial agency in the Legislature. The several departments of State would be reviewed and the business of the State, as a whole, would be grasped for specific treatment. In a small State, in ancient times, such departments were limited to three or four. Each great magistrate was associated with another great magistrate, in respect of each departmental office, to secure its due performance. In a great State the departments were more numerous than three, or four. The number of the great officers was preferably small rather than large. The result, in both a small State and in a large State, was similar. The great magistrates, as statesmen in Council, considered the whole and every part of the business of State from different standpoints. One mind was not dominant but each mind was liable to have its views modified by the Council.

In the management of the State unity in thought and in action was necessary so that a small Council was more efficient than a large one. As many men as many minds has always been a characteristic

of Councils so that a large Council has tended to dissension where a small Council has tended to unity. It was the good quality of the minds that was most necessary for the efficiency of the whole. Where there was not unity of thought it was realised that a majority of councillors was not a test of excellence in the conclusion arrived at. The popular fallacy on this point did not prevail. The quality of excellence in a minority was often of more value than number, especially where a minority contained experts in a branch of statesmanship. In England, in the mediæval period, the Senate, or Council of State, was the main means of prosperity in the State. It is needless to go into details. The servitorial statesmen, to be efficient, needed, for their duties, qualities similar to those of the magisterial statesmen. The records of the knightly men who served the State, in peace and war, for centuries, in England, compare favourably with those of foreign States. The upright statesmen of both branches possessed all those virile qualities which made them reliable in the management of the State. Much may be implied that the more competent classes of the community supplied the needs of the State and served the State well. The multitude did not intrude with its fallacy of "a fair opportunity for all," as a class interest of private utility.

Public utility was the basis of State service. The State, as the true State, is still to be deemed fair in the structure of its Government and, more or less, in accord with its political community, in the methods of its management. Where, however, the State, either by imperfection has not reached the condition of the true State, or by defect has departed from it, the work of statesmanship will include more than management. There are statesmen who, as the builders, or the repairers, or the extenders, or the renovators, of the State, have had to do their work in the presence of internal and external difficulties. The States of the world are like the men of the world. They come and they go and, in the interval of existence, they have, more or less, prosperous, or adverse careers. The State, however, differs from a man in that it is more in the nature of a corporation which continues to exist whilst its particles come and go. The great States of the world have not been very numerous. Among those which have passed away their rise and their fall and the history of their careers are known, far enough, to indicate the causes of strength and decay in States. The States which exist, to-day, are divided, mainly, into old States and young States, or into great States and small States, or into maritime States and non-maritime States, or into military States and non-military States. All States, to enable them to exist, are, more or less, industrial States. There are vigorous States with Governments

well organised and resting on solid foundations and, in contrast, there are decrepit States which have lost the power to reform and to reinvigorate themselves.

There are States which, in development, have reached perfection in the complete union of the factors of the State, in its domain, its supremacy, and its community. These are the States which have complete self-control under one supremacy. They can always present a united front to any, or to all, foreign States which may be adverse to them. In such a State unity is strength and that strength is the means of safety and the source of welfare. In such a State, safety and justice measure true freedom which is not marred by any licentiousness. The multitude has justice, although it has not control. The excellence in the State is consistent with the absence of control by the multitude. The State is controlled from above; its Government is in a general accord with its community; its regional managements are in the nature of minor States and its regional populations do not control it from below. There are States which, in their development, have not yet reached perfection in the complete union of the factors of the State. Such a State is in process of completion. This is the condition of Britain's Empire. The community had an ideal in the realm State. This ideal is tending to be followed in the empire State. There are other ideals, in conflict with it, and these ideals are, in fact, not relational to the State. There are, also, several political fallacies which have to be met and rejected. There are subtle forces at work, both within and outside of the empire domain, and these forces are directed to lessen its unity and its strength. The greatest Empire in the world has its secret foes as well as its open foes.

The close accord between Britain's Empire and the United States of North America is a phenomenon which is disquieting to States which foster military ambitions. The bonds of race and language with a similarity of ideals which pervade two great domains indicate growth and strength in political power with a world wide influence. The cordial co-operation of the Empire of Japan with the two English-speaking Empires, together, constitute sea power and land power which, in defence, can resist, with success, the rest of the world. This union makes for peace, for freedom and for progress. The domains of the world are now limited. There must be competition between States, in future, in the extension of their domains. There must, also, be competition within States in the economic struggles of the classes. In the past, these class struggles have always tended to disorganise the system of Government and to change the nature of the State. In the future, these difficulties have to be fairly and squarely met. Among the causes of

the Great War was the military and the clerical ideal of a world empire. In the dreams of the extremists of the multitude there was, also, the ideal of a world empire of industry. Both ideals are still foreshadowed. It follows, therefore, from an external and from an internal view of Britain's Empire, that its business of statesmanship must be many-sided. This business must be mastered, with thoroughness, in every branch and part.

The range of empire statesmanship is very great, and the qualities of statesmen with capacity and training need to be very high. There is ample scope for the best qualities of statesmen in Council. This Council should be select, and it should rest on the firm foundation of a larger magisterial Council which should, also, be select. The unquestionable probity of Senators, and the tests of this probity by other Senators, where there have been select electorates, are among the best traditions of the true State which have descended from earlier times. The model Senator, who did not fear either the scowl of the despot, or the howl of the mob, is typical of the upright statesman of the magistracy. The servitorial statesmen, in respect of political ability and virile quality, approach, or reach, the standard of magisterial statesmen. The quality of uprightness is a necessary quality which is common to both branches of political agents, as reliable statesmen. It is a quality which is not to be set aside, either as an indulgence to the servitorial branch of the Legislature, or as an indulgence to its electorates, or on any ground whatever. It is consistent with this principle that the various electorates should be made to conform, to a reasonable extent, to the same standard. The foundations of political power in the State should be wholesome and reliable. The presence of unworthy, unwise and incompetent persons in the various electorates tends to produce demoralisation in Parliament, unless those who are, in any way, unfit to be agents are excluded.

The admission of incompetent and improper persons may tend to inefficiency and to corruption in the management of the State. In an empire State and, especially, in its capital province, there must be a strict regard for propriety and utility, to secure defence and welfare against the multitudinous evil which, always, exists in the lowest electorates. When wild political theories are propounded to the regional multitudes upright statesmen have an obvious duty to resist them. It is not enough, in the true State, that the magistrates and the servitors, alone, should resist these wild theories and their consequences. The number of upright statesmen, among the private persons in the State's community, may be increased so that in their public duty and by means of the electorates they may support the accredited political agents and

add strength to the State. The good subjects of the State, having the intelligence and the education which enables them to study the State and to appreciate its needs, have a duty to stand by the State in its support against the attacks of its bad subjects. The empire State needs to be consolidated and the realm State needs to be reformed. Upright statesmen have to solve many complex problems. If the Supreme Senate is restored, and made to rest on an empire basis, the main source of stability and of moderation will be secured.

The Cabinet, as a ministerial body, will be reduced to its proper place of subordination in the State. The servitorial body in Parliament will no longer be allowed to domineer over its magisterial body. The Throne will again have the support of the Senate. The source of the gravest evils in the State will cease. All the provinces of the Empire will have an interest in the support of magistracy which is the main source of strength in the exercise of the supremacy both in defence and in welfare. The Lords of the Council will be restored to their proper place and no Cabinet Council ought to be held without one, or more, of them being present. The same rule would apply in respect of interviews between ministers and the occupant of the Throne. The operation of the parts, in the mechanism of the Constitution, can, then, be regulated in accordance with constitutional principles. Political excellence can be attained only by worthiness and by diligence. Political depravity is derived from baseness and it grows, without care, like weeds. Upright statesmen, whether entrusted with the care of the State, or as private persons in its community, are to be counted as a part of the State's greatest treasure.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

(1) THE EMPIRE STATE

THE empire State stands out as the main subject of patriotic consideration in the defence of its domain, and in the welfare of its immense population. The empire State is still in the process of construction in the sense that it has yet to be consolidated into a model State with its supreme control (or its political supremacy) made relational to its great domain to enable it to act in a constant accord with its political community for the welfare of its population. The State, itself, as being above and apart from its subordinate provinces, stands out among the greater States of the world as the greatest empire State.

It is, also, a maritime State which, if true to itself, can be made an easily defensible stronghold for its population without any aggressiveness to other States. The empire State has a free and an industrious population which can be made safe by the mutual support of its provinces in the maintenance of peace against the aggressive tendencies of foreign States. Peace with safety and welfare is the main object of its international policy. Freedom which includes peace can be maintained only by the State's readiness for war in its own defence. Freedom and warlike defence, on land and sea and in the air, are necessary accompaniments. In the science of tactics States are in no better position than men who are worthy, wise and prudent. The State, in respect of self defence is, also, in a similar position. The same end is often attainable by a variety of means. Defence, as a means of perfect security, is not consistent with leaving to chance anything which is necessary to complete the means of security. The State, throughout its vast domain and along its coasts and its frontiers, must always be on watch and on guard. There are many ways in which a foreign or an internal foe can act to weaken and to destroy a State. Safety to be real requires vigilance and thoroughness in defence. The unity of the State's domain, the unity of the supremacy relational to its domain and the unity, or accord, of its population may be deranged and broken by internal, or by external foes, or by a

combination of both. A position may arise in which it would be not only unwise, but in the nature of criminal negligence, to allow political evils to ripen and to reach a stage where it would be beyond the power of the State to control them. The State, in respect of its self-defence, might, then, be placed in the position of having a defence which would be futile, or ineffective. The alternatives will be either a defence which will result in ruin, or an attack which may be effective by the defending State and may result in its safety. The best defence may be an attack. It may be the duty of the State, in its defence, to anticipate an attack instead of waiting until it is too late to resist the impending attack upon it.

It follows that the true State, as an institution for defence and welfare, as a well ordered State, has the duty to make defence its first consideration. In the empire State which has been built up by the enterprise of a virile race which holds its freedom as a precious treasure, the military instincts of a large part of its population enable all of the provinces to make ample provision for regional defence, with an effective surplus of power both to strengthen the particular provinces which may be threatened, or attacked, and to supply an expeditionary force for an attack on the hostile State, or States, which are adverse to the empire. The self-defence by a State must rest on reason, utility and necessity and, in the appreciation of its duty, it must be devoid of all maudlin sentiment. The empire State can be strengthened by unity and be weakened by dissension. Popular assemblies are the main sources of dissension. The empire State, as a completed and perfect State, will be stronger, safer and more prosperous than it would be if it should continue to be left in an incomplete, or in an unconsolidated condition. The empire State, in this respect, can gain all the good in its power by a study of other great States which, by wise repair, or reform, in good time, were made strong, safe and prosperous. Such States contrast with those States which, by folly and neglect, in the absence of patriotism, have been first weakened and then been broken.

(2) THE STATE AS AN ORGANISM

The State, as the subject matter of political science, has rarely received the attention which it has deserved. In the long history of Britain both the State and its Constitution of Government in their development have had a place in the world's work of human progress. This work has not been purely accidental. It contains

well marked traces of design. The career of the State in Britain has been providential. The State had been evolved from the most ancient feudalism in the world. The two insular regions of Britain and Japan, at the opposite ends of a great continent, emerged, with their feudal systems, at points in time, many centuries apart, to contribute ideals and practices in the development of the State which made these regions partners, in a later age, to secure human progress. In England the origin and the structure of the State have been obscured by Hebrew, Hellenic, Latin and post-mediæval theories. These theories, to-day, need to be examined and tested. In Japan, in contemplating the ancient relations between the military order and the Sanctuary order, certain European theories have been allowed to prevail, but without any material loss, in the compromise which has had a successful result. The supremacy has been unified. The magisterial agency, as that of the peerage of Japan, was most like the similar agency in Britain. It, also, had a superstructure. The Supreme Senate of Elder Statesmen in Japan was most like the lost Supreme Senate of England.

The connection of the feudal system with the State was similar in Japan and in Britain. The peerage of Japan, since the reformed Constitution was set up, has not made a single mistake. It has been an exemplary body in comparison with the servitor House which has exhibited the notorious defects of popular representation. This result is creditable to the virility and excellence of feudalism and it is discreditable to the effeminacy and baseness of democracy. The feudal gentry of Japan, as a class, with their expert political influence, have shown that they are worthy of esteem as well as a source of strength. The multitudes in Japan have been like multitudes elsewhere. The ungraded electorates are adverse to excellence and tend to baseness. The results of the multitudinous electorates, in Japan, are akin to those of England during the period of their existence, for the short space of twenty-three years, when they were suppressed, in 1429, and the "rabble" were excluded from taking part in the election of the knights of the shires. The Senate of Elder Statesmen in Japan, although it is a much less powerful body than the old Senate of England was, yet it has, so far, justified its existence as the Council of State. Much of the system of regional managements has been preserved in Japan with the relative economic systems which have been a source of strength in internal, or domestic, relations. In external, or international, relations the conduct of Japan has been notable for its dignity, its excellence and its success.

In Britain's Empire State there are, as in Japan, ancient foundations which, in utility, have not been excelled by those of any other

State in the world. The Court of Peers is still, in quality, and in statesmanship, an able body. When it has been invigorated by the addition of magisterial agents from all of the provinces of the domain it will then be fit to be the substructure of a new supreme Senate of the Empire. The popular fallacy of the burgess mentality that, in the Court of Parliament, the Commons were the equals of the magistrates originated earlier than 1399, when the Peers, as the magistrates, stood fast and resisted the absurd pretension. This fallacy was, therefore, the basis of a pretension before the House of Commons, as the servitor part of the Court of Parliament, had come into existence by being allowed to sit *in camera* (1407), for certain purposes. The burgess mentality was the mentality of the multitude, and it has become the democratic mentality in which the old fallacy continues to dwell. Time has amply justified the stand made by the Peers, in 1399, and since maintained by them as recently as the passing of the Parliament Act which, however, does not limit the powers of the peers in the Court of Peers as a separate body from the Court of Parliament. The democratic mentality, in fact, does not appreciate the nature and the structure of the Constitution, although, in the City of London, the ancient type still prevails, with the Court of Aldermen and the Court of Common Council, which has never been divided into two Houses. In the City of London the Common Councillors are not allowed to domineer over the Court of Aldermen which still retains censorial powers such as were exercised, in the realm, by the Court of Peers. When Britain's Empire is reviewed, possibilities are presented of great strength and prosperity by means of reform and consolidation.

In the late war the aptitude of the provincial populations to bear the strain of military service indicates that it is equally fit to bear the strain of State service in peace. It is, also, likely that the necessary number of statesmen of the best quality could be found for this service. It is, however, not enough that the empire State has the elements of strength and the means of safety and wellbeing with the prospect of securing both for posterity. It is necessary in a great State to regard the past and the future and to review the great heritage of the Empire which was derived from generations of virile statesmen. These clear-headed and stout-hearted patriots, in their continuous work in expanding the domain, in building up the State in the process of its repair, and in securing freedom and welfare for their posterity, were ever regarding the State's past with reverence and its future with hope. To-day, the patriots of the Empire need to possess the ideal of the State and, in the work of construction, to continue and to complete what their forefathers began and maintained.

It is never to be forgotten that, in the Supreme Senate, the great magistrates who controlled the realm, in earlier times, and steered the State through the perils of foreign wars and through the internal evils of despotism and multitudinism, had succeeded in a work in which the greatest of Roman statesmen had failed. England, for generations, had ranked, in the quality of its organised State, as one of the foremost States in Europe when, in the size of its domain, it was, relatively, but a small State. The Roman Empire which, under Augustus, had reverted to the ideal of the true State, from the last stage of the State's decline in the form of the degraded Republic, failed in the work of reconstruction. The Republic, at its best, had never been a true State but only a distorted State. Its doom, in earlier times, could have been safely predicted after it had truckled to plebeianism and tribunism. What happened, at Rome, when "the Empire" came into existence, has been related. The Senate, with the supremacy, was not supplied with a magisterial substructure. The State, as a consequence, in the process of its renovation, soon went the way of despotism, after its revolt from the opposite, but kindred, evil of multitudinism. It found, later, an ideal in the Sanctuary and in Orientalism, and this it followed to its fall.

In Britain, the ancient feudalism had never ceased to exist. In the modified mediæval feudalism, in England, the ideal of the true State was preserved. The magisterial structure was maintained with its servitorial accessory. The preservation of the Constitution, in England, was the salvation of the State. This preservation was the work of the worthy, the wise and the efficient magistracy, the peerage, which had the patriotic support of the knightage. They preserved the State against the attacks of foreign States and the attacks of the foreign Sanctuary, from outside of the domain, and, within the domain, against the attacks of despotism on the Throne, ministerialism in the service of the Throne, and multitudinism in the community. The magistrates, the servitors and the virile community of England were the true source of that famous Constitution which, in its perfection, when compared with the managements of Continental States, was the wonder of the world. This Constitution had excelled that of the Roman State in its exclusion of the two kindred but extreme evils of despotism and multitudinism. Its strength was the Council of State which exercised the supremacy and supported the Throne, as the seat of its Executive Officer, or Administrator, who was its accessory.

In the unity of its supremacy the Roman State had excelled in a career of 1,200 years. It had a contrast, in this respect, in one

of the most unfortunate States of earlier times. In Greece, Argos, in a career of 1,000 years, had the elements of strength and prosperity and it might have been successful but its supremacy was never unified. It was the old story of the Sanctuary which was not subordinate to the State. It has its lesson to-day. Britain's Empire is weak where the Roman Empire was strong. Britain's Empire has need to secure its united supremacy in a senatorial body which is, in every way, qualified to exercise it.

(3) THE CONSTITUTION -

In the completion and in the consolidation of the empire State it is necessary to view the Constitution closely, in its utility, simplicity and strength. It had been so developed in its origin and it had been so well preserved in its career that the estates of the realm stood together and remained clear, as the three graded seats of power, almost to the end of the Middle Age. These ranged from the highest to the lowest and indicated the original descent of authority from above. The Senate had possessed the supremacy. The points, in time, which marked changes in the Constitution, are noticeable, and they are memorable. The institution of Receivers and Triers of Petitions, in 1305, implies that the Coron Senate had been weakened and broken, although a century earlier, in the reign of King John, it had been vigilant and strong enough to suppress despotism. The institution of the House of Commons, in 1407, implied an intention to strengthen, and not to weaken, the peerage which, in 1265, had strengthened the knightage by the addition of citizen and burgess servitors to the Common Council. The policy of 1265 was to allow the State and its community to co-operate. In resisting despotism it was not intended that the door should be opened to multitudinism.

In the dilapidation which has happened and in the excrescences which have grown up, since then, the classic ideal of the original Constitution has been obscured. Those whose ancestors knew it retained traditions of it. Those who did not know it and had not retained its traditions, such as the general population, were impressed with a vague and a confused ideal. There were parts of the multitude which had the primitive ideal of "the shepherd and his flock," illustrated, in the parish, by "the pastor and his people." The combination of "the King's people and the people's King" was sufficient to exclude from further consideration any theory of the State and its Constitution. The classic ideal stood but it

had ceased to be regarded. The principle of operating the mechanism of the Constitution became changed and it still tends to change. The evils which caused the ruin of ancient States have again appeared and they are growing in vigour because the State has been negligent in not suppressing them. These evils should always be nipped in the bud. The circuit of their existence, from their rise to their suppression, indicates a well-known ailment of the State. In respect of the Constitution, reform and reconstruction, with completion and expansion, have all to be kept in mind. Patriotic caution is most of all necessary to prevent the empire State from being diverted from its purpose, which is to secure its safety and to promote the welfare of the many millions within its domain.

The Empire's first duty is to itself. The fantastic theories of liberalism and the antics of democracy can never be a source of goodness in the State. The Empire community never needed more than it does, to-day, the determination and the tenacity of purpose which are necessary to keep the State in the path of progress and to avoid, as the alternative evil, the certainty of adversity. The State and its Constitution can be easily understood by trained soldiers and, especially, by those who, in the Great War, stood for freedom and realised the value of the State and the fact that freedom can never be effectually maintained except at the cost of blood. Virility and not effeminacy is the characteristic of the State and of statesmen, from the great magistrates to the members of the political community. The good soldier on duty is not to be caught napping. He knows that the loss of many may result from the failure of one. It is the same in the State with every patriot who is true to it. Every province of the Empire domain, from the largest to the smallest, has the same duty to the empire State. All parts of the domain and its community can help to complete the patriotic work of statesmanship. The Senate of magistracy is the strong tower of the State.

The friends of the State can, also, be distinguished from the foes of the State. It is a constant duty to keep clear the differences between them. The antagonists of the State have been roughly but sufficiently outlined. The light of truth is necessary to disperse the darkness of error. The craze of democracy would not endure long if the more sober minded members, in each regional community, were to examine it, and test it, to realise its true nature. The right standpoint has, also, to be taken for purposes of comparison. In respect of the State, as a specific institution, Britain excelled where Greece and Rome had failed. If democracy is the excellent system its promoters and its supporters profess

it to be, it is a matter of wonder that, in England, the land of the true State, no English word has been found to describe it. Mob-sway is the nearest approach to it. The system, when so described, does not appear to be made more attractive by its English name.

The political blight from which the English-speaking populations are now suffering most mischief is trades unionism, which is closely akin to democracy. It is one of its protean forms. The kindred blight of liberalism, as a political creed, is one of the chief political plagues of the Empire. It is a creed of political paganism. It is a creed which, in the public interest, might usefully be made the subject of an examination and report by an expert and a trusted Commission. Democracy and trades unionism are but phases, or forms, of multitudinism which, throughout the historic period of 3,000 years, in Europe, has never ceased to be the antagonist of the State. During this period, in distorted States, the multitude has sought to solve the problem of its appropriate position in the State, in relation to its domain, its supremacy and the rest of its community, or the rest of its population. The issue has always affected the Constitution in its most fundamental part. In the true State the Constitution has, always, rested on the political community which was necessarily the lesser body when it was compared with the whole population. This community was, also, less than the total adult male population because the slaves were excluded. The lords of the domain and the military community, as the tribal proprietors of these lands, were virtually the proprietors of the State. The gradual enlargement of the political community, by the admission to it of parts of the general population, reached a stage, as at Rome, when the domain part of the mixed community became outnumbered by a less substantial but more numerous part of this mixed community.

Means were then found to defeat the new evil which arose in the State. The new freedmen, as the emancipated slaves and their descendants, were grouped for census purposes, within the four city tribes. The rustic tribes, or regional communities, which were outside of the City, were, by this means, severed from the populace and, in their regional managements, were freed from the drag of this undesirable part of the free population. This is the short story of the phase of the democracy, or the multitude, as it presented itself at Rome. It followed there, as elsewhere, that the appropriate position of the multitude, in the State, was not that of principal, as being the political community, but that of being the more numerous part of the general population. The multitude has, always, been composed of several parts, and

all of these parts have not been vicious and mischievous but certain parts have been unfortunate, or pitiable. The State does not exist for the multitude, alone, but for its community and its general population. The multitude is not the principal, as the political community, which fluctuates in size, relatively, to the rest of the population.

In quality, and in wealth, the community, which is the foundation on which the Constitution rests, is, and always has been, an exclusive body. The multitude, or the mischievous parts of it, contest this position and attack this exclusive body with the intent that the multitude, as "the greater number," may have the control in the State. Such parts of the multitude, as for instance the proletarians and the trades unionists, differ in several respects. The proletarians, as a body, are poor, but they are not necessarily vicious. In their struggle for existence, when they are tumultuous, the purpose is mainly to obtain help, as a means of livelihood. They are often willing to work and to make the best of their position. With the exception of a few desperate men, as demagogues and as instigators and inciters, the proletarians have no ambitions in seeking the control in the State. The trades unionists, as a body, are not poor. They are earners of wealth in excess of their needs and they use this wealth for mischievous purposes to pursue their silly political ambitions of getting control in the State when, by leaving politics alone and using wealth in the development of industry, they could better their own condition and help to make the community more prosperous. The multitude, to-day, as in all previous periods, is not the principal body in the domain but it is the most dependent part of the community and of the population of the domain. It is, and it has always been, the most troublesome part of the population, where it has been allowed to get out of hand, as in decadent States. In the well-ordered State, by firm and proper treatment, the multitude is usually kept within proper control, with benefit to itself and the rest of the population, as well as with increased strength to the State.

The English-speaking communities of Britain's Empire domain and of the United States domain, have need to be aroused from their political lethargy, in this respect, to consider the difference between a decadent State and a well-ordered State. In the well-ordered State, the multitude had the sense to behave itself because it knew what was the alternative. The multitude was not allowed to cause wreckage in the constitution of the State's Government. The magistracy was firm and just and it did not flinch from its duty. It knew well, by tradition, or experience,

that nothing is more disastrous to the State than weakness in government.

If bad subjects cannot behave themselves the alternatives of correction, or extermination, are the proper remedies. These were the remedies which formerly prevailed in Britain. In England, from about 1350 (Statute of Labourers) to 1600, the population, throughout all grades, was cleansed, with thoroughness, and with the result that, at the end of that period, England had one of the most virile and advanced populations in Europe. The multitude was not allowed to make depredations, either on the rest of the community, or on the rest of the population. The multitude was not allowed to tamper either with the State's economic system, or with the industrial system, or with the system of production. The servers in industry were not allowed to domineer over the employers in industry. There was freedom for all, to work and to compete in work. The supremacy in the State was not allowed to be usurped, either by the multitude, or by any part of it. In the House of Commons the graded electorates allowed the knights and the citizen servitors, who were by far the most competent part of the servitors, not to be swayed by the burgess servitors who were the nearest representatives of the multitude. Poverty and infirmity had been provided for, from the earliest times, by the regional managements. These provisions were revised, after the abbeys had been abolished, at the time of the Reformation, and a new Poor Law system, for the realm, was set up, with the result that, on the ground of poverty, no excuse was left for crime. Industry and frugality were inculcated with rigid severity.

England, in these provisions for the poor, and against desperation in the multitude, excelled all other European States. The community, as a fairly exclusive body, remained free from being outnumbered, at the polls, by the multitude; and the House of Commons was free from its evil influence. The Constitution still retained its balance. The House of Peers was, relatively, strong. The Lords of the Council were not dominated by the Administration. The Lords of the Council, as the Council of State, effectively maintained the defence of the domain against foes outside of it and inside of it. It maintained order and justice, within the domain, against despotism on the Throne, and against multitudinism in the population. The Council of State kept to the procedure of the Supreme Senate of England, which was in the nature of the Attic Areopagus. The Tudor dynasty retained a regard for the past in its maintenance of the principles of the Constitution. The Stuart dynasty failed in this respect. The

great Rebellion, which was brought about in the career of this dynasty, caused a break to be made with the past.

The English-speaking peoples of the Empire domain, and of the domain of the United States, can look back, with even minds, at the usages of the State, in respect of its multitudes, in the old realm of England, in which a virile and progressive civilisation was cradled and grew up. The bonds of race, of language, and of law remain, as the bonds of Empire, within two domains, and of union between two great States, which, as against the rest of the world, are a natural source of mutual support. The evils of multitudinism have a special significance for the English-speaking communities which retain the traditions of their forefathers who had excelled in their knowledge and management of the true State. These evils are not characteristic of virile races but indicate the presence of degenerate populations which, where they obtain an undue influence in the State, infect the political community and are a source of political baseness. It is only a matter of time and neglect for the State to be distorted and for its Constitution to be deformed. The effect of these evils, in the domain of the United States, is a means of comparison with the effects, in the old realm, as well as in the great provinces of the expanded Empire. The treatment of multitudinism, up to almost recent times, in Britain, was not ungenerous, but it was notable for a *due regard for the safety of the State and for the welfare of its community*. The Constitution was not allowed to be tampered with, either by the multitude, or by its agents. The social excellence of the political community was a sufficient security against any oppression of the multitude. The multitude had fair play. It was the constant source of enterprising men who were respected, for their merits, both in lowly positions and among the classes. These classes knew well that their own descendants, or some of them, would revert to the multitude.

The regard for fair play, with the esteem for worthiness and ability, were common characteristics of the more fortunate classes. A similar proof of social excellence may still be seen in the domain of the United States and, especially, in the parts which were formerly Colonial provinces of Britain. The existence of this social excellence affords a standard of comparison with a force which originated in Britain and continued, under changed circumstances, in the Colonies of the English, in America. In the United States, the part of the population of Britannic origin, in the new American community, is, relatively, small, whilst its influence is great and, in a sense, dominant. The original settlers and immigrants from the British Isles have been added to, by the

accessions from foreign populations and from Africa by the accessions of the Negro populations, with the result that the descendants of the English colonists, with the political English characteristics, are but a minority of the whole population. This minority, however, although it has continued to exist in the face of great obstacles, yet, by its widespread influence, it has given a moral tone and a political character both to the State and to its community. The Confederate Government of the American Over-State (as the empire State of the united domains) is the outcome of racial ideals which have been transmitted through the original Colonial statesmen.

These ideals were derived from England and not from Rome, or from Greece. The only connection with the Continental civilisation, associated with the Roman Empire, was related to tenure, in order to supply a principle of union between the Crown, with the paramount lordship in the lands of the new domain, and the Colonial regional communities which held these lands from the Crown. This principle, termed "emphyteusis," was adopted in the Tudor period. It was termed the "Plantation system." The Colonies, in this sense, were "Plantations." There was no novelty in the principle, as it was that of "Freeholder and Leaseholder," which was not peculiar to the East, but had existed in early Britain and with elaborate conditions. It is enough for the purpose in hand to notice that it was more applicable to the new lands than the feudal tenure, which had become defective. The Colonial life, in the Colonies in America, was, thus, akin to the shire life in England, under a regional management, and, until the secession of these Colonies, no fundamental change was made. At this change new theories were developed.

England, at the time of the Reformation, had won the greatest political victory in Europe in securing, as a true State, the undivided supremacy in its domain. The victory left behind it, in the vanquished, a legacy of sinister intrigue. Although nearly 400 years have goné by since the Reformation, the influences of sinister intrigues have never ceased to be directed to purposes of disintegration. The supremacy, the domain and the community, have to be united, in themselves, and, also, to be in union, as the necessary factors of the true State. The disintegration of any one of these factors must affect the State and its constitution. In the mischief which arose between England and its Colonies in America, England had to contend not only with the military and the naval forces of foreign Continental States, as political forces, but also against the sinister intrigues of what had survived in the Continental States which had arisen after the fall of Charlemagne's empire,

in its character as the Holy Roman Empire. These intrigues made mischief between States where soldierly goodfellowship would have prevented it. The intrigues made mischief between the State and its community, within States, by causing dissension in the multitudes. In this way, the State's constitution was affected, in its fundamental parts, because the issue was raised whether the community or the multitude was to have the control in the State.

The secession of the Colonies was influenced by the hostility of France and, after the French Revolution, new political theories affected what, up to that time, had been peculiarly English in Colonial life. The crude principles of "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," were advanced by the multitude of France which had dominated the community of France. These terms have been developed to evolve principles which are held to be "liberal principles." They, however, contain nothing good which was not found in the principles of policy developed in the ancient realm of England, without any of the extravagances which, as evils, had accompanied, or had arisen out of, the French Revolution. The causes of tumult and the sources of dissension, with the sophisms which mislead the multitude, were the common means of political mischief, which had its end in disintegrating any of the factors of the State, in order to weaken the State and break up the domain, the supremacy, or the community of the State. The American people, since the secession, have passed through several phases of change, but have departed most from the earlier English standard in the adoption of the "democratic principle," which was the basis on which the French Republic was set up. Its elated champions were so charmed with their work that they deemed it to be a perfect State, and that its excellence would have a magnetic influence in causing foreign nations to follow its model. The class hatred, by the mass in France was peculiar to France, and it was imported into England, where the classes and the masses, as the community and the multitude, were on very different terms.

In the United States, the class hatreds, by the mass, had no explosive effects. In England, where the relics of an ancient realm contained three, or four, social ranks, the result was different. Apart from the Colonies, which seceded, the policy of cohesion, followed by the Colonial provinces which remained true to Britain's Empire, has not been inconsistent with the means of ample development, in freedom and in prosperity. In Britain's Empire domain, the parts of the Empire community of Britannic origin still retain a force, akin to that which survives in the United States. This force, still influences the moral tone and tends to shape the political

character of the rest of the population. The unity of Britain's Empire has made it a State of great strength, a State which, in spite of its incompleteness, has since played a valiant part in a world struggle for freedom and for civilisation. The unity of the Empire provinces will remain as a memorable record in the heroic story of the Great War.

Both political domains of the English speaking populations were ranged, together, on the side of freedom. These populations, of kindred origin, after a long severance, were, again, united in an alliance against a common foe. They realised the value of unity as a means of defence. The main secrets of the malignant confederates, who brought a great war on an advancing world, are known, although they are not widely known. The victory won for freedom has to be maintained, and the lessons of the war have to be appreciated. Wars have not ceased. It is not the first but the last round in a fight that secures the victory. Britain's Empire, like every other great State, may hope for the best, but, to be safe, it must prepare for the worst. It has been awakened. It has realised, too late, that with unity, watchfulness and proper statesmanship, it could have been strong enough to have obviated the late war and to have maintained the peace. Germany, by means of trained experts, had far excelled most States, in matters of economy and industry, when Britain's Empire, in these respects, relatively, was negligent.

The wastefulness, in Britain's Empire, caused by the neglect of economy, by weak statesmanship, and by the usurpations of trades unionism, in industry, were but invitations to an advancing military State to attack it, or to ignore its power, in the comity of States. It needed only weakness in the Headship of Britain's Empire State to enable Germany to calculate upon a reasonable probability of success in its warlike designs. The German Empire, apart from its despot, was a well ordered State, which was not at the mercy of its multitude. In Britain, the Constitution had been greatly deformed, and its multitude was a cause of weakness. The State's domestic foes have often been more dangerous than its external foes. The greatest evil in the State has been imported from the Continent. The evil of multitudinism touches the most fundamental part of the Constitution, which, after all, is the Empire's surest means of strength. The issue is, always, "Does the Constitution rest on the domain community, or on the multitudes?" The ignorance, the incompetence, and the greed of the multitude, have to be put into the scales against the knowledge, the competence and the generosity of the community, apart from its multitude.

The great army of darkness is always arrayed, in the State,

against the small army of light which, alone, can supply strength and safety to the State. It is untrue that the multitude cannot have justice unless it has the control. The first principle of the Constitution is that it does not rest on the multitude. The Constitution rests on the more substantial and the better part of the community and, especially, in respect of the magisterial branch of the domain agency. The servitorial branch of agency is most excellent, when it is similar to the principal agency, in the qualities which are useful and necessary in the management of the State and in all of the regional managements under the State. In Britain's Empire the traditions of the State and the principles of statesmanship are always to be kept in mind as standards of conduct. England has a storehouse of political relics, in principles and in historic incidents which, in value, and in utility, surpass anything which may be found in the Greek States, or in the long career of the Roman Empire. The relics of the State and its constitution indicate the qualities of generous, free, and brave races which, from earlier times, in Britain, have kept to a line of policy which tended more to excellence than to baseness.

In the darkness of the mediæval period the political chieftains retained the traditions of earlier times and, especially, of the causes of excellence, or of baseness in great States which had passed away. The evils of despotism and of multitudinism had been the most common causes of mischief and of ruin in States. It was well known that the Empires of Persia and of Rome had ceased to thrive when the Senate of each Empire was weakened. An Empire which rested only on a throne was not far from its fall. The Empires of Alexander and Charlemagne rested only on thrones and they soon passed away.

In England the realm rested on a Senate. The virile magistrates of that Senate would not tolerate despotism on the Throne. It is among the records of England that, when the Prince was misguided and misled to act as a despot, it was put to him, by these valiant magistrates, that, if he did not behave himself, another should be put in his place. Such incidents were, on several occasions, among the occurrences in England's story of the State. The evil of multitudinism was faced with equal vigour. It is an evil which ought not to prevail in a decent community.

The existence of such an evil is as much a mark of political decadence as the evil of despotism on the Throne, or in ministers under the Throne. The State, as a well-ordered State, is like an efficient army. In its command and among its officers and men there is need that, in its service, the fittest and best men in its community should be selected and that the most unfit and worst

men should be excluded. An army would cease to be efficient if it was controlled, from below, by its privates instead of by its command, from above. A State would be inefficient if it was controlled by its multitude. All regional managements would be inefficient, as the State would be, by yielding to the influence of multitudinism. The magisterial statesmen who, in the interest of the State and its community, would not tolerate despotism in princes, were equally bound, in principle, not to tolerate tyranny in multitudes. The evil of multitudinism has usually entered the State by means as specious and methods as subtle as those used by despotism.

The evil of multitudinism is a topic in the study of the State and its Constitution which study, in its effects, on the political community of the Empire, would be the most effective means for promoting measures whereby the empire State could be consolidated and whereby its Constitution could be renovated. It would be useful to the Empire to set up a collegiate institution for the scientific study of the Constitution. It would do for the State what the College of Physicians did for the human body, after its foundation in the reign of Henry VIII. There is room for an additional Inn of Court, on an Empire basis, for this purpose. The cost, relatively to the immensity of the gain, would be small.

The funds gathered for the memorials to those who died in the Great War, for the sake of the Empire, could be well used in a work of patriotism to secure the safety of the State and the prosperity of its population. A Justiciaries' Inn with a Senate, a General Council, and a Common Council, would allow it to be well managed, for its main purpose. It would be a new bond of Empire. The Collegiate body might include, as its magisterial part, representatives of the peerage with the greater and the lesser Judges from all provinces of the domain. The Serjeants might be restored, as its servitorial part, with Barristers expert in the study of the State and the Constitution, as members. Associates might be added to allow all who serve the State to be trained for their work in every branch of statesmanship. In this respect, the Romans did well in having a College of Fœtal agents to aid the State in maintaining a due regard for international propriety. A State should go further. The internal and the external relations of the State could both be considered in the suggested College. The Empire Inn of Court could be in touch with the Four Inns without in any way interfering with these venerable bodies, whose Halls and Libraries might be placed, when required, at the service of the Empire Inn, which could be located within, or near, the Temple precincts.

(4) THE COUNCIL OF STATE

The German Empire, as a new State, had a Council of State which was expert in every branch of State management. This Council, however, had not a strong magisterial substructure. It was without a firm foundation and it was accessory to a military despot. It was not a Council of State like the old "Senate of England." The German despotism was the morbid, or vulnerable, part of the German Government. The Executive was stronger than the Control. In Britain despotism was not absent. The Ministerial Cabinet was stronger than the Government with the duty of magisterial control. The Administration had got into the habit of speaking of itself as "the Government." The Executive in Germany and the Administration in Britain were both out of control. The German Throne relied on a Divine right. The Cabinet in Britain looked to the majority in the House of Commons and to the multitude beneath it. A great calamity had overtaken the State and had affected the Empire by the domination of multitudinism within the realm. The evil precepts of liberalism had intoxicated many of the electorates with the result that the majority of servitors in the House of Commons allowed the Cabinet to make an attack on the House of Peers.

There was, thus, ministerial despotism, which is the most odious form of despotism that can be found in the State. A "guarantee" had been sought from the First Magistrate in order to break the power of the domain magistracy to allow the House of Commons, as a servitor body, to domineer in the State over the magisterial body. Liberalism, in its error, had deemed the kingship to be the mastership in the State, in form, and the Cabinet to have this mastership, in fact. The Constitution was broken and it has not yet been repaired. Multitudinism, in the realm, which is now the capital province of the empire State, is a matter of concern to all of the other provinces of the domain. It affects the defence and the welfare of the empire State. The Court of Peers remains as the fundamental magistracy of the domain. It ought to be invigorated by the addition of the most able statesmen to be found in the provinces of the Empire domain.

A supreme Senate, on this foundation, could again be erected and made a means of stability and a source of strength and welfare to the empire State. The perils of a new war can by this means be obviated. The waywardness of ministers and the domination of multitudinism can also be prevented. The good of all is the most ancient beacon of the State.

The Supreme Senate is the most perfect as well as the most ancient system of control in the State. The multitudes ought to be controlled and their leaders, or servitor agents, ought to be controlled. The licentiousness of multitudes has grown, in part, as a consequence of the laxity of the magistracy in not curbing it and, in part, as the effect of false political theories. The general community has, also, become affected by the undue prevalence of poisonous political creeds. The English-speaking populations, in spite of a certain amount of political infection, have plenty of common sense and, in their business affairs, exercise a shrewdness which would produce excellent effects if it should be applied to the State.

Multitudinism and democracy, which are akin, have never yet been able to reform themselves. Reform which has been effective has always come from outside of the multitude. It has come from the best elements in the community. The heroic patriots who, as gallant soldiers and sailors, in the defence services, have faced the State's foreign foes, have usually been the most fit to save the State from despotism and from multitudinism, as the two evils which are not less dangerous to the State than its foreign foes. The multitude that needs the ballot, to shelter it from public inspection at the polls, even in domestic affairs, indicates that it has lost the best quality of a free and brave population.

This innovation, in Britain, was an importation from the Continent and derived from a race which failed egregiously in the management of the State. It is not baseness but excellence that adds strength and utility to the State. The Supreme Senate of excellent magistrates, supported by great servitors of a similar type, has always been the best moderator in the State. The Senate is the best guardian of the State. The Senatorial Council, as an extension of the Senate, by the inclusion of skilled servitors, as advisers, is more competent than a Ministerial Cabinet which owes a divided allegiance to the State because it has to keep in accord with a servitor body which, in turn, is liable to be held in the tentacles of provincial multitudes. The scheming politician, the prating demagogue, the greedy trades unionist, and the cunning and intriguing socialist are to be numbered among the foes of the State. None of these foes could prevail against either the Senate, or the Senatorial Council, as the Council of State. These foes, as political ruffians, may sway the multitudes and incite and mislead parts of these multitudes, but they ought not to prevail against the communities and the Senate with the supremacy in the domain.

These foes of the State, with their monkey-house system of economics, which is at variance with the economic system of the

State, have become the pests of the empire State. The position of the State, in the face of these foes, is not free from peril yet it is not without the means of strength. Instances have occurred in the careers of States where despotism and multitudinism have joined hands and, by a sudden movement, have secured the power in the domain against the Senate, with the supremacy, and the community to which the Senate was accessory. The possibilities of ministerial despotism, with a Cabinet not under control and a provincial multitude which calls itself "the people," and deems itself to be the political community, are factors of mischief which are not to be overlooked. The House of Commons and the Cabinet have been the sources of great evils in the State when they have been wayward and not under control. The incident of the "guarantee," which was connected with the Parliament Act, does not stand alone. In that incident the servitor House and the Ministerial Cabinet were the foes of magistracy and the leaders of multitudinism.

The restoration of the system of the supreme magistracy, in a Council of State, such as a Supreme Senate resting on the Empire domain, would supply a means of control which would give new strength and vigour to the State. This Senate would exercise a moderating influence throughout the Empire, and, on behalf of the Empire, in its competition with all foreign States, to secure its defence against the rest of the world. The Senate's efficiency will depend on its quality and on its strength. The Empire contains all the necessary elements to make it, as a Supreme Senate, second to none in the world. It could be the Areopagus of the empire State. It could have the power to put any political malefactor on his trial and also to secure for such a trial all that is necessary, in the public interest, to be done in the due administration of justice. It may even reserve to itself the right of review in a final appeal. In its excellent quality it would be able to influence the moral tone and to shape the political character which ought to prevail in an Empire State. The records of the Senate, in the realm State, contain worthy precedents which might be followed, as the deliberate conclusions of virile statesmen who lived in an age before effeminacy and political depravity had become dominant in the State.

The military statesmen of the mediæval period may not have been great scholars, in the academic sense, but they were practical men whose intellectual and moral faculties reached, at least, to the standard of the shire gentry. The short and simple creeds of these military statesmen indicated the nature of their clean and vigorous minds. The feudal household, either in the strong castle,

or in the fortified house, or in the moated grange, was a good school in which, even from childhood, mental alertness and military training, with discipline and industry, were not neglected. There the child was taught to walk in the footsteps of those who have gone before him and to observe the points and beacons of their short and simple creed. Death with honour was better than life with shame. Straight ways were better than crooked ways. Honesty was the best policy in all the affairs of life. Generosity, fairness and justice were due even to foes. Men who had been trained in these virile schools were at the service of the State and formed the best class of those knightly men who, for centuries, were to be seen serving the State, either on the field of battle, or in the Council Chamber, or in administering offices under the State, as they passed from the knightage to the peerage and thence to the seats at the Round Table of the State. This was the Board of State. The Senate of England, which, as the feudal Council of State, was commonly called the "Coron of England," which, with its vestige the "Crown," has, to-day, only a *notional* existence. This is the kind of Supreme Senate which could be restored and be made relational to the Empire domain by resting on the strong foundation of the Court of Peers, after that body has been invigorated by the addition of magisterial agents from all provinces of the domain. This Court of Elder Statesmen would sit *in camera*. It would be replenished, from time to time, by the accession of fit magistrates, by means of the Court of Peers, as an independent body which would be fearless and indifferent to the scowl of despotism and to the howl of multitudinism. This is the Senate which, as a moderating body, could rightly be entrusted with the Supreme Control, as principal to the Supreme Executive, which would remain as its accessory. The Senate would have the support of all the provincial Senates, throughout the domain, and this support would be mutual. The Senate, in its impartiality, would be above all regions, all classes, and all parties.

No minister could prevail against it, even with the support of the House of Commons, and, also, even with the support of the multitude of the United Kingdom. The provincial communities of the Empire would be stronger than the multitude of the realm, as the capital province. Ministerial despotism, and the oppression of multitudinism would be controlled and defeated. Political malefactors would be suppressed before the empire State, or any province of the domain, suffered any mischief that was threatened. The Headship of the State is one of the most important parts of the true State. In Britain's empire State there are yet to be found some of the most valued relics of the true State. In the same

Empire there are yet to be found, in all social grades, the descendants of those who raised the State to its highest degree of excellence. In an appeal to all Empire patriots, against the fallacies and the sophisms of debased political creeds, the main aim is to find a remedy and a means of strength worthy of their forefathers in Britain.

(5) THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The history of States and their careers involves the topic of the domain and its environment. This topic, within the scope of political science, as the study of the State, throws much light on the causes, the means, and the effects, in the rise, the continued existence, and the fall of States. All States from the earliest times, have been affected by their environments. The State domain and its environment are counterparts. The nature of the environment has changed considerably since the earliest times. When the world was less thickly populated and its complete area was either unknown, or less known, there was a general inclination for oppressed and suffering populations to leave the more densely populated and perilous parts to find new homes in unoccupied lands, or in thinly populated and attractive lands, such as wilds and solitudes. In modern times, when the complete area of the world is known, all of its parts have now come within the domains of its several States. In future there can be no expansion of a State's domain except by the contraction of another State's domain. The union may be effected by submission, or by subjection of the lost domain, or part of a domain to the supremacy of another State. In the interval which has elapsed between the earlier times and modern times, a great change has arisen in the nature of State domains and their environments. There have been land-girt States which have had their domains limited by frontiers, but without shores. There have been sea-girt States, as insular States which have had their domains limited by shores but without frontiers. These have been purely maritime States. There have, also, been States with domains which have been, in part, land-girt and, in part, sea-girt, having both frontiers and shores, as their limitations relational to their environments. States, as land powers, and as sea powers, have been contrasted. The maritime States, as sea powers, are subject to the environment of the world, in part, and, in part, to that of the contiguous domains. Certain States, for their security and defence, have followed a policy of exclusiveness, as hermit States.

Certain States have gone to the opposite extreme and, notably, maritime States, in favouring a policy of mutual intercourse. Maritime States, from earlier times, in the nature of their civilisation, have been more advanced than backward and, in the quality of their population, have been more virile than effeminate. Sea power was traceable at the dawn of history, and it has had an important influence in the economic forces which have shaped the destiny of States and changed the world. The Babylonian domain and the Egyptian domain originated at the estuary of a great river. The subsequent settlements on the Euphrates, and, on the Nile, extended up each river from the sea. The Sidonian sea power, including that of Tyre and that of Carthage, was the means of planting settlements along the shores of the Mediterranean Sea and on the shores of the Atlantic Ocean, including Britain. Maritime States, in respect of their domains, which included scattered settlements, have necessarily been dependent on sea power for their continued existence. The rise and fall of the sea power of the Cretans, the Phœnicians, the Athenians, the Etruscans, the Carthaginians, and the Corinthians, allowed the severed parts of their domains to become subject to foreign States. In contrast, the land power of the Babylonians and of the Egyptians tended to the consolidation of those domains. The maintenance of a State's sea power, against the world's maritime environment, has usually been the most serious problem for the constant consideration of a maritime State.

The existence of such an empire State, in its period of growth, has always been precarious. This precarious position of a maritime empire State has been gradually changed to a position of strength and safety when the domain has grown in size and power to be effectively complete. The consolidation of all the parts, in subjection to the supremacy of the whole domain, then secures co-operation and control in the State. The strong maritime bases, in every ocean and sea, backed by the support of Continental and insular land power, has rendered Britain's Empire State, in spite of its domain being severed by the seas, defensible and safe against the world's environment.

The empire State can be strong and prosperous without being aggressive. It is to its credit that, with an exemplary regard for propriety, it maintained, in the cause of civilisation, the sea power of the world for more than a century. The domain of the Empire has been greatly increased, in power, in recent times, by means of wireless communications, whereby the provinces of the Empire can now keep in close accord more easily and quickly than the shires of the realm could be kept, in former days. All

parts of the domain can concert with the supremacy, for the defence of any one, or more, of these parts, against attacks from the environment. Warfare, by military, naval and air forces, in attack and defence, is not the only warfare which can exist in respect of the State's domain and its environment.

There is also a warfare which can be waged by means of the economic forces. These economic forces within the State's domain and within its environment, have always been, either in balance, or in favour of the domain, or against the domain, and in favour of its environment. These economic forces include land power and sea power with man power, industrial power and production power, with the accessories of communication, carriage and the means of exchange, and other necessities, or conveniences, or facilities. In respect of economic power, the domain and its parts are relational, under the common supremacy of the whole domain. The environment has many parts which are relational to the several States and their supremacies. It can, now, be realised how great has been the influence of the environment upon the State's domain and upon the State's career. We may, in a few glances, regard the past and also look into the future. In the rise of the Roman State, the hostile environment caused the domain of that State to be developed, on a military basis, to secure its defence. When, later, the Roman State was affected by a maritime State in the environment, the Roman State became a maritime State, as well as a military State. The accumulation of power in the Roman domain and its systematic use, then, caused that domain to expand along the lines of least resistance in the environment. The Senate of Rome was the source of a policy, and a means of direction, of stability in strength, and of tenacity of purpose. The environment was not united, like the domain, but was divided into parts, so that the Roman Senate surveyed the whole and, with diplomatic tact, resisted some parts and fought other parts of it, by taking one at a time. The military Senators of Rome were expert and patriotic magistrates who maintained the supreme control in the domain and acquired a good knowledge of the strength and weakness of the environment. In the fall of the Roman State the weakness of the magistracy, in the domain, was the main cause of the decline and fall of the State. The State ceased to be managed by statesmen. The domain became weaker than the environment.

In the West, and in the East, in the later stages of the State's decline, the barbarians, in Europe and Asia, issuing from the environment, made inroads into the domain. They pressed on and advanced along the lines of least resistance. In the rise, and in the career of the realm of England, the earlier environment,

by land and sea, had an influence on the State and its domain which was similar to that which shaped the career of Rome. England, after the Norman Conquest, was eminently both a military and a maritime State, which expanded its domain along the lines of least resistance in its environment. The Senate of England was the source of a policy and the means of direction of the State's strength, in its constant survey of the possibilities and perils of the environment. The domain of Britain's empire State continues to be affected by its environment, which is, now, a world environment.

The weakness in the Empire domain is caused by the absence of the Senate, as the possessor of the supreme control (or the supremacy) which is relational to the whole domain. The supreme executive, as the Throne, is quite inadequate to perform the function of the Senate, with the supremacy. The Senate, as the body of the supreme magistrates, has always been "the Government" which changes not, but remains, like a corporation which never dies, although its members come and go. The Senatorships, or great magistracies, were as much magisterial offices as the kingship is a magisterial office. The Senate was the Headship of the State. The departments of State were relational to the business of the State, as partitioned, in relation to the Senatorial offices. The Lord Treasurer, for instance, was a member of the Senate and the Treasury and the Exchequer were subordinate to the Senate.

This Senate was a tower of strength within the domain, and its constant vigilance was directed to the environment by the Senators who were responsible for the maintenance of State policy. Changes have been made, in part, by various occupants of the Throne, in concert with ministers and the House of Commons, and, also, where legislation was necessary, with the consent of the House of Lords, and, as a result, the Senate and the later body, the Lords of the Council, have ceased to have the control. The realm State was weakened by the loss of its most necessary magisterial part of the Constitution; and the empire State has never been supplied with that Headship, the Supreme Senate, which is the most necessary part of the true State. Great evils have resulted, from time to time, to the empire State, in consequence of the absence of the Supreme Senate and, failing that Senate, to the absence of the Lords of the Council. The care and vigilance which are requisite, in respect of the environment and State policy, have not been kept under proper control and direction.

The foreign policy of Britain's empire State, had it been kept in competent hands, could have obviated the calamity, or lessened the evil effects, of the German war. The international environment

was, and is, a matter of the deepest concern to Britain's empire State. The German Empire was a military State and an industrial State with sea power which made it a maritime State. It had developed all branches of its economic power to such an extent that its world environment was affected by its domain power. It had indicated that it was advancing in competition with Britain's empire State. It was well known that economic competition has led to the most bitter wars. Britain's empire State had the capacity to be economically strong enough for self defence and, also, for the defence of its allies, against the impending outburst and the possible attack by the German Empire. The Cabinet in England was out of control. The State interests of the realm and of the Empire were sacrificed to party interests in the House of Commons in order to maintain support for the Cabinet. The majority in that House, in turn, had to retain the support of its electorates. These electorates had been debased and some of them were intoxicated with the creed of political villainy. The tenets of political propriety observed by the worthier classes of the community were odious to those who were infected with multitudinism and relied not on quality and duty but on numbers and on greed. Several factions had been formed in respect of Home Rule, the disestablishment of the Welsh Church, and of the House of Peers, to break its power. Some of the factions favoured the domination of trades unionism, and these were associated with Communism, Socialism and Internationalism. Free Trade theories which, as a craze of the multitude, had been most detrimental to the economic power of the State, in respect of its environment, was a bond which linked several factions together. The clever "parliamentary hands" united these factions for their mutual support, as "a party."

The Cabinet was acting as the Council of State. The King in Council, was the King in the magisterial Council, which had the power of control, and every peer, if he chose, had the right to attend this Council and, if called upon for support by the Lords of the Council, would have had the duty to attend. The duty to support the State is the first duty of magistracy. The King has no authority to dismiss peers from the Council. The Council, in this respect, differs from the Privy Council. The doctrine that the King can make and unmake members of the Privy Council indicates that this Council can never be an effective Council of Control. The Council of State, had it been restored, could have controlled the Cabinet. It could have controlled the House of Commons and have caused it to observe the principle of propriety, as the servitor body in Parliament, with duties, to the State, to

the magisterial body in Parliament, and to the community of the domain.

Neither the Cabinet, nor the House of Commons, exists for itself. Both bodies are dependent, and they have trustee duties which can be maintained in spite of any breach of observance of these duties by either of these bodies. Now that the mischief of the Great War has been done, and the causes and the effects can be traced, the lesson of political incompetence, in the past, ought to be useful in the future. It can be noted to prevent the repetition of such mischiefs in order that the Empire State may be preserved from similar calamities. The Senate, as the tower of strength, is the body which is necessary to secure the safety and the welfare of the Empire domain against its environment. There is no definite name for this domain to facilitate the easy passage of ideas from mind to mind in the consideration of the empire State. The domain is large and it has many provinces and parts. It is the *patria* or the "fatherland" of the Empire. The name *Britia*, being clear and short, would be sufficient to indicate the unity of this domain as against the environment of the world. The generic term *Britian* would include all provinces and parts, and it would be more significant of union and unity than the term "British," or "Britannic," which are specific terms. All subjects of the supremacy of the Empire domain could thus be described as *Britians* without, at all, lessening the sentiment of Dominion, or Provincial, or Regional, patriotism which is a source of great strength to the Empire. The landed classes, with domain interests, are, and have always been, the more substantial and the more reliable classes in the support of the State and of its magistracy. These classes, with virility, generosity and a due regard for the principles of political propriety, are the extreme counterpart of the multitudes, with selfishness, with greed and with the creeds of political villainy. The Senate, with its extension, the Council of State of the Empire domain, supported by the substantial classes of the domain community, would form not only a strong bond of union within the domain, but they would have the power and the duty to keep a vigilant watch on the international environment.

The Senate of the Empire would have the Senatorial duties of supervision within the domain and, apart from matters of Judicature, it would be able to receive and to consider petitions on all matters and grievances, touching the welfare of the domain, its provinces and its population. In this most necessary work it could co-operate with all of the provincial Senates. The duality of the Control and the Executive has the excellent result that petitions to the Control

cannot be intercepted by the Executive, or by any agency under the Executive. There are many matters which have their private and their public side relational respectively to private utility and to public utility, and especially, in the system of economy which is more fit for consideration by a Senate than by the multitudes or by the servitor branch of the Legislature. The economic system of the empire State, in respect of the exchange of products, is in a condition which allows waste that is inconsistent with proper management in a well-ordered State.

Industry and livelihood, with justice and welfare, are associated in State economy, as a system, which cannot be neglected with impunity. On the public side of economy the domain and its environment, in this respect, are counterparts. In this system of economy the craze of "Free Trade," in the United Kingdom, was an evil of multitudinism which has been detrimental to the Empire. It is necessary to keep in view the value of industry, in the domain, as a means of livelihood for the industrial population of the domain, and as the economic basis of the State, in its relations with its environment. The differentiation of *Trade*, as the exchange of domain products within the domain, from *Foreign Commerce*, as the exchange of foreign products brought into the Empire domain, and, also, from *Britannic Commerce*, as the exchange of Britannic products exported from the Empire domain into foreign domains, is sufficient to secure a clear definition of the several things, ideas, and names. These various kinds of exchange can be associated with the red, white, and blue of the Empire Flag. The unity of the Flag is a bond of Empire unity. The Red, White, and Blue will, respectively, indicate, in this order, (1) *Foreign Commerce* as the import of foreign products, (2) *Trade* as the exchange of Empire products within the Empire domain, and (3) *Britannic Commerce*, as the export of products raised, grown, or wrought within the Empire domain, from this domain into foreign domains.

The regulation of Commerce rests on principles which affect the domain and its environment, and these principles control both private and public utility, as well as international wellbeing. International intercourse is not to be allowed to become licentious. The defence of industry, within Britain's Empire domain, is patriotic conduct in all of its subjects. The like conduct, in the subjects of foreign States, is equally rational, in this respect, in their patriotic duties to their several States. The defence and the promotion of *Trade*, within the Empire domain, is an internal and domestic affair for our empire State, and it does not concern any foreign State, or the environment, generally, except so far as the position is modified by *commercial* treaties.

There is nothing which is more repugnant to the unity, the strength, and the welfare of the State than for its provinces not to be united in the conduct of all *international* relations. The treaties would not be lessened, in their utility, if they were made to regard two standards, with the support of the Council of State. Empire interests and the several provincial interests would be protected or defended more effectively by the united strength of the empire State than by the divided provinces. Empire economy is a part of Empire defence. The duty of patriotism, in defence, and the duty of goodfellowship, in welfare, as between the provinces and their communities, are duties which are relative and a source of strength to the State.

The Senate of the Empire, apart from defence by armaments and by economic provisions, would have a duty to secure the Empire against the environment and against all international entanglements. The Senate of the United States has a committee for the consideration of foreign relations. This committee has done good work for its domain in safeguarding the State against the new international body, the League of Nations. This body came into existence under sinister circumstances. It is not free from fanatical associations. It is not a novelty, except on the largeness of its scale. Greece and Ionia, on a small scale, had similar leagues which were associated more with the Sanctuary than with the State. They were sources of intrigue and failures. The military leagues were more akin to the State. The League of Nations is not a confederacy of States which has a due regard for the proprieties in respect of a domain and its supremacy. The League of Nations ought not to be allowed to interfere in Britain's Empire domain. The Senate of the Empire is the best representative of the Empire domain and of its unity. It would be the main source of strength, within its domain, and against its environment.

Empire patriotism, which rests on the landed classes of the domain, will be a better safeguard, as the support of the Senate of the Empire, than any reliance on the League of Nations, which rests on internationalism and is more representative of the environment than of the domain. The foundation of the Senate of the Empire would be the old Court of Great Council, the primary form of the House of Peers, which, in the primary form, is not within the Parliament Act. The Court of Great Council could be invigorated from the landed classes, throughout the provinces of the domain. Small contributions from the landowners, with land revenues of £1,000 a year, £5,000 a year, and £10,000 a year, would be sufficient to set up an Exchequer for the Empire, in

support of its land power. The great shipping companies, in a maritime Empire, by small but relative contributions, might be willing to support its sea power. The Court of Great Council made contributions to the Crown, as the Senate of the realm, and this fact is one of the evidences that the assumed power of the House of Commons was usurped. The Senate of the Empire, to be strong and effective in the performance of its functions, needs to rely on the Empire, and not to be controlled, in any way, by the House of Commons.

The magisterial supremacy in the domain needs a strong foundation. The Supreme Senate, as the Headship of magistracy of the empire State, as the Over-State, needs, for its support and efficiency, a firm economic basis. The pretension of the House of Commons that it has the economic control involves two fallacies. It wrongly implies that the House of Commons, which is a servitor body, possesses the economic power which is one of the coefficients of the Supreme Control in the Headship of magistracy. In the realm, the Exchequer and the Treasury were, and are, accessories of the Crown, and they were not, and are not, the accessories of the House of Commons. The same pretension, also, wrongly implies that the House of Commons had an economic power, outside of the realm domain, to which its constituencies belong. The Throne and the House of Commons, in this excess of authority, had a share in the cause which brought about the secession of the Colonies, in America. It is true that the House of Commons, as a servitor body, shares in the Legislature, as the Court of Parliament, but this is only because it is accessory to the magisterial body, the peerage, which is the principal body, to which both the Crown and the Throne are accessories.

The Empire State, as the Over-State, therefore, needs for its wholesome and unfettered existence, in strength and in safety, that its Senate and its Council of State should be freed from any domination by the House of Commons. It follows clearly that the Senate of the Empire, for the efficient performance of its duties, should have the economic means requisite for its service and that the revenue of its Treasury should be derived from the Empire domain. The Senate, as the Control, and the Throne, as the Executive, will retain their relative positions in the Empire, as in the realm, and the Treasury will remain as the accessory of the Senate. An Empire Treasury is, therefore, requisite and, for the reasons mentioned, it ought not to be controlled, in any way, by the House of Commons. The Treasury must belong to the Empire State, to the Empire Senate, and to the Empire Great Council, as the foundation of the Senate. The cost of the

maintenance of the Senate will be small relatively to the revenues of the Empire domain. This cost will be small relatively to the great savings which can be effected by the prevention of waste. The contributions to the Empire Treasury from the regional parts of the domain would be very trivial in comparison with the value in strength, safety, and welfare, which would result to the Empire from the efficient supervision and control by the Empire Senate.

Contributions were, originally, made to the realm Treasury by the shires, as regional parts. The principle of provincial contributions was maintained in the Roman Empire. The same principle was traceable in the Persian Empire and in the Phœnician colonial system, as well as elsewhere. In the Over-State of the United States the dual system of contribution prevails for both the federal States and the Over-State. The League of Nations, as a new political body, rests on an economic basis of contributions. Britain's Empire State, and certain provincial parts of its domain, make separate contributions. The member States of the League conform to a rule to which Britain's Empire State, in respect of certain of its provinces, is an exception. In the event of the Empire remaining a member of the League of Nations it would be consistent with propriety for the Empire Treasury to make its contribution, for its entire domain, as in the case of any other State. It could be so arranged that its representatives, commissioned by the Senate of the Empire, should be in number and voting power in proportion to the size of its domain and population.

The Empire is a united State and it is not to be treated as a State with either a divided domain, or a divided supremacy, or a divided community, but a State, with an integral domain, united in every way, against its environment. The implied partition of any factor of the State, or the implied disunion of these factors, is an impropriety. This adverse implication has a sinister significance which the Senate of the Empire could resist and control. It is not proper for the League of Nations to have relations with the provinces of a State, apart from the supremacy relational to its domain. In Britain's Empire State the principle of international propriety ought to be strictly observed by the environment to accord with the State's sole supremacy in its own domain which is incidental to the State's existence. The issues need not now be considered, as to the cause of the exceptional treatment of Britain's Empire, by the League of Nations. It matters not whether the effect which has resulted was due to weakness in the domain, or to dominant power in the environment, or whether it was due to weakness in the control, within the Empire, or to

weakness in the Executive, or to dominant power in its Administration. It is enough that the Empire Senate, as the control, had it existed, would have been the proper power, with its Executive the Throne, to have acted on behalf of the State. In this respect, all States, for their defence and welfare, have duties to themselves, in maintaining their unity and strength, against sinister influences in their environment.

The disintegration of Britain's Empire State is part of an old policy which emanated from the environment. It has existed for several centuries. It began as a reaction to the great victory won by the State to possess the sole supremacy in its own domain. The political independence of the State from the pretension of a part-supremacy, or jurisdiction in it, by a foreign Sanctuary, in its environment, was vindicated and maintained, with the result mentioned, as a legacy from the past. The ambition of the foreign Sanctuary is, by patience, perseverance and tenacity, to attain a domination, by any means possible. Latent hostility, with apparent amity, coupled with international political intrigues, ought not to be neglected, nor underestimated, as a mischief. A nuisance may be created to cause loss, or annoyance, to a State, to enable a gain of some kind to be made by the author of the nuisance, for abating the evil. The gain made to the abater, by the yielding State, may be small, in itself, but, as a part, in a cause, it may greatly increase the general effect. The insidious means to attain the desired end may have alternative results which would be equal.

To disintegrate Britain's Empire domain, or to sow discord within it, by poisonous tenets, or to make mischief between the Empire domain and the domain of the United States, would produce equal results, as an end. It is realised, in the world's environment of Britain's Empire domain, that the Empire State, with the United States and with the Japanese State, have such an accumulation of Land power and Sea power, when united, as would enable them, in their own defence, to maintain the peace against their environment, which is the rest of the world. These States, as a confederacy of States, have duties of mutual fidelity in their common support. The United States, in respect of the League of Nations, have taken up a position which accords with political propriety. The League of Nations ought not to have been allowed to interfere in domains which are subject to their own State supremacies and are not subject to any other earthly superior. The position of the League of Nations tends to be assimilated with that of a foreign Sanctuary, in the State's environment, with the pretence of a part-supremacy in that State's

domain. This tendency of the League of Nations, unless it be restrained, will allow it to interfere in State domains and to set up a world State, on a basis which differs from that of the State, and be akin to Sanctuary enthrallment.

The Over-State of the United States, by its Senate, has refused to enter the League of Nations, and the Senate of Britain's Empire domain, as an Over-State, would be a body which could be trusted to act discreetly in the Empire's relations with the League of Nations. This League might be modified to make it a source of utility and to prevent it from being a source of licentiousness. It ought to be excluded from the possession of any domain power at all. The regions taken from the German Empire domain ought to accede to the domains of the several States which hold them. These regions were won by the victorious States and they should be incorporated in their domains and be free from interference by any other State, or by the League of Nations. In Britain's Empire domain the co-operation of certain great provinces with the capital province, at an international conference, was for the domestic convenience of the Empire, as a *modus vivendi* which was creditable to the patriotism of the Empire community, to maintain the unity of the Empire's land power and sea power, as against its foes in the environment. This *modus vivendi* did not effect any change of status within the Empire domain, as between the Crown with the supremacy and these particular provinces. The policy of disintegration has not been pursued by the League of Nations against any other State than Britain's Empire State.

The policy of tenure from the League of Nations, in respect of certain regions, has been pursued against other States. It is a policy which has no good purpose to serve. If a State is to be entrusted with the care of its own domain it can be entrusted with the care of the new and accessory regions to the exclusion of the League of Nations. The League of Nations, apart from any domain power, may have a scope of utility in assisting States to lessen those mischiefs which are in part international and in part domestic and national in the sense of being within a State's domain. The origin and the nature, as well as the destiny, of the State, as a true State, are to be kept in view. Its ancient foes remain as its modern foes. The Sanctuary, the despot, and the multitude, have to be controlled. Malignant priests, with benign aspects, and misguided multitudes, with benevolent aims, have been causes of international mischiefs as well as of mischiefs within State domains. This fact can be illustrated, in Europe, in the case of States which were once within the domain of the Holy

Roman Empire and, also, in States with domains contiguous to that Empire's domain. In this contest the career of Britain has been successful in spite of the fact that it has been chequered for more than 1500 years with many evils from this source.

There are kindred international mischiefs caused by the permeation of domains from the environments by foreign races with peculiar aptitudes and inclinations. This fact can be illustrated by the presence of Jewish groups with financial aptitudes and Sanctuary inclinations which connect the international relations of the environment with the domestic relations of the domain. In the Eastern parts of the Empire domain other races with various aptitudes and inclinations exist and, with their variant creeds and customs, in this respect, connect the domain with its environment. In the Western parts of the Empire domain native Celtic races with various aptitudes and inclinations remain, as in Ireland, in touch with Irish racial groups settled in the domain of the United States. The Irish race, with many excellent qualities, is naturally gifted in several ways. Its peasantry and certain classes have become enthralled by the tenets of a foreign Sanctuary and, with evil consequences, which include a political blight. Views, impressed in childhood, on a talented race, have produced warped mentalities. This race, under State protection, could have developed, in a wholesome atmosphere, with unfettered minds, to excel like other Celts who have thriven under fair conditions.

The moulding influence of the Sanctuary atmosphere can deform what the moulding influence of the purer political atmosphere would have developed. The instance of Sir Thomas More, a brilliant and an estimable person, indicated how his mind had been warped so that he could not appreciate the nature of the State and its supremacy. The Irish peasantry are to be pitied. The State is to be blamed for allowing it to be debased and enthralled. One of the evil effects has made the Irish of this type a source of mischief between two domains, as between the Empire and the United States. The Empire has been hurt in its province of Ireland by evils which emanated from the environment, on one side, with mischief in the domain, and with a connected evil which entered the environment, on the other side. The friendly co-operation of States affected by these and other like mischiefs would extirpate these evils. The League of Nations, within the scope of international utility, could assist a group of States, acting in concert, to defeat Sanctuary ambitions to domineer in States, and to prevent their populations from being debased. Ignorance and depravity are evils which ought to be lessened and not aggravated and increased.

The border lands of the State and its environment, when searched, often disclose mischiefs, with their causes, on one side, and their effects, on the other side. The mutual duties of States are adverse to mischief-makers who are the common foes of all States. The worst foes of the State are those who exercise a poisonous influence on the multitudes and the more ignorant and helpless parts of these multitudes. The State has the alternative to control its multitude, or to be controlled by it. The democracy, as an organic form of the multitude, is an ugly monster, and it may be very destructive, but, if it is well controlled, it can be saved from itself and be rendered harmless to the State and the rest of its community. The Senate is the best counterpoise to the multitude which has behind it the record of its evil career in causing the decline and the downfall of States. In Britain's Empire State the evils of multitudinism have crept into the servitor branch of the Legislature and have had disastrous effects on the management of the State. It has illustrated the wreckage and the waste which result from political incompetence.

The State has the alternative to control the House of Commons or to be controlled by it. The Empire State has a duty to itself to secure its community in its defence and in its welfare. The Supreme Senate, resting on its firm foundation of the domain magistracy, could do, what it is now beyond the power of the Throne to do, to control the Administration. The Cabinet rests on the quicksands of parties in the House of Commons which, in turn, rests on the debased electorates of the unstable multitudes of the realm, so that it is powerless to serve effectively the Empire State, in its greatest needs. Cabinets and ministers, on the false basis of the House of Commons, have precarious tenures which are inconsistent with the true basis of magistracy and, also, with the duties of vigilance, thoroughness, and firmness characteristic of the Senate in the management of a great Empire. The qualities of statesmen and of parliamentarians are incongruous. The domination of the House of Commons is, also, inconsistent with the welfare of the Empire State. The House of Commons is in greater need of reform than any other part of the Constitution. If its members could be lessened to about the half of their number and be raised in quality, by three degrees, to the standard of its excellence when it was in its prime, the main difficulties of the Empire State would vanish. The cause of weakness and peril in the domain would cease and, the quicksands of multitudinism being left for the rock basis of magistracy, strength and safety would prevail against the environment.

The restoration of the Supreme Senate is the most urgent need

of the Empire. It would allow the Court of Parliament to be reformed and, in it, the House of Commons which, for more than fifty years, has been subject to the debasing influence of unscrupulous politicians infatuated with the craze of mob-sway, or democracy. The Senate, in its excellence, could be as efficient in the Empire State as the ancient Senate was in the realm State. The ancient body, under the name of "the Crown," as the feudal Areopagus, is still held in traditional reverence. The new body could become second to none in the world and, also, be a model for other States. The boon to the world would excel anything which the League of Nations could supply. The Constitution, restored in structure and in principle, to rest on the Empire domain, in its utility, simplicity and strength, would give stability to the Empire State as well as to its environment.

In the Empire State the Cabinet would be controlled. Political adventurers would cease to domineer in the State and would look in vain to parties in the House of Commons and in the multitudes, for support. The recent mischiefs, such as the Parliament Act and the reversals of policy in Ireland, in Egypt, and in India, would not be added to but be rectified. The miscreants would be disqualified from being sources of future mischiefs. The compatriots of the Empire domain, and especially the more public-spirited ones, might be aroused to survey the position and, after due consideration, to conclude whether, in matters of political competency, expert statesmen, or political adventurers, ought to be entrusted with the management of the State. The multitude is to be pitied and its welfare should be secured, but it should be made to keep its violent hands from the State. The statesmen of the Empire will always have enough to do in guarding the State against its environment. The compatriots of the Empire can all help the State against its worst foes, the foes within it.

The result of the General Election, in October, 1924, may enable all of the provinces of the domain to unite in systematic co-operation to secure their common safety and welfare. The Parliament Act ought to be repealed. There is need to be on guard against the Byzantine theory that the peerage is accessory to the Throne and, also, against the Democratic theory that the Control belongs to the House of Commons. The peers as *paires patriæ* (or magistrates of the domain) can meet, as the Great Council, and appoint a Domain Committee, with the King, as President. This Committee, by a Precept to the Executive, could offer the services of some of the peers to all provinces of the domain in the protection of their interests. The regional Senates, or select electoral bodies, could be the electors of these peerage agents until a better means can

be provided. This course would be an act of duty and of patriotic generosity in the peerage in the execution of its trust and it would, at once, and without expense, unite the Empire State in the process of setting up a Supreme Senate, as the Control. The Lords of the Council could then be restored and the Headship of the Empire State would be strengthened. The Byzantine theory, in Germany, and the Democratic theory, in Britain, were sources of weakness, in each domain, and they were factors in the outburst of the Great War. The feudal theory, in the Empire State, would allow the Constitution to be restored in principle, in form, and in balance, as a means to strengthen the State, in its purpose of defence and welfare. The aim of Empire patriots should be to think and act "*pro patriâ totâ Britannicâ nostrâ*," or "to think imperially." The expanded domain has no name. The term "*Britia*" has been suggested.

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